State Tax Commission of Missouri
| GEORGIA ELLEN HAMMONS, | ) | |
| ) | ||
| Complainant(s), | ) | |
| ) | ||
| v. | ) | Appeal # 14-10640 |
| ) | ||
| JAKE ZIMMERMAN, ASSESSOR | ) | |
| ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, | ) | |
| ) | ||
| Respondent. | ) |
ORDER AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION
On April 3, 2015, Senior Hearing Officer John Treu issued his order affirming the value placed upon the subject property by the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, finding that Complainant failed to present any evidence demonstrating market value. Complainant appealed.
Standard Upon Review
A party subject to a Decision and Order of a Hearing Officer with the State Tax Commission may file an application requesting the case be reviewed by the Commission. The Commission may then summarily allow or deny their request. The Commission may affirm, modify, reverse or set aside the decision. The Commission may take any additional evidence and conduct further hearings.
Complainant’s Appeal Brief
Complainant filed a rambling nonsensical 20 page brief with an equally nonsensical 21 page attachment.
DISCUSSION AND RULING
The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).
The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of witnesses and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of witnesses who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).
Complainant has failed to state any facts which tend to demonstrate that the decision of the Hearing Officer was erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to Missouri law.
ORDER
The Decision and Order of the Hearing Officer, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law therein, is AFFIRMED and incorporated by reference, as if set out in full, in this final decision of the Commission.
Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Order.
If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts unless disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031.8, RSMo.
If no judicial review is made within thirty days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.
SO ORDERED this 25th day of August, 2015.
STATE TAX COMMISSION
Bruce E. Davis, Chairman
Randy Holman, Commissioner
Victor Callahan, Commissioner
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been sent electronically or mailed postage prepaid this 25th day of August, 2015. The individuals notified are as follows:
Georgia Hammons, 14227 Kinderhook Dr, Chesterfeild, MO 63017-2921, Complainant
Paula Lemerman and Priscilla Gunn, Associate County Counsel, Attorney for Respondent, PLemerman@stlouisco.com;
Jake Zimmerman, Assessor, syoutzy@stlouisco.com
Mark Devore, Collector, collector@stlouisco.com
Jacklyn Wood
Legal Coordinator
State Tax Commission of Missouri
| GEORGIA ELLEN HAMMONS, | ) | |
| ) | ||
| Complainant | ) | |
| ) | ||
| v. | ) | Appeal No. 14-10640 |
| ) | ||
| JAKE ZIMMERMAN, ASSESSOR | ) | |
| ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,Respondent | ) |
DECISION AND ORDER
HOLDING
Decision of the County Board of Equalization of St. Louis County affirming the assessment made by the Assessor is AFFIRMED. Complainant did not present substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board of Equalization. True value in money for the subject property for tax year 2014 is set at $328,600, residential assessed value of $62,434. Complainant asserts the subject property is worth $0.00.
Complainant appeared pro se.
Respondent appeared by attorney Priscilla Gunn.
Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer John Treu.
ISSUE
Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation, discrimination, exemption and misclassification, the decision of the St Louis County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2013. The value as of January 1 of the odd numbered year remains the value as of January 1 of the following even numbered year unless there is new construction and improvement to the property. Section 137.115.1 RSMo.
Complainant was allowed to submit legal arguments. Complainant submitted various definitions, statutory references and legal principles which Complainant did not correlate to the particular facts of this appeal. Complainant also sent what was essentially a letter, received by the State Tax Commission on March 17, 2015, which ended with “Complainant has experience and understand that the right mind under the influence of psychological drugs may easily go on a killing intent to get even; mind having no intent to accept the pain thereof; profitable psychological prejudge belief right shall end immediately; society brings forth its own required end.”
The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
- Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.
- Evidentiary Hearing. The Evidentiary Hearing was held on 3/11/2015 at the St. Louis County Administration Building, Clayton, Missouri.
- Identification of Subject Property. The subject property is identified by map parcel number or locator number 18R640363. It is further identified as 14227 Kinderhook Dr., Chesterfield, St. Louis County, Missouri. (Complainant’s Complaint for Review, Ex. 1)
- Description of Subject Property. The subject property consists of a 22,750 square foot lot improved by a one-story brick, with minimal vinyl, ranch style, single-family residence, built in 1978. The gross living area is 2,428 square feet and the house has a full basement. There is a three car garage. The residence has seven rooms, with three bedrooms, two full and one half bathrooms. At the time of the 2010 appeal, the structure was considered to be in good condition and the quality of materials and workmanship was considered average, consistent with surrounding properties. (Decision and Order 10-10030).
- Assessment. The Assessor valued the property at $328,600, an assessed residential value of $62,434. The Board of Equalization sustained the appraiser’s valuation of the subject property. In 2009 the subject property was valued at $347,900 by Respondent, supported by an appraisal of $355,000. (Ex. 1 and Ex. C)
- Complainant’s Evidence. Complainant offered into evidence Exhibits A through D. Exhibit A consisted of an affidavit of an affidavit of Complainant. Exhibit B consisted of maps of Canaan. Exhibit C consisted of Respondent’s appraiser’s direct testimony in Appeal #10-10030 and Respondent’s appraisal in Appeal #10-10030. Exhibit D consisted of various writings on a CD. Exhibits A through D were received into evidence without objection and were given whatever weight and relevance as the Hearing Officer deemed appropriate.
- No Evidence of New Construction & Improvement. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2013, to January 1, 2014; therefore the assessed value for 2013 remains the assessed value for 2014. Section 137.115.1, RSMo.
- Respondent’s Evidence. Respondent offered into evidence Exhibits 1 through 4 Exhibit 1 consisted of a Notice of Decision. Exhibit 2 consisted of documents and photographs related to Appeal #10-10030, including proposed exhibits in such appeal. Certain of such exhibits in Appeal #10-10030 were designated at AA-AK and BA-BI. Such exhibits were excluded in Appeal #10-10030. Exhibit 3 consisted of the qualifications of Sharon Kuelker. Exhibit 4 consisted of a 12/10/14 Letter. Complainant objected to all evidence based upon the best evidence rule, because the Evidentiary Hearing was not held at her house and because St. Louis County did not personally come out to her house and look at such, regarding this appeal. Complainant’s best evidence rule objection is discussed below. Exhibit A was specifically objected to on the grounds it was fraudulent and Complainant contends the house is unsellable. Exhibit 3 was specifically objected based upon the best evidence rule. All objections were overruled and each exhibit was received into the evidentiary record.
- Presumption of Correct Assessment Not Rebutted. Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2013, to be $0, as proposed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION
Official and Judicial Notice
Agencies shall take official notice of all matters of which the courts take judicial notice. Section 536.070(6), RSMo. Courts will take judicial notice of their own records in the same cases. State ex rel. Horton v. Bourke, 129 S.W.2d 866, 869 (1939); Barth v. Kansas City Elevated Railway Company, 44 S.W. 788, 781 (1898). In addition, courts may take judicial notice of records in earlier cases when justice requires or when it is necessary for a full understanding of the instant appeal. Burton v. Moulder, 245 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo. 1952); Knorp v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943); Bushman v. Barlow, 15 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Mo. banc 1929); State ex rel St. Louis Public Service Company v. Public Service Commission, 291 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Mo. banc 1956). Courts may take judicial notice of their own records in prior proceedings involving the same parties and basically the same facts. In re Murphy, 732 S.W.2d 895, 902 (Mo. banc 1987); State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Mo. banc 1984); State v. Keeble, 399 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Mo. 1966).
In the present appeal, the Hearing Officer takes official notice of Appeal #10-10030 involving the same subject property and parties. The Hearing Officer affirmed the valuation of the assessor in such appeal. The appeal was ultimately taken to the St. Louis County Circuit Court, the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District and the Missouri Supreme Court without success by Complainant. The issues of such appeal and the Decision made in such appeal will not be re-litigated, but are given official notice to allow a more thorough understanding of the background surrounding the present appeal and to better allow a proper decision herein.
Best Evidence Rule
Complainant moved to exclude all evidence by Respondent based upon the best evidence rule because the Evidentiary Hearing was not held at her house and because St. Louis County did not personally come out to her house and look at such, regarding this appeal. “The best evidence rule states the law’s preference for producing a writing or recording when its terms or contents are at issue”. State v. Hill, 918 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Mo.App. E.D.1996). If the contents of a writing or recording are not directly in issue, even though the evidence contained in the writing may bear upon a fundamental issue in the case, the best evidence rule does not apply and secondary evidence may be used without accounting for the original document. State v. Fleer, 851 S.W.2d 582, 592 (Mo.App. E.D.1993).” State v. Hedges, 193 S.W.3d 784 (Mo. App. 2006). The best evidence rule has no bearing on the fact that the Evidentiary Hearing was not held at Complainant’s house. Also, Respondent was under no obligation to go to Complainant’s house to inspect such; although evidence was presented that the County attempted to arrange coming out to Complainant’s house, albeit its attempts were unsuccessful. The best evidence rule also has no bearing on this issue.
Jurisdiction
The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. The Hearing Officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Article X, Section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, 138.431.4, RSMo.
Basis of Assessment
The Constitution mandates that real property and tangible personal property be assessed at its value or such percentage of its value as may be fixed by law for each class and for each subclass. Article X, Sections 4(a) and 4(b), Mo. Const. of 1945. The constitutional mandate is to find the true value in money for the property under appeal. By statute real and tangible personal property are assessed at set percentages of true value in money. Section 137.115.5, RSMo – residential property at 19% of true value in money; commercial property at 32% of true value in money and agricultural property at 12% of true value in money.
Presumption In Appeal
There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958). This presumption is a rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption. It places the burden of going forward with some substantial evidence on the taxpayer – Complainant. The presumption is not evidence of value. The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property. Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).
Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse, supra. Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).
Complainants’ Burden of Proof
In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2013. Hermel, supra. There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof. The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief. Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.” See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003); Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991). A valuation which does not reflect the fair market value (true value in money) of the property under appeal is an unlawful, unfair and improper assessment.
Owner’s Opinion of Value
The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner’s opinion is without probative value; however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).
“Where the basis for a test as to the reliability of the testimony is not supported by a statement of facts on which it is based, or the basis of fact does not appear to be sufficient, the testimony should be rejected.” Carmel Energy at 783. A taxpayer does not meet his burden if evidence on any essential element of his case leaves the Commission “in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise.” See, Rossman v. G.G.C. Corp. of Missouri, 596 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Mo. App. 1980).
In the present appeal, Complainant has left the Commission “in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise.” Id. Although Complainant testified about certain termite damage, water damage and her assertion that the house is not properly affixed to the foundation, Complainant did not present even a scintilla of evidence as to what the effect of such would have on the value of the subject property, as of January 1, 2013, in the open market. Thus, the Commission would have to resort to speculation, conjecture and surmise to determine an appropriate valuation. Such would not be proper. The obligation and burden to prove the appropriate market value lies squarely and solely upon the shoulders of Complainant. Complainant did not meet her burden of proof.
Further complicating matter, many of Complainant’s writings/submission/exhibits are difficult to decipher, in that they contain random streams of thought, intertwined with a plethora of definitions and religious commentary, expressed predominately in a form which lacks coherent purpose or phrasing. The foregoing is interlaced with legal references with an occasional clarity of the written word. The following is one small example, all constituting one sentence. A small font size is utilized by the Hearing Officer herein to preserve space:
“The Chesterfield police department first […]during the herein Circuit Court appeal procedural step; acting upon the initial psychological goal at the beginning of the herein State Tax Commission of Missouri appeal—pursuant to the Biblical created and established historical forbidden tree of knowledge of good and evil of the lord’s monetary belief covenant who did not repent on the cross thereof for the establishment of the single sole monetary equality tree of life; the very birth and death of Jesus was pursuant to the enticing “Devil’s Apple” thereof; originally established under a secretive psychological united but divided governmental and religious monetary futuristic belief right; under an agreement to create a futuristic monetary obligation to pay a tithe/tax to the intended supreme being thereof; pursuant to the original general secretive but known governmental created animated corporate lambs psychologically yoked-bounded to the governmental law thereof; but also united by the psychological yoke-bound to an obligation to repay those not an actual free will party to the secretive covered-up agreement thereof; pursuant to the shedding of inheritable covenant’s innocence blood to distinguish the establishment of the intended created monetary equality tree of life thereof, thus, Jesus’ oath qualified to establish the monetary equality covenant by rising to the earthly heavenly monetary equality giving father’s position with untouched hand for the uniting thereof to Abram’s tithed judge of the tribe of Dan way thereof; returned to reveal the legal establishment of the united monetary equality funnel hands to its to be receiving feet hollow earthly heaven, and then Jesus re-rose to assume the established earthly heavenly Supreme Judgeship thereof; under the united governmental voiced-worded acceptance of the repented belief voiced-word pursuant thereto; establishing earth’s heavenly monetary equality right-of-way for a united established governmental animated roe bounded to a futuristic help meet struggle for rightful arched over goodly words to reward Jesus, the establisher of the intellectual legal monetary equality tree of life, for his patience for a prayerful understanding of his earthly required presentation of the intertwined hand-in-hand mentally consumed and digested obligatory monetary equality right that shall be accomplished for a futuristic nation of true united free “People” v. legally created people of, by, and for the current intended chosen few understanding knowledgeable people thereof; pursuant to the unyoking-unbinding of the intertwined psychological acceptance of an earthly good monetary lifestyle pursuant to a monetary lifestyle from evil, within a created knowledgeable nation of established constitutional monetary creation authority, because, willfully lazy, allowed to be cover-over and concealed under a psychological prejudice futuristic belief in a afterlife good heaven and evil hell before the facts are known—what will be will be; it is not ours to know; and that is the way it is to be.”
Board Presumption
There exists a presumption of correct assessment by the Board of Equalization. The Assessor’s original value in this appeal was determined by the Board to be correct. Accordingly, the taxpayer must rebut that presumption in order to prevail. The taxpayer must establish by substantial and persuasive evidence that the value concluded by the Board is in error and what the correct value should be. The burden, of course, is discharged by simply establishing the fair market value of the property as of the valuation date, since once fair market value is established it, a fortiori (with stronger reason), proves that the Board’s value was in error. The computer-assisted presumption plays no role in this process.
Computer-Assisted Presumption
The computer assisted presumption can only come into play in those instances where the Respondent is seeking to have the Assessor’s original valuation affirmed. If the Board of Equalization sustained the valuation of the Assessor, such does not negate the fact that the Board presumption remains operative as to evidence which is presented by the taxpayer and Respondent. The computer-assisted presumption only comes into play if the Board of Equalization lowered the value of the Assessor and Respondent is seeking to sustain the original assessment and it has not been shown that the Assessor’s valuation was not the result of a computer assisted method. The Board valuation is assumed to be an independent valuation.
Standard for Valuation
Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use. Daly v. P. D. George Company, et al, 77 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App E.D. 2002), citing, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. STC, 852 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo. App. 1993); citing, Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S.W.2d 798, 801-803 (Mo. 1973).
It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, supra.
Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.
Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
- Buyer and seller are typically motivated.
- Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.
- A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.
- Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.
- Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.
- The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction. Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.
Hearsay
Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition (1999), p. 726, defines hearsay as follows: “Traditionally, testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what he or she knows personally, but what others have said, and that is therefore dependent upon the credibility of someone other than the witness. Such testimony is generally inadmissible under the rules of evidence.” McCormick on Evidence, Third Edition, (1984), p. 729, defines the term as; “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” The Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence Missouri Practice, William A. Schroeder – 2012, Principle 800.c, p. 504,
follows the definition given by the Federal Rules and cited by McCormick. The out of court statement can take the form of either oral or written assertions. Therefore, documents which make assertions of facts are hearsay, just as well, as the speech of another person.
The hearsay rule provides that “no assertion offered as testimony can be received unless it is or has been open to test by cross-examination or an opportunity for cross-examination, except as otherwise provide by the rules of evidence, by court rules or by statute.” Black’s, supra – hearsay rule, p. 726. The rationale behind the rule is quite simply that out of court hearsay statements are not made under oath and cannot be subject to cross-examination. Accordingly, when various documents, such as but not limited to, Internet, newspaper and magazine articles are offered as exhibits in a hearing before the Commission, unless the document falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, upon objection such must be excluded.
Relevance
The principle of relevance is the second critical evidentiary factor that must be considered when testimony and documents are tendered for admission into an evidentiary record. For facts, information or opinions to be relevant they must be connected in a logical manner and tend to prove or disprove a matter that is at issue in the proceeding. Black’s, supra – relevant, p. 1293. McCormick explains that “There are two components to relevant evidence: materiality and probative value. Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues of the case. If the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial. . . . The second aspect of relevance is probative value, the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.” McCormick, supra – p. 541. Evidence, that tends to prove or disprove a fact that is at issue or of consequence, is relevant. Missouri Practice, supra – p. 95.
In appeals on the value of property, the issue is what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as the purchase price on the applicable valuation date. The issue is not what real estate price trends in general may have been or any given period of time. The issue is specific to the property that is under appeal. Therefore, general statements, claims, conclusions and opinions as to what the “market for homes” has or hasn’t done do not meet the factors of materiality and probative value and are accordingly irrelevant. The fact that some report provides general information on home values is addressing a matter that is not at issue in an appeal. Such information is not material. Furthermore, such general data does not tend to prove what the property under appeal was worth on the given valuation date. For example, a report that home prices in the nation, region or certain metropolitan area over a four or five year period decreased by a certain average percentage provides no factual information as to the price or value of any given home. In other words, such information is not probative on the issue of value. It does nothing to prove that a given property is worth one amount or another.
Investigation by Hearing Officer
In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer may inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer’s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon his inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo. The Hearing Officer during the evidentiary hearing made inquiry of Complainant and Respondent’s appraiser.
Weight to be Given Evidence
The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
Methods of Valuation
Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission. It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case. See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra; Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975). Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).
Opinion Testimony by Experts
No expert testified regarding the true market value of the property at the Evidentiary Hearing.
Misclassification
Complainant asserts in her Complaint for Review that one of the grounds for her appeal is misclassification. In Missouri, property is classified as residential, agricultural or commercial/all other. In order to qualify for an agricultural classification, property must actually be used for agricultural purposes. Section 137.016, RSMo. There was absolutely no dispute in this appeal at the evidentiary hearing that Complainant recognized the property to be a residential property. Complainant put on no evidence to the contrary. Thus, Complainant did not prove misclassification.
Discrimination
Complainant also list discrimination as a ground for appeal. In order to obtain a reduction in assessed value based upon discrimination, the Complainants must (1) prove the true value in money of their property on January 1, 2013; and (2) show an intentional plan of discrimination by the assessing officials resulting in an assessment of that property at a greater percentage of value than other property, generally, within the same class within the same taxing jurisdiction. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 690, 695 (Mo. 1959). Evidence of value and assessments of a few properties does not prove discrimination. Substantial evidence must show that all other property in the same class, generally, is actually undervalued. State ex rel. Plantz v. State Tax Commission, 384 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. 1964). The difference in the assessment ratio of the subject property the average assessment ratio in the subject county must be shown to be grossly excessive. Savage v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 722 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Mo. banc 1986). No other methodology is sufficient to establish discrimination. Cupples-Hesse, supra.
Where there is a claim of discrimination based upon a lack of valuation consistency, Complainants have the burden to prove the level of assessment for the subject property in 2013. This is done by independently determining the market value of the subject property and dividing the market value into the assessed value of the property as determined by the assessor’s office.
Complainant must then prove the average level of assessment for residential property in St. Louis County for 2013. This is done by (a) independently determining the market value of a representative sample of residential properties in St. Louis County; (b) determining the assessed value placed on the property by the assessor’s office for the relevant year; (c) dividing the assessed value by the market value to determine the level of assessment for each property in the sample; and (d) determining the mean and median of the results. The difference between the actual assessment level of the subject property and the average level of assessment for all residential property, taken from a sufficient representative sample in St. Louis County must demonstrate a disparity that is grossly excessive. Savage, supra.
Complainant’s discrimination claim fails first because she failed to establish the market value of her property. Without establishing their market value, they cannot establish their assessment ratio. Complainant also did not establish the ration. Without establishing a ratio, she cannot establish that she is being assessed at a higher percentage of market value that any other property.
However, even if Complainant had established their market value, her discrimination claim would still fail because they have not demonstrated that a statistically significant number of other residential properties within St. Louis County are being assessed at a lower ratio of market value than their property. Complainant put on absolutely no evidence of discrimination. Thus, Complainant did not prove discrimination.
Statutory Exemptions
Complainant also asserted as one of the grounds for her appeal as exemption. Properties which can be exempted from taxation are set out within our Constitution and the statutes enacted to enforce that Constitution, to wit:
“. . .all property, real and personal, not held for private or corporate profit and used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, for purposes purely charitable, . . .may be exempt from taxation by general law but any such law may provide for approximate restitution to the respective political subdivisions of revenues lost by reason of the exemption. All laws exempting from taxation property other than the property enumerated in this article, shall be void. Article X, Section 6, Mo. Const. of 1945.
In support of this Constitutional provision, the Legislature has enacted Section 137.110, RSMo, which provides in relevant part:
The following property shall be exempt from taxation:
(5) All property, real and personal, actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, or for purposes purely charitable and not held for private or corporate profit, except that the exemption herein granted does not include real property not actually used or occupied for the purpose of the organization but held or used as investment even though the income or rentals received therefrom is used wholly for religious, education or charitable purposes; Section 137.110, RSMo 1994.
Complainant put on absolutely no evidence of exemption. Thus, Complainant did not prove exemption.
Complaint Fails to Prove Value
Complainant failed to present substantial and persuasive evidence to establish a fair market value as of January 1, 2013. Consequently, the St. Louis County Board of Equalization True Market Value of $328,600 was not rebutted as to the subject property.
ORDER
The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.
The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2014 is set at $62,434.
Application for Review
A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Decision. The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.
Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the application for review is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo
Disputed Taxes
The Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.
Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.
SO ORDERED this 3rd day of April, 2015.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
John Treu
Senior Hearing Officer
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been sent electronically or mailed postage prepaid this 3rd day of April, 2015. The individuals notified are as follows:
Georgia Hammons, 14227 Kinderhook Dr, Chesterfeild, MO 63017-2921, Complainant
Paula Lemerman and Priscilla Gunn, Associate County Counsel, Attorney for Respondent, PLemerman@stlouisco.com;
Jake Zimmerman, Assessor, syoutzy@stlouisco.com
Mark Devore, Collector, collector@stlouisco.com
Jacklyn Wood
Legal Coordinator
Contact Information for State Tax Commission:
Missouri State Tax Commission
301 W. High Street, Room 840
P.O. Box 146
Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146
573-751-2414