Nestle USA, Inc. v. Gogarty (SLCO)

November 29th, 2001

 

NESTLE USA, INC., )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeals Number 00-10006, 00-10007 & 00-10008

)

MAURICE M. GOGARTY, ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

 DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessments made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE, Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject properties for tax year 2000 to be as follows:

Appeal No. 00-10006 $1,091,855, assessed value of $363,952.

Appeal No. 00-10007 $1,460,802, assessed value of $486,934.

Appeal No. 00-10008 $3,185,830, assessed value of $1,061,943.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Thomas L. Caradonna, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUES

The Commission takes these appeals to determine the true value in money for the subject properties on January 1, 2000.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decisions of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization (Board) which sustained the valuation of the subject properties in each appeal. The Respondent determined an appraised value in Appeal 00-10006 of $3,388,200 (assessed value of $1,129,400, as personal property – furniture, machinery, tools, manufacturing and office equipment). The Respondent determined an appraised value in Appeal 00-10007 of $5,370,690 (assessed value of $1,790,230, as personal property – furniture, machinery, tools, manufacturing and office equipment). The Respondent determined an appraised value in Appeal 00-10008 of $7,144,050 (assessed value of $2,381,350, as personal property – furniture, machinery, tools, manufacturing and office equipment).

A hearing was conducted on July 25, 2001, at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant’s Evidence

Complainant offered into evidence in each appeal the appraisal report (Exhibit A) and written direct testimony (Exhibit B) of Allen D. Bealmear, ASA, CEA, President of MB Valuation Services. Exhibit C, a cost and sales comparison illustration of valuation referenced in the written direct testimony of Mr. Bealmear, was prefiled with Exhibit B. All exhibits were receive into evidence. Mr. Bealmear was cross-examined by Respondent’s Counsel, and that testimony, as well as testimony in response to questions by the Hearing Officer, in redirect examination and in rebuttal, constitute part of the record in this appeal.

Mr. Bealmer presented his opinion of value for the property under appeal in each case. His opinion of value for the individual cases were as follows: Appeal No. 00-10006, $2,999,940; Appeal No. 00-10007, $1,460,702; and Appeal No. 00-10008, $3,185,730.

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent offered into evidence the following exhibits in each appeal:

Exhibit 1 Appraisal Report, with Exhibits 1 through 5 attached, of Larry Davis, Revenue Field Auditor for St. Louis County, Missouri.

Exhibit 2 Written Direct Testimony of Mr. Davis.

Exhibit 3 Written Direct Testimony of Richard Haubrick, Revenue Field Auditor Supervisor for St. Louis County, Missouri.

Exhibit 4 The Construction in Progress document for each of the subject properties (Appeal 00-10006 – Exhibit 4A; Appeal 00-10007 – Exhibit 4B; and Appeal 00-10008 – Exhibit 4C).

All the exhibits were received into evidence. Mr. Davis was cross-examined by Complainant’s Counsel and his testimony under cross-examination, testimony in response to questions by the Hearing Officer and in redirect examination, constitute part of the record in this appeal.

Mr. Davis offered his opinion of value for the property under appeal in each case. His opinion of value for the individual cases were as follows: Appeal No. 00-10006, $2,999,940; Appeal No. 00-10007, $5,269,400; and Appeal No. 00-10008, $7,346,390.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Appeal 00-10006 – Affton West Location

1. The subject property in Appeal 00-10006 consists of approximately 585 individual items of furniture, office machines and equipment, machinery, tools and manufacturing equipment. The property is identified by the Respondent’s account number M0007934A for tax year 2000. The property is located at 8064 Chivvis Dr, St. Louis County, Missouri. The facility in which the items of personal property are located is known as the Affton West facility. These individual items of property make up and constitute the manufacturing operation of Complainant. A complete listing of the items of property under appeal is found in Exhibit A – 00-10006, pp. 18-48.

2. Complainant’s appraiser valued approximately 581 of the items of property relying on comparative sales data, and 4 of the items (Items 49, 50, 255 & 371 – Total appraised value of $103,500) relying on a discounted cost analysis or replacement cost new, less depreciation method. Exhibit A, pp. 10-11, pp. 18-48; Exhibit C.

Appeal 00-10007 – Affton South Location

3. The subject property in Appeal 00-10007 consists of approximately 5,146 individual items of furniture, office machines and equipment, machinery, tools and manufacturing equipment. The property is identified by the Respondent’s account number M0029160A for tax year 2000. The property is located at 8155 New Hampshire Ave., St. Louis County, Missouri. The facility in which the items of personal property are located is known as the Affton West South. These individual items of property make up and constitute the manufacturing operation of Complainant. A complete listing of the items of property under appeal is found in Exhibit A – 00-10007, pp. 18-71.

4. Complainant’s appraiser valued all of the items of property relying on comparative sales data. Exhibit A, pp. 10-11, pp. 18-71; Exhibit C.

Appeal 00-10008 – Affton North Location

5. The subject property in Appeal 00-10008 consists of approximately 1,043 individual items of furniture, office machines and equipment, machinery, tools and manufacturing equipment. The property is identified by the Respondent’s account number M0087349A for tax year 2000. The property is located at 8121 New Hampshire Ave., St. Louis County, Missouri. The facility in which the items of personal property are located is known as the Affton North facility. These individual items of property make up and constitute the manufacturing operation of Complainant. A complete listing of the items of property under appeal is found in Exhibit A – 00-10008, pp. 18-76.

6. Complainant’s appraiser valued approximately 1,007 of the items of property relying on comparative sales data, and 36 of the items (Items 238, 244, 245, 246, 247(2), 248, 249, 250, 255, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270(4), 271(4), 276, 277, 278, 280, 284, 285, 286, 288, 289, 291(2), 292(2) & 293 – Total appraised value of $598,450) relying on a discounted cost analysis or replacement cost new, less depreciation methodology. Exhibit A, pp. 10-11, pp. 18-76; Exhibit C.

Factors Applicable to Each Appeal

7. Complainant’s appraiser valued the items of property based on the concept of fair market value – the estimated amount expressed in terms of money that may reasonably be expected for an item of property between a willing buyer and a willing seller with equity to both, neither under compulsion to buy or sell and both fully aware of all relevant facts. Exhibit A, p. 3, 9. Exhibit B, p. 7, Line 12 – p. 8, Line 9. This is the appropriate concept of value to be applied in the valuation of the property.

8. Personal property is valued based upon its true value in money. True value in money is value in exchange, not value in use or value installed. Value in use/installed may be, in a given case, the value in exchange if there is market data to so establish. There was no such market data presented in this appeal from which it could be established that value in use/installed was value in exchange.

9. Complainant’s appraiser conducted a personal inspection of the items of property being valued and confirmed that all of the items valued were at the particular facilities as of January 1, 2000. Exhibit A, pp. 7-8; Exhibit B, p. 6, Line 25 – p. 7, Line 11; Tr. 25, Line 25 – Tr. 27, Line 4; Tr. 34, Lines 8-11.

10. Complainant’s appraiser performed his appraisal in conformity with the Principles of Appraisal Practice and Code of Ethics of the American Society of Appraisers, and in conformity with the applicable standards of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). Exhibit A, p. 4; Exhibit B, p. 22, Lines 10-15.

11. The concept of highest and best use was considered by the appraiser in his valuation of the subject property in accordance with Standard 7, Subsection 3(a) of USPAP. The subject items of furniture, machinery, tools and equipment were being utilized for the purpose designed by the manufacturer, and therefore were being utilized in the reasonably probable and legal use that is physically possible, appropriately supported and financially feasible, and resulted in the highest value in the appropriate marketplace. Exhibit A, pp. 4, 6 & 8; Exhibit B, p. 10, Line 13 – p. 11, Line 13. None of the items of machinery, tools and equipment have any special or unique characteristics which would require that they be valued as a unit or whole rather than individually. Exhibit B, p. 8, Lines 10-23.

12. The principle of substitution is that a prudent buyer will not pay more for a property than the cost of acquiring a substitute property of equivalent utility. The principle can be applied to either an individual asset or to an entire facility. The principle applies in either a cost, sales comparison or income approach. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, Machinery and Technical Specialities Committee of the American Society of Appraisers, 2000, pp. 45, 115; Appraising Machinery and Equipment, Machinery and Equipment Textbook Committee of the American Society of Appraisers, John Alico, Editor, 1989, p. 81; Exhibit 1, p. 7.

13. Complainant’s appraiser relied upon the MB Data Base in his appraisal. The MB Data Base is made up of a multitude of research data sources, including purchase price new from a manufacturer, dealers’ asking and selling prices, auction sales and any other type of transaction which can be gathered. This data base is a large data resource computer program which has sales information posted to it daily of all kinds of equipment from the various sources. The database has the condition of items of sale machinery and equipment when it is known. The database identifies the type of sale, equipment being sold, date of sale, location of sale, and auctioneer from sale brochures on the various auctions. Information from the database can be sorted by categories of equipment type and model. Each equipment category has data posted which can then be retrieved for use in appraising such individual items of machinery and equipment. The sources utilized in the MB Data Base are sources that the appraiser is familiar with and that he has found to be reliable over his years of appraisal practice. The sources used in the data base are sources that are generally accepted by the appraisal community as reliable. Other appraisers use the MB Data Base as a resource in performing their appraisals. Exhibit A, pp. 5 & 17, Exhibit B, p. 18, Line 14 – p. 21, Line 4; Tr. 33, Line 18 – Tr. 34, Line 7;

14. Complainant’s appraiser also utilized recognized pricing guides, sources and catalogues as research data sources. Contacts were made to manufacturers of various items of machinery and equipment being appraised. Exhibit A, p. 17.

Finding of Value in Each Appeal

15. Complainant’s evidence was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board in each appeal and to establish the true value in money of the subject property under appeal as of January 1, 2000, to be as follows:

Appeal 00-10006 $1,091,755

Appeal 00-10007 $1,460,702

Appeal 00-10008 $3,185,730

16. Respondent’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and to establish the true value in money of the subject property under appeal as of January 1, 2000, to be as proposed in any of the appeals.

17. The value of supplies reported by Complainant as $100, in each appeal, was not at issue.

19. The total true value in money of the subject furniture, machinery, tools, equipment, vehicles and supplies as of January 1, 2000, in Appeal 00-10006 was $1,091,855, assessed value of $363,952.

20. The total true value in money of the subject furniture, machinery, tools, equipment, vehicles and supplies as of January 1, 2000, in Appeal 00-10007 was $1,460,802, assessed value of $486,934.

21. The total true value in money of the subject furniture, machinery, tools, equipment, vehicles and supplies as of January 1, 2000, in Appeal 00-10008 was $3,185,830, assessed value of $1,061,943.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Board Presumption

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the Board. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo 1994, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978). True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use. Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S. W.2d 798, 801-802 (Mo. 1973); Equitable Life Assurance v. Morton, 852 S.W.2d 376 (380) (Mo. 1993).

Complainant’s Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2000. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Respondent’s Burden of Proof

In an appeal where Respondent presents an opinion of value different from that determined by the Board, substantial and persuasive evidence must be presented to rebut the Board presumption and establish the value proposed. Hermel, supra.

Weight to be Given Evidence

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

Trier of Fact

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as she may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

Opinion Testimony by Experts

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion of inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinion or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).

DECISION

Complainant Proved Value

Complainant’s evidence presented an opinion of value based on the concept of fair market value or value in exchange. This concept of value as employed by Complainant’s appraiser presents a methodology which is proper, fair, not arbitrary, not capricious and is lawful under Missouri statutes, Commission regulations and case law. This is the recognized standard under Missouri case law. Section 138.430, RSMo. A listing of recent cases following this standard can be found at the end of this decision (End Note – hereinafter cited as P. D. George et al).

Valuing what a knowledgeable buyer and seller would give in exchange for the individual items of property and totaling the values avoids conjecture and speculation. Complainant’s appraisal clearly demonstrated that there is reliable sales data available on virtually all of the subject items (6734 out of 6774 total items of property – 99.41%). The sales data establishes the prices at which the various individual items of property are selling in the market. From such data, a clear indication of the value for the various pieces of machinery, tools and equipment can be developed.

Mr. Bealmear’s opinion of value is based upon reliable and appropriate data. He correctly valued the property relying upon the value in exchange concept recognized under Missouri case law, statutes, Commission regulations and decisions. His appraisal methodology and resulting final opinion are based upon a reasonable degree of appraisal standards certainty. Therefore, Complainant has met its burden of proof to establish the true value in money for the subject property as proposed in each of these appeals. To each of the value amounts is added $100 for supplies (See, Finding of Fact 17, supra.), to arrive at the total true value in money for the property in each appeal.

Sales Data

The data relied upon by Mr. Bealmear demonstrates that the market for the hundreds of pieces of machinery, tools and equipment that comprise the subject property consists of all types of sales transactions, direct and indirect (direct sale – sale to ultimate end user; indirect sale – sale to used equipment dealer). The fact that some sales, or even a large number of the sales relied upon, are auction sales, either consignment, orderly liquidation or forced liquidation, does not render such sales invalid for developing an opinion of value. Such sales are not the same as forced sales for taxes or mortgage foreclosures in real property cases. The market world for items of machinery, tools and equipment consists of new equipment sales, recondition equipment sales, orderly liquidations, forced (bankruptcy) sales, excess equipment sales and auctions.

This diversity of types of transactions does not render use of data derived from such sales invalid or inappropriate. This market arena, with its mixed information base, is where real transactions occur each day. It is the responsibility of the appraiser when faced with an appraisal problem such as the present one, to explore and analyze this market arena to extract the most reliable data to utilize in his appraisal. It is the responsibility of the appraiser to make the appropriate upward or downward adjustments to such sales data to arrive at an opinion of value for the particular item of property being valued. Such adjustments are made in large part based on the experience which the individual appraiser is able to bring to bear in a given appraisal assignment. Complainant’s appraiser made appropriate adjustments for the various types of sales which were utilized in the appraisal relying upon his education, training and experience. Mr. Bealmear is a well trained and experienced appraiser having more than 28 years of experience in valuing machinery, tools and equipment. Furthermore, his firm is able to rely upon the vast experience of other appraisers (Karen Miles Milan, ASA, 15 years appraisal experience, H. W. Choate, ASA) and their education, training and experience, as well as a trained research staff which provides assistance in data collection and analysis. Exhibit A, pp. 72 & 74; Exhibit B, p. 19, Lines 6-15, 24 – p. 20, Line 16. The staff of MB Valuation Services monitors sales of machinery and equipment by on-site attendance at the sale. Questionnaires are filled out regarding information relating to the number of attendants, number of active bidders, type of bidders (end users or used equipment dealers), conduct of auctioneers, handling of the crowd, and the weather. These are all factors which could affect the results of the sale. The information for sales is entered into the databank in order that relevant factors can be considered when adjustments are made to comparables. Tr. 33, Line 1 – Tr. 34, Line 7.

If there is another market arena where sales of the multitude of individual items which comprise the subject property in this appeal sell together in an assembled manner, then it would, of course, be appropriate for the appraiser to explore, investigate and analyze the sales which occur in that market. It would, in fact, be his responsibility to do so in order to arrive at an appropriate opinion of value. However, there is no evidence in this record of such a market.

In the absence of such evidence, it would amount to pure speculation and conjecture for either the appraiser or this Hearing Officer to attempt to arrive at a valuation of the subject property under such a hypothetical market condition. Accordingly, the evidence of sales brought forward by Mr. Bealmear is substantial and persuasive evidence as to what the hundreds of items of machinery, tools and equipment which make up the subject property are selling for in the only market for which evidence was presented

The experience and record of the Commission in addressing valuation of machinery, tools and equipment in twenty separate appeals (P. D. George, et al, infra) has clearly shown, without any contradictory evidence, that the auction market is a major component of the arena in which used machinery, tools and equipment are bought and sold throughout the United States. Nothing was presented in the present appeal which demonstrates in any way, shape or form that there is another market arena, level of trade for used machinery and equipment, from which Mr. Bealmear should have drawn sales data. The data base which is utilized by Mr. Bealmear in addition to information received from transactions at auctions also includes used equipment dealer’s asking and selling prices.

Willing Seller/Willing Buyer and Machinery and Equipment Auctions

The definition of fair market value (true value in money – Section 137.115, RSMo) utilized by the experts for both parties in this appeal is the estimated amount expressed in terms of money that may reasonably be expected for an item of property between a willing buyer and a willing seller with equity to both, neither under compulsion to buy or sell and both fully aware of all relevant facts. In other words, in attempting to value a given item of machinery, or even an assembled group of machinery and equipment, a hypothetical sale between a willing buyer and seller of the property being valued is assumed. In some minds, this translates to a prohibition against the use of any sales data which does not also involve a willing seller and a willing buyer, or, that per se any auction sale is inappropriate and cannot be used. Such a conclusion is in error.

In the field of real estate appraisal, appraisers do not rely upon tax sales as a comparable sale. In most instances, a mortgage foreclosure sale of real estate would not be utilized as a comparable sale. In both cases the seller is not considered to be a willing seller. In addition, however, there are other factors which weigh against using a tax or foreclosure sale in real estate appraisals. In a tax sale, all that is being sought is recovery of taxes owed and expenses of the sale. In a foreclosure sale, recovery of the outstanding debt and expenses of sale is what is being sought. In tax and foreclosure real estate sales, the exposure to the market is greatly limited, consisting of generally a legal notice in the local newspaper and posted at the courthouse. Furthermore, in real estate appraisal there is generally sufficient market data outside of tax and foreclosure sales from which sales data can be extracted.

In the realm of machinery and equipment auctions there are significant differences from real estate tax or foreclosure auctions. If a machinery and equipment auction involves a bankruptcy, the bankrupt owner is, of course, being forced to sell. However, the trustee in bankruptcy is under an obligation to protect creditors by obtaining the best price possible when assets are sold. The record in this appeal and in other similar cases (P. D. George, infra) which have come before the Commission, clearly and convincingly establishes that vast amounts of various machinery, tools and equipment used in a multitude of manufacturing operations and facilities are bought and sold on a continuing basis throughout the nation in auction sales. This is a recognized level of trade for used machinery and equipment which can be utilized in valuing machinery and equipment. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, Chapter 4 – Sales Comparison Approach, pp. 115-155.

The very nature of a machinery and equipment auction is for the entity conducting the auction to expose the items to be sold to as large a group of buyers as possible through the advertising of the sale. The auctioneer is motivated to obtain the highest sale price possible, since compensation to the auctioneer is based upon a percentage of sale price. This is the case whether the sale involves a forced liquidation or not. In other words, the auctioneer does not seek to get a lower price for sale items simply because there may be a forced liquidation.

In many states, there is a Deceptive Trade Practice Act which prohibits public offerings of machinery and equipment for sale without disclosing everything the seller knows about the property. For the most part, auctioneers and sellers know the equipment being sold and they are aware if there is anything wrong with it. Sellers at auctions disclose if a machine is only a partial machine, without certain components or whether it was considered scrap or in poor condition. Bidders are also aware of such conditions. They do not buy out of ignorance. Tr. 34, Line 15 – Tr. 37, Line 3.

There is no evidence to even suggest that buyers at an auction will bid lower if it is a bankruptcy sale as opposed to a sale of excess machinery or a sale simply due to a plant closing. Basic reasoning establishes that bidding by potential buyers is not tied in any logical fashion to the seller’s motivation or circumstances which brought about the sale. Buyers at an auction, like buyers in any other sales arena, seek to buy at the lowest price. Auctioneers, as the selling agent for the seller, are seeking the highest price. Competing buyers increase the sale price by bidding against each other.

Any sale, auction or otherwise, of a given piece of machinery is valid to use as a comparable sale for a like piece of machinery if proper adjustments are made. Adjustments to comparable sales, whether in real property or personal property appraisals, are what brings the comparable to reflect market value and make the appropriate comparison to the subject. There is no set formula for each type of adjustment which might be made to a sale price for a given piece of machinery. It is not possible nor practical to set up a sales grid for each item of machinery and equipment in which the subject item of machinery or equipment would be compared to 4, 6, 8 or a dozen like items of property and each one adjusted on the various possible points of comparability for machinery and equipment. (See, Valuing Machinery and Equipment, Elements of Comparability, pp. 120-122). The adjustments which are required to be made are a product of the appraiser’s training and experience. Mr. Bealmear made adjustments to bring the sales data to the fair market value standard. Exhibit B, p. 18, Lines 6 – 13; Tr. 32, Line 23 – Tr. 33, Line 17. Exhibit C provides an illustration as to the sales data which would be utilized by the appraiser in conducting his sales comparison valuation. The Bealmear appraisal would be strengthened if some sample illustrations as to the kinds of adjustments which are made during his valuation process were also provided.

The credentials, testimony and other evidence on this record demonstrate that Mr. Bealmear is quite knowledgeable and experienced in the various elements of comparability which would need to be considered for making adjustments and conducting a proper appraisal. His testimony substantiated that in performing his appraisal he made relevant inquiries related to the subject items of machinery and equipment that are ordinarily and properly made. He had available, through his own research or that of his staff, essential and appropriate information relative to the sales used for comparison in the appraisal. In summary, it is reasonable to conclude that the Bealmear appraisal was conducted in such a manner as to be in accordance with the general frame work and guidelines one would expect for such an appraisal. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, Chapter 4.

Principle of Substitution

Sales Comparison Approach

The valuation of the subject property by Complainant’s expert is in accordance with the principle of substitution for these particular assets. A well informed buyer will not pay more for items of property than the amount such property will command in a market with sufficient demand. Mr. Bealmear found sufficient sales to value nearly every single piece of machinery and equipment by the sales comparison approach. His appraisal demonstrates a market with sufficient demand for the various items of manufacturing property being valued in this appeal. The Bealmear illustrations and supporting data (Exhibit C) show that he generally had four or more sales of items of machinery and equipment to use to arrive at an indicated value for each of the 6,734 items of machinery and equipment valued under the sales comparison approach in the three combined appeals. The Hearing Officer concludes from the testimony of the expert that there were in all likelihood a larger number than 4 to 6 sales for many of the individual items, however, the appraiser selected those sales which were most like the subject item being valued. Exhibit B, p. 17, Line 14 – p. 18, Line 5.

The sales information utilized by Mr. Bealmear demonstrates what informed buyers are paying for the various items of machinery and equipment. One of the strengths of drawing from such sales data is that the appraiser is dealing with actual transactions for the purchase of like machinery, whether by an end user or a used equipment dealer for resale. Actual sales data provides a firm foundation from which the trained and experienced appraiser can make appropriate adjustments to arrive at an opinion of what price the item of property being valued would demand in an open and active market.

Cost Approach

In those few instances (40 items of machinery) in two of the three appeals, where Complainant’s expert was unable to find adequate sales of machinery and equipment, he arrived at an opinion of value using the cost approach. In developing his cost approach, Mr. Bealmear would obtain the replacement cost new as of the effective date for the appraisal (valuation date – January 1, 2000) from the manufacturer of the particular item of machinery or equipment. If the appraiser was unable to obtain a replacement cost new from the manufacturer, he would attempt to determine the date of acquisition and purchase price and make appropriate adjustments for the difference in time between its original purchase and the valuation date. From the replacement cost new, either obtained from the manufacturer or calculated from original acquisition costs, deductions were made for physical, functional and economic obsolescence. Exhibit A, p. 10; Exhibit B, p. 14, Line 13 – p. 16, Line 22.

The adjustment for physical depreciation is made based upon the actual inspection of each item of machinery and equipment and discussions with plant personnel, if necessary, regarding the physical condition. Functional depreciation can be anything such as a different model from which would be purchased new, difference in speed, capacity, type of controls, energy consumption, technological changes or any other factor which might be considered an obsolescence factor when compared to a new piece of equipment. Economic obsolescence is a deduction that is made for factors which affect the value of an item of machinery outside of the specific piece of property. It could include style of machine, demand for specific equipment or demand for the product which the machine produces, or other factors outside the given machine. The appraiser can contact the manufacturer to investigate demand for a given piece of equipment to determine economic obsolescence. It can also be calculated by looking at equipment of a similar type and comparing the market price for such equipment to the cost new to calculate economic obsolescence where physical and functional obsolescence are known. Information available to Mr. Bealmear through his data sources provides information from the market to assist in adjusting for the three types of obsolescence in performing his cost approach. Exhibit A, p. 10; Exhibit B, p. 14, Line 13 – p. 17, Line 8; The cost methodology employed by Mr. Bealmear for the limited number of items valued under this approach appears to be within the parameters and guidelines for developing a cost approach as applicable in this appraisal problem generally recognized by the machinery and equipment appraisal community. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, Chapter 3, pp. 45-113.

Respondent’s Valuation Not Persuasive

Appraisal Methodology

Mass Valuation Appraisal

Respondent’s appraiser, Mr. Davis, elected to perform a mass valuation of the subject property relying on a set of depreciation tables for various categories of the subject property. Tr. 70, Lines 12-13.

In performing his valuation, Mr. Davis relied upon the asset list shown by Exhibit 2 to Exhibit 1 to value the property under appeal. Mr. Davis totaled the acquisition costs for the various categories of property (Furniture & Fixtures, Computer Equipment, and Machinery & Equipment) by year of acquisition and then multiplied each total acquisition cost by a depreciation percentage based upon the year of acquisition. The basic methodology was the same as the appraiser would have used for any taxpayer in St. Louis County under the County’s mass appraisal system. He utilized the depreciation factors set forth on the Personal Property & Manufacturer’s Equipment Declaration (Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 1) for all items except computer and peripheral equipment, and for those items used depreciation factors from a study performed by the NACOMEX company. Exhibit 1, pp. 9 and 11-13; Exhibit 5 to Exhibit 1, p. 3, Schedule 8; Tr. 51, Line 23 – Tr. 54, Line 4; Tr. 58, Line 15 – Tr. 59, Line 19; Tr. 62, Lines 8-20.

In conducting his valuation of the subject property, Mr. Davis did not determine what it would cost to replace each individual item of personal property new as of January 1, 2000, nor what it would cost to replace the assembled furniture, fixtures, office machines, computers, computer peripheral equipment, manufacturing equipment, etc. He did not make a specific analysis and determination of physical, functional or economic depreciation or obsolescence for each item of property or for the assembled items of property. The appraiser did not make an itemized listing of the various items of property for each category and for each year based upon an inspection and inventory of the Complainant’s facility. He did not make any effort to verify whether any of the items on the asset list (Exhibit 2 to Exhibit 1) were at the facility as of January 1, 2000. Exhibit 1; Tr. 58, Line 22 – Tr. 59, Line 19.

Proper Cost Methodology

The proper methodology for developing an estimate of value relying on the cost approach starts with a determination of replacement cost new for an item of property as of the date of valuation. The next step is to address the issue of physical depreciation for the item of property and make an appropriate deduction. Functional obsolescence for the property must then be analyzed and an adjustment made for this factor. Finally, the matter of economic obsolescence must be considered and investigated so that a proper adjustment can be made. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, Chapter 3, p. 45.

This is not the methodology utilized by Respondent’s appraiser. The cost approach relied upon by Respondent starts with original costs and allegedly trends the cost to estimate current replacement cost and then makes deductions for the elements of physical, functional and economic depreciation. All of this is supposed to be contained in the composite factor which is the combination of a trending factor used to develop a reproduction cost new and the remaining economic life, commonly referred to as the percent good after the deduction for depreciation. The composite factor is also called the original cost multipliers. These original cost multipliers are a tool commonly used by assessors in mass valuations of personal property. The original cost multipliers are the percentage factors in the individual depreciation tables used by Mr. Davis in Exhibit 1 and Exhibits 1 and 5 to Exhibit 1.

Under this trending/depreciation of original costs all machinery and equipment purchased in a given year is trended and depreciated at exactly the same rate. This is true irrespective of whether the item of machinery and equipment is a barrel dolly, a ladder, a bandsaw or a shop table (all items of machinery and equipment included in the subject property). Neither the appraisal of Mr. Davis, nor his testimony establishes the trending factor for any given year or the basis, analysis or research to develop the unknown trending factors. Nor does Respondent’s evidence establish the basis, analysis or research to develop the unknown depreciation factors for each year. All of this weighs in on the side of unpersuasive when considering Respondent’s valuation.

Trending in Cost Approach

Respondent’s methodology is further unpersuasive due to its variance from accepted appraisal practice. The trending factor (whatever it may be for a given year) has been applied by Mr. Davis and by Respondent in the original mass valuation to original cost. Trending is applied not to the original cost but to the historic cost. Historical cost is the cost of a property when first placed in service by its first owner. Original cost is the actual cost of a property when acquired by the present owner. In some instances historical and original cost may, of course, be the same. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, Chapter 3, p. 62.

Trending can easily lead to errors in valuation. Trending does not give replacement cost new. It does not provide a means to measure the difference between reproduction cost new and replacement cost new. Trending is to only be applied to historical cost. The appraiser must establish that the cost being trended is the actual historical cost and not a cost resulting from a prior allocation of purchase price or used cost. Historical cost to be trended may not be the typical cost, but may include or exclude cost factors that must be considered and accounted for in a given appraisal problem. Trending of used cost is improper. Trending factors are based on averages, but the specific property being valued may differ from the average. Trending for periods in excess of ten years should not be employed unless confirmation can be made by other methods of estimating cost new. The appraiser should know the basics of how the trending index was developed. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, Chapter 3, pp. 62-64. The record in this appeal provides nothing to demonstrate that any of these concerns are addressed in any manner by the trending/depreciation schedules employed by Respondent and Respondent’s appraiser. This results in the methodology as applied being unsubstantial and non-persuasive to establish the value proposed.

Depreciation Factors

In like manner, the unknown depreciation factors which are contained in the cost multipliers relied upon by Mr. Davis lack in persuasive content for the purpose for which they are employed. The most obvious deficiency is that the factors do not separately identify physical, functional and economic obsolescence. All are simply lumped together for each individual year. This results in all individual items of office furniture and equipment for a given year being depreciated at the same rate for physical, functional and economic factors, irrespective of actual physical condition, functional utility or economic circumstances. The same would be true for each item of manufacturing machinery and equipment.

The appraiser had conducted no market studies to support the depreciation schedules which he relied upon. He had no knowledge of any market studies having been performed by the Assessor’s office to support the depreciation factors employed in his appraisal. Mr. Davis did not independently arrive at the depreciation schedules used to value the subject property. Tr. 63, Lines 6 -20.

Unpersuasiveness of Mass Valuation Methodology in Contested Cases

Mass valuation of personal property under a standard set of depreciation schedules is used for purposes of reassessment throughout the state, especially when dealing with the machinery and equipment which makes up a manufacturing facility. Due to the multitude of items of personal property and the individual personal property accounts in any given county it is not possible, nor practical for the assessor to perform an individual appraisal on each manufacturing facility for purposes of his annual personal property assessment. Therefore, the mass valuation methodology whereby the assessor multiplies the total acquisition costs for a given year times a set depreciation amount (percent good) for each year to arrive at an indicated true value in money is an appropriate tool to use for valuing office furniture, computer equipment and manufacturing machinery and equipment. However, once the issue of valuation has moved to an appeal before the Commission, the mass valuation approach, absent market derived supporting evidence, will generally lack the qualities of substantial and persuasive evidence to establish value. This is especially true in the face of an appraisal of the property under appeal based upon market data in the development of sales comparison and cost approaches.

The mass valuation technique has been presented in various contested cases before the Commission (See, P. D. George, et al, infra). It has failed to reach the level of substantial and persuasive evidence in each instance. The reason the method is not persuasive in a contested case is quite simple. There is no hard market data to demonstrate and support the validity and soundness of the underlying figures used in the mathematical calculations. As has been discussed above (See, Proper Cost Methodology, Trending in Cost Approach, Depreciation Factors, supra, pp. 22-25 ), the critical factors which go into the math equation are unsupported by the market.

The formula for any given year is very basic. The formula is A x B = market value. In the formula A represents acquisition costs. This apparently includes the purchase price for the item of property by Complainant, the original sales tax, if applicable, the original freight expenses and all original installation costs for each given year of acquisition. Exhibit 1, pp. 8-9. The factor B represents the combination trending and depreciation factors for each given year of acquisition. Exhibit 1, p. 8. The process of calculation is fundamental. All of the acquisition costs for a given year from an asset ledger are totaled to arrive at the A factor for the year. The factor A is then multiplied times B which represents the amount trended up for the given year and the amount of depreciation deducted to produce a percent good.

Relying on this elementary formula in a contested case is fatally flawed in the absence of market data to establish the proper foundation for this methodology. Respondent’s exhibits, taken individually or collectively do not provide any indication or supporting documentation which will demonstrate that acquisition costs (A) represents the market cost new as of January 1, 2000. There is nothing within Respondent’s exhibits that establish that the various trending and depreciation factors (B), which were used for furniture and office machines, computers and peripherals, manufacturing equipment and tooling, are appropriate for any of the given items of property or the entire group of items of property which were acquired in a single year to which one trending/depreciation (percent good) factor would apply. The two elements A and B must be supported by market data if Respondent desires to rely upon these figures.

The entire exercise of using a combined factor for trending and depreciation is unnecessary in the vast majority of appeals, since it has been demonstrated time and time again that there is an active user to user (direct), and user to dealer (indirect) market for the vast majority of machinery and equipment that is found in virtually every type of manufacturing facility. (See, P. D. George, et al, infra). Sales from this market can be adjusted to arrive at a market based indication of value. Furthermore, the appropriate and proper methodology, if a party seeks to rely upon the cost approach, is to obtain replacement cost new from the market and then adjust for physical depreciation based upon actual observation of each item of property and adjusted for functional and economic obsolescence derived from appropriate market investigation and data.

Reliance upon acquisition costs, whether historic or original, as the starting point of a valuation exercise in a contested case, and a table of trending and depreciation factors in the face of actual sales data does not reach the level of substantial and persuasive to establish value. It matters little what was paid for an item of equipment five or six years prior to the tax date, when one can go to the market and find a sufficient number of actual sales for the item to demonstrate the present value. This procedure (investigation and research of the present market) eliminates any level of speculation and conjecture as to whether the trended and then depreciated acquisition cost is reflective of market value.

Construction in Progress

The issue of construction in progress must now be addressed. Respondent’s appraiser added an amount for construction in progress in each of the three appeals. The amount of construction in progress was taken from the Complainant’s property declaration in each appeal and then was valued at 65% good. In Appeal 00-10006, Mr. Davis added $472,090 for construction in progress. A total of $340,330, was added in Appeal 00-10007 and an additional $579,240 was included as construction in progress in Appeal 00-10008. Exhibit 1, p.11. It was the position of Mr. Davis that Complainant’s appraisal omitted the value of construction in progress items. Exhibit 2, Q & A 18, p. 4.

Mr. Davis made no independent investigation, inspection or inventory of what items would have constituted construction in progress at any of the three facilities where Complainant’s machinery and equipment were located. He did ask for and received a detailed listing of the items that made up the various figures for construction in progress. This list is Exhibit 4, 4A being the list for Appeal 00-10006, 4B being the list for Appeal 00-10007 and 4C being the list for Appeal 00-10008. When Mr. Davis conducted his plant tour he did not ask to see items of construction in progress because the items shown on Exhibit 4 would have been as of January 1, 2000 and the plan tour wasn’t conducted until December 22, 2000. However, Mr. Davis should have and could have made inquiry as to what items of machinery and equipment were part of or effected by any of the expenditures shown as construction in progress. This he did not do. Mr. Davis came to the conclusion that the Bealmear appraisal omitted construction in progress simply because there was no specific mentioning of construction in process or a specific delineation of any such items. However, no attempt was made whatsoever to identify specific items of construction in progress relating to specific items of machinery and equipment and then determining if such items of machinery and equipment were valued in the Bealmear appraisal. Tr. 45, Line 10 – Tr. 51, Line 22.

Respondent does not establish the failure of Complainant’s appraiser to value an item of machinery, simply because his witness asserts an omission in Complainant’s appraisal report. Respondent, by the assertion of Mr. Davis, raised the issue of omitting construction in progress and therefore must present substantial and persuasive evidence to carry the burden of proof on this particular issue. Mr. Davis’ blank assertion, without even the mere pretense of the most basic and fundamental type of investigation and inventory which an experienced appraiser would have performed, is totally unsupported by any evidence to establish that the Bealmear appraisal failed to value any property at any of Complainant’s three facilities which could have been described as construction in progress on January 1, 2000.

Construction in progress includes projects under construction that have not been completed and capitalized. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, p. 31. This classification or definition must be applied in the context of a valuation of furniture, machinery and equipment only to those items. It cannot be applied to items of construction or remodeling relating to the building and improvements to the land.

Items on Exhibit 4 such as dock and BUB door replacement, resurface plant floor, stockroom/office expansion, installing truck restraints, install sprinklers in office area, remodel QC lab, and relocate tray washer should raise a question in the mind of an appraiser, who would be relying upon a construction in progress list, that these items may not be part of the furniture, machinery and equipment. An experienced appraiser, if he were going to place some reliance on the construction in progress list, would want to identify to what specific items of machinery and equipment the various cost amounts for construction in progress related. Mr. Davis had the obligation in carrying out his responsibilities to fairly and accurately value the Complainant’s personal property to make appropriate inquiries and specifically identify what was being addressed in the various items on the construction in progress list.

The list (Exhibit 4) is apparently a computer generated accounting spreadsheet. It is no doubt for general bookkeeping and accounting purposes and not for appraisal purposes. It is clear from the most elementary review of the list that certain items are replacements for items of machinery and equipment. For example, metal detector replacement, cool exhaust blower replacement, replace nitrogen generation, air compres, replac

St. John’s Health System v. Strahan (Taney)

October 4th, 2001

 

 

ST. JOHN’S HEALTH SYSTEMS, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeals Number 00-89501 and 00-89502

)

JAMES STRAHAN, ASSESSOR, )

TANEY COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

SUMMARY

Complainant filed appeals challenging the non-exempt status for tax year 2000 of two of its Taney County properties — a tract of land on State HWY 248 identified as parcel number 8-9-0-29-0-0-33.006, and a clinic property located at 151 Birch in Hollister, Missouri identified as parcel number 17-3-8-4-5-3.0.

On May 23, 2001, an evidentiary hearing was held before Tax Commission Hearing Officer, Aimee Smashey, at the Taney County Courthouse in Forsyth, Missouri. Complainant was represented by Michael Merrigan. Respondent was represented by William McCullah.

RULING ON MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Upon identification of the properties under appeal, Complainant indicated that the parcel number and Board decision letter on Appeal Number 00-89501 was submitted in error and Complainant’s intention was to appeal the assessment on parcel no. 18-6.0-14-003-001-010.003, which is improved with the Branson Medical Center. Accordingly, Complainant made motion that the Complaint be amended to reflect the intended parcel. Respondent objected to any such amendment arguing that the Commission has no jurisdiction to allow an amendment on a material issue like the identification of the property at issue. The statutes do not provide the Commission with discretion to extend its jurisdiction to a wholly different property in lieu of the specific parcel appealed. Complainant’s motion is denied.

Complainant indicated its intention to dismiss Appeal Number 00-89501 if the amendment was not permitted. Appeal Number 00-89501 is voluntarily dismissed.

ISSUE

Do Complainant’s operations at the subject medical clinic constitute charity?

HOLDING

Each tax exemption case is peculiarly one which must be decided upon its own facts. The persuasive impact of the evidence presented indicates that the subject clinic is actually and regularly used exclusively for a charitable purpose, is owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis, and that the use of the subject clinic is beneficial to society in addition to those directly served by the subject clinic. Accordingly, the subject clinic is entitled to a property tax exemption.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The subject property is a 6.92 acre lot improved with a clinic building built in 1996 containing approximately 3,825 square feet. It is located at 151 Birch in Hollister, Missouri (Parcel Id No. 17-3-8-4-5-3.0).

2. The subject clinic houses a one-physician family medicine clinic. Complainants Exhibits B at 4.

3. The subject clinic is owned and operated by St. John’s Regional Medicine of the Ozarks (SJRMO), a Missouri Nonprofit Corporation. SJRMO is a subsidiary of Complainant.

4. SJRMO’s Articles of Incorporation state the corporation’s purpose to be:

…to establish and maintain one or more medical clinics as institutions with permanent health service facilities for the diagnosis and treatment of patients and to provide such medical services as may be required by patients; to conduct educational activities related to care of the sick and injured or to the promotion of health; to develop efficient and practical arrangements for providing health services; to foster teaching and research functions at its facilities in cooperation with other health services and educational institutions; to provide in service training programs to personnel employed at its facilities in order to maintain their skills and to make them aware of developments in the health services field; and for any and all other lawful purpose or purposes for which a nonprofit corporation may be organized in the State of Missouri….

Complainant’s Exhibit E, at 1. The Articles further provide that no part of SJRMO=s net earnings or property may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual and that upon dissolution of the corporation, the corporate assets are to be distributed to the Sisters of Mercy Health System, St. Louis, Inc. or affiliated nonprofits or, alternatively, to a charitable organization as determined by the court. Id, at 2 and 4.

5. The subject clinic operated at a $182,983 loss for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2000, and operations for the six months ending December 31, 2000, also indicated a $108,220 loss. The subject clinic has operated at a loss since 1996 and the losses are covered by Complainant. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 8.

7. The mix of payment sources are: 46.79%- Medicare, 18.23%-Medicaid, 5.88%-Self Pay and 29.10%-Insurance.

8. The salary and benefits for the physician at the subject clinic is consistent with the nationally surveyed range of salaries for family practice practitioners. Complainant’s Exhibit R, at 9.

9. The other clinic staff persons are paid market level salaries. Complainant’s Exhibit R, at 8.

10. Clinic physicians can receive additional compensation if his or her production exceeds the production levels established in their compensation plan. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 9, Complainant’s Exhibit N, Appendix at 2. The physician’s supplemental compensation is not driven by or contingent upon the profitability of the clinic.

11. Patients are not denied service at the subject clinic based upon an inability to pay. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 11.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Taney County Board of Equalization.

Burden of Proof

Although a taxing statute is construed strictly against the state, an exemption statute is strictly construed against the one claiming the exemption. State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Goldberg, 578 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Mo. banc 1979). “The law disfavors claims for exemption from taxation. The substantial burden of establishing the property falls within the exempted class is on the person claiming exemptions under the referenced constitutional and statutory provisions. To prevent the curtailing of the purpose and intended scope of a tax exemption, the tax exemption statute is to be strictly but reasonably construed.” Twitty v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 896 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995) (citations omitted). Accordingly, in order to prevail, Complainant must demonstrate by substantial and persuasive evidence, that it is entitled to an exemption.

Substantial evidence is that evidence which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, i.e., evidence favoring facts which are such that reasonable men may differ as to whether it established them, and from which the Commission can reasonably decide an appeal on the factual issues. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Statutory Exemptions

Properties which can be exempted from taxation are set out within our Constitution and the statutes enacted to enforce that Constitution, to wit:

“. . .all property, real and personal, not held for private or corporate profit and used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, for purposes purely charitable, . . .may be exempt from taxation by general law but any such law may provide for approximate restitution to the respective political subdivisions of revenues lost by reason of the exemption. All laws exempting from taxation property other than the property enumerated in this article, shall be void. Article X, Section 6, Mo. Const. Of 1945.

 

In support of this Constitutional provision, the Legislature has enacted Section 137.110, RSMo 1994, which provides in relevant part:

The following property shall be exempt from taxation:

(5) All property, real and personal, actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, or for purposes purely charitable and not held for private or corporate profit, except that the exemption herein granted does not include real property not actually used or occupied for the purpose of the organization but held or used as investment even though the income or rentals received therefrom is used wholly for religious, education or charitable purposes;

 

 

Section 137.110, RSMo 1994.

Case Law on Charitable Use

In order for a property to be exempt from taxation for state, county or local purposes, the following tests must be met:

1. The property must be actually and regularly used exclusively for a charitable purpose, as charity is defined by Salvation Army v. Hoehn, 188 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. banc 1945). “Charity” is therein defined as “. . .a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining the public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.” Salvation Army at 830.

2. The property must be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis. The property “must be dedicated unconditionally to the charitable activity in such a way that there will be no profit, presently or prospectively, to individuals or corporations. Any gain achieved in use of the building must be devoted to achievement of the charitable objectives of the project.” Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213, at 224 (Mo. banc 1978).

3. The dominant use of the property must be for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons and must directly or indirectly benefit society generally. “It is required that there be the element of direct or indirect benefit to society in addition to and as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons directly served by the humanitarian activity”. Franciscan at 224. See also, Barnes Hospital v. Leggett, 589 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. banc 1979).

Subject Property Operations

1. The provision of products or services to the public at cost or less constitutes a gift.

2. Medical treatment directly benefits people by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering, or constraint and health education assists to establish people for life.

3. The performance history of the subject clinic evidences an intent to provide medical and educational services on a non-profit basis.

4. The availability of cost-based or subsidized medical services at the subject clinic accessible to rich and poor alike is beneficial to the Taney County community.

DECISION

1. Use

Exemption law requires an unconditional dedication to a charitable objective. Charity is defined as “. . .a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining the public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.” Salvation Army at 830. Does Complainant’s operation of the subject clinic constitute a gift? The provision of products or services to the public at cost or less constitutes a gift. Complainant is organized as a non-profit corporation. Complainant through its subsidiary St. John’s Regional Medicine of the Ozarks (SJRMO) operates a one-physician family practice clinic at the subject property. Complainant presented evidence that the subject clinic operated at a $182,983 loss for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2000, and operations for the six months ending December 31, 2000, also indicated a $108,220 loss. While there is not evidence to show or explain the decision making involved in setting the charges or fees for the services at the clinics, the performance history evidences an intent to provide medical and educational services at cost or less.

The provision of medical services in a clinic setting clearly qualifies as an appropriate use under the Salvation Army definition in that medical treatment directly benefits people by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering, or constraint and health education assists to establish people for life.

2. Operation

Exemption law requires ownership and operation on a non-profit basis. The subject clinic is owned and operated by St. John’s Regional Medicine of the Ozarks (SJRMO), a Missouri Nonprofit Corporation. SJRMO was established as a Missouri Nonprofit Corporation in September of 1999. Since that time they have continuously owned and operated the subject clinic in Hollister, Missouri. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 4. SJRMO’s Articles of Incorporation state the corporation’s purpose to be:

…to establish and maintain one or more medical clinics as institutions with permanent health service facilities for the diagnosis and treatment of patients and to provide such medical services as may be required by patients; to conduct educational activities related to care of the sick and injured or to the promotion of health; to develop efficient and practical arrangements for providing health services; to foster teaching and research functions at its facilities in cooperation with other health services and educational institutions; to provide in service training programs to personnel employed at its facilities in order to maintain their skills and to make them aware of developments in the health services field; and for any and all other lawful purpose or purposes for which a nonprofit corporation may be organized in the State of Missouri….

Complainant’s Exhibit E, at 1. The Articles further provide that no part of SJRMO’s net earnings or property may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual and that upon dissolution of the corporation, the corporate assets are to be distributed to the Sisters of Mercy Health System, St. Louis, Inc. or affiliated nonprofits or, alternatively, to a charitable organization as determined by the court. Id, at 2 and 4.

As referenced in the “use” discussion above, Complainant presented evidence that the subject clinic operated at a $182,983 loss for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2000, and operations for the six months ending December 31, 2000, also indicated a $108,220 loss. The mix of payment sources are: 46.79%- Medicare, 18.23%-Medicaid, 5.88% – Self Pay and 29.10% – Insurance. Elysa Fabian, C.O.O. for SJRMO testified:

…the payor mix is weighted heavily toward Medicare, Medicaid and self-pay patients which compose approximately 70% of patients seen in the clinic. Both Medicare and Medicaid reimburse for physician services pursuant to a fee schedule. For example, on a Level III office visit for an established patient, the St. John’s charge is $65.00. Medicare pays $44.97 dollars and Medicaid pays $24.00 for the service. From a cost accounting standpoint the amount paid by Medicaid does not cover the cost incurred by St. John’s in the provision of these services.

Complainant’s Exhibit R at 8. She further testified that the subject clinic has operated at a loss since 1996 and that the losses are covered by St. John’s Health System, Inc., the parent corporation. Id.

The Medical Group Management Association annually publishes a national survey reporting salary, benefit, and retirement benefit ranges for physicians practicing a number of different specialties. The salary and benefits for the physician at the subject clinic are consistent with the nationally surveyed range of salaries for family practice practitioners. Complainant’s Exhibit R, at 9.

The salary structure for physicians is a two-tiered system. The physicians receive a bi-weekly draw payment that is based upon their historical productivity and can receive additional compensation if his or her production exceeds the production levels established in their compensation plan. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 9, Complainant’s Exhibit N, Appendix at 2. The additional compensation is tied to increased patient management as measured by net professional and ancillary revenues and not any resulting profit of the clinic. Complainant’s Exhibit N, Appendix at 2 -3. While this may be a thin line, it appears that there are no profits paid to the physicians.

While there is not evidence to show or explain St. John’s Health System Inc.’s decision- making in setting the charges or fees for the services at the clinic, the performance history evidences an intent to provide medical and educational services on a non-profit basis.

Twitty v. State Tax Commission

In the Twitty v. State Tax Commission case, the Court of Appeals in the Southern District found a medical clinic in Greene County owned and operated by a corporate entity of St. John’s Regional Health Center to be taxable. 896 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995). The Court found that the clinic failed to qualify for property tax exemption because (1) the use of the subject clinic was not consistent with its corporate purposes of supplying medical care in under served areas; and (2) the role of the subject clinic was to generate income or profit to enhance the network. Id., at 687 and 688.

The operations of the subject clinic in this appeal are distinguishable from the clinic reviewed in the Twitty case in a number of ways. First, St. John’s Health System, Inc., and its subsidiaries have re-organized. As of 1999, the regional clinics are now owned and operated by a subsidiary entitled St. John’s Regional Medicine of the Ozarks which, according to its Articles of Incorporation, operates for the purpose of establishing and maintaining “…medical clinics as institutions with permanent health care facilities for the diagnosis and treatment of patients…” and providing certain health education functions on a not-for-profit basis. Complainant’s Exhibit E at 1. The owning and operating entity is no longer organized for the express corporate purpose of providing medical care in medically under served areas. The corporate purpose of establishing medical clinics in under served areas was important in the Twitty case because the clinic under review was established in Greene County which was not listed as a medically under served area, and therefore, was an operation beyond the scope of the corporate purpose and was taxable. In this case, the owning entity does not have the express corporate purpose of establishing medical clinics in medically under served areas, rather, they have the purpose of establishing and operating medical clinics. Taney County is not currently designated as a medically under served area, but had been in the past. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 11. A St. John’s corporate entity first established a medical clinic in Hollister in 1996. Taney County was considered a medically under served area as recently as 1998. Id, at 11. Elysa Fabian, C.O.O. of SJRMO, testified that Taney County would become under served again if the St. John’s clinics would close. Id., at 11. Second, unlike the clinic in the Twitty case, there are no exhibits or testimony which suggest that profit was the primary goal of the clinic for the benefit of the clinic network, thereby, undermining a necessary determination that the clinic is dedicated unconditionally to a charitable objective. The Court’s analysis in the Twitty case as applied to the subject property’s operation lends support for a positive determination of exempt status.

3. Public Benefit

Exemption law further requires “…that there be the element of direct or indirect benefit to society in addition to and as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons directly served by the humanitarian activity.” Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213, at 224 (Mo. banc 1978). The patients seen and treated at the clinic are the persons directly served by the clinic operations. The families of those patients are also directly served by the clinic. The clinic staff also provides general education and health promotions in the city and county, such as flu clinics and sports clinics. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 4. It is difficult to objectively measure a direct or indirect benefit to society. Under this analysis the court requires us to consider whether the rendering of the charitable activity inherently confers a benefit to society in general. Is the operation of the subject clinic beneficial to that community in general, even if similar medical services are available elsewhere in the community? In developing this test, the court reasoned as follows:

Another prerequisite for charitable exemption is that the dominant use of the property must be for the benefit of an indefinite number of people, for the purpose, as expressed in Salvation Army, of “bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.” 188 S.W.2d at 830. The court at that same point included “humanitarian activities, * * * rendered at cost or less, which are intended to improve the physical, mental and moral condition of the recipients and make it less likely that they will become burdens on society and make it more likely that they will become useful citizens.” Thus, it is required that there be the element of direct or indirect benefit to society in addition to and as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons directly served by the humanitarian activity.

Examples of such humanitarian activities previously held to be exempt as charitable include the operation of hospitals which are open and available to rich and poor (Community Memorial and Jackson County); a facility operated to provide employment and training for handicapped persons (Goodwill); operating a YMCA building housing boys and young men, preferably of low income, as a part of a program intended *225 to foster good citizenship and Christian ideals in those boys and young men (YMCA No. 4); providing housing at less than cost to girls and young women, including the needy, intended to promote the welfare of such persons (Salvation Army); providing good low cost housing for low income people to replace old, dilapidated properties in a slum area which was cleared (Bader Realty). All of these, while benefitting the individuals served, also were considered to benefit society generally.

Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213, 224-225 (Mo. banc 1978) (emphasis supplied).

Patients are not denied service at the subject clinic based upon an inability to pay. Ms. Fabian clarified Complainant’s policies regarding indigent patients as follows:

Q: Are patients denied service due to their inability to pay?

A: No. Our policy is to work with patients to determine an acceptable payment arrangement. If they are unable to make payments, their account is written off to charity care.

Q: Do you write off patient accounts as bad debts?

A: We write off accounts to charity for those patients who work with us. Those patients who do not accept responsibility for the payment of their bills and do not respond to any of the billing statements are often written off as bad debt and referred to a collection agency.

Q: Are these patients given the opportunity to work with the clinic regarding payment arrangements?

A: As previously stated, our staff is very willing to work with those patients who accept responsibility for payment of their bills, communicate with us, and show follow through to their commitments.

Q: Are patients terminated from the clinic because of their payments?

A: No, they are not. As stated earlier, we try and work with those patients who do not have insurance to determine an acceptable payment schedule. We also have a very significant Medicare and Medicaid payor mix and we participate in a number of managed care insurance contracts.

Q: Are the patients denied appointments with the clinic?

A: Appointments are made pursuant to scheduling availability. There will be times when physicians are on vacation or ill and we are unable to accommodate patient requests for appointments. Individuals who have shown a lack of responsibility on their accounts, have been non-compliance [sic], or for other reasons, may have their patient-physician relationship terminated and if this was to occur we would not schedule their appointment. However, we provide the patient thirty (30) days notice of any type of termination and remain available to provide emergency care should they need it.

Complainant’s Exhibit R, at 11-12.

The fact that Taney County has cost-based or subsidized medical services at the subject clinic (and perhaps other locations) available to rich and poor alike is beneficial to the Taney County community.

Conclusion

The evidence persuasively supports a conclusion that the subject clinic is actually and regularly used exclusively for a charitable purpose, is owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis, and that the use of the subject clinic is beneficial to society in addition to those directly served by the subject clinic. The subject clinic is entitled to a property tax exemption.

ORDER

Appeal Number 00-89501 is voluntarily dismissed, so the current assessment stands. The non-exempt status of the subject property in Appeal Number 00-89502 for tax year 2000, as determined by the Assessor and approved by the Board of Equalization, is SET ASIDE. The Clerk is HEREBY ORDERED to show this parcel as exempt for tax year 2000.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of a hearing officer decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.

If an application for review of a hearing officer decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with these appeals shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Taney County as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in these appeals. If any protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED October 4, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Aimee Smashey, Hearing Officer

Midwest Aerials & Equipment v. King (SLCY)

September 18th, 2001

 

 

MIDWEST AERIALS & EQUIPMENT, INC., )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 00-20002

)

MARY KING, ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS CITY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the St. Louis City Board of Equalization reducing the assessment made by the Assessor, AFFIRMED in part and SET ASIDE in part, Commission finds true value in money for the property which was not in dispute and therefore not contested for tax year 2000 to be $181,146, assessed value of $60,382; the Commission finds $357,370 of the disputed property to be inventory and exempt from assessment and taxation and the remaining $1,429,478, assessed value of $476,493, to be taxable personal property. Total assessed value of taxable personal property $536,875.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Michael Gordon, Clayton, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Susan Phelps, Assistant City Counselor and Eugene J. Hanses, Jr., Associate City Counselor

Case heard by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

Case decided by the Commission.

ISSUES

The Commission takes this appeal to determine whether certain items of Complainant’s property are non-taxable as inventory and to determine the true value in money for such items as are determined to not be inventory and therefore taxable.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the St. Louis City Board of Equalization which reduced the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $2,362,740 (assessed value of $787,580, as personal property). The Board of Equalization reduced the value to $2,361,600 (assessed value of $787,200). A hearing was conducted on May 22, 2001, at the St. Louis City Hall, St. Louis, Missouri. Complainant and Respondent filed their Post-Hearing Briefs (July 9, 2001 & August 7, 2001) and Complainant filed a Post-Hearing Reply Brief (August 24, 2001).

The Commission, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record and arguments of Counsel in Briefs filed, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant’s Evidence

Complainant offered into evidence the following exhibits:

Exhibit A Copy of sign displayed at various locations on Complainant’s premises, reading: ALL EQUIPMENT IS FOR SALE – INQUIRE TODAY FOR PRICING.

Exhibit B Picture of sign (Exhibit A) displayed at Office of Complainant’s premises.

Exhibit C Lease utilized by Complainant for lease of inventory. Photocopy filed at time of evidentiary hearing, original copy filed, at request of Hearing Officer, on June 13, 2001.

Exhibit D Complainant’s Inventory Price List.

Exhibit E Original Business Tangible Personal Property 2000 – Tax Return.

Exhibit F Amended Business Tangible Personal Property 2000 – Tax Return.

Exhibit G List of Sales and Dispositions to date.

Exhibit H Written Direct Testimony of Kevin J. Morrell.

Mr. Morrell was submitted for cross-examination and testified in response to questions by Respondent’s Counsel and the Hearing Officer. Exhibits A through H were received into evidence.

Counsel for Complainant filed with his Brief two exhibits.

Brief Exhibit 1 Stipulation of Facts signed by Counsel for Complainant and Counsel for Respondent.

Brief Exhibit 2 Copy of Letter dated January 22, 1988, to the Cole County Assessor from the Administrative Secretary of the Commission setting forth recommended criteria for determining whether or not rental property is being held for sale.

Reply Brief  Exhibit 1 Copy of Letter dated February 27, 1996, to the St. Louis County Assessor from the Chief Counsel of the Commission setting forth factors to assist in determining if property was inventory.

No objections were made to any of the Brief Exhibits. They are received as part of the record in this appeal. The Joint Stipulation of Facts signed by Counsel is approved.

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent offered into evidence the following exhibits:

Exhibit 1 Appraisal Report of Kimberly Simon.

Exhibit 2 Written Direct Testimony Kimberly Simon.

Counsel for Complainant had no cross-examination of Ms. Simon. Exhibits 1 and 2 were received into evidence.

Counsel for Respondent filed with her Brief four exhibits.

Brief Exhibit AA Copy of Internet article from bizjournals.com from the week of October 9, 2000, on Complainant’s business.

Brief Exhibit BB Copy of Empire Gas, Inc. v. Robert Raines, STC Appeal No. 91- 73004, 2/19/93 (1993 WL 49756 (Mo.St. Tax. Com.)).

Brief Exhibit CC Copy of Nixon’s Farm Equipment, Inc. v. Linda Harmon, STC Appeal No. 93-51000, 7/7/94 (1994 WL 362326 (Mo. St. Tax. Com.)).

Brief Exhibit DD Copy of Beagle’s Rental Center v. Shirley Quick, STC Appeals No. 85-32016 & 85-32017, 12/24/86, STC 41st Annual Report, p. 729, 1986.

No objections were made to the Brief Exhibits. They are received as part of the record in this appeal.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis City Board of Equalization.

2. Complainant’s property, for tax purposes, is located at 2231 Papain Street, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by Assessor’s Account Number 70061 0A.

3. The parties have stipulated to the following facts: Brief Exhibit 2.

1. The assessment of certain tangible personal property of the Complainant is not an issue in this appeal. This property consists of all the personal property that was identified in the May 31, 2001, Interlocutory Order and had an agreed market value of $181,146.00 and an assessed value of $60, 382.00.

2. The tangible personal property of the Complainant that is at issue in this appeal is the Complainant’s machinery and equipment which pursuant to the Respondent’s Appraisal Report (Exhibit 1) has a market value of $1,786,848.00 and an assessed value of $595,616.00.

3. The Complainant’s rental agreement (Exhibit C) contains language that the personal property at issue can be purchased.

4. At any point in time the twenty percent of the personal property at issue is idle at Complainant’s place of business.

4. The disputed property, which is under appeal on the issue of whether or not it constitutes inventory and is therefore not subject to assessment and taxation, consists of non- manufacturing machinery and equipment acquired in 1998 and 1999 consisting of various height Push Arounds, Scissor Lifts, Boom Lifts, Trailer Booms, Material Lifts and other machines and equipment leased and sold by Complainant. Exhibit D; Exhibit E, pp. 4-8.

6. Complainant’s business is the leasing and selling of machinery and equipment. Brief Exhibit AA; Exhibits A, B, D, G, & H, Q & A 4, 10, 12, 13, 23, 26, & 40.

7. Complainant’s Inventory Price List gives the sale price for each individual piece of machinery or equipment. Each item of property is identified by a unit number, a description, a serial number, direct cost, markup rate (percentage) and the total markup price or price to a customer purchasing the equipment. The purchase price for each piece of equipment is reasonable and is less than the manufacturer’s suggested retail price. Complainant has at least 15-20 identical or virtually identical pieces of equipment in each category of equipment that are available for sale. Complainant’s average length of the lease term is approximately five days. Exhibit D; Exhibit H, Q & A’s 12-25; Tr 4, Line 22 – Tr. 5, Line 4.

8. Complainant’s Lease/Rental Agreement, on its cover, states: INTERESTED IN PURCHASING A UNIT? ALL OF OUR EQUIPMENT IS FOR SALE – CALL TODAY FOR PRICING. Exhibit C.

9. From 4/29/98 through 12/31/99, Complainant sold: 18 scissor lifts, 1 trailer boom and 5 material lifts; during 2000, Complainant sold: 3 push arounds, 25 scissor lifts, 9 boom lifts, 1 trailer boom and 21 material lifts. Approximately 24% of Complainant’s gross revenue through the end of 2000 was from the sale of equipment. Exhibit G & H, Q & A 40.

10. Signs like Exhibit A are posted on Complainant’s premises on the front door, in the reception area and on the access door to the warehouse where the machinery and equipment is located. TR. 8, Lines 15-25.

11. Respondent admits that twenty (20%) percent of the property in dispute is immediately available for sale and exempt from taxation as it is inventory. Respondent’s Brief, p. 4, Proposed Finding of Fact 9 & p. 9.

12. At any one time twenty (20%) percent of the property on the Inventory Price List is immediately available for sale and is therefore inventory and exempt from taxation.

13. The value of the contested personal property that is available for sale at any one time is $357,370 ($1,786,848.00 x .20 = $357,370), this constitutes inventory and is therefore exempt from taxation. The remaining $1,429,478 of contested personal property is not inventory and is therefore taxable.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Board of Equalization Presumption

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

Complainant;s Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainant must present substantial and persuasive evidence that the disputed property is inventory. Hermel, supra, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Tax Exemptions

Tax exemptions are not favored in law, and claims therefor must be strictly but reasonably construed against the party claiming exemption. Bader Realty & Investment Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 217 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. banc 1949); Missouri United Methodist Retirement Homes v. State Tax Commission, 522 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1975); Home Builders Association of Greater St. Louis v. St. Louis County Board of Equalization, 803 S.W.2d 636, (Mo. App. E.D. 1991).

Inventory Exempt from Taxation

All personal property held as goods, wares, merchandise, stock in trade or inventory for resale by distributors, wholesalers, or retail merchants or establishments shall be exempt from taxation. Article X, section 6, Mo. Const. of 1945.

DECISION

The issue presented in the present appeal is a straight foreword issue of law. If the subject machinery and equipment constitutes inventory, it is under the provision of the Constitution of Missouri exempt from taxation. If the subject property is not inventory it is subject to taxation. Respondent admits that twenty (20%) percent of the machinery and equipment in dispute is available for sale at any one time on Complainant’s lot and is therefore inventory and exempt from taxation.

Empire Gas Case

The present case come under the holding of the Commission in the Empire Gas case, supra. The items of property at issue, in that appeal, were 460 propane tanks owned by Empire Gas. Approximately 50 of the tanks were located at two bulk plants in Morgan County owned by the taxpayer. The remaining approximately 410 tanks were located on individuals’ properties and leased to the individuals. It was complainant’s policy that the individuals leasing any of the 410 tanks could purchase them at any time at Complainant’s posted price. The Commission determined that the 50 tanks at the bulk plants were immediately available for sale (inventory) and therefore exempt.

The 410 tanks were not deemed as being available for sale simply because Complainant was always willing to sell a leased item. The ability to sell the leased tanks was limited by the fact that the lessees were entitled to retain the equipment as long as they paid the rent and otherwise met the lease terms. The lease tanks were not salable to the general public. The Commission relied upon a Florida case (Adams Construction Equipment Company v. Hausman, 472 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1985), citing to Olson Equipment Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 171 N.W.2d 717 (1969)) in defining inventory to denote an availability for sale in the ordinary course of business.

In Empire Gas the 50 propane tanks at the Complainant’s bulk plant were found to be inventory. They were available for sale or lease. These units are comparable to the twenty percent of Complainants machines and equipment that on average are idle on the premises ready for sale or lease. The lease tanks were not readily available for sale just like Complainant’s machinery that is out on lease. A leased piece of Complainant’s equipment is not available for immediate sale.

The holding in the Empire Gas case is controlling in the present appeal. Property cannot be held for resale while simultaneously being rented or leased. The owner cannot hold property for sale in the ordinary course of business when possession has been lost due to the item of property being leased. Complainant’s leased equipment is not immediately available for sale and is therefore not inventory. Accordingly it is taxable as personal property. The twenty percent available for immediate sale, valued at $356,370, is exempt as inventory.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and reduced by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis City for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE in part and AFFIRMED in part.

The assessed value for the portion of the property which is not inventory for tax year 2000 is set at $536,875.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis City, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED September 18, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Sam D. Leake, Chairman

Bruce E. Davis, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner

St. John’s Health Systems v. Tunnel (Lawrence)

September 6th, 2001

 

 

ST. JOHN’S HEALTH SYSTEMS, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 00-65001

)

DAVID TUNNELL, ASSESSOR, )

LAWRENCE COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the non-exempt status of its property for tax year 2000.

On April 5, 2001, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Tax Commission Hearing Officer, Aimee Smashey, at the Lawrence County Courthouse in Mount Vernon, Missouri. Complainant was represented by Michael Merrigan. Respondent was represented by Robert E. George.

ISSUE

Do Complainant’s operations at the subject medical clinic constitute charity?

HOLDING

Each tax exemption case is peculiarly one which must be decided upon its own facts. The persuasive impact of the evidence presented indicates that the area of the property housing the two medical clinics is actually and regularly used exclusively for a charitable purpose, is owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis, and that the use of the subject clinic is beneficial to society, in addition to those directly served by the subject clinic. That portion of the subject clinic is entitled to a property tax exemption. Accordingly, this hearing officer finds that 89% of the subject property should be exempt from property taxes.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The subject property is a 2.91 acre lot improved with a clinic building built in 1992 containing approximately 12,390 square feet. It is located at 1319 South Landrum Street in Mount Vernon, Missouri (Parcel Id. No. 08-7.0-36-004-002-031.003).

2. The subject clinic houses a two-physician family medicine clinic, a one-physician internal medicine clinic, and a small private pharmacy. Complainant’s Exhibits B at 6 & 7, R at 4.

3. The pharmacy is operated by a private individual who leases the space from Complainant. The pharmacy is operated on approximately 1,344 square feet (11%) of the subject property.

4. The subject clinic is owned and operated by St. John’s Regional Medicine of the Ozarks (SJRMO), a Missouri Nonprofit Corporation. SJRMO is a subsidiary of Complainant.

5. SJRMO’s Articles of Incorporation state the corporation’s purpose to be:

…to establish and maintain one or more medical clinics as institutions with permanent health service facilities for the diagnosis and treatment of patients and to provide such medical services as may be required by patients; to conduct educational activities related to care of the sick and injured or to the promotion of health; to develop efficient and practical arrangements for providing health services; to foster teaching and research functions at its facilities in cooperation with other health services and educational institutions; to provide in service training programs to personnel employed at its facilities in order to maintain their skills and to make them aware of developments in the health services field; and for any and all other lawful purpose or purposes for which a nonprofit corporation may be organized in the State of Missouri….

Complainant’s Exhibit E, at 1. The Articles further provide that no part of SJRMO’s net earnings or property may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual and that upon dissolution of the corporation, the corporate assets are to be distributed to the Sisters of Mercy Health System, St. Louis, Inc. or affiliated nonprofits or, alternatively, to a charitable organization as determined by the court. Id., at 2 and 4.

6. The subject clinic operated at a $126,964 loss for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2000, and operations for the six months ending December 31, 2000, also indicated a $107,335 loss. The subject clinic has operated at a loss since 1991 and the losses are covered by Complainant. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 8.

7. The mix of payment sources are: 37.5%- Medicare, 5%-Medicaid, Self Pay 27.5% and Insurance 30%.

8. The salaries and benefits for the physicians at the subject clinic are at or below the 25th percentile of the nationally surveyed range of salaries for family practice and internal medicine specialties. Complainant’s Exhibit M, at 1.

9. The other clinic staff persons are paid market level salaries.

10. Clinic physicians can receive additional compensation if his or her production exceeds the production levels established in their compensation plan. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 10, Complainant’s Exhibit N, Appendix at 2. The physician’s supplemental compensation is not driven by or contingent upon the profitability of the clinic.

11. Patients are not denied service at the subject clinic based upon an inability to pay.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Lawrence County Board of Equalization.

Burden of Proof

Although a taxing statute is construed strictly against the state, an exemption statute is strictly construed against the one claiming the exemption. State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Goldberg, 578 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Mo. banc 1979). “The law disfavors claims for exemption from taxation. The substantial burden of establishing the property falls within the exempted class is on the person claiming exemptions under the referenced constitutional and statutory provisions. To prevent the curtailing of the purpose and intended scope of a tax exemption, the tax exemption statute is to be strictly but reasonably construed.” Twitty v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 896 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995) (citations omitted). Accordingly, in order to prevail, Complainant must demonstrate by substantial and persuasive evidence that it is entitled to an exemption.

Substantial evidence is that evidence which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, i.e., evidence favoring facts which are such that reasonable men may differ as to whether it established them, and from which the Commission can reasonably decide an appeal on the factual issues. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Statutory Exemptions

Properties which can be exempted from taxation are set out within our Constitution and the statutes enacted to enforce that Constitution, to wit:

. . .all property, real and personal, not held for private or corporate profit and used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, for purposes purely charitable, . . .may be exempt from taxation by general law but any such law may provide for approximate restitution to the respective political subdivisions of revenues lost by reason of the exemption. All laws exempting from taxation property other than the property enumerated in this article, shall be void. Article X, Section 6, Mo. Const. of 1945.

 

In support of this Constitutional provision, the Legislature has enacted Section 137.100, RSMo 2000, which provides in relevant part:

The following property shall be exempt from taxation:

(5) All property, real and personal, actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, or for purposes purely charitable and not held for private or corporate profit, except that the exemption herein granted does not include real property not actually used or occupied for the purpose of the organization but held or used as investment even though the income or rentals received therefrom is used wholly for religious, education or charitable purposes;

 

 

Section 137.100, RSMo 2000.

Case Law on Charitable Use

In order for a property to be exempt from taxation for state, county or local purposes, the following tests must be met:

1. The property must be actually and regularly used exclusively for a charitable purpose, as charity is defined by Salvation Army v. Hoehn, 188 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. banc 1945). “Charity” is therein defined as “. . .a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining the public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.” Salvation Army at 830.

2. The property must be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis. The property “must be dedicated unconditionally to the charitable activity in such a way that there will be no profit, presently or prospectively, to individuals or corporations. Any gain achieved in use of the building must be devoted to achievement of the charitable objectives of the project.” Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213, at 224 (Mo. banc 1978).

3. The dominant use of the property must be for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons and must directly or indirectly benefit society generally. “It is required that there be the element of direct or indirect benefit to society in addition to and as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons directly served by the humanitarian activity”. Franciscan at 224. See also, Barnes Hospital v. Leggett, 589 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. banc 1979).

Subject Property Operations

1. The 1,344 square feet of the subject clinic that is operated as a pharmacy is not operated on a not-for-profit basis. It is taxable.

2. The provision of products or services to the public at cost or less constitutes a gift.

3. Medical treatment directly benefits people by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering, or constraint and health education assists to establish people for life.

4. The performance history of the subject clinic evidences an intent to provide medical and educational services on a non-profit basis.

5. The availability of cost-based or subsidized medical services at the subject clinic accessible to rich and poor alike is beneficial to the Lawrence County community.

DECISION

1. Use

Exemption law requires an unconditional dedication to a charitable objective. Charity is defined as defined as “. . .a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining the public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.” Salvation Army at 830. Does Complainant’s operation of the subject clinic constitute a gift? The provision of products or services to the public at cost or less constitutes a gift. Complainant is organized as a non-profit corporation. Complainant through its subsidiary St. John’s Regional Medicine of the Ozarks (SJRMO) operates a two-physician family practice clinic and a one-physician internal medicine clinic at the subject property. Complainant presented evidence that the subject clinics operated at a $126,964 loss for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2000, and operations for the six months ending December 31, 2000, also indicated a $107,335 loss. While there is not evidence to show or explain the decision making involved in setting the charges or fees for the services at the clinics, the performance history evidences an intent to provide medical and educational services at cost or less.

The provision of medical services in a clinic setting clearly qualifies as an appropriate use under the Salvation Army definition in that medical treatment directly benefits people by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering, or constraint and health education assists to establish people for life.

2. Operation

Exemption law requires ownership and operation on a non-profit basis. The subject clinic is owned and operated by St. John’s Regional Medicine of the Ozarks (SJRMO), a Missouri Nonprofit Corporation. SJRMO was established as a Missouri Nonprofit Corporation in September of 1999. Since that time they have continuously owned and operated the subject clinic in Mount Vernon, Missouri. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 4. SJRMO’s Articles of Incorporation state the corporation’s purpose to be:

…to establish and maintain one or more medical clinics as institutions with permanent health service facilities for the diagnosis and treatment of patients and to provide such medical services as may be required by patients; to conduct educational activities related to care of the sick and injured or to the promotion of health; to develop efficient and practical arrangements for providing health services; to foster teaching and research functions at its facilities in cooperation with other health services and educational institutions; to provide in service training programs to personnel employed at its facilities in order to maintain their skills and to make them aware of developments in the health services field; and for any and all other lawful purpose or purposes for which a nonprofit corporation may be organized in the State of Missouri….

Complainant’s Exhibit E, at 1. The Articles further provide that no part of SJRMO’s net earnings or property may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual and that upon dissolution of the corporation, the corporate assets are to be distributed to the Sisters of Mercy Health System, St. Louis, Inc. or affiliated nonprofits or, alternatively, to a charitable organization as determined by the court. Id., at 2 and 4.

As referenced in the “use” discussion above, Complainant presented evidence that the subject clinic operated at a $126,964 loss for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2000, and operations for the six months ending December 31, 2000, also indicated a $107,335 loss. The mix of payment sources are: 37.5%- Medicare, 5%-Medicaid, Self Pay 27.5% and Insurance 30%. Elysa Fabian, C.O.O. for SJRMO testified:

…the payor mix is weighted heavily toward Medicare, Medicaid and self pay patients which compose approximately 70% of patients seen in the clinic. Both Medicare and Medicaid reimburse for physician services pursuant to a fee schedule. For example, on a Level III office visit for an established patient, the St. John’s charge is $55.25. Medicare pays $44.97 dollars and Medicaid pays $24.00 for the service. From a cost accounting standpoint the amount paid by Medicaid does not cover the cost incurred by St. John’s in the provision of these services.

Complainant’s Exhibit R at 8. She further testified that the subject clinic has operated at a loss since 1991 and that the losses are covered by St. John’s Health System, Inc., the parent corporation. Id. Trying to collect payment for services is not a factor that would disqualify a taxpayer from receiving a charitable exemption. Callaway Community Hospital v. Craighead, 759 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Mo. App. 1988).

The Medical Group Management Association annually publishes a national survey reporting salary, benefit, and retirement benefit ranges for physicians practicing a number of different specialties. The salaries and benefits for the physicians at the subject clinic are at or below the 25th percentile of the surveyed range of values for family practice and internal medicine specialties. Complainant’s Exhibit M, at 1. Ms. Fabian opined that the staff salaries were consistent with marketplace salaries for such positions. Complainant’s Exhibit R, at 9.

The salary structure for physicians is a two-tiered system. The physicians receive a bi-weekly draw payment that is based upon their historical productivity and can receive additional compensation if his or her production exceeds the production levels established in their compensation plan. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 10, Complainant’s Exhibit N, Appendix at 2. The additional compensation is tied to increased patient management as measured by net professional and ancillary revenues and not any resulting profit of the clinic. Complainant’s Exhibit N, Appendix at 2-3. While this may be a thin line, it appears that there are no profits paid to the physicians.

While there is not evidence to show or explain St. John’s Health System Inc.’s decision- making in setting the charges or fees for the services at the clinic, the performance history evidences an intent to provide medical and educational services on a non-profit basis.

Twitty v. State Tax Commission

In the Twitty v. State Tax Commission case, the Court of Appeals in the Southern District found a medical clinic in Greene County owned and operated by a corporate entity of St. John’s Regional Health Center to be taxable. 896 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995). The Court found that the clinic failed to qualify for property tax exemption because (1) the use of the subject clinic was not consistent with its corporate purposes of supplying medical care in under served areas; and (2) the role of the subject clinic was to generate income or profit to enhance the network. Id., at 687 and 688.

The operations of the subject clinic in this appeal are distinguishable from the clinic reviewed in the Twitty case in a number of ways. First, St. John’s Health System, Inc., and its subsidiaries have re-organized. As of 1999, the regional clinics are now owned and operated by a subsidiary entitled St. John’s Regional Medicine of the Ozarks which, according to its Articles of Incorporation, operates for the purpose of establishing and maintaining “…medical clinics as institutions with permanent health care facilities for the diagnosis and treatment of patients…” and providing certain health education functions on a not-for-profit basis. Complainant’s Exhibit E at 1. The owning and operating entity is no longer organized for the express corporate purpose of providing medical care in medically under served areas. The corporate purpose of establishing medical clinics in under served areas was important in the Twitty case because the clinic under review was established in Greene County which was not listed as a medically under served area. In this case, the owning entity does not have the express corporate purpose of establishing medical clinics in medically under served areas, rather, they have the purpose of establishing and operating medical clinics. Lawrence County is not currently designated as a medically under served area, but had been in the past. Tr. 4. A St. John’s corporate entity first established a medical clinic in Mt. Vernon in 1991. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 5. Elysa Fabian, C.O.O. of SJRMO, testified that Lawrence County would become under served again if either the Cox Health Systems clinic or the subject clinic would close. Id., at 11. Second, unlike the clinic in the Twitty case, there are no exhibits or testimony which suggest that profit was the primary goal of the clinic for the benefit of the clinic network, thereby, undermining a necessary determination that the clinic is dedicated unconditionally to a charitable objective. The Court’s analysis in the Twitty case as applied to the subject property’s operation lends support for a positive determination of exempt status.

Pharmacy

As referenced above, Complainant leases 1,344 square feet (11%) of the subject clinic to an individual for the operation of a pharmacy. The area is leased at a monthly rental of $1,106.00. All pharmacy proceeds are retained by the owner of the pharmacy. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 5. Even though the pharmacy tenant compliments the medical use of the building, this portion of the clinic is clearly held and leased for investment purposes and would not qualify for exemption, as conceded by Complainant.

3. Public Benefit

Exemption law further requires “…that there be the element of direct or indirect benefit to society in addition to and as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons directly served by the humanitarian activity.” Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213, at 224 (Mo. banc 1978). The patients seen and treated at the clinic are the persons directly served by the clinic operations. The families of those patients are also directly served by the clinic. On occasion, the clinic physicians provide services at area homes, the rehabilitation center, and the local law enforcement facilities. They also may provide volunteer services at area health programs, athletic events and community programs. Complainant’s Exhibit R at 11. Respondent contends that “…there has been no objectively measurable benefit to the county as a whole since Complainant purchased the subject premises (a tax-paying enterprise at that time) four years ago.” Respondent’s Brief at 4. While it is always easier to analyze objective measurements, there may not be a means of objectively measuring a direct or indirect benefit to society. Under this analysis the court requires us to consider whether the rendering of the charitable activity inherently confers a benefit to society in general. Is the operation of the subject clinic beneficial to that community in general, even if similar medical services are available elsewhere in the community? In developing this test, the court reasoned as follows:

Another prerequisite for charitable exemption is that the dominant use of the property must be for the benefit of an indefinite number of people, for the purpose, as expressed in Salvation Army, of “bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.” 188 S.W.2d at 830. The court at that same point included “humanitarian activities, * * * rendered at cost or less, which are intended to improve the physical, mental and moral condition of the recipients and make it less likely that they will become burdens on society and make it more likely that they will become useful citizens.” Thus, it is required that there be the element of direct or indirect benefit to society in addition to and as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons directly served by the humanitarian activity.

Examples of such humanitarian activities previously held to be exempt as charitable include the operation of hospitals which are open and available to rich and poor (Community Memorial and Jackson County ); a facility operated to provide employment and training for handicapped persons (Goodwill ); operating a YMCA building housing boys and young men, preferably of low income, as a part of a program intended *225 to foster good citizenship and Christian ideals in those boys and young men (YMCA No. 4 ); providing housing at less than cost to girls and young women, including the needy, intended to promote the welfare of such persons (Salvation Army ); providing good low cost housing for low income people to replace old, delapidated properties in a slum area which was cleared (Bader Realty ). All of these, while benefitting the individuals served, also were considered to benefit society generally.

Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213, 224-225 (Mo. banc 1978) (emphasis supplied).

Patients are not denied service at the subject clinic based upon an inability to pay. Ms. Fabian clarified Complainant’s policies regarding indigent patients as follows:

Q: Are patients denied service due to their inability to pay?

A: No. Our policy is to work with patients to determine an acceptable payment arrangement. If they are unable to make payments, their account is written off to charity care.

Q: Do you write off patient accounts as bad debts?

A: We write off accounts to charity for those patients who work with us. Those patients who do not accept responsibility for the payment of their bills and do not respond to any of the billing statements are often written off as bad debt and referred to a collection agency.

Q: Are these patients given the opportunity to work with the clinic regarding payment arrangements?

A: As previously stated, our staff is very willing to work with those patients who accept responsibility for payment of their bills, communicate with us, and show follow through to their commitments.

Q: Are patients terminated from the clinic because of their payments?

A: No, they are not. As stated earlier, we try and work with those patients who do not have insurance to determine an acceptable payment schedule. We also have a very significant Medicare and Medicaid payor mix and we participate in a number of managed care insurance contracts.

Q: Are the patients denied appointments with the clinic?

A: Appointments are made pursuant to scheduling availability. There will be times when physicians are on vacation or ill and we are unable to accommodate patient requests for appointments. Individuals who have shown a lack of responsibility on their accounts may also have their patient-physician relationship terminated and if this was to occur we would not schedule their appointment. However, we provide the patient thirty (30) days notice of any type of termination and remain available to provide emergency care should they happen to come back to the clinic thereafter.

Complainant’s Exhibit R, at 12.

The fact that Lawrence County has cost-based or subsidized medical services at the subject clinic (and perhaps other locations) available to rich and poor alike is beneficial to the Lawrence County community.

Conclusion

The evidence persuasively supports a conclusion that the portion of the subject clinic used for family practice and internal medicine clinics is actually and regularly used exclusively for a charitable purpose, is owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis, and that the use of the subject clinic is beneficial to society in addition to those directly served by the subject clinic. That portion of the subject clinic is entitled to a property tax exemption.

ORDER

The non-exempt status the subject property for tax year 2000, as determined by the Assessor and approved by the Board of Equalization, is SET ASIDE. The Clerk is HEREBY ORDERED to show this parcel as exempt for tax year 2000.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of a hearing officer decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.

If an application for review of a hearing officer decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Lawrence County as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED September 6, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Aimee Smashey

Hearing Officer

Twelve Oaks Motor Inn v. Strahan (Taney)

September 6th, 2001

 

 

TWELVE OAKS MOTOR INN, INC., )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 00-89503

)

JAMES STRAHAN, ASSESSOR, )

TANEY COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

Holding: The evidence on the record most persuasively supports a market value of $1,725,000 for the subject property as of January 1, 1999. The assessment is modified accordingly. The May 1999 Notice of Change in Assessed Value provided adequate notice of increased assessment. Accordingly, the Commission only has jurisdiction to review the 2000 assessment.

SUMMARY

The subject property in this appeal consists of a 4.05 acre parcel improved with two motels. The two properties have a total of 116 guest rooms. The older motel, Twelve Oaks, has 66 rooms, exterior corridors, was built in three phases (1982, 1986, and 1990) and has three separate buildings. It has an outdoor pool, an office, a manager’s apartment, two other apartments, and a maintenance area with two garage doors. The newer motel, Spinning Wheel, has 50 rooms, exterior corridors and was built in 1993. It has an outdoor pool and a manager’s apartment. The subject property is located at 205 and 215 Shaefer Drive, Branson, Missouri. The parcel identification number is 07-7.0-35-000-000-039.000.

Respondent appraised the subject property at a market value of $2,506,470 ($802,070, assessed) for the 1999 – 2000 assessment cycle. On July 13, 2000, the Taney County Board of Equalization reviewed the assessment for the 2000 tax year and affirmed the assessor’s valuation. Complainant appeals the assessment on the grounds of overvaluation and discrimination and proposes a market value of $1,725,000 ($552,000 assessed). Complainant further challenges the adequacy of the 1999 Notice of Change in Assessed Value in putting Complainant on notice that the 1999 assessed value would increase regardless of the ultimate outcome of the 1997 cycle assessment appeals. Complainant maintains that the notice communicates a tentative assessment increase for the 1999 cycle subject to the court’s decision in the pending litigation. Complainant argues that in light of the ineffective notice, the 1999 assessment should be under consideration in this appeal and should be reduced in accordance with Complainant’s valuation evidence.

An evidentiary hearing was conducted on April 19, 2001, at the Taney County Courthouse, Forsyth, Missouri. Complainant appeared by Counsel, C. Ronald Baird, Springfield, Missouri. Respondent appeared by Counsel, William McCullah, Taney County Counselor, Forsyth, Missouri.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer Aimee L. Smashey.

Complainant’s Evidence

Complainant presented the appraisal testimony and report of Appraiser Kenny Meyers. Mr. Meyers relied upon the income approach in arriving at his opinion of value because typical investors purchase hotels in anticipation of the income stream that can be generated from operation of the property. Mr. Meyers evaluated the cost and sales comparison approaches, but did not develop them because of the significant physical, functional, and external obsolescence applicable to the cost approach, and the lack of a credible means of separating real estate value from the business value and the FF&E value in the sales data.

To begin his income approach, he analyzed the revenue stream for the subject properties for the last 4 years and the market revenues for comparable properties on the Schaefer Drive Loop, and on Green Mountain Drive. From his analysis, he projected a stabilized occupancy of 78%, a stabilized average daily rate (ADR) of $40.50 and a revenue per available room (RevPAR) of $31.59. These projections indicate a room revenue of $967,791 or $8,343 per room. He projected additional miscellaneous revenues at $12,347 which flows from the rental of the two apartments, telephone revenues and merchandise sales. The total projected revenues are $980,291.

Mr. Meyers evaluated the expense information from the subject motels and industry-wide market surveys complied by the Host Report and PKF Trends. He stabilized expenses at 69.3% of revenue. He calculated reserves for replacement at 3.97%, and a return on FF& E of 1.07%. Deducting these expense projections from the projected revenue stream yields a net income attributable to the real property of $241,187.

In order to calculate an appropriate capitalization rate, Mr. Meyers used market extraction and a mortgage-equity analysis. For market rate data, he relied on a capitalization rate study updated in January 2000 that was produced for Johnson, Sedgwick, Shawnee and Douglas Counties in Kansas. He indicated that this study included sales from across the nation and differentiated between luxury/full-service, limited service, and extended stay properties. The market extraction analysis indicated a range of overall rates from 12.5% to 13%. In working his mortgage-equity analysis he utilized Arthur Anderson’s 1996 Hospitality and Leisure Executive Report, and Landuauer and Associates’ 1998 Hospitality Investment Survey Results. He estimated the mortgage interest rates between 8.5% and 9% and the equity yield rate between 17.5% and 20% which lead to a range of overall rates between 11.35% and 12.5%. These analyses led Mr. Meyers to the conclusion that the subject properties would have an overall capitalization rate of 12.5%, which, with the addition of the effective tax rate of 1.37%, indicated a tax-adjusted overall range of 13.75% – 14%. Applying this capitalization range to the projected net income of $241,187, Mr. Meyers concluded a value of $1,725,000 for the subject property as of January 1, 1999. Complainant’s proposed value breaks down to $14,870 per unit.

Complainant also offered the testimony of Mr. Martin Joseph Sinclair, sole owner of Complainant. Mr. Sinclair testified that he has been a motel operator in the Branson area since 1982. Mr. Sinclair also testified that he learned of the recent sale of Dutch Country Inn for $12,000 per unit from a Mr. Schaeffer who was a real estate broker involved in the sale.

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent, James Strahan, offered testimony that he valued the subject property for tax purposes using a cost approach to value. In his cost approach methodology, he determined the replacement cost new less depreciation for improvements to be $1,977,212 and the value of the land at $529,254 for an indicated total value of $2,506,466 for the subject property as of January 1, 1999. Mr. Strahan’s value breaks down to $21,607 per unit.

Mr. Strahan also offered a list of nine sales of motel properties in the Branson area between 1998 and 2001 that ranged in price from $16,600 to $23,529 per unit. These sales included the contributory value of the property’s furniture, fixtures, and equipment. Tr. 58.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Taney County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property consists of a 4.05 acre parcel improved with two motels. The two properties have a total of 116 guest rooms. The older motel, Twelve Oaks, has 66 rooms, exterior corridors, was built in three phases (1982, 1986, and 1990) and has three separate buildings. It has an outdoor pool, an office, a manager’s apartment, two other apartments, and a maintenance area with two garage doors. The newer motel, Spinning Wheel, has 50 rooms, exterior corridors and was built in 1993. It has an outdoor pool and a manager’s apartment.

3. The subject motels are not operated year round. The Twelve Oaks Motor Inn is open from mid-March through mid-December for a 271-day season. The Spinning Wheel Inn is open April through mid-December for a 255-day season.

4. Motels are income-producing properties. They are typically bought and sold based upon their ability to produce income.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Complainant, as movant in the appeal, has the burden of presenting substantial and persuasive evidence that its proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 1999, in order to have that value accepted. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897.

2. “Substantial” evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

3. “Persuasive” evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

4. It is this Hearing Officer’s judgment that Complainant’s appraisal provides the best indication of what buyers and sellers would rely on in negotiating a sales price for the subject property. Accordingly, it is the best evidence of the market value of the subject property as of January 1, 1999.

5. The subject real property has a market value of $1,725,000 ($14,870 per unit) as of January 1, 1999.

6. The May, 1999 Notice of Change in Assessed Value provided adequate notice of an increase in assessed value for the 1999 tax year despite the unresolved nature of the previous assessment.

DECISION

Valuation

The question that must be answered from the evidence submitted is: What was the market value of the subject properties as of January 1, 1999? “Market value” is defined as “…[t]he most probable price which a property would bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus. Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. buyer and seller are typically motivated;

2. both parties are well informed or well advised, and acting in what they consider their best interests;

3. a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market;

4. payment is made in terms of cash in United States dollars or in terms of financial arrangements comparable thereto; and

5. the price represents the normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions granted by anyone associated with the sale.”

Federal Register, vol. 55, no. 163, August 22, 1990, pages 34228 and 34229; also quoted in the Definitions section of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, 1996 ed.

The hearing officer, sitting as trier of fact in this appeal, has the responsibility to review the evidence presented in order to determine what is the best, most persuasive evidence of the market value of the subject property. The subject property in this appeal is an income-producing property. It is exchanged in the marketplace based upon its ability to produce income. Complainant presented an appraisal that relied upon reasonable projections of stabilized income, expenses, and the appropriate tax-loaded capitalization rate. Respondent presented an appraisal that relied upon reasonable projections of replacement cost, estimates of physical depreciation, and a determination of the contributory value of the underlying land. This Hearing Officer is persuaded that Complainant’s value is the best indicator of the market value of the subject property.

1999 Notice of Increased Assessment

Complainant challenges the adequacy of the 1999 Notice of Change in Assessed Value in putting Complainant on notice that the 1999 assessed value would increase regardless of the ultimate outcome of the 1997 cycle assessment appeals. Complainant maintains that the notice communicates a tentative assessment increase for the 1999 cycle subject to the court’s decision in the pending litigation. Complainant argues that in light of the ineffective notice, the 1999 assessment should be under consideration in this appeal and should be reduced in accordance with Complainant’s valuation evidence. It is this Hearing Officer’s judgment that the May, 1999 notice reasonably communicates the Assessor’s intention to raise the assessment for the 1999 assessment year despite the unresolved nature of the previous assessment.

ORDER

The 2000 assessed valuation for the subject property is modified to $552,000.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of a hearing officer decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.

If an application for review of a hearing officer decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Taney County as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED September 6, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Aimee Smashey

Hearing Officer

 

DENYING APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

OF HEARING OFFICER DECISION

On September 6, 2001, Hearing Officer Aimee L. Smashey entered her Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessment by the Taney County Board of Equalization and finding value for the property under appeal for the 2000 tax year. The Hearing Officer determined that the 1999 notice of increase in assessment provided adequate notice to Complainant and that the 1999 assessment was not properly before the Commission, since no appeal of the 1999 assessment had been made to the Board of Equalization and the Commission in tax year 1999.

Complainant’s Ground for Review

Complainant timely filed its Application for Review of the Decision. Complainant’s Application for Review does not challenge the determination of valuation for the 2000 tax year. The sole basis for Complainant’s Application for Review is that the Hearing Officer misapplied the law to the facts in this appeal in that the 1999 notice that was sent to the taxpayer was vague and ambiguous and, therefore, was improper notice under the statues and void under the law of the State of Missouri.

DECISION

Exhibit B in this appeal (copy attached to this Order) (note:   a copy of the attachment is available from the State Tax Commission’s office – it is not attached here) is a copy of the May, 1999, Notice of Change in Assessed Value of Real Property issued by Respondent on the subject property. Said Notice contains the following headings and writing: (Items in Bold are as printed on the Notice, Items in Italic are handwritten on the Notice.)

Previous Assessed value (1998):

RESIDENTIAL     AGRICULTURAL      COMMERCIAL TOTAL

                                                        Total           584,000          584,000

                                                                            pending court Decision

Previous Assessed value (1999):

RESIDENTIAL     AGRICULTURAL      COMMERCIAL TOTAL

                                                        Total     802,070    802,070

The words pending court Decision are also circled on the Notice.

In the case of Twelve Oaks Motor Inn, Inc. v. Strahan, STC Appeal No. 97-89535 (April 26, 1999), the Commission sustained the Decision of Chief Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor, in finding the assessed value for the subject property for the 1997-98 assessment cycle to be $584,000. On May 6, 1999, Respondent filed a Petition for Review of the Commission’s Decision in the Circuit Court of Taney County.

Hearing Officer Smashey in her Decision made the following Conclusion of Law: The May, 1999 Notice of Change in Assessed Value provided adequate notice of an increase in assessed value for the 1999 tax year despite the unresolved nature of the previous assessment. Decision, p. 6, Conclusion of Law 6. Complainant asserts that this determination by the Hearing Officer was in error. Complainant’s position is that the ambiguous language on the assessment form constituted a failure to give notice of the increased assessment by the Assessor’s Office and thus denied Complainant its administrative remedies. The Commission is not so persuaded.

The Notice of Change also contains the following language which clearly put the Complainant on notice as to its administrative remedy.

In accordance with the laws of the State of Missouri, the Taney County Assessor’s Office is required to provide a notice of change in value to property owners. The assessed value for 1999 total (bold and underlined in original) at the bottom right corner represents the value to be used in determination of property taxes for 1999. If the property owner does not agree with these values, they may appeal this value by one of two methods: Informal Hearing, or Board of Equalization Hearing. If you have questions concerning this notice or wish to schedule an informal hearing, you may call the Taney County Assessor’s Office at 417-546-7241 or 546-7240. Board of Equalization Hearing appointments must be made with the County Clerk’s office at 417-546-7200.

If Complainant found the notice ambiguous, it should have availed itself of the opportunity to place a phone call to the Assessor to determine if the 1998 or the 1999 assessed value would be changed pending the court decision. The location of the phrase pending court Decision on the notice could reasonably be applied to the 1998 valuation and not the 1999 valuation. The Hearing Officer could rightly so find. Furthermore, knowing that the 1997-98 valuation had been for $584,000 it would be most reasonable to assume that figure might change if the circuit court ruled in favor of Respondent on his appeal. The Notice clearly states that the assessed value of $802,070 is the value to be used in determination of the 1999 property taxes. The 1999 valuation was not a part of the pending court case. The Notice taken as a whole clearly provides for an increase in the value of the subject property for 1999 to $802,070.

A review of the record provides support for the determination made by the Hearing Officer relative to adequate notice. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused her discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). The conclusion made by the Hearing Officer is supported by substantial evidence upon the whole record. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

The Hearing Officer did not err in her determination as challenged by Complainant. The Complainant’s point is not well taken.

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.470 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED December 4, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Sam D. Leake, Chairman

Bruce E. Davis, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner 

Pohlman, Inc. v. Gogarty (SLCO)

September 6th, 2001

 

 

POHLMAN, INC., )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 00-10023

)

MAURICE M. GOGARTY, ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE, Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject property for tax year 2000 to be $2,407,875, assessed value of $802,625.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Thomas L. Caradonna, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUES

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2000.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization (Board) which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Respondent determined an appraised value of $6,213,930 (assessed value of $2,071,310, as personal property – furniture, machinery, tools, manufacturing and office equipment). A hearing was conducted on July 24, 2001, at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant’s Evidence

Complainant offered into evidence the appraisal report (Exhibit A) and written direct testimony (Exhibit B) of Allen D. Bealmear, ASA, CEA, President of MB Valuation Services. Exhibit C, a cost and sales comparison illustration of valuation referenced in the written direct testimony of Mr. Bealmear, was prefiled with Exhibit B. Exhibit D, a listing of comparable sales data on certain items of equipment, and Exhibit E, an affidavit of Richard L. Luter, Facilities Manager for Complainant, were offered into evidence in rebuttal. All exhibits were receive into evidence. Mr. Bealmear was cross-examined by Respondent’s Counsel, and that testimony, as well as testimony in response to questions by the Hearing Officer, in redirect examination and in rebuttal, constitute part of the record in this appeal. Mr. Bealmer presented his opinion of value for the subject property of $2,406,775.

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent offered into evidence the following exhibits:

Exhibit 1 Appraisal Report, with Exhibits 1 through 5 attached, of Martina Ragain, Revenue Field Auditor for St. Louis County, Missouri.

Exhibit 2 Written Direct Testimony of Ms. Ragain.

Exhibit 3 Written Direct Testimony of Richard Haubrick, Revenue Field Auditor Supervisor for St. Louis County, Missouri.

All the exhibits were received into evidence. Ms. Ragain was cross-examined by Complainant’s Counsel and her testimony under cross-examination, testimony in response to questions by the Hearing Officer and in redirect examination constitute part of the record in this appeal. Ms. Ragain offered her opinion of value for the subject property of $5,298,930.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The subject property consists of approximately 1,652 individual items of furniture, office machines and equipment, machinery, tools and manufacturing equipment. The property is identified by the Respondent’s account number M0023699A for tax year 2000. The property is located at 140 Long Road, Chesterfield, Missouri. These individual items of property make up and constitute the manufacturing operation of Complainant. A complete listing of the items of property under appeal is found in Exhibit A, pp. 18-64, with 26 photographs of certain specific items on seven pages following page 64.

2. Complainant’s appraiser valued approximately 1,641 of the items of property relying on comparative sales data, and 11 of the items (Items 203, 290, 300, 434, 468, 469, 475, 476, 580, 604 & 605 – Total appraised value of $102,080) relying on a discounted cost analysis or replacement cost new, less depreciation. Exhibit A, pp. 10-11, pp. 18-64; Exhibits C & D.

3. Complainant’s appraiser valued the items of property based on the concept of fair market value – the estimated amount expressed in terms of money that may reasonably be expected for an item of property between a willing buyer and a willing seller with equity to both, neither under compulsion to buy or sell and both fully aware of all relevant facts. Exhibit A, p. 3, 9. Exhibit B, p. 7, Line 12 – p. 8, Line 9. This is the appropriate concept of value to be applied in the valuation of the property.

4. Personal property is valued based upon its true value in money. True value in money is value in exchange, not value in use or value installed. Value in use/installed may be, in a given case, the value in exchange if there is market data to so establish. There was no such market data presented in this appeal from which it could be established that value in use/installed was value in exchange.

5. Complainant’s appraiser conducted a personal inspection of the items of property being valued. Exhibit A, pp. 7-8; Exhibit B, p. 6, Line 25 – p. 7, Line 11. He confirmed with Complainant that all of the items in the appraisal report were at the subject facility as of January 1, 2000. Exhibit B, p. 7, Lines 9-11; Tr. 71, Line 24 – Tr. 72, Line 2.

6. Complainant’s appraiser performed his appraisal in conformity with the Principles of Appraisal Practice and Code of Ethics of the American Society of Appraisers, and in conformity with the applicable standards of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). Exhibit A, p. 4; Exhibit B, p. 22, Lines 10-15.

7. The concept of highest and best use was considered by the appraiser in his valuation of the subject property in accordance with Standard 7, Subsection 3(a) of USPAP. The subject items of furniture, machinery, tools and equipment were being utilized for the purpose designed by the manufacturer and therefore, were being utilized in the reasonably probable and legal use that is physically possible, appropriately supported and financially feasible, and resulted in the highest value in the appropriate marketplace. Exhibit A, pp. 4, 6 & 8; Exhibit B, p. 10, Line 13 – p. 11, Line 13. None of the items of machinery, tools and equipment have any special or unique characteristics which would require that they be valued as a unit or whole rather than individually. Exhibit B, p. 8, Lines 10-23.

8. The principle of substitution is that a prudent buyer will not pay more for a property than the cost of acquiring a substitute property of equivalent utility. The principle can be applied to either an individual asset or to an entire facility. The principle applies in either a cost, sales comparison or income approach. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, Machinery and Technical Specialities Committee of the American Society of Appraisers, 2000, pp. 45, 115; Appraising Machinery and Equipment, Machinery and Equipment Textbook Committee of the American Society of Appraisers, John Alico, Editor, 1989, p. 81; Exhibit 1, p. 7.

9. Complainant’s appraiser relied upon the MB Data Base in his appraisal. The MB Data Base is made up of a multitude of research data sources, including purchase price new from a manufacturer, dealers’ asking and selling prices, auction sales and any other type of transaction which can be gathered. This data base is a large data resource computer program which has sales information posted to it daily of all kinds of equipment from the various sources. The database has the condition of items of sale machinery and equipment when it is known. The database identifies the type of sale, equipment being sold, date of sale, location of sale, and auctioneer from sale brochures on the various auctions. Information from the database can be sorted by categories of equipment type and model. Each equipment category has data posted which can then be retrieved for use in appraising such individual items of machinery and equipment. The sources utilized in the MB Data Base are sources that the appraiser is familiar with and that he has found to be reliable over his years of appraisal practice. The sources used in the data base are sources that are generally accepted by the appraisal community as reliable. Other appraisers use the MB Data Base as a resource in performing their appraisals. Exhibit A, pp. 5 & 17, Exhibit B, p. 18, Line 14 – p. 21, Line 4; Tr. 47, Line 14 – Tr. 48, Line 4; Tr. 48, Line 16 – Tr. 49, Line 1; Tr. 67, Lines 12-15.

10. Complainant’s appraiser also utilized recognized pricing guides, sources and catalogues as research data sources. Contacts were made to manufacturers of various items of machinery and equipment being appraised. Exhibit A, p. 17.

11. Complainant’s evidence was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and to establish the true value in money of the subject property under appeal as of January 1, 2000, to be $2,406,775, as proposed.

12. Respondent’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and to establish the true value in money of the subject property under appeal as of January 1, 2000, to be $5,298,930, as proposed.

13. The value of vehicles of $600 was not at issue in this appeal. Exhibit 1, p. 14.

14. The value of supplies reported by Complainant as $500 was not at issue in this appeal.

15. The total true value in money of the subject furniture, machinery, tools, equipment, vehicles and supplies as of January 1, 2000, was $2,407,875, assessed value of $802,625.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Board Presumption

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the Board. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo 1994, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978). True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use. Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S. W.2d 798, 801-802 (Mo. 1973); Equitable Life Assurance v. Morton, 852 S.W.2d 376 (380) (Mo. 1993).

Complainant’s Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2000. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Respondent’s Burden of Proof

In an appeal where Respondent presents an opinion of value different from that determined by the Board, substantial and persuasive evidence must be presented to rebut the Board presumption and establish the value proposed. Hermel, supra.

Weight to be Given Evidence

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

Trier of Fact

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as she may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

Opinion Testimony by Experts

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion of inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinion or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992)

DECISION

Complainant Proved Value

Complainant’s evidence presented an opinion of value based on the concept of fair market value or value in exchange. This concept of value as employed by Complainant’s appraiser presents a methodology which is proper, fair, not arbitrary, not capricious and is lawful under Missouri statutes, Commission regulations and case law. This is the recognized standard under Missouri case law. Section 138.430, RSMo. A listing of recent cases following this standard can be found at the end of this decision (End Note – hereinafter cited as P. D. George et al).

Valuing what a knowledgeable buyer and seller would give in exchange for the individual items of property and totaling the values avoids conjecture and speculation. Complainant’s appraisal clearly demonstrated that there is reliable sales data available on virtually all of the subject items (1641 out of 1652 items of property – 99.33%). The sales data establishes the prices at which the various individual items of property are selling in the market. From such data, a clear indication of the value for the various pieces of machinery, tools and equipment can be developed.

Mr. Bealmear’s opinion of value is based upon reliable and appropriate data. He correctly valued the property relying upon the value in exchange concept recognized under Missouri case law, statutes, Commission regulations and decisions. His appraisal methodology and resulting final opinion are based upon a reasonable degree of appraisal standards certainty. Therefore, Complainant has met its burden of proof to establish the true value in money for the subject property to be $2,406,775, as proposed. To this is added $600 for vehicles and $500 for supplies (See, Findings of Fact 13 and 14, supra.), for a total true value in money for all property under appeal and not contested of $2,407,875, assessed at one-third as personal property for an assessed value of $802,625.

Sales Data

The data relied upon by Mr. Bealmear demonstrates that the market for the hundreds of pieces of machinery, tools and equipment that comprise the subject property consists of all types of sales transactions, direct and indirect (direct sale – sale to ultimate end user; indirect sale – sale to used equipment dealer). The fact that some sales, or even a large number of the sales relied upon, are auction sales, either consignment, orderly liquidation or forced liquidation, does not render such sales invalid for developing an opinion of value. Such sales are not the same as forced sales for taxes or mortgage foreclosures in real property cases. The market world for items of machinery, tools and equipment consists of new equipment sales, recondition equipment sales, orderly liquidations, forced (bankruptcy) sales, excess equipment sales and auctions.

This diversity of types of transactions does not render use of data derived from such sales invalid or inappropriate. This market arena, with its mixed information base, is where real transactions occur each day. It is the responsibility of the appraiser when faced with an appraisal problem such as the present one, to explore and analyze this market arena to extract the most reliable data to utilize in his appraisal. It is the responsibility of the appraiser to make the appropriate upward or downward adjustments to such sales data to arrive at an opinion of value for the particular item of property being valued. Such adjustments are made in large part based on the experience which the individual appraiser is able to bring to bear in a given appraisal assignment. Complainant’s appraiser made appropriate adjustments for the various types of sales which were utilized in the appraisal relying upon his education, training and experience. Mr. Bealmear is a well trained and experienced appraiser having more than 28 years of experience in valuing machinery, tools and equipment. Furthermore, his firm is able to rely upon the vast experience of other appraisers (Karen Miles Milan, ASA, 15 years appraisal experience) and their education, training and experience, as well as a trained research staff which provides assistance in data collection and analysis. Exhibit A, pp. 72 & 74; Exhibit B, p. 19, Lines 6-15, 24 – p. 20, Line 16. The staff of MB Valuation Services monitors sales of machinery and equipment by on-site attendance at the sale. Questionnaires are filled out regarding information relating to the number of attendants, number of active bidders, type of bidders (end users or used equipment dealers), conduct of auctioneers, handling of the crowd, and the weather. These are all factors which could affect the results of the sale. The information for sales is entered into the databank in order that relevant factors can be considered when adjustments are made to comparables. Tr. 67, Line 23 – Tr. 68, Line 20.

If there is another market arena where sales of the multitude of individual items which comprise the subject property in this appeal sell together in an assembled manner, then it would, of course, be appropriate for the appraiser to explore, investigate and analyze the sales which occur in that market. It would, in fact, be his responsibility to do so in order to arrive at an appropriate opinion of value. However, there is no evidence in this record of such a market.

In the absence of such evidence, it would amount to pure speculation and conjecture for either the appraiser or this Hearing Officer to attempt to arrive at a valuation of the subject property under such a hypothetical market condition. Accordingly, the evidence of sales brought forward by Mr. Bealmear is substantial and persuasive evidence as to what the hundreds of items of machinery, tools and equipment which make up the subject property are selling for in the only market for which evidence was presented

The experience and record of the Commission in addressing valuation of machinery, tools and equipment in twenty separate appeals (P. D. George, et al, infra) has clearly shown, without any contradictory evidence, that the auction market is a major component of the arena in which used machinery, tools and equipment are bought and sold throughout the United States. Nothing was presented in the present appeal which demonstrates in any way, shape or form that there is another market arena, level of trade for used machinery and equipment, from which Mr. Bealmear should have drawn sales data. The data base which is utilized by Mr. Bealmear in addition to information received from transactions at auctions also includes used equipment dealer’s asking and selling prices.

Willing Seller/Willing Buyer and Machinery and Equipment Auctions

The definition of fair market value (true value in money – Section 137.115, RSMo) utilized by the experts for both parties in this appeal is the estimated amount expressed in terms of money that may reasonably be expected for an item of property between a willing buyer and a willing seller with equity to both, neither under compulsion to buy or sell and both fully aware of all relevant facts. In other words, in attempting to value a given item of machinery or even an assembled group of machinery and equipment a hypothetical sale between a willing buyer and seller, of the property being valued, is assumed in order to establish the standard of value. In some minds, this translates to a prohibition against the use of any sales data which does not also involve a willing seller and a willing buyer or that per se any auction sale is inappropriate and cannot be used. Such a conclusion is in error.

In the field of real estate appraisal, appraisers do not rely upon tax sales as a comparable sale. In most instances, a mortgage foreclosure sale of real estate would not be utilized as a comparable sale. In both cases the seller is not considered to be a willing seller. In addition, however, there are other factors which weigh against using a tax or foreclosure sale in real estate appraisals. In a tax sale, all that is being sought is recovery of taxes owed and expenses of the sale. In a foreclosure sale, recovery of the outstanding debt and expenses of sale is what is being sought. In tax and foreclosure real estate sales, the exposure to the market is greatly limited, consisting of generally a legal notice in the local newspaper and posted at the courthouse. Furthermore, in real estate appraisal there is generally sufficient market data outside of tax and foreclosure sales from which sales data can be extracted.

In the realm of machinery and equipment auctions there are significant differences from real estate tax or foreclosure auctions. If a machinery and equipment auction involves a bankruptcy, the bankrupt owner is, of course, being forced to sell. However, the trustee in bankruptcy is under an obligation to protect creditors by obtaining the best price possible when assets are sold. The record in this appeal and in other similar cases (P. D. George, infra), which have come before the Commission, clearly and convincingly establishes that vast amounts of various machinery, tools and equipment used in a multitude of manufacturing operations and facilities are bought and sold on a continuing basis throughout the nation in auction sales. This is a recognized level of trade for used machinery and equipment which can be utilized in valuing machinery and equipment. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, Chapter 4 – Sales Comparison Approach, pp. 115-155.

The very nature of a machinery and equipment auction is for the entity conducting the auction to expose the items to be sold to as large a group of buyers as possible through the advertising of the sale. The auctioneer is motivated to obtain the highest sale price possible, since compensation to the auctioneer is based upon a percentage of sale price. This is the case whether the sale involves a forced liquidation or not. In other words, the auctioneer does not seek to get a lower price for sale items simply because there may be a forced liquidation.

In many states, there is a Deceptive Trade Practice Act which prohibits public offerings of machinery and equipment for sale without disclosing everything the seller knows about the property. For the most part, auctioneers and sellers know the equipment being sold and they are aware if there is anything wrong with it. Sellers at auctions disclose if a machine is only a partial machine, without certain components or whether it was considered scrap or in poor condition. Bidders are also aware of such conditions. They do not buy out of ignorance. Tr. 75, Line 19 – Tr. 76, Line 2.

There is no evidence to even suggest that buyers at an auction will bid lower if it is a bankruptcy sale as opposed to a sale of excess machinery or a sale simply due to a plant closing. Basic reasoning establishes that bidding by potential buyers is not tied in any logical fashion to the seller’s motivation or circumstances which brought about the sale. Buyers at an auction, like buyers in any other sales arena, seek to buy at the lowest price. Auctioneers as the selling agent for the seller are seeking the highest price. Competing buyers increase the sale price by bidding against each other.

Any sale, auction or otherwise, of a given piece of machinery is valid to use as a comparable sale for a like piece of machinery if proper adjustments are made. Adjustments to comparable sales, whether in real property or personal property appraisals, are what brings the comparable to reflect market value and make the appropriate comparison to the subject. There is no set formula for each type of adjustment which might be made to a sale price for a given piece of machinery. It is not possible nor practical to set up a sales grid for each item of machinery and equipment in which the subject item of machinery or equipment would be compared to 4, 6, 8 or a dozen like items of property and each one adjusted on the various possible points of comparability for machinery and equipment. (See, Valuing Machinery and Equipment, Elements of Comparability, pp. 120-122). The adjustments which are required to be made are a product of the appraiser’s training and experience. Mr. Bealmear made adjustments to bring the sales data to the fair market value standard. Exhibit B, p. 18, Lines 6 – 13; Tr. 67, Lines 4-22.

The credentials, testimony and other evidence on this record demonstrate that Mr. Bealmear is quite knowledgeable and experienced in the various elements of comparability which would need to be considered for making adjustments and conducting a proper appraisal. His testimony substantiated that in performing his appraisal he made relevant inquiries related to the subject items of machinery and equipment that are ordinarily and properly made. He had available, through his own research or that of his staff, essential and appropriate information relative to the sales used for comparison in the appraisal. In summary, it is reasonable to conclude that the Bealmear appraisal was conducted in such a manner as to be in accordance with the general frame work and guidelines one would expect for such an appraisal. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, Chapter 4.

Principle of Substitution

Sales Comparison Approach

The valuation of the subject property by Complainant’s expert is in accordance with the principle of substitution for these particular assets. A well informed buyer will not pay more for items of property than the amount such property will command in a market with sufficient demand. Mr. Bealmear found sufficient sales to value nearly every single piece of machinery and equipment by the sales comparison approach. His appraisal demonstrates a market with sufficient demand for the various items of manufacturing property being valued in this appeal. The Bealmear illustrations and supporting data (Exhibits C and D) show that he generally had four or more sales of items of machinery and equipment to use to arrive at an indicated value for each of the 1641 items of machinery and equipment valued under the sales comparison approach. The Hearing Officer concludes from the testimony of the expert that there were in all likelihood a larger number than 4 to 6 sales for many of the individual items, however, the appraiser selected those sales which were most like the subject item being valued. Exhibit B, p. 17, Line 14 – p. 18, Line 4; Tr. 42, Line 25 – Tr. 43, Line 15.

The sales information utilized by Mr. Bealmear demonstrates what informed buyers are paying for the various items of machinery and equipment. One of the strengths of drawing from such sales data is that the appraiser is dealing with actual transactions for the purchase of like machinery, whether by an end user or a used equipment dealer for resale. For example, when valuing a 1993 Fadal CNC Vertical Machining Center, Model 4020 (Exhibit A, Entry # 250, p. 36), the appraiser had five different sales of model 4020 units ranging in age from 1990 to 1996. The sales of these five units had taken place in a period from November, 1999, through July, 2000, in four different states. The sale prices ranged from $22,00 to $42,500. After adjustments, Mr. Bealmear opined a value of $30,000 for the subject unit. Exhibit D. Actual sales data provides a firm foundation from which the trained and experienced appraiser can make appropriate adjustments to arrive at an opinion of what price the item of property being valued would demand in an open and active market.

Cost Approach

In those few instances (11 items of machinery) in this appeal, where Complainant’s expert was unable to find adequate sales of machinery and equipment, he arrived at an opinion of value using the cost approach. In developing his cost approach, Mr. Bealmear would obtain the replacement cost new as of the effective date for the appraisal (valuation date – January 1, 2000) from the manufacturer of the particular item of machinery or equipment. If the appraiser was unable to obtain a replacement cost new from the manufacturer, he would attempt to determine the date of acquisition and purchase price and make appropriate adjustments for the difference in time between its original purchase and the valuation date. From the replacement cost new, either obtained from the manufacturer or calculated from original acquisition costs, deductions were made for physical, functional and economic obsolescence. Exhibit A, p. 10; Exhibit B, p. 14, Line 13 – p. 15, Line 15.

The adjustment for physical depreciation is made based upon the actual inspection of each item of machinery and equipment and discussions with plant personnel, if necessary, regarding the physical condition. Functional depreciation can be anything such as a different model from which would be purchased new, difference in speed, capacity, type of controls, energy consumption, technological changes or any other factor which might be considered an obsolescence factor when compared to a new piece of equipment. Economic obsolescence is a deduction that is made for factors which affect the value of an item of machinery outside of the specific piece of property. It could include style of machine, demand for specific equipment or demand for the product which the machine produces or other factors outside the given machine. The appraiser can contact the manufacturer to investigate demand for a given piece of equipment to determine economic obsolescence. It can also be calculated by looking at equipment of a similar type and comparing the market price for such equipment to the cost new to calculate economic obsolescence where physical and functional obsolescence are known. Information available to Mr. Bealmear through his data sources provides information from the market to assist in adjusting for the three types of obsolescence in performing his cost approach. Exhibit A, p. 10; Exhibit B, p. 14, Line 13 – p. 17, Line 8; Exhibit C; Tr. 24, Line 10 – Tr. 29, Line 14; Tr. 21, Line 21 – Tr. 32, Line 10. The cost methodology employed by Mr. Bealmear for the limited number of items valued under this approach appears to be within the parameters and guidelines for developing a cost approach as applicable in this appraisal problem generally recognized by the machinery and equipment appraisal community. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, Chapter 3, pp. 45-113.

Miyano Machines

Respondent’s appraiser asserted that as of January 1, 2000, Complainant had nine Miyano machines. This was based upon information provided by an employee at the Complainant’s facility. She was able to only locate three such machines in Mr. Bealmear’s appraisal report and concluded that he had omitted six Miyano machines from being valued. Exhibit 1, p. 10; Exhibit 3, Q & A 20 & 23. Ms. Ragain did not specifically count and identify nine Miyano machines, due to the fact that at the time of her inspection of the Complainant’s facility all the Miyano machines were stacked together in such a manner that she could not count them or further identify them.

Counsel for Complainant presented rebuttal evidence in the form of testimony by Mr. Bealmear and an affidavit from the Facilities Manager for Pohlman relative to the number of Miyano machines at Pohlman’s St. Louis County facility as of January 1, 2000. Tr. 144, Line 25 – Tr. 147, Line 9; Exhibit E. Exhibit E establishes that entries number 425, 426 and 427 of the Bealmear appraisal represent the only Miyano machines located at Pohlman’s St. Louis County facility on January 1, 2001.

Ms. Ragain’s testimony was inconclusive to establish that in point of fact on January 1, 2000, there were nine Miyano machines at the St. Louis County facility of Complainant. The company may, in fact, have owned nine such machines on January 1, 2000. However, the evidence from Mr. Bealmear’s appraisal, his inspection and inventory to ascertain the machinery and equipment at the St. Louis facility as of January 1, 2000, and the affidavit of the Complainant’s Facility Manager establish that Mr. Bealmear identified and valued the only Miyano machines at the St. Louis facility on January 1, 2000.

Respondent’s Valuation Not Persuasive

Appraisal Methodology

Mass Valuation Appraisal

Respondent’s appraiser, Ms. Ragain, elected to perform a mass valuation of the subject property relying on a set of depreciation tables or a given depreciation factor for various categories of the subject property. The only exception to this methodology was the valuation of the Miyano machines which the appraiser denoted as a market approach. This valuation will be discussed separately below.

In performing her valuation, Ms. Ragain relied upon the asset list shown by Exhibit 2 to Exhibit 1 to value the property under appeal. Ms. Ragain totaled the acquisition costs for the various categories of property (Furniture, Fixtures & Office Machines, Computer and Peripheral Equipment, Manufacturing Equipment and Tooling) by year of acquisition and then multiplied each total acquisition cost by a depreciation percentage based upon the year of acquisition. The basic methodology was the same as the appraiser would have used for any taxpayer in St. Louis County under the County’s mass appraisal system. She utilized the depreciation factors set forth on the Personal Property & Manufacturer’s Equipment Declaration (Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 1) for all items except computer and peripheral equipment and for those items used depreciation factors from a study performed by the NACOMEX company. Exhibit 1, pp. 9 and 11-13; Exhibit 5 to Exhibit 1, p. 3, Schedule 8; Tr. 79, Line 24 – Tr. 80, Line 19; Tr. 89, Line 8 – Tr. 90 Line 7.

In conducting her valuation of the subject property, Ms. Ragain did not determine what it would cost to replace each individual item of personal property new as of January 1, 2000, nor what it would cost to replace the assembled furniture, fixtures, office machines, computers, computer peripheral equipment, manufacturing equipment, etc. She did not make a specific analysis and determination of physical, functional or economic depreciation or obsolescence for each item of property or for the assembled items of property. The appraiser did not make an itemized listing of the various items of property for each category and for each year based upon an inspection and inventory of the Complainant’s facility. She did not make any effort to verify whether any of the items on the asset list (Exhibit 2 to Exhibit 1) were at the facility as of January 1, 2000. Exhibit 1; Tr. 84, Line 8 – Tr. 85, Line 1; Tr. 90, Line 25 – Tr. 91, Line 14; Tr. 103, Lines 20-25.

Proper Cost Methodology

The proper methodology for developing an estimate of value relying on the cost approach starts with a determination of replacement cost new for an item of property as of the date of valuation. The next step is to address the issue of physical depreciation for the item of property and make an appropriate deduction. Functional obsolescence for the property must then be analyzed and an adjustment made for this factor. Finally, the matter of economic obsolescence must be considered and investigated so that a proper adjustment can be made. Tr. 83, Line 8 – Tr. 84, Line 7; Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, Chapter 3, p. 45.

This is not the methodology utilized by Respondent’s appraiser. The cost approach relied upon by Respondent starts with original costs and allegedly trends the cost to estimate current replacement cost and then makes deductions for the elements of physical, functional and economic depreciation. All of this is supposed to be contained in the composite factor which is the combination of a trending factor used to develop a reproduction cost new and the remaining economic life, commonly referred to as the percent good after the deduction for depreciation. The composite factor is also called the original cost multipliers. These original cost multipliers are a tool commonly used by assessors in mass valuations of personal property. The original cost multipliers are the percentage factors in the individual depreciation tables used by Ms. Ragain in Exhibit 1 and Exhibits 1 and 5 to Exhibit 1.

Under this trending/depreciation of original costs all machinery and equipment purchased in a given year is trended and depreciated at exactly the same rate. This is true irrespective of whether the item of machinery and equipment is an anvil, a barrel pump, a parts cleaner, a turning center or an automatic screw machine (all items of machinery and equipment included in the subject property). Neither the appraisal of Ms. Ragain, nor her testimony establishes the trending factor for any given year or the basis, analysis or research to develop the unknown trending factors. Nor does Respondent’s evidence establish the basis, analysis or research to develop the unknown depreciation factors for each year. All of this weighs in on the side of unpersuasive when considering Respondent’s valuation.

Trending in Cost Approach

Respondent’s methodology is further unpersuasive due to its variance from accepted appraisal practice. The trending factor (whatever it may be for a given year) has been applied by Ms. Ragain and by Respondent in the original mass valuation to original cost. Trending is applied not to the original cost but to the historic cost. Historical cost is the cost of a property when first placed in service by its first owner. Original cost is the actual cost of a property when acquired by the present owner. In some instances historical and original cost may, of course, be the same. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, Chapter 3, p. 62.

Trending can easily lead to errors in valuation. Trending does not give replacement cost new. It does not provide a means to measure the difference between reproduction cost new and replacement cost new. Trending is to only be applied to historical cost. The appraiser must establish that the cost being trended is the actual historical cost and not a cost resulting from a prior allocation of purchase price or used cost. Historical cost to be trended may not be the typical cost, but may include or exclude cost factors that must be considered and accounted for in a given appraisal problem. Trending of used cost is improper. Trending factors are based on averages but the specific property being valued may differ from the average. Trending for periods in excess of ten years should not be employed unless confirmation can be made by other methods of estimating cost new. The appraiser should know the basics of how the trending index was developed. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra, Chapter 3, pp. 62-64. The record in this appeal provides nothing to demonstrate that any of these concerns are addressed in any manner by the trending/depreciation schedules employed by Respondent and Respondent’s appraiser. This results in the methodology as applied being unsubstantial and non-persuasive to establish the value proposed.

Depreciation Factors

In like manner, the unknown depreciation factors which are contained in the cost multipliers relied upon by Ms. Ragain lack in persuasive content for the purpose for which they are employed. The most obvious deficiency is that the factors do not separately identify physical, functional and economic obsolescence. All are simply lumped together for each individual year. This results in all individual items of office furniture and equipment for a given year being depreciated at the same rate for physical, functional and economic factors, irrespective of actual physical condition, functional utility or economic circumstances. The same would be true for each item of manufacturing machinery and equipment.

The appraiser had conducted no market studies to support the depreciation schedules which she relied upon. She had no knowledge of any market studies having been performed by the Assessor’s office to support the depreciation factors employed in her appraisal. Ms. Ragain did not independently arrive at the depreciation schedules used to value the subject property. Tr. 93, Line 22 – Tr. 94, Line 18.

Miyano Equipment

The issue of the number of Miyano machines has been fully addressed above. (See, Miyano Machines, pp. 19-20). Ms. Ragain contends that the Miyano machinery was valued under a market approach, valuing nine machines at six percent (6%) of original cost. As concluded above, there were only three Miyano machines at the Complainant’s St. Louis facility to be valued on January 1, 2000. Mr. Bealmear, relying on sales of like machines valued, each Miyano (3 machines) at $30,000. Ms. Ragain valued the three machines, which she believed were the three valued by Mr. Bealmear, at $20,480, applying the 6% good factor to the original cost of $341,295 per machine.

Ms. Ragain had obtained the 6% factor from a contact to the sales department for used equipment of the Miyanos/CNC company. Exhibit 3 to Exhibit 1; Exhibit 3, Q & A 20. This is an appropriate source for an appraiser to contact when gathering data and performing an appraisal. However, it does not equate to a sales comparable in the absence of more substantial data having been provided as to models of machines, dates of sales, sale prices, etc., which constitute the kind of information needed to be researched for a sales comparison approach and the kind of information which the Bealmear appraisal and testimony demonstrate. Accordingly, Ms. Ragain’s valuation of the three Miyano machines is not persuasive to establish value. Ms. Ragain valued six items of property which she identified as Miyano machines which were not property at the St. Louis County facility on January 1, 2000.

Tooling

Ms. Ragain placed a value of $542,710 on what she characterized as tools, dies and molds which she contended were omitted from the Bealmear appraisal. Exhibit 3, Q & A 20. She arrived at an acquisition value for such items from pages 14 – 16 of Exhibit 2 to Exhibit 1 for items listed identified by a TF on the asset list. She then applied depreciation factors per year of acquisition to the total cost per year for three, five and ten year life tooling. Exhibit 1, pp. 12-13.

The questioning of both Ms. Ragain and Mr. Bealmear established several important factors relating to the valuation of the subject machinery and equipment and any tooling which might be related to given machinery and equipment. Tr. 49, Line 9 – Tr. 66, Line 10 & Tr. 104, Line 7 – Tr. 117, Line 6. Mr. Bealmear is very knowledgeable as to what constitutes tooling on machinery. He understands and is able to distinguish between durable tooling and expendable tooling or supplies. His valuation accounted for durable tooling and was appraised. He did not value supplies. The Hearing Officer has included the value for supplies, as reported by Complainant, in the final determination of value in this Decision. Finding of Fact 13, supra, p. 6. Respondent’s evidence does not establish that Mr. Bealmear failed to value the durable tooling which was part of the subject property as of January 1, 2000.

Ms. Ragain did not attempt in any manner to identify the various items she categorized as tooling. In point of fact, a review of the listing of items she considered to be tooling quickly demonstrates that the descriptions given are not adequate to identify what most, if any, of the items actually are. Such entries as Misc Deph, Chip Break, Hydormat i, Inverting, Vertical s, pulleys, loader, combustion, gage, cut-off un, retention, control, etc. appear in the listing on pages 14-16 of Exhibit 2 to Exhibit 1. Ms. Ragain was not able to explain what any of these entries meant, what type of tooling the entries may have described or whether any of the items would have been properly valued as part of a piece of equipment. This demonstrates an essential weakness in simply taking acquisition costs from a list for purposes of valuation when no effort is made to identify exactly what the list constitutes and contains, and whether there are items which are in fact parts of the durable tooling of machines which would be valued as a part of such machines in either a true cost analysis or a sales comparison methodology.

No explanation was provided relative to how the appraiser determined that certain items on the asset list constituted three, five or ten year life tooling. Nor was any information or data provided to establish what the trending indices, if used, were for tooling, or the basis for the various depreciation factors employed. In short, Complainant’s evidence established that durable tooling was appraised by Mr. Bealmear and that no tooling, dyes or molds were omitted. Respondent’s assertion that such items were omitted was unsubstantiated. Respondent’s valuation of the general category of tools, dyes and molds was not based upon substantial and persuasive evidence either as to the issue of value, nor as to appropriate and proper identification of the items being valued in the mass valuation. After considering the testimony of both Mr. Bealmear and Ms. Ragain, it is the conclusion of the Hearing Officer that Mr. Bealmear properly accounted for the value of tooling in conjunction with and as a part of the appropriate machine or equipment for which durable tooling was applicable. No property of durable tooling was omitted from the Bealmear appraisal.

Unpersuasiveness of Mass Valuation Methodology in Contested Cases

Mass valuation of personal property under a standard set of depreciation schedules is used for purposes of reassessment throughout the state, especially when dealing with the machinery and equipment which makes up a manufacturing facility. Due to the multitude of items of personal property and the individual personal property accounts in any given county it is not possible, nor practical for the assessor to perform an individual appraisal on each manufacturing facility for purposes of his annual personal property assessment. Therefore, the mass valuation methodology whereby the assessor multiplies the total acquisition costs for a given year times a set depreciation amount (percent good) for each year to arrive at an indicated true value in money is an appropriate tool to use for valuing office furniture, computer equipment and manufacturing machinery and equipment. However, once the issue of valuation has moved to an appeal before the Commission, the mass valuation approach, absent market derived supporting evidence, will generally lack the qualities of substantial and persuasive evidence to establish value. This is especially true in the face of an appraisal of the property under appeal based upon market data in the development of sales comparison and cost approaches.

The mass valuation technique has been presented in various contested cases before the Commission (See, P. D. George, et al, infra). It has failed to reach the level of substantial and persuasive evidence in each instance. The reason the method is not persuasive in a contested case is quite simple. There is no hard market data to demonstrate and support the validity and soundness of the underlying figures used in the mathematical calculations. As has been discussed above (See, Proper Cost Methodology, Trending in Cost Approach, Depreciation Factors, supra, pp. 21-24 ), the critical factors which go into the math equation are unsupported by the market.

The formula for any given year is very basic. The formula is A x B = market value. In the formula A represents acquisition costs. This apparently includes the purchase price for the item of property by Complainant, the original sales tax, if applicable, the original freight expenses and all original installation costs for each given year of acquisition. Exhibit 1, pp. 8-9. The factor B represents the combination trending and depreciation factors for each given year of acquisition. Exhibit 1, p. 8. The process of calculation is fundamental. All of the acquisition costs for a given year from an asset ledger are totaled to arrive at the A factor for the year. The factor A is then multiplied times B which represents the amount trended up for the given year and the amount of depreciation deducted to produce a percent good.

Relying on this elementary formula in a contested case is fatally flawed in the absence of market data to establish the proper foundation for this methodology. Respondent’s exhibits, taken individually or collectively do not provide any indication or supporting documentation which will demonstrate that acquisition costs (A) represents the market cost new as of January 1, 2000. There is nothing within Respondent’s exhibits that establish that the various trending and depreciation factors (B), which were used for furniture and office machines, computers and peripherals, manufacturing equipment and tooling, are appropriate for any of the given items of property or the entire group of items of property which were acquired in a single year to which one trending/depreciation (percent good) factor would apply. The two elements A and B must be supported by market data if Respondent desires to rely upon these figures.

Respondent’s appraiser did present in Exhibit 4 to Exhibit 1 illustrations for four individual items of property in an attempt to demonstrate that the 25% depreciation factor utilized for all manufacturing equipment acquired before 1995 was appropriate. No such similar information was presented which would support other depreciation factors relied upon in the remainder of Respondent’s appraisal. Three of the four illustrations when compared to the market data relied upon by Complainant’s appraiser (Exhibit D) demonstrate general support for the valuations determined by Mr. Bealmear under his sales comparison approach. On only one of the items (Entry 496 – Micrometer, Exhibit A) was the Bealmear sales data and conclusion of value, and the Ragain data and calculated value at a great degree of variance.

This demonstration provides some level of support for the 25% depreciation factor, however, it is of limited benefit given that it is based on only four items of machinery and equipment. Actual cost new and a sufficient number of sales of comparable machinery and equipment should have been obtained to make appropriate calculations to arrive at depreciation factors. Furthermore, since the limited calculations essentially provide support for the Bealmear valuations on the items given, it provides substantiation for developing and relying on a sales comparison methodology, as opposed to using a mass valuation approach. Actual sales data on machinery and equipment that is being actively traded provides a superior foundation for valuation of such items than a cost method relying upon depreciation factors unsupported by proper market analysis.

The entire exercise of using a combined factor for trending and depreciation is unnecessary in the vast majority of appeals, since it has been demonstrated time and time again that there is an active user to user (direct) and user to dealer (indirect) market for the vast majority of machinery and equipment that is found in virtually every type of manufacturing facility. (See, P. D. George, et al, infra). Sales from this market can be adjusted to arrive at a market based indication of value. Furthermore, the appropriate and proper methodology, if a party seeks to rely upon the cost approach, is to obtain replacement cost new from the market and then adjust for physical depreciation based upon actual observation of each item of property and adjusted for functional and economic obsolescence derived from appropriate market investigation and data.

Reliance upon acquisition costs, whether historic or original, as the starting point of a valuation exercise in a contested case and a table of trending and depreciation factors in the face of actual sales data does not reach the level of substantial and persuasive to establish value. It matters little what was paid for an item of equipment five or six years prior to tax date, when one can go to the market and find a sufficient number of actual sales for the item to demonstrate the present value. This procedure (investigation and research of the present market) eliminates any level of speculation and conjecture as to whether the trended and then depreciated acquisition cost is reflective of market value.

Expert Testimony

A determination of value in a personal property case involving items of machinery and equipment rests to a very large extent on evidence presented by the expert witnesses. Where specialized knowledge will assist the hearing officer to understand evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness with necessary knowledge, skill, experience, training and education may testify as an expert. Section 490.065, RSMo. The issue of valuation of machinery and equipment calls for expert testimony in the form of an appraisal and direct and cross-examinations. In the present appeal a witness for each side was tendered as an expert in valuation of the property under appeal.

Complainant’s Expert

Complainant’s expert, Allen D. Bealmear, brings extensive education, training and experience to the performance of his appraisal assignment. He has in excess of twenty-eight years of appraisal experience. He holds a Bachelors degree in Valuation Sciences. He is a Senior Member of the American Society of Appraisers in both Machinery/Technical Specialities and Real Property/Urban. He is a certified equipment appraiser (CEA) with the Association of Machinery and Equipment Appraisers. He holds memberships in the Association of Iron and Steel Engineers, American Bankruptcy Institute and Machinery Dealers National Association.

He has performed appraisal and research assignments relating to machinery and equipment in industrial plants in twenty-four different industries, consisting of: Steel Making, Metals Processing & Fabricating, Construction, Mining, Concrete, Gravel & Asphalt Plants, Quarries, Aerospace & Electronics, Printing, Paper Making & Processing, Food Processing, Metalworking & Woodworking Machine Tools, Textiles, Plastics, Chemical Manufacturing & Processing, Special Single Purpose, Industrial Prototypes, Agricultural, Petro-Chemical, Agricultural Chemical, Marine, Communications, Waste & Water Treatment Facilities and Computer. He has performed real estate appraisals for special purpose industrial properties, apartment, office, recreational and commercial properties.

Mr. Bealmear has appraised properties in the United States and 15 other countries. He has been a contributing editor or author of papers appearing in various valuation publications such as Market & Valuation, Market Update Report, ASA Valuation, M & E Appraiser and Handbook on Business Valuation. He has testified as an expert witness in Federal Bankruptcy Courts and tax courts in various states and before the State Tax Commission of Missouri on approximately twenty occasions. He is president of MB Valuation Services which appraises industrial plants, machinery and equipment, personal property, real estate and inventory. Exhibit A, p. 73 & Exhibit B, p. 5, Line 9 – p. 6, Line 16.

Mr. Bealmear was assisted in his appraisal of the subject property by Karen Miles Milan, ASA and CEA. Ms. Milan has had the ASA and CEA designation since 1989. Her experience in appraisal of machinery and equipment in industrial plants parallels that of Mr. Bealmear. She has appraisal experience in the United States, Ireland, Canada and Mexico. Exhibit A, p. 74.

Respondent’s Expert

Respondent’s expert, Martina Ragain, has been a revenue field auditor for St. Louis County for over three years. Prior to becoming a revenue field auditor she worked as a Clerk III and an Account Clerk II for St. Louis County from approximately 1994 through 1998. From 1988 until 1994 she worked for the St. Louis City Assessor as a personal property appraiser and assistant supervisor. She has completed all of the IAAO (International Association of Assessing Officers) courses required for the personal property designation. She has not previously testified as an expert witness before the Commission or in court on an appraisal of machinery and equipment. Exhibit 3, Q & A 1 – 5.

Ms. Ragain was supervised in her appraisal by Mr. Richard Haubrich, revenue field auditor supervisor for St. Louis County. Mr. Haubrich has been a revenue field auditor for nineteen years and the supervisor for one and a half years. He has never testified as an expert witness before the Commission or in court on an appraisal of machinery and equipment. Exhibit 2, Q & A 1 – 5.

Weight Accorded Evidence

The Hearing Officer, as trier of the facts, is responsible for the weighing of the evidence presented. The Hearing Officer has the duty to evaluate the evidence presented to determine the sufficiency and persuasiveness of the evidence in establishing market value. One of the critical factors in weighing and evaluating evidence is the education, training and experience of the experts who testify on the issue of value.

The comparison made just above between Mr. Bealmear and Ms. Ragain is not intended to, in any manner, cast aspersions on Ms. Ragain and her work and experience as a revenue field auditor. Nor is the comparison aimed at denigrating Ms. Ragain for her work with regards to this appeal. The comparison is important because of the contrast which it demonstrates between the two witnesses relative to the specific and relevant expertise which each brought to the trial of this appeal.

The Hearing Officer has no reason to believe that Ms. Ragain is not a competent and qualified revenue field auditor. The Hearing Officer would not suggest for one instance that Ms. Ragain did anything less than her best in carrying out the responsibility assigned to her relative to valuation of the property under appeal. Nevertheless, the expertise and skill which Ms. Ragain possesses relative to the work necessary to conduct a field audit do not translate into the category of qualifications essential to properly perform either a cost or sales comparison approach for valuation of furniture, computers, machinery and equipment. Just as persons playing on the PGA (Professional Golfers Association) Tour are superior to the Hearing Officer in golfing skills, Mr. Bealmear is superior as an expert in appraisal of machinery and equipment to Ms. Ragain.

Accordingly, the Hearing Officer cannot simply turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to the Complainant’s evidence as developed and presented by a recognized expert in the field of machinery and equipment valuation. The Bealmear appraisal comes within the standards of both the Commission rule (12 CSR 30-3.065(2) and American Society of Appraisers (Valuing Machinery and Equipment, supra) for rendering a persuasive opinion of value. The evidence on this record which is possessed of both substantial and persuasive weight is the opinion of value developed by the Bealmear appraisal. This is so because of the following factors:

1. Mr. Bealmear possesses the necessary credentials to establish his expert status for performing both a proper cost approach and a proper market approach to arrive at an opinion of value.

2. The various items of furniture, computer and manufacturing equipment are regularly traded in the used machinery and equipment market as evidenced by the fact that comparable sales data was available on 99.34% of the items being valued (1641/1652 = .9934).

3. Complainant’s appraisal valued the items of machinery and equipment on the basis that they will continue to be utilized for the specific purpose or function for which each is designed. The property was not valued on a salvage or scrap basis. The appraiser recognized that the machinery and equipment will continue to be used in a manufacturing process, as evidence by the reliance on sales of comparable machinery and equipment that is bought and sold to be used in an on going manufacturing operation.

4. Complainant’s valuation was based upon generally accepted appraisal methodology and practice, for furniture, computers, machinery and equipment such as comprise the personal property under appeal, relying upon appropriately developed sales and cost data.

5. No evidence was presented, derived from and/or supported by market transactions, which would establish that the subject property would sell for a value greater than that determined under Complainant’s cost and sales comparison approaches.

6. Respondent’s mass cost methodology, which is not adequately supported by or founded upon market data, fails to demonstrate or establish that such a methodology provides a reliable and persuasive indication of market value.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2000 is set at $802,625.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds

upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the License Collector of St. Louis County shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, Complainant may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED September 6, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

 

END NOTE

The following is a list of recent appeals which have addressed the issue of valuing of machinery, tools and equipment in various manufacturing facilities in various counties.

P. D. George v. Daly, STC Appeal 97-20316, March 21, 2000, Order Granting Application for Review, August 10, 2000,

(Daly v. P. D. George Co., Cause No. 004-2046, Circuit Court City of St. Louis, April 24, 2001);

St. Clair Die Casting v. Overschmidt, STC Appeal 99-57024, 5/3/00;

Rexam v. Overschmidt, STC Appeal 99-57025, 5/3/00;

Bull Moose Tube Co. v Overschmidt, STC Appeals 99-57027 & 99-57028, 5/3/00;

Angeles Group, Inc. v. Overschmidt, STC Appeal 99-57029, 5/3/00;

Ducoa v. Tunnell, STC Appeal 99-65000, 5/5/00;

St. Louis Post-Dispatch v. Daly, STC Appeal 99-20261, 1/29/01;

Nordyne, Inc. v. Daly, STC Appeal 99-20263 (1/29/01);

Lincoln Industrial v. Daly, STC Appeal 99-20264, 1/29/01;

Boxes, Inc. v. Daly, STC Appeal 99-20265, 1/29/01;

P. D. George v. Daly, STC Appeal No. 99-20262, 2/2/01;

Sunline Brands v. Daly, STC Appeal 99-20269, 4/30/01;

Alumax Foils, Inc. v. Daly, STC Appeal 99-20270; 4/30/01;

St. Clair Die Casting Company v. Overschmidt, STC Appeal 00-57002, 5/16/01;

Rexam Containers v. Overschmidt, STC Appeal No. 00-57003, 5/16/01;

Bull Moose Tube Company v. Overschmidt, STC Appeals No. 00-57004 & 00-57005, 5/16/01;

Lowell Manufacturing Co. v. Overschmidt, STC Appeal 00-57006, 5/16/01.

Warner-Jenkinson v. Daly, STC Appeal 99-20267, 8/8/01.

Watlow Industries v. Ruhl, STC Appeal 00-81000, 8/8/01.

VonWeise Gear v. Overschmidt, STC Appeal 00-57001, 8/8/01

Ozark Avalon v. Lachner (Cooper)

August 8th, 2001

 

 

OZARK AVALON, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 00-52500

)

JAMES LACHNER, ASSESSOR, )

COOPER COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the Cooper County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor and rejecting Complainant’s claim for exemption, SET ASIDE. Subject Property found to be exempt as a religious use property.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Daniel S. Simon, Columbia, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Douglas Abele, Prosecuting Attorney.

Case heard and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

The only issue in this case is Complainant’s entitlement to an exemption on religious and/or charitable grounds.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the Cooper County Board of Equalization which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $8,900 (assessed value of $1,070, as agricultural property). Complainant does not contest either the valuation or classification of the subject property, but appeals on the sole ground of the asserted entitlement to an exemption on religious/charitable grounds. A hearing was conducted on July 12, 2001 at the Cooper County Courthouse, Boonville, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant’s Evidence

The following exhibits were received into evidence on behalf of Complainant.

Exhibit 1        Certificate of Incorporation of Complainant.

Exhibit 2         Letter to Cooper County Commission requesting documents, with copies of documents requested attached.

Exhibit 3         Subdivision Restriction Indenture.

Exhibit 4         Letter from Shelby County Assessor.

Exhibit 5        Affidavit of Tax-Exempt Status from Cedar County.

Exhibit 6         Affidavit of Tax-Exempt Status from Madison County.

Exhibit 7         List of Exempt Properties in Cooper County.

Exhibit 8        Application for Exemption, Form 1023 for Complainant.

Exhibit 9    IRS Exemption Letter for Complainant.

Exhibit 10 Letters to Respondent from members of Complainant.

Exhibit 11 Letter from President of Complainant.

Exhibit 12 Letter to ACLU, with attachments.

Exhibit 13 Letter to Complainant.

Exhibit 14 Articles of Incorporation of Complainant.

Exhibit 15 Bylaws of Complainant.

Exhibit 16 Income and Expense Statement of Complainant.

Exhibit 17 Photographs of Complainant’s property and activities at the property.

Exhibit 18 Affidavits of Tax-Exempt Status from various counties.

Exhibit 19 Written Direct Testimony of the President/Secretary, Robert Thomas Dixon, III and Treasurer, Rose Wise, of Complainant.

Mr. Dixon testified under cross-examination, redirect examination and questions by the Hearing Officer. There was no cross-examination of Ms. Wise.

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent presented no evidence.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Cooper County Board of Equalization. Complaint for Review of Assessment; Board of Equalization Letter, dated July 27, 2000.

2. The property in this appeal is located at 26213 Cumberland Church Road, Boonville, Cooper County, Missouri and identified as parcel number 82993. Complaint for Review of Assessment. Respondent valued this property at $8,900 (assessed value $1,070). Exhibit 2, Property Record Card. Complainant does not dispute this value.

3. The subject property (church site) consists of a tract of land of approximately 84 to 87 acres. Tr. 12, Lines 21-22; Exhibit 2, Property Record Card. There is a shed on the church site in which camping supplies for use of individuals are kept and a pre-Civil war farmhouse that has been converted to a retreat center with four bunk rooms. No one resides permanently in the retreat center or on the church site. Tr. 18, Lines 4 – 17.

4. Complainant (Ozark Avalon) is a not-for-profit religious corporation and is exempt from income taxation under the Internal Revenue Code. Exhibits 1, 8, 9, 14 and 15.

5. Ozark Avalon is organized exclusively for religious, educational and charitable purposes within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as amended) to be a church offering worship services and religious education classes, and to do any and all things which may be necessary or proper in connection with these purposes. Exhibit 14.

6. Ozark Avalon is a Wiccan church. Exhibit 19, Q & A 9 & 11.

7. The church site is used to provide a safe place for outdoor worship in an earth-centered, earth honoring spiritual context, to promote community among persons with these beliefs and practices and to further environmentalism and appreciation for nature spirits and the earth. The church site is the land owned by Ozark Avalon on which the congregation worships. It is necessary to the mission of Ozark Avalon as a church. Exhibit 19, Q & A 9, 10 & 19.

8. Wicca is a religion of nature. The worship and celebration cycles coincide with the seasons of the year. Worshiping in a religion of nature depends significantly on access to nature. Worship services and weekend retreats are the primary activities conducted on the church site. Retreats are held to celebrate the eight Wiccan holidays each calendar year. Retreats foster inter-generational fellowship, community, religious education, and worship. The Saturday evening worship service is the culmination of each weekend retreat, held (weather dependent) out of doors. At retreats religious education classes are tied thematically to the liturgical year. Personal relationship with God and Goddess is presented through the stories and lessons of the holiday appropriate for that season. Retreats generally start at 5 p.m. on a Friday and end at

12 p.m. on Sunday, or Monday in the case of a 3 day weekend. There are separate children’s religious education tracks at most retreats. Adult only services are provided twice a year for addressing marital and relationship issues. Exhibit 19, Q & A 11,12, 13, 14, 49, 51, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 & 70.

9. Wicca is a religion based on the concept of personal responsibility, the interconnectedness of all life and the call to serve God and Goddess through ecological living and stewardship of the Earth. Ozark Avalon follows the Wiccan Rede – an it harm none, do as thou will. Applied to everyday life, this means each action must be weighed against possible harm to others, including one’s self. Combined with the attitude that one is related to, not set above, all other life, Wicca is a rather peaceful religion. Ozark Avalon believes and lives the Wiccan Three Fold Law – whatsoever you do shall be returned to you three fold. This is a statement of relationships. It is the moral equivalent of the Christian adage – do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Exhibit 19, Q & A 76, 77 & 79.

10. Wicca full moon ceremonies are held on the Saturday nearest the full moon. A typical Wiccan worship experience starts with creating a circle, i.e., a setting aside of a particular space for a sacred purpose. Prayers of invocation are said at each cardinal point of the circle, asking for the blessing of each element at that point. Prayers of invocation are said for God and Goddess, asking for the blessing of the worship about to commence. The worship to be done may take a wide array of purposes; a wedding, a funeral, an infant naming, a request for healing, a homily on a particular subject, or a simple celebration of community. Following the worship is a period of general communion. Food and drink are often served, and announcements of community interest are made. God and Goddess are then praised, thanked, and released, as are the elements at each cardinal point of the circle. The circle is then opened. Song and dance is considered appropriate at all points of the worship experience. The purpose of Wicca worship is to offer thanks and prayers to God and Goddess, to establish a feeling of spiritual growth and inter-dependence between each other and all living things, to bring one closer to God and Goddess through prayer, song, dance, and community, to share fellowship and worship with fellows of like mind and to mark the passing of the seasons. Exhibit 19, Q & A 15, 16 & 52

11. The activities of worship, religious education classes, group discussion, individual contemplation and meditation in a natural surrounding are designed to promote understanding of God and Goddess in the Wicca church. Exhibit 19, Q & A 53.

12. The are currently 72 members of Ozark Avalon. The membership has been increasing steadily for the last five years. A typical worship service will have 5-10 members and 10-15 non-members, though summer time services have been as high as 50 attendees. Approximately 95% of members are returning worshipers. The number of attenders at a retreat will vary. The largest retreat is during Labor Day weekend, the traditional congregational meeting weekend. During this time, 40-50 members will be present along with 30-40 non-members. Exhibit 19, Q & A, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30 & 36.

13. The vast majority of the religious activities held on the church site are inter-generational and open to both males and females. There are religious education classes for toddlers through elders. The Wicca worship incorporates customs from European, Native American and African traditions, since Ozark Avalon has members from all of these backgrounds. Ozark Avalon opens its doors to people of all faiths. Persons of many backgrounds worship on the church site, including Christians, Jews, Muslims and others. Children attending Ozark Avalon services are exposed to many traditions in a broad religious education. The Yule retreat includes children’s stories from the Christian Christmas, the Jewish Hanukkah and the African-American Kwanzaa. Several of the children are of different faiths or mixed faith families. There are 12 current members who are children and 6 more actively working towards membership. Children’s religious education is age-appropriate. Ozark Avalon offers a week-long day-camp for children in the spring. Exhibit 19, Q & A, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 55, 78 & 82.

14. Work weekends are held at the church site. These weekends are opportunities for volunteers to do retreat preparation, facility repair and maintenance. They can be used as contributions to the church and are recognized equally with cash donations. They are also a chance to live the ideals of service to the community and to the environment of the sacred earth held by members of Ozark Avalon. Activities during the work weekends include preparing the land for religious worship, brush hogging meadows, child care for other workers, clearing trails, clearing worship areas, cutting firewood, digging and lining new and existing fire pits, emptying the composting toilets, hauling sand and gravel to the lake, helping to cook lunch, maintaining the floating dock at the lake, maintaining the plumbing for the showers, making items for the worship service, planting seeds and weeding the garden. These activities are conducted by volunteer labor in order to repair and maintain the church physical plant (the church site – subject land). It is the goal of the work weekends to maintain the church site, to train members in the day to day operations of the church and the church site, fellowship with one another and do service to God and Goddess through stewardship of the land. Because Ozark Avalon believes the earth is the sacred manifestation of God and Goddess, and that service to the environment honors the sacredness of the individual and all of nature, the work weekend activities enhance the individual’s personal relationship with God and Goddess. Separate age appropriate activities and tasks for the children are included in the work weekends. Exhibit 19, Q & A, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 & 63.

15. Ozark Avalon provides different opportunities outside of traditional worship service to its members, these include, pastoral counseling, hospital visits, care and sheltering of those in need and marital counseling. Clergy are available for one to one counseling, meditation, and hospital visits when needed. Ozark Avalon collects money, arranges services and otherwise coordinates help for members or others in need. The church also participates in interfaith canned food and clothing drives. The church has provided shelter to the homeless, need-based scholarship for retreats and special accommodations for those with disabilities. Exhibit 19, Q & A 71, 72 & 73.

16. There is no charge to attend worship services at the church site. The camping retreats do have a suggested donation level to cover costs. There has always been an option to make a donation of labor rather than monies. There is also a policy of waiving a donation for cases of hardship. Exhibit 19, Q & A 86.

17. Under the beliefs of Wicca any particular natural setting is appropriate for worship and religious education. The church will organize religious services around a particular section of the church grounds to facilitate the needs of the congregants and the service being performed. The environment of the church grounds is important to the advancement of the religion of Ozark Avalon. Nature is a manifestation of God and Goddess. This view of God and Goddess existing within nature is referred to theologically as immanence, and has been linked to another theological idea known as continuous creation. According to this theological notion, God and Goddess did not create only one time and then back away from the world, but they create continually and moment to moment. That is why God and Goddess can act and express through nature. Nature in this view is the ever created embodiment of God and Goddess at any particular moment. Exhibit 19, Q & A, 90 & 91.

18. Religious education classes and worship services are held in particular groves and meadows. These areas are decorated with rustic furniture, lectern areas and fire pits. During inclement weather, the retreat center is used for religious education and worship. The meadows and groves are described as Glen Avalon, Wolf Tree Glen, Red Bud Circle, the Shelves, Lake Caia and the Sweat Lodge. These areas are scattered throughout the church site. Each site is suitable for the church’s various religious education classes and worship services. Each are used according to the type of class or service being conducted and the number of people attending. Exhibits 17 & 19, Q & A 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 and 99.

19. The list of Exempt Properties for Cooper County lists a total of 70 parcels of real property that are exempt for use as churches, church parsonages, or church parking lots. Exhibit 7.

20. There are nine church camp properties in the counties of Shelby, Cedar, Madison, Cole and Crawford Counties consisting of acreages of 160, 172, 518, 40, 124, 120, 363, 184 and 159 which are tax exempt due to use for religious purposes. Exhibits 4, 5, 6 & 18.

21. Robert Thomas Dixon, III, serves as priest for Ozark Avalon. He is ordained by the Universal Life Church of California. Ozark Avalon is currently working on creating its own ordination. The ordaining will incorporate written doctrine and teaching materials in about a five-year tract study. Once that has been put in place the church will ordain its own priests. TR. 8, Line 1 – Tr. 9, Line 14.

22. Ozark Avalon believes in God and Goddess as the manifestations of a single deity. In Ozark Avalon belief, God and Goddess are manifested through nature. This manifestation of a deity as God and Goddess is viewed as comparable to a manifestation of deity through Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Individual members may also possess beliefs in natural objects rather than a Supreme Being. This is a matter of individual interpretation. Tr. 10, Line 4 – Tr. 11, Line 8.

23. Ozark Avalon’s belief in the manifestation of a single deity as God and Goddess is a doctrine of belief in a supreme being, which is the Supreme Being for adherents to the Ozark Avalon (Wiccan) faith.

24. Upon dissolution, Ozark Avalon is required to distribute its assets according to sections 355.661 through 355.746, RSMo. Exhibit 14.

25. The subject property is not leased to anyone for farming operations or for harvesting of timber. Tr. 17, Lines 16-22.

26. Complainant’s evidence was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board of Equalization. The subject property is actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship and for purposes purely charitable and not held for private or corporate profit.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Board of Equalization Presumption

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

Burden of Proof

Although a taxing statute is construed strictly against the state, an exemption statute is strictly construed against the one claiming the exemption. State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Goldberg, 578 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Mo. banc 1979). In order to prevail, Complainant must demonstrate by substantial and persuasive evidence, that it is entitled to an exemption.

Substantial evidence is that evidence which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, i.e., evidence favoring facts which are such that reasonable men may differ as to whether it established them, and from which the Commission can reasonably decide an appeal on the factual issues. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Complainant bears the burden of establishing, by substantial evidence, every element to support its claim for tax relief. The failure to establish an essential element results in the failure of Complainant to carry its burden of proof. Steward v. Goetz, 945 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App. 1997); Breckenridge v. Meierhoffer-Fleeman Funeral Home, Inc., 941 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. App. 1997). Complainant fails to prove its case, when the evidence on an essential element leaves the trier of fact in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise. Rossman v. G.F.C. Corp of Mo., 596 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo. App. 1980); Hawkins v. Whittenberg, 587 S.W.2d 358, 261 (Mo. App. 1979); Shelton v. Bruner, 449 S.W.2d 673, 680 (Mo. App. 1969).

Statutory Exemptions

Properties which can be exempted from taxation are set out within our Constitution and the statutes enacted to enforce that Constitution, to wit:

. . .all property, real and personal, not held for private or corporate profit and used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, for purposes purely charitable, . . .may be exempt from taxation by general law but any such law may provide for approximate restitution to the respective political subdivisions of revenues lost by reason of the exemption. All laws exempting from taxation property other than the property enumerated in this article, shall be void. Article X, Section 6, Mo. Const. of 1945.

In support of this Constitutional provision, the Legislature has enacted Section 137.100, RSMo 2000, which provides in relevant part:

The following property shall be exempt from taxation:

(5) All property, real and personal, actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, or for purposes purely charitable and not held for private or corporate profit, except that the exemption herein granted does not include real property not actually used or occupied for the purpose of the organization but held or used as investment even though the income or rentals received therefrom is used wholly for religious, education or charitable purposes; Section 137.100, RSMo 2000.

 

Charitable Exemption

In order for a property to be exempt from taxation for state, county or local purposes as a charitable use, the following tests must be met:

1. The property must be actually and regularly used exclusively for a charitable purpose, as charity is defined by Salvation Army v. Hoehn, 188 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. banc 1945). “Charity” is therein defined as “. . .a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining the public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.” Salvation Army at 830.

2. The property must be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis. The property “must be dedicated unconditionally to the charitable activity in such a way that there will be no profit, presently or prospectively, to individuals or corporations. Any gain achieved in use of the building must be devoted to achievement of the charitable objectives of the project.” Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213, at 224 (Mo. banc 1978).

3. The dominant use of the property must be for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons and must directly or indirectly benefit society generally. “It is required that there be the element of direct or indirect benefit to society in addition to and as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons directly served by the humanitarian activity.” Franciscan at 224. See also, Barnes Hospital v. Leggett, 589 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. banc 1979).

Religious Exemption

The constitutional and statutory term religious worship of Art. X, Sec. 6 and Section 137.100, RSMo embody as a minimum requirement a belief in the Supreme Being. Missouri Church of Scientology v. STC, 560 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Mo.banc 1977).

Used Exclusively

The phrase used exclusively in the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to exemption has reference to the primary and inherent use of the property and not to a mere secondary and incidental use. Pentecostal Church of God of America v. Hughlett, 602 S.W.2d 666 ( App. 1980); Missouri United Methodist Retirement Homes v. STC, 522 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1975); State ex rel. Spillers v. Johnston, 113 S.W. 1083 (Mo. 1908).

Church of Wicca

The Church of Wicca is a religion entitled to the protection of the first amendment of the United States Constitution. Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1986).

DECISION

Each tax exemption case is peculiarly one which must be decided upon its own facts. It is the public policy of the state that property actually and regularly used exclusively for religious and/or charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation, and taxing authorities are not to be permitted to defeat that policy by unreasonable or unrealistic application of the “strict construction” rule. Missouri United Methodist Retirement Homes v. State Tax Commission, 522 S.W.2d 745, 751 (Mo. banc 1975). However, Complainant has a “substantial burden” to establish that the property in question qualifies for an exemption. Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213, 224 (Mo. banc 1978).

In the present case, the burden to be met requires that Complainant bring forth substantial and persuasive evidence that the primary and inherent use of the subject property is for a religious purpose and that the property is not held for private or corporate profit. Preceeding the burden to prove use and not held for profit is the burden to establish that the religious worship of Ozark Avalon embodies as a minimum requirement a belief in the Supreme Being.

Belief in Supreme Being

On December 19, 1977, the Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc, issued its decision in the Church of Scientology case, supra. In that case the Court affirmed the State Tax Commission’s denial of exemption. The Court in essence deferred to the Commission’s determination that there was not sufficient credible evidence presented by the taxpayer on a single critical element. That element was the taxpayer’s failure, in the view of the Commission, that it held a devotion to the worship of the Supreme Being (Hearing Officer’s emphasis). The Commission concluded that being devoted to the worship of the Supreme Being was necessary for the property owner to have its property considered exclusively for religious worship. Scientology, at 845, Appendix- Commission’s Conclusion of Law 8. The Court in affirming the Commission adopted the standard of worship of the Supreme Being for religious exemption cases.

The Supreme Being

It is interesting and noteworthy that in the Scientology decision, the Commission made a conclusion of law relating to the Supreme Being. It is likewise fascinating that the term supreme being was used and was capitalized by both the Commission and the Court in each respective decision. Both of these notable items needs to be addressed in the present case.

Use of Definite Article

The use of the definite article (the) as opposed to an indefinite article (a or an) is used to refer to a specific or particular person or thing. The indefinite article on the other hand is used to refer to one, or one sort of, a person or thing. Specifically, the standard for religious worship under Scientology is a devotion to a specific supreme being, not just a supreme being. However, neither the Commission nor the Court, in Scientology, set forth who or what this specific, particular religious entity was or is.

The definite article requires devotion to the specific deity. Spiritual devotion to just any deity cannot suffice. While it might be comforting to Jews, Roman Catholics, Orthodox Catholics, Protestants, and other Christian groups not considered to be Protestants and Muslims that the Supreme Being is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob – Allah, such a line of demarcation results in those of Buddhist, Hindu, Native American, Taoist, Confucianist and various other religious entities whose Supreme Being is not the God recognized generally by those labeled as Jews, Christians and Muslims, being denied tax exempt status for their religious sites because theirs is not a religious devotion to the Supreme Being. Such a standard in effect restricts the definiton of religious worship or religion to conventional orthodox religions. Scientology, at 845 – Concuring in Result of Judge Sieler. If on the other hand, the Supreme Being is a Hindu god then churches, mosques and synagogues throughout the state have been wrongly granted religious exemptions, because of a religious devotion to the wrong Supreme Being.

The use of the definite article in the Scientology decisions results in a standard that cannot be uniformily applied in the granting of religious exemptions. It would require, if truely applied, an investigation by the Hearing Officer into the issue of whether a specific religious group possessed a belief in the proper or true Supreme Being. This is simply a task which neither the Hearing Officer, the Commission, nor any Court is competent to do, since matters of spiritual or religious conscience, specifically as they might relate to who or what is supreme, fall beyond the pale of any judicial or governmental body to decide.

Use of the term Supreme Being

The use of the term Supreme Being in its capitalized as well as uncapitalized form should also be considered. The word supreme simply means highest in rank, power, authority, dominant. Webster’s New World Dictionary. This gives some explanation as to the use of the definite article. There cannot be different supreme beings, one must be the highest in rank, power and authority. If the god of Jews, Christians and Muslims is supreme then the god of Hindus, or the god of Native Americans cannot be supreme. (The Hearing Officer recognizes that Jews, Christians and Muslims may not agree that their god is one and the same.)

The term supreme being in its capitalized form is nothing other than a reference to god in its capitalized form – God. Webster’s New World Dictionary. By requiring, in order to obtain a tax exemption for religious purposes, a devotion to the worship of the Supreme Being the Commission and the Supreme Court of Missouri did in fact require nothing more or less than worship of God, without further identifying God.

The forgoing analysis illustrates the inherent danger in judicial or quasi-judicial governmental entities attempting to enter into the arena of determining what is or is not of a religious nature for a given group held together by religious or spiritual beliefs and doctrines. It also illustrates that the Scientology standard in a strict, literal sense cannot be applied by comparing the doctrine of one group concerning what or who is a supreme being for purposes of their faith to another faith group and its doctrine on the same subject. In other words, the comparision of what a Baptist views as god or supreme being is not the appropriate standard to determine if what a Buddist views as god or supreme being is correct.

In the specific case at hand, the concept of God in an orthodox Jewish, Christian or Islamic sense is not the criterion to be applied in reaching a determination of whether Ozark Avalon’s belief concerning God and Goddess is devotion to the Supreme Being. The term Supreme Being must be given the widest possible reading and definition. It will not suffice for a narrow, strict, technical meaning to be given to this phrase, for a stringent meaning can only result in the government giving benefit to those of one religious faith and denying the same to those of other religious faiths in violation of the Non-establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Such a course of action would have the effect of a denial of equal protection by preferring some religions over others – an invidious discrimination that would transgress the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188, Douglas Concurring Opinion. The term Supreme Being must be read within the context of the teachings, doctrines and practices of the specific religious faith under consideration, not some other faith.

Conclusion

All of the forgoing notwithstanding, Ozark Avalon’s belief encompasses faith in and devotion to what it considers to be Supreme Being. The form of manifestation for Supreme Being in the faith and practice of Ozark Avalon is irrelevant. Part and parcel of the worship of Ozark Avalon is its recognition of Supreme Being – God and Goddess – as contained within the tenents of its creed or statement of faith.

Ozark Avalon satisfies the requirement of devotion to Supreme Being in order for the Hearing Officer to address the issue of whether the church site is used regularly and exclusively for religious worship.

Use of Church Site

The evidence brought forth by Complainant clearly and without question establishes that the primary and inherent use of the Ozark Avalon property is for religious worship. All of the activities which are conducted by the church on the church site are interwoven within the religious practices and beliefs of Ozark Avalon. All of the activities which are conducted at the monthly worship services, the special holiday retreats and other events held on the church site are comparable to any number of activities which would be conducted at various church camps of what would be recognized generally as mainline Protestant denominations throughout Missouri.

The fact that the church site for Ozark Avalon encompasses various groves, glens, trails and other grass or woodland areas, used at different times, on the subject site does not render the use of the subject property as non-religious. The various worship and religious teaching areas on the total tract of land are all utilized in conjunction with and as a part of the religious practices, education and fellowship of this particular church.

Ozark Avalon’s worship practices do not fit neatly within the boundaries or standards that one might draw if using a Roman Catholic or Protestant church as the pattern for what is proper or acceptable religion. On the other hand, the worship practices of Baptists and Methodists do not fit within the pattern one might draw if using Ozark Avalon as the template for permissible religion. Fortunately, the radical experiment of religious liberty undertaken early in the life of this nation permits the very type of religious diversity that is evidenced in a comparison between a Christ-centered faith and a Nature-centered faith.

It is clear that Ozark Avalon is not a part of Christian orthodoxy. It does not have to be to be granted a tax exemption. Its use of the subject property is a religious use under Section 137.100, RSMo. This religious use requires the property to be exemption from taxation.

Profit

The only remaining element which must be met is that the property which is used for a religious purpose must not be held for present or future profit. There is no profit generated by the use of the church site. Income to Ozark Avalon is used for its religious purpose just as income (contributions) to any mainline Christian church is not profit but income used for a religious purpose. The property being owned by a not for profit corporation comes under the statutory provisions relating to disposition of the property upon dissolution, which requires that upon dissolution any proceeds remaining after payment of debts must be transferred to another not for profit corporation. Section 355.691, RSMo. Accordingly, Complainant satisfies the not held for profit requirement.

Franciscan Charitable Use

The Hearing Officer is persuaded that the above discussion has properly addressed the standard for granting of a religious worship exemption. However, in order to not be charged with negligence in the rendering of this decision, a brief analysis under the Franciscan case will be provided.

The three elements under Franciscan are:

1. Actual and regular primary and inherent use must be for a charitable purpose.

2. Property owned and operated on a not for profit basis.

3. Dominate use benefits an indefinite number of people and society directly or indirectly.

Charitable Purpose

Charitable purpose includes and encompasses bringing the hearts of individuals under the influence of religion. The actual and regular use of the subject property is for the purpose of bringing the hearts of those individuals who attend worship services at the church site under the influence of the Ozark Avalon (Wiccan) religion. There is no charge to attend services. There is no membership fee. Ozark Avalon members freely contribute to the support of their church just as adherents to various other religious faiths voluntarily provide financial support for their individual religious entities. There is no restriction in membership based upon age, gender, or race. There is not even any restriction based upon religious faith, since individuals who are other faiths are welcome to take part in the religious practices of Ozark Avalon at the church site.

Not For Profit Ownership and Operation

The subject property is both owned and operated on a not for profit basis. As a not for profit corporation the property is dedicated unconditionally to the charitable activity of bringing hearts under the influence of the Wiccan religion. Any gain that may be achieved in the use of the church site is devote to the advancement of the religious objectives of Ozark Avalon. Upon dissolution any assets remaining after payment of debts are required to be transferred to another not for profit, 501(c)(3) corporation.

Benefit for Indefinite Number of Persons and Society

Since there is not a closed membership, the dominate use of the church site is for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons. Anyone who desires to unite with Ozark Avalon as a follower of the Wiccan religion or is of another faith but desires to take part in the religious activities of Ozark Avalon may do so. The religious nature of Ozark Avalon provides an indirect benefit to society in general, in the same manner that society is benefited by having adherents of different faiths free to practice, express and follow their individual religion. The principle of religious liberty embodied within the First Amendment of the United States Constitution is the specific recognition of the overall benefit to society of permitting the exercise of various and sundry religious faiths in our nation.

The use of the subject church site meets the standards of Franciscan as a charitable use for a religious purpose.

Size of Church Site

The fact that the subject church site is in excess of 80 acres is out of the ordinary when compared to the amount of land that might be require to support a meeting house of a rural or urban religious entity. Given that a mainline Protestant congregation in a city might not require more than an acre or two for its church building and supporting parking area, it would appear that the Ozark Avalon church site is excessive. However, the determination for an exemption for religious purposes is not based upon any set standard for size of the land to be exempted.

It is clear that the religious activities of Ozark Avalon require a different type of facility, specifically open air, out of doors, than what Catholics, Baptists or Methodists might need. Although the Ozark Avalon congregation does in cases of inclement weather conduct services indoors, that is not their regular practice. The use of the subject church site is more in the nature of a church camp site. Church camps of varying sizes are exempted from taxation throughout the state of Missouri, because of their religious use. The size of such facilities is not a factor to deny exemption, so long as the actual, regular and primary use is consistent with the overall religious purpose. See, Finding of Fact 20, supra.

ORDER

The determination by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for Cooper County that the subject property is not exempt from taxation is SET ASIDE.

The Assessor and Clerk of Cooper County are ordered to place the subject property on the list of exempt properties for said county.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of a hearing officer decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 2000.

If an application for review of a hearing officer decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with these appeals shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Cooper County as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in these appeals. If any protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, Complainant may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED August 8, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

Mississippi Lime Company v. Donze (Ste. Genevieve)

March 12th, 2001

 

 

MISSISSIPPI LIME COMPANY, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeals No. 99-84500 & 99-84501

)

CLEMENT F. DONZE, ASSESSOR, )

STE. GENEVIEVE COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the Ste. Genevieve County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE, Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject real property (Appeal No. 99-84500) for tax years 1999 and 2000 to be $58,285,000, assessed value of $18,651,200 and the true value in money for the subject personal property (Appeal No. 99-84501) for tax year 1999 to be $22,755,000, assessed value of $7,577,415.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Byron Francis, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Margaret Mooney, St. Louis, Missouri.

Case heard and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUES

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject real and personal property on January 1, 1999.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the Ste. Genevieve County Board of Equalization which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $108,699,605 (assessed value of $34,783,870, as commercial property) and an appraised value of $9,744,294 (assessed value of $3,248,098, as personal property). Combined value for real and personal property of $118,443,899, assessed $38,031,968. Complainant proposed a true value in money of $75,000,000 for both the real and personal property. Respondent proposed a value for the real and personal property combined of $102,500,000 ($73,705,000 for the real property, $22,755,000 for the personal property and $6,040,000 for the mineral rights). A hearing was conducted on November 20 and 21, 2000, at the Ste. Genevieve County Courthouse, Ste. Genevieve, Missouri.

Protective Order

On January 13, 2000, the Hearing Officer entered his Order granting Complainant’s Motion for Protective Order. Portions of various exhibits filed by both Complainant and Respondent contain data, material and information that fell within the purview of the Protective Order. The entirety of exhibits filed by both Complainant and Respondent have been sealed by the Hearing Officer within the files of the Commission. In order to preserve data, material and information that falls or may fall within the purview of the Protective Order, this Decision and Order will not set forth specific data and information which might reveal income and expenses or production amounts related to the Complainant’s property and facility. The Hearing Officer has endeavored to exclude from this Decision and Order any information which was submitted under the Protective Order.

The parties filed Briefs on February 1, 2001. Both parties also filed Reply Briefs. The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record and arguments advanced by parties through Briefs, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant’s Evidence

The following exhibits were received into evidence on behalf of Complainant.

Exhibit A        Original Cost Improvements and Fixtures.

Exhibit B        Income Data for Years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999.

Exhibit C        Production Data for Years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999.

Exhibit D        Ste. Genevieve Division, Cost of Sales Plant Closing, 1997.

Exhibit E        Mississippi Lime Combined Balance Sheet Costs, 1998.

Exhibit F        Ste. Genevieve Division Net Sales for December, 1999 and Budget for 2000.

Exhibit G        Engineer’s Opinion of Cost for Greenfield Calcium Products Plant.

Exhibit H        Appraisal Report by Real Estate Analysis Corporation – Michael J. Kelly.

Exhibit I        Written Direct Testimony of Donald D. Roberts.

Exhibit J        Written Direct Testimony of John D. Macfadyen, P.E.

Exhibit K        Written Direct Testimony of Michael J. Kelly.

Exhibit L        Deposition Spreadsheet – contains same information as Exhibit 32.

Exhibit M        Spreadsheet.

Exhibit N        Discounted Cash Flow Survey.

Exhibits M and N were also provided in electronic versions to the Commission on a disk.

Complainant’s Briefs

Complainant filed a Brief and Reply Brief in these appeals setting forth the Complainant’s theory of the case, with supporting arguments.

Summary of Complainant’s Case

Testimony of Donald D. Roberts

Complainant presented the testimony of Donald D. Roberts, Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer of Complainant. Mr. Roberts provided testimony to identify various exhibits which related to income, expenses, plant and production capacity, reserves and their value, net sales and general financial documents and records related to Complainant’s Ste. Genevieve plant. Exhibits A – F & I.

Testimony of John D. Macfadyen

Complainant also presented the testimony of John D. Macfadyen, Vice-President of Penta Engineering Corporation and a registered professional engineer. The testimony of Mr. Macfadyen related to the Opinion of Cost for a Greenfield plant. A Greenfield plant is a new plant to be constructed on bare land which would produce the same products in the same production capacities as the subject plant. In the report prepared by Mr. Macfadyen he calculated the capital cost to construct a new facility like the subject facility. Exhibits G & J.

Testimony of Michael J. Kelly

The information provided and developed by both Mr. Roberts and Macfadyen was utilized by Complainant’s appraiser in developing his opinion of value for the subject real and personal property. Michael J. Kelly, MAI, provided expert testimony on behalf of Complainant relative to the valuation of the subject property, both real and personal. Mr. Kelly developed the Cost, Sales Comparison and Income approaches to value to arrive at a final opinion of value.

Greatest weight was placed on the income approach due to there being more extensive data with regard to income, expense and capitalization information. Mr. Kelly utilized the historic income, expense and production data for the five year period, 1995 through 1999. The appraiser considered the indicated value under the income approach to be the prime indicator of value. That indicated value was $73,500,000. Both the market and cost approaches were considered, but neither was given as great a weight as the income approach. The value indicated under the sales comparison approach was $78,500,000. There were two sales of lime facilities which the appraiser was able to utilize. The cost approach produced an indicated value of $62,000,000.

The appraiser arrived at a final opinion of value for the subject facility of both real and personal property of $75,000,000. He then allocated 15% of that value to the land and buildings, with the remainder allocated for all the processing machinery and equipment. The final determination of value did not include a value for the mineral rights. Exhibits H, K, L, M & N.

Respondent’s Evidence

The following exhibits were received into evidence on behalf of Respondent.

Exhibit 1        Appraisal Report of Dinan Real Estate Advisers.

Exhibit 2        Appraisal Report by Chantal Appraisal.

Exhibit 3        Qualifications of Edward Dinan.

Exhibit 4        Missouri Licensed Real Estate Appraiser Certificate of Edward Dinan.

Exhibit 5        Qualifications of Ernest K. Lehmann.

Exhibit 6        Qualifications of Roger Chantal.

Exhibit 7        Articles of Incorporation.

Exhibit 8        Mississippi Lime Web Site Information.

Exhibit 9        U. S. Geological Service 1999 Directory of Lime Plants.

Exhibit 10 Assessor’s Record Cards.

Exhibit 11 1999 BOE Appeal.

Exhibit 12 Assessor’s Change Notice, 1999.

Exhibit 13 Assessor’s Valuation of Improvements, Minerals, Land and Personal Property, 1999.

Exhibit 14 Assessor’s correspondence to M. D. Aimone.

Exhibit 15 Mr. Aimone’s Letter to Assessor and Memo to File.

Exhibit 16 2000 Budgeted Income Statement and Budget.

Exhibit 17 Combined Balance Sheets for Ste. Genevieve Division for 1997, 1998, and Balance Sheet year end 1996.

Exhibit 18 Mississippi Lime Finance Department Data File dated April 29, 1999.

Exhibit 19 Mississippi Lime Original Cost Improvements and Fixtures dated, December 31, 1998.

Exhibit 20 Mississippi Lime Capital Leases and Master Lease Agreement dated, January 6, 1994.

Exhibit 21 Ste. Genevieve Division Production Data Cost of Sales.

Exhibit 22 Maerz Kiln Project Analysis Project Costs dated May 12, 1999.

Exhibit 23 Correspondence to Byron Francis, Attorney for Mississippi Lime.

Exhibit 24 Notice of Action by BOE.

Exhibit 25 Complaint for Review of Assessment on Real Property.

Exhibit 26 Complaint for Review of Assessment on Personal Property.

Exhibit 27 Letter to County Collector, dated December 28, 1999, Re Real Property.

Exhibit 28 Letter to County Collector, dated December 28, 1999, Re Personal Property.

Exhibit 29 Prefiled Testimony of Edward Dinan.

Exhibit 30 Prefiled Testimony of Roger Chantal.

Exhibit 31 Prefiled Testimony of Ernest K. Lehmann.

Exhibit 32 Spreadsheet – contains same information as Exhibit L.

Respondent’s Briefs

Respondent filed a Brief in these appeals setting forth the Respondent’s theory of the case, with supporting arguments.

Summary of Respondent’s Case

Testimony of Roger Chantal

Respondent’s expert, Roger Chantal performed an appraisal of the personal property (machinery and equipment, trucks, automobiles, trailers, computer equipment and office machines and furniture). Mr. Chantal utilized both a market and cost approach to arrive at a value for each item of personal property being appraised. For application of the cost approach, the appraiser utilized the Marshal and Swift Valuation Service and the depreciation factors set out by Marshal and Swift. For the market approach, Mr. Chantal relied upon sales data from various industry sources. He arrived at a fair market value for the personal property of $22,755,000. This value was then utilized by Respondent’s real property appraiser in his valuation of Complainant’s facility. Exhibits 2 & 6.

Testimony of Ernest K. Lehmann

Ernest K. Lehmann, geologist and mining consultant, assisted Edward W. Dinan in the preparation of the Dinan appraisal. Mr. Lehmann did the research and calculations relative to both the sales comparison and income approaches. The income approach performed was a discounted cash flow analysis. Exhibits 1, 5, 31 & 32.

Testimony of Edward W. Dinan

Mr. Edward W. Dinan performed an appraisal of the subject facility utilizing the Cost, Comparable Sales and Income approaches to value. The indicated values for these approaches as developed by Mr. Dinan were $103,000,000, $230,000,000 and $122,900,000, respectively. These values were reconciled by the appraiser to an indicated value of $115,000,000. This value included business enterprise valued by the appraiser at $12,500,000, due to the fact that the appraiser valued the property as a going concern. Therefore, the final opinion of value determined by Mr. Dinan was $102,500,000, for the real and personal property and mineral rights. Exhibits 1, 3, 4 & 29.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The subject property in appeal 99-84500 consists of real property with improvements identified by parcel number 792974, in the records of the Assessor’s office. The subject property in appeal 99-84501 consists of personal property identified by account number 5608, in the records of the Assessor’s office. The property, in both appeals, is located at 16147 U. S. Highway 61, Ste. Genevieve, Missouri. The real property consists of 821 acres of land. It is improved with a plant and ancillary buildings utilized in the production and processing of a variety of limestone products. There are approximately 25 structures on the property which include the main office building, plant, crushers, rotary and vertical kilns, repair and maintenance facilities, and ancillary buildings. Exhibits H & 1. The personal property consists of machinery and equipment, trucks, trailers, office machines, furniture and fixtures, including but not limited to: whizzers, crushers, mills, dryers, hydrators, storage bins, feeders, conveyors, scales, backhoes, tractors, trailers, tanks, trucks, excavators, hoists, air compressors, metal working machines, pumps, radios, winches and other machinery, tools and equipment used in the limestone processing facility on the subject real property. Exhibits 1 & 2.

2. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 1999, to January 1, 2000, which would be a basis for an adjustment to the valuation for the 2000 tax year.

3. The evidence on the record presented by both Complainant and Respondent establish that the Board of Equalization valuation was in error, accordingly the presumption that the Board correctly valued the subject real and personal property is rebutted.

4. The highest and best use of the property is the present industrial use as a limestone mine and lime production facility. Exhibit H, p. 49; Exhibit 1, p. 50; CP’s Brief, p. 7; RP’s Brief, p. 2.

5. It is appropriate in this appeal to value the real and personal property together to determine an overall value as a going concern. Exhibit H, p. 3; Tr. 27, 15-17; Exhibit 1, p. 85; Tr. 115, 2-11; CP’s Brief, p. 8; RP’s Brief, p. 15.

6. The proper approach for valuation of the property is as a going concern under the income approach. Exhibit H, 114-142; Tr. 28, 9-12; Exhibit 1, pp. 71-82, 84; Tr. 131, 16 – Tr. 132, 12; CP’s Brief, p. 8; RP’s Brief, p. 15.

7. Valuation of the property as a going concern under the income approach requires that a adjustment be made by way of a deduction for working capital and business value. Exhibit H, p. 141; Exhibit 1, Transmittal letter – 2, p. 85.

8. The business value to be deducted from the going concern value is $4,500,000. The working capital to be deducted from the going concern value is $3,000,000. Exhibit H, pp. 137, 138, 141.

9. The value of the going concern is $82,500,000. The value of the real and personal property is $75,000,000 ($82,500,000 – $7,500,000 = $75,000,000). Exhibit H, pp. 160-162.

10. The value of the mineral reserves is $6,040,000, it was not challenged by Complainant. Exhibit 1, p. 83; Tr. 7, 8-22; CP’s Brief, p. 6; RP’s Brief, p. 2; Tr. 7, 20 – Tr. 10, 2.

11. The value of the real property, including the mineral reserves, and the personal property is $81,040,000 ($75,000,000 + $6,040,000 = $81,040,000).

10. The value of the personal property is $22,755,000. Exhibit 1, Transmittal letter – 2; Addenda, pp. 1-75; Exhibits 2 & 30. The assessed value of the personal property is $7,577,415 ($22,755,000 x .333 = $7,577,415).

11. The value of the real property, including mineral rights, is $58,285,000. ($81,040,000 – $22,755,000 = $58,285,000) Exhibit H, pp. 160-162; Exhibit 1, p. 83; Tr. 7, 8-22; CP’s Brief, p. 6; RP’s Brief, p. 2. The assessed value of the real property is $18,651,200 ($58,285,000 x .32 = $18,651,200).

12. Appraisers Michael Kelly and Edward Dinan are qualified by education, training and experience to render opinions of value relative to the subject facility. Appraiser Roger Chantal is qualified by education, training and experience to render an opinion of value relative to machinery, tools, equipment and other personal property valued in these appeals. Ernest K. Lehmann is qualified by education, training and experience as a geologist and mining expert to assist in the preparation of a valuation of the subject facility. John D. Macfadyen is qualified by education, training and experience to render an opinion as to the cost for construction of a Greenfield facility.

13. A discount rate allows for a return on capital. A capitalization rate allows for both a return on and a return of capital. A capitalization rate includes a recapture component as well as the discount component. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 11th Edition, Appraisal Institute 1996, pp. 457-458; Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Revised Edition, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 1984, Capitalization Rate, p. 41, Discount Rate, p. 80; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, The International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 267-299.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Board of Equalization Presumption

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo 1994, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, supra, at 897.

Complainant’s Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 1999. Hermel, supra, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Weight to be Given Evidence

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, supra.

Trier of Fact

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

Opinion Testimony by Experts

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion of inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992).

DECISION

Cost and Sales Comparison Approaches

The Hearing Officer was not persuaded by either the cost or sales comparison approaches to value given the agreement of both Mr. Kelly and Mr. Dinan that the income approach offered the best indicator of value for the subject property. Even in the absence of agreement by the experts as to the income methodology, the Hearing Officer would have been persuaded that this approach would provide the best indicator of value. Accordingly, the decision to be rendered as to value of both the real and personal property is based upon an income analysis.

Of the two cost approaches presented, the Kelly approach, which was based on and supported by the Macfadyen/Penta Engineering cost of a “Greenfield” plant, was the most persuasive. Had the Hearing Officer decided to utilize a cost approach analysis, either as a final determination of value or in support of a decision using cost and income approaches, he would have utilized the Kelly cost approach as a basis for his analysis. The Hearing Officer sees no benefit to be gained from a detailed discussion of each cost approach as to relative strengths and weaknesses.

As to the sales comparison approaches offered, the Hearing Officer did not find either significantly persuasive in light of the greatest reliance being placed on the income approach. Of the two sales comparison presentations, the Kelly developed approach provided a more persuasive foundation for the Hearing Officer. Had the Hearing Officer been only presented with the two sales comparison approaches, or had he elected to have utilized the sales comparison approach in support of the income or cost approach, he would have utilized the Kelly analysis. Like the cost approaches, the Hearing Officer sees no benefit to be gained from a detailed discussion of each sales comparison approach as to relative strengths and weaknesses.

Classification of Kilns

A sub-issue in the present appeal relates to the classification of horizontal, vertical and the Maerz kilns. As noted in Complainant’s Brief, p. 10, … the record on this issue is sparse, … . The record is, in point of fact, quite sparse on this matter. There is no testimony or evidence to rebut the conclusion of Respondent’s appraiser, Mr. Chantal. There is only Counsel for Complainant’s argument against the Chantal conclusion.

Complainant argues that none of the kilns should be considered as fixtures since there is an inconsistency in the Assessor’s position that some kilns are fixtures because they cannot easily be moved and others are not fixtures because their dismantling and moving would be easier. The Hearing Officer concurs that the dismantling line of demarcation to establish a fixture is not necessarily the strongest and most compelling. However, this issue was simply not developed through testimony and other evidence with sufficient clarity to permit a clear cut determination. The Hearing Officer can see that some kilns might, due to the factor of ease and cost of dismantling and reconstruction, be considered fixtures and other kilns not be considered fixtures. The Assessor’s position of some kilns being fixtures and others not could just as easily be used, applying Counsel for Complainant’s logic, to determine that all kilns should be considered as fixtures and assessed a real property.

The Hearing Officer finds himself in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise on this particular point. Rossman v. G.G.C. Corp. of Missouri, 596 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo. App. 1980). Accordingly, the allocation of $22,755,000 for the personal property at the subject facility as determined by Mr. Chantal will stand for purposes of this Decision. The Hearing Officer recognizes that the levy of tax applicable to commercial real property and personal property may vary. However, the record does not provide sufficient basis upon which a reallocation of the kilns determined by Chantal to be fixtures can be made to assign them to the personal property classification. This is the type of element in a case such as this where the parties could have, and should have been able to have, stipulated in advance as to what items should be considered as fixtures or personal property.

Income Approaches

Both parties presented an income approach to determine the value of the going concern of the subject facility. Complainant’s expert (Kelly) developed an income capitalization approach by stabalizing the net income of Mississippi Lime over the immediate preceding five year period. This was capitalized at 12 percent to develop the value of the subject real and personal property on a going concern basis. Respondent’s experts (Lehmann/Dinan) relied upon a discounted cash flow analysis to arrive at an indicated going concern value from the income approach.

Kelly Analysis – Direct Capitalization

Mr. Kelly did an analysis of the income and expenses at the Ste. Genevieve facility for the years 1995 through 1999. See, Exhibit H, p. 119 & Exhibits A through F. From this data he stabilized the revenues for this five year period and projected a sales price per ton on a stabilized basis. Exhibit H, pp. 125, 127. The stabilized price per ton was multiplied by the stabilized tons to be sold. This produced a stabilized net sales.

The appraiser analyzed the five years of historical expenses for the subject facility. He excluded interest, depreciation and property taxes from the historic expenses to arrive at the allowable expenses for an income approach. Kelly calculated the stabilized expenses per ton and multiplied this by the stabilized tons to be sold. This produced the stabilized expenses. Exhibits H, p. 127 & K, p. 4.

The stabilized expenses were deducted from the stabilized net sales. There was also a deduction made based on the typical royalty rate for limestone utilized per year. These calculations resulted in a stabilized net income to be capitalized to arrive at an indicated value.

Mr. Kelly employed two methods to determine a capitalization rate for his income approach. One method was to utilize the overall rate from the sales of the two going concerns utilized in the sales comparison approach. These two rates were 11.4% and 7.8%. Exhibit H, pp. 129-130. The second method was the band of investment method. This produced a rate of 14%. Exhibit H, pp. 131-133. The appraiser decided on an overall rate of 12%. By capitalizing the stabilized net income previously calculated, an indicated value for the overall going concern was determined before adjustment for working capital, property taxes and goodwill (business value).

Calculations were made to arrive at an amount for working capital and goodwill. Exhibit H, pp. 135, 137. These deductions produced a value for the subject facility (real and personal property) before the deduction for taxes. Exhibit H, p. 138. In order to account for the adjustment for property taxes, Kelly estimated property taxes by multiplying the assessment percentage of one-third by the local tax rate of 4.5%. This results in a product of 1.5%. This rate is then divided into the overall capitalization rate of 12%, thus yielding a rate of 12.5%, which reflects the amount of property tax liability that has been capitalized into value. The indicated value before the deduction for taxes was divided by the factor of 1.125 to produce the value after property taxes for the subject real and personal property. The value produced did not account for a value for the reserves. Exhibit H., pp. 140-141. Mr. Kelly allocated 85% of the indicated value to personal property and 15% to real property. This was based on cost figures developed from the Macfadyen cost analysis for a greenfield plant. Exhibit H, Transmittal Letter, p. 3.

Lehmann/Dinan Analysis – Discounted Cash Flow

Respondent’s appraiser, Mr. Edward Dinan, relied upon a discounted cash flow (yield capitalization) analysis to arrive at the opinion of value under the income approach. The discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis was performed by Mr. Edward Lehmann. Exhibit 1, pp. 71-83. In performing the DCF analysis, Mr. Lehmann assumed that the property would continue to operate for 20 years and that inflation would result in increases in the value of sales and costs of 4% per year on overage. He allowed for limited capital expenditures in the DCF analysis. Lehmann did not include 1998 and 1999 cost numbers from Complainant due to the installation of the Maerz kiln. For the year 2000 he use the company’s projected cost figure. He did not follow this same practice for the sales figures because sales figures appeared to be constant. Tr. 80-81, 13-21. He did not rely on strict averages for his base line figures for his DCF, but made judgments as to whether the numbers from various years seemed reasonable. Tr. 90, 8-19. See, Exhibit 1, pp. 71 – 83. After receiving additional information at his deposition, Mr. Lehmann recalculated his DCF spreadsheet which resulted in a 2.9% reduction in indicated value for the going concern value. Exhibits L and 32; Tr. p. 93-94. The Lehmann/Dinan analysis relied upon a 12% discount rate for calculations of value under the DCF analysis.

Determination of Value

The determination of value in the present appeals rests upon a determination relative to the appropriate income approach to be utilized in the present appeals. The choice, on this record, lies between a valuation based upon a direct capitalization methodology or valuation based upon yield capitalization (discounted cash flow). In the present appeal, with the income and expense data established for the subject facility, the direct capitalization methodology presents substantial and persuasive evidence upon which a determination of value can be made.

Discounted Cash Flow

The Commission has previously addressed the matter of utilization of a discounted cash flow in Jeffery E. Smith, et al, d/b/a Lebanon Properties I, II & III v. Johnny North, Assessor, Laclede County, Appeals 97-64002 through 97-64005, STC 53rd Annual Report, 1998, pp. 435-456. In Lebanon Properties, the Commission set aside the Hearing Officer Decision which had relied upon a discounted cash flow to arrive at value. In so doing, the Commission set forth in explicit detail the general, basic and fundamental flaws, shortcomings and deficiencies inherent in reliance upon a discounted cash flow approach in an ad valorem tax appeal.

A discounted cash flow analysis is a set of procedures in which an appraiser specifies the quantity, variability, timing and duration of periodic income, as well as the quantity and timing of reversions, and discounts each to its present value at a specified yield rate. The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1984.

Such an analysis requires the appraiser to project all income, expenses, vacancies, credit losses and reserves over a period of time in the future. Additionally, the appraiser must guess as to the possible sales price of the property at the end of the period, the capitalization during the holding period, the costs of sale and the net gain on the property at the end of the period. Finally, the appraiser must speculate as to the correct interest or yield rate in order to discount the present value of the projected income stream and sales price.

A discounted cash flow is only viable if all of the information utilized by the appraiser is extracted from the marketplace. Determining income, expenses and yield rate 40 years into the future is not market derived evidence. Finally, the more assumptions which are made and the more variables which are used, the greater the likelihood of error.

We are called upon to find the value of the properties as of January 1, 1997. In order to do that, we must use facts which exist on the appraisal date. A discounted cash flow analysis based upon hypothetical facts 40 years in the future can only leave us in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise. Rossman v. G.G.C. Corp. of Missouri, 596 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo.App. 1980). Consequently, we find that the appropriate methodology for determining value of this property is the direct capitalization income approach.

The pronouncement of the Commission on October 13, 1998 relative to the use of the discounted cash flow analysis in Lebanon Properties finds application today in the present appeals. The Commission has consistently not found favor with the discounted cash flow methodology. Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3rd 611 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000); Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Morton, 852 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. App. 1993). The discounted cash flow procedure has, likewise, not been well received in sister jurisdictions. See, University Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Hackensack, 12 N.J. Tax 354, 368 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1992); Equitable Life Assurance Society v. County of Ramsey, 430 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1995); Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Oregon Dep’t of Revenue, 11 Or.Tax 138, 157 (Or.T.C. 1989). The Hearing Officer finds no basis upon this record which would justify and substantiate a reversal of the positions espoused in the sources just cited. Accordingly, the discounted cash flow approach is not deemed to be substantial and persuasive evidence to establish value in the present appeals.

Complainant’s Direct Capitalization Persuasive

The direct capitalization approach developed by Mr. Kelly was based on income, expense and production data taken from the actual operation of the subject property. It was appropriately stabilized to arrive at a net operating income factor to be capitalized. The capitalization rate of 12% was appropriately developed. The rate was further substantiated by Respondent’s development of the discount rate for the yield capitalization performed by Respondent’s experts. Since Respondent’s discount rate was 12% and only reflected the return on investment, it certainly supports a capitalization rate of 12% which would include the discount, plus the recapture rate for the return of the investment. In essence, there could be no dispute between the experts for Complainant and Respondent that Mr. Kelly’s capitalization rate of 12% was appropriate for his direct capitalization.

The fact that Kelly relied upon the actual performance for the subject facility during the five year period from 1995 through 1999 provides a solid basis for the information and assumption used in his analysis. The most appropriate source of data from which to develop the going concern value for the subject is the actual production, sales and cost information from the recent history of this facility. By looking to this hard, factual data, conjecture and speculation as to production, sales and costs into the future whether 5, 10 or 20 years is avoided. Kelly’s development of his approach looking to the immediate past performance of Complainant’s mine and plant is solidly market-oriented. This approach reflects reasonable conclusions derived from substantial and persuasive data which provides a sound basis relative to the expectations of a potential buyer of this facility as of January, 1999.

The valuation of the subject facility at $75,000,000 plus the mineral reserves ($6,040,000) for a total value of $81,040,000 is substantially and persuasively established by this record.

Respondent’s Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Not Persuasive

The discounted cash flow analysis presented by Respondent’s experts lacked persuasiveness on several points. A review of the methodology presented reveals a number of errors, miscalculations and unsupported assumptions that go to the very heart of this approach and ultimately render the analysis of no probative value in the present appeals.

The critical factor in applying the discounted cash flow procedure is that everything is driven by the assumptions which the appraiser makes for constructing the analysis. There are inherent problems within a discounted cash flow analysis due to the assumptions that have to be made. Tr. 154, 6-10. In the present appeals, the Lehmann/Dinan analysis made assumptions that the plant would operate for an additional twenty years with sales and costs increasing by 3% per year over that twenty year period and that there would be no major capital expenditures, only routine maintenance.

Operation Without Major Capital Expenditures

The Lehmann/Dinan approach first assumes the existing plant will operate for another twenty years without major capital expenditures. Complainant’s expert did a significant analysis to determine the effective age of the facility. The estimated economic life of the facility is 30 years, but the effective age, by weighted average, of the plant is 22 years. The Hearing Officer does not take this to mean that Mr. Kelly is suggesting that the plant will close in 8 years. However, it does demonstrate that it is reasonable to assume that expenditures will be required in order to insure that the plant continues to operate in a modern and up to date environment. The assumption by Lehmann/Dinan that the plant can continue to operate and increase in sales and profitability with only routine maintenance costs is not supported by information and data from the industry, nor is it well founded in rational logic. The Hearing Officer knows from the record that a major capital expenditure was made within recent history by the addition of the Maerz kiln. If the plant is to continue in operation for the next twenty years, under the assumption made in the Lehmann/Dinan analysis, it seems reasonable that major capital expenditures may have to be made into order to insure that the facility operates in the most economical and efficient manner.

3% Growth in Sales and Costs

The Lehmann/Dinan approach next assumed that sales and costs will increase at 3% per year. This is based essentially on an inflation factor. The increase in sales revenue is not based on an assumption of increased production. Respondent’s experts stabilized production for the Complainant’s facility over the 20 year period.

Production

No data was presented which would demonstrate that within the limestone industry that production has been stable for the last 5, 10, 15 or 20 years. The data presented relative to the subject plant failed to demonstrate a stabilizing of production for the past 5, 10, 15 or 20 years. The data for the production years 1995 through 1999 fail to establish that the subject plant has had a stabilized production over this period of time, at the level projected and assumed by the Lehmann/Dinan analysis. The stabilized (average) production for 1995 – 1999 was slightly less than the total tons of product assumed by Respondent’s experts. The Lehmann/Dinan assumed production was 7.8% above the actual production for 1999 and 1.5% above actual production for 1998. It was 2.1% above the Complainant’s projected production for year 2000.

The actual plant production figures, for the subject facility, establish that from 1995 to 1996 there was a 7.6% decrease in total production. From 1996 to 1997 there was only a 2.1% increase. Production then decreased by 2.5% from 1997 to 1998. Production was down 4.4% from 1998 to 1999. The actual production figures establish that for the period from 1995 through 1999 there was an average decrease in production of 3.1% per year, not a stabilizing of production. The actual history of this facility clearly identifies that tons of product sold has been essentially flat during the period 1995 through 1998 and down in 1999.

Sales

The next assumption made in performing the Respondent’s analysis is that sales will increase by 3% per year over the 20 year period of the analysis. The increase in sales is not, as has been addressed above, due to an increase in production. The increase in sales comes entirely from an increase in the price of lime over the twenty year period at a inflation rate of 3%. Tr. 74, 15-21. Respondent’s expert (Lehmann) concurred with Complainant’s appraiser that the price for lime over the last five years was fairly constant. Tr. 75, 5-6. Mr. Dinan also agreed that sales prices for lime have been flat or stable over the last five years. Tr. 154, 14-22. Industry data demonstrates that lime pricing has remained flat over the last five years. Exhibit H, p. 125.

The actual sales figures for the subject plant demonstrate that from 1995 to 1996 net sales decrease by 2.5%. For the period of 1996 to 1997 sales were essentially flat. From 1997 to 1998 sales again decreased by 3.2% and then remained flat for 1998 to 1999. Overall this was an average of 1.425% decrease per year in net sales.

There is simply no basis within this record to support the assumption that Complainant’s sales will increase by 3% per year over the next twenty years. The best that can be concluded is that sales prices will remain flat.

Costs

Like production and sales figures, there is no information presented in this record to establish that the past history of the industry would support a 3% per increase in costs. The actual figures for the subject facility do not establish a 3% per year level of increase in costs from the past five years of data. Respondent’s expert (Lehmann) in conducting a recalculation (Exhibit 32) of his discounted cash flow analysis utilized an average for costs based only on the years 1995 through 1997, instead of an average based on years 1995 through 1999, like he did with the sales figures. The recalculation performed by Lehmann resulted in an indicated value under the discounted cash flow method of 3% ($3,800,000) less than the original calculation made for the Dinan appraisal. Exhibit 32, Exhibit 1, p. 82. The development of the base line figures for both sales and costs should have been conducted in a consistent manner, utilizing the five year averages for both.

Summary of Assumption Flaws

In this particular case, the utilization of the discounted cash flow method rests upon the worth and validity of three critical elements – production, sales and costs. If any one of the legs of this three legged analysis is defective, then the stool will not properly support the proposed value. In the present appeal, all three legs are flawed. They are broken. The discounted cash flow stool does not stand.

The record does not establish a level of production stabilized at the level utilized by Respondent’s experts. The record will simply not support the 3% assumption. Neither industry data or actual data attributable to the subject facility demonstrate the worth and validity of the 3% assumption. Furthermore, the assumption as to the baseline data to be used to which the 3% assumption was to be applied could not be supported by data from the subject facility. A slight variation, plus or minus, for the base line data for production, sales or costs and a slight variation, plus or minus, in the 3% assumption results in greatly differing indicated values.

A portion of the conclusion expressed by the Commission in Lebanon Properties, supra, bears repeating at this point. A discounted cash flow is only viable if all of the information utilized by the appraiser is extracted from the marketplace. … . Finally, the more assumptions which are made and the more variables which are used, the greater the likelihood of error.

The assumptions made, by Lehmann/Dinan as to operation without major capital expenditures, production, sales, costs, yield rate and other variables 20 years into the future, are not market derived evidence. Having no support from past industry data or past facility operation data, the assumptions are nothing more than conjecture and speculation. The fact that the assumptions made by the Lehmann/Dinan analysis are consistent with what may be done in the valuation of mineral production facilities generally, does not raise such assumptions to the level of substantial and persuasive evidence. For such assumptions to have validity, weight and probative value in the evidentiary process of determining value for the subject facility, there must be market data, not industry practice, to support each assumption.

The Hearing Officer cannot ignore the economic realities demonstrated by Complainant’s and Respondent’s evidence, relative to the actual operation of the subject facility. These must be taken into consideration and account when making a determination of value for ad valorem tax purposes. Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. STC, 867 S.W.2d, 510, 513-514 (Mo. 1993). The economic realities of the subject facilities past five years will not support the assumptions upon which Respondent’s experts based their value.

Complainant’s Rebuttal

Kelly – Discounted Cash Flow Recalculation

Complainant presented rebuttal evidence as to Respondent’s discounted cash flow methodology. Complainant’s expert, Mr. Kelly, developed the discounted cash flow analysis utilizing the identical methodology employed by Mr. Lehmann in preparing his revision as shown by Exhibit 32. However, Kelly, used a five year average as the baseline number relative to costs. This produced an indicated value for the real and personal property which was directly in line with Kelly’s value, before adding the value for the mineral rights. Exhibits M & N.

Roberts – 2000 Budget

Complainant also presented rebuttal evidence from Donald Roberts that established the budget numbers for the year 2000, which had been employed by the Lehmann/Dinan analysis were not appropriate. Complainant’s actual income and expenses for 2000 were not meeting budget. Sales were off 5% and gross margin and operating income were off as well. Therefore, to the extend that the Lehmann/Dinan analysis had rested upon 2000 budget numbers, the indicated value obtained under even the revised discounted cash flow methodology was an inflated value.

Conclusion

Complainant’s evidence substantively and persuasively establish the value for the subject real and personal property, not including the mineral rights, to be $75,000,000. The value of the personal property is $22,755,000. The remaining value of $52,245,000 is real property value. The value of the mineral rights ($6,040,000) added to the real property value results in a total real property value, including mineral rights of $58,285,000, for a total value of $81,040,000, real, personal and mineral.

ORDER

The assessed valuations for the subject properties as determined by the Assessor and affirmed by the Board of Equalization for Ste. Genevieve County for the subject tax day are SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property in appeal 99-84500 for tax year 1999 and 2000 is set at $18,651,200.

The assessed value for the subject property in appeal 99-84501 for tax year 1999 is set at $7,577,415.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with these appeals shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Ste. Genevieve County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in these appeals. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED March 12, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

ORDER

DENYING APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

OF HEARING OFFICER DECISION

On March 12, 2001, Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor, entered his Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessments by the Ste. Genevieve County Board of Equalization and finding value for the real and personal property which were the subject of these appeals.

Respondent’s Grounds for Review

Respondent filed his Application for Review of the Decision. The grounds stated in the Application for Review may be state in a summary fashion as follows:

1. The Hearing Officer erred in adopting the income capitalization approach of Complainant’s appraiser.

2. The Hearing Officer erred in not adopting the discounted cash flow analysis of Respondent’s appraiser.

3. The Hearing Officer erred in his application of the relevant case law and Commission decisions.

Standard Upon Review

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, supra; Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

DECISION

A review of the record in the present appeals provides substantial and persuasive evidence to support the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. Quite simply, Complainant’s expert persuaded the trier of fact relative to the going-concern value of the subject facility. Respondent’s expert failed to persuade the trier of fact.

While reasonable minds might differ on the Hearing Officer’s findings and conclusions, a reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the result which the Hearing Officer reached on each of these points. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Findings. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995).

The facts found by the Hearing Officer are supported by substantial evidence upon the whole record. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

The Hearing Officer addressed in appropriate manner the issue of the utilization of the discounted cash flow analysis and the deficiencies contained therein in this appeal. Decision, Determination of Value, pp. 18-20; 21-26. The Commission sees no need to restate the analysis and discussion of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer correctly discussed the applicable and appropriate case law and prior Commission decisions. In particular, the Hearing Officer’s conclusions as to the discounted cash flow analysis are in accord with the Commission’s decisions in Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000); Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Morton, 852 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) and Jeffery E. Smith, et. al d/b/a Lebanon Properties I, II & III v. Johnny North, Assessor, Laclede County, Appeals 97-64002 through 97-64005, STC 53rd Annual Report, 1998, pp. 435-456.

The Hearing Officer did not err in his determinations as challenged by Respondent. The Respondent’s points are not well taken.

***

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.470 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED August 28, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Sam D. Leake, Chairman

Bruce E. Davis, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner

Casino Aztar v. Snider (Pemiscot)

February 1st, 2001

 

 

CASINO AZTAR, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 99-76503

)

DONNA SNIDER, ASSESSOR, )

PEMISCOT COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the Pemiscot County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE, Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject property for tax year 1999 to be $4,237,791, assessed value of $1,411,200.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Thomas L. Caradonna, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Stephen P. Sokoloff, Kennett, Missouri.

Case heard and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUES

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 1999. Specifically, the only issue of valuation is the value of the marine vessel, City of Caruthersville and a wharf barge, Scott.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the Pemiscot County Board of Equalization which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $17,210,160 (assessed value of $5,736,720, as personal property). A hearing was conducted on July 27, 2000, at the Pemiscot County Courthouse, Caruthersville, Missouri. Complainant waived filing of Brief. Respondent filed her Brief on October 5, 2000. Counsel for Complainant filed a Reply Brief on October 16, 2000.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, and the arguments and responses advanced by each Counsel in the respective Briefs, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant’s Evidence

The following exhibits were received into evidence on behalf of Complainant.

Exhibit A – Appraisal Report of James N. Manley, Marine Surveyor.

Exhibit B – Written Direct Testimony of James N. Manley.

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent submitted the Written Direct Testimony of Donna Snider (Exhibit 1) with Exhibit A, a balance sheet attached. The exhibit was excluded from evidence and was only received as an offer of proof.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Hearing Officer received into evidence Commission Exhibit 1, listing of personal property including Slot Machines and Gaming Equipment, Boat and Barge, Fixtures and other Equipment, Computer Equipment. Tr. 9, Lines 5-9; Tr. 46, Line 5 – Tr. 47, Line 3. The Hearing Officer took official notice of the personal property listing attached to the Complainant for Review of Assessment filed with the Commission. Order, 7/28/00.

2. The subject property consists of the boat City of Caruthersville and the barge Scott. The City of Caruthersville was originally constructed and put into service as an excursion boat. In 1994 it was converted into a gaming vessel. Its approximate hull dimensions are 136 by 40 by 10 feet. The vessel is used for full time dockside gaming as the Aztar Casino. The Scott was originally used as a single skin tank barge prior to being converted for service as a casino service and passenger boarding barge. Its approximate hull dimensions are 210 by 51 by 11 feet. The Scott is believed to be about 40 years old. Exhibit A, pp. 9-10.

3. Complainant did not challenge the valuations made by the Assessor and sustained by the Board on the slot machines, gaming equipment computer equipment, fixtures and other equipment. The total appraised value of all personal property determined by the Assessor was $17,210,160. The appraised value of the City of Caruthersville and the Scott was $13,715,109 (Commission Exhibit 1). The value of the undisputed personal property not challenged in this appeal is $3,495,051. ($17,210,160 – $13,715,109 = $3,495,051).

4. Complainant’s personal property is identified by Assessor’s account number 05566, which includes all of Complainant’s personal property.

5. Complainant’s evidence was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment and establish the true value in money for the boat and barge as of January 1, 1999, to be $742,740.

6. The assessed value of the Complainant’s personal property is $1,411,200 ($3,495,051 + $742,740 = $4,237,791 x .333 = $1,411,185, rounded to $1,411,200).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Board of Equalization Presumption

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo 1994, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Complainant’s Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 1999. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Weight to be Given Evidence

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

Trier of Fact

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

Opinion Testimony by Experts

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinion or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992).

DECISION

Valuation of the Boat and Barge

The only evidence of value for the boat and barge in this appeal is that of the Manley appraisal. Even if Respondent’s Exhibit 1 had been received into evidence, it would not have been relevant, substantial or persuasive evidence, due to the fact that it approached the valuation problem from the wrong perspective. Valuation in use, that is, valuing the boat and barge as a casino is not the proper standard under the statute and case law. Value in exchange is the appropriate standard. Casino personal property cannot be valued based upon the income stream of the gaming business conducted on the premises. It must be valued based on what a willing buyer and seller would pay for the personal property, not what someone would pay for the casino as an ongoing and operating concern, even if such a sale were possible. The going concern value can be calculated, but then there would have to be excluded from that going concern value, the value of the casino license. Furthermore, in order to arrive at the value of the boat and barge, it would also be necessary to extrapolate from the going concern value the value of the land and real property improvements which also make up the casino. The value of the gaming and all other supporting machinery and equipment would also have to be calculated and deducted. The contributory value of all other elements which make-up and contribute to the casino operation would have to be taken away from the going concern value to finally arrive at the value which the boat or barge contributes. A much simpler and more reliable method to arrive at the fair market value of a boat and a barge is represented by the valuation made by Complainant’s appraiser.

The property to be valued consists of the boat and barge. Its valuation must be based upon what a willing buyer and seller would pay for those two items, not what a willing buyer and seller might agree to a price for an operating casino. The taxation of gaming operations is controlled and administered under statutes other than those relating to the assessment of real property. The operating license for a casino cannot be bought and sold along with the boat and barge that are part of the casino. Therefore, any consideration as to what the subject property might sell for with a gaming license attached is pure speculation. Furthermore, such speculation would be valuing more than the boat and barge, it would be valuing the license.

The valuation of the boat and barge by Mr. Manley was based upon the data and analysis that the appraiser was able to develop on these two vessels from his investigation, knowledge and experience in marine vessel markets. The appraisal properly considered the existing condition of the two vessels. The market conditions affecting a hypothetical sale were also explored. The appraiser properly recognized that there are a limited number of casino licenses available and a limited number of locations to accommodate the subject vessels for a casino operation. This clearly impacts the potential use and market for either vessel.

In valuing the boat the appraiser considered sales of three other gaming vessels. These were all comparable to the subject. Two of the sales demonstrated that boats such as the City of Caruthersville have decreased in value from the height of the gaming boat boom. The range of decline was from an initial sale value in the early and mid-1990’s of $17,000,000 to $20,000,000 down to a resale value in 1999 and 2000 of $1,200,000 to $1,800,000. The third sale indicated a value of only $675,000 for a boat comparable to the subject.

The valuation of the barge was based on an analysis of gaming boat operations that indicates the barge would have scant appeal. The barge is not designed and equipped to operate in a larger gaming market. The major alterations required to make the barge efficient for operation in a larger gaming market would be prohibitive. Accordingly, the barge was only given a value of $125,000, essentially a scrap value. The evidence establishes that there is not any other reasonable market for the barge. The appraiser had determined that tank barges of this type are readily available at prices below $100,000 from a variety of sources. The availability of barges with comparable or better hulls in the market make the subject barge less desirable. Exhibit A, p. 13.

Respondent’s Brief and Argument

Counsel for Respondent put forth the following arguments in his Brief. The Hearing Officer has summarized these for purposes of this Decision.

A. Complainant’s appraiser dismissed out-of-hand utilization of a cost approach or income capitalization approach. This was inappropriate and improper.

B. Complainant’s appraiser valued the City of Caruthersville at $617,000, despite the fact that Complainant carries the boat at a depreciated value of $9,333,000.

C. Complainant’s appraiser valued the Scott at $125,000, without presenting any sales comparables and despite the fact that Complainant carries the barge at a depreciated value of $5,468,000.

D. Complainant’s assertion that use of the income approach for the boat is inappropriate because income is derived as a result of ownership of the gaming license, not ownership of the boat and barge is absolutely preposterous. The highest and best use for the boat and the barge is for gaming facilities.

E. Complainant’s sales comparison approach for the City of Caruthersville was not properly applied and utilized other sales that are clearly not comparable.

F. The appraisal of the Scott is wholly so inadequate that it provides no assistance in determining a value for the property. The appraiser made no attempt to assess the number of gaming positions available on the barge and failed to consider its available use as a gaming facility. These errors render the value established by the appraisal as worthless.

G. Complainant has for five years, since the initial opening of the casino, had an agreement with Respondent for the assessment of the subject property. In reliance on the agreement, the Assessor refrained from obtaining an outside appraisal of the property and relied instead on figures given to her by Complainant. Therefore, Complainant is estopped from asserting a value different than the figures provided to Respondent in prior years for the assessment of the boat and barge.

Complainant’s Brief and Argument

Counsel for Complainant in his Brief presented the following arguments in response to Respondent’s argument as set for in the Brief of Counsel for Respondent. The Hearing Officer has summarized Complainant’s responses for this Decision.

1. Complainant’s appraiser considered both the cost and income approaches, but determined to rely upon the sales comparison approach.

2. The fact that Complainant carries the boat and barge at certain depreciated values do not establish the market value for the boat and barge.

3. The claim of valuation of the boat and barge in use should be disregarded as fair value in exchange is the appropriate standard.

4. Complainant’s appraiser made appropriate adjustments to the comparable sales upon which the sales comparison approach was based.

5. The barge was not a gaming facility on January 1, 1999, and Complainant’s evidence demonstrated that single skin barges were selling as low as $15,000 and up to $80,000. Further, such barges are obsolete.

6. Respondent’s argument of equitable estoppel was not previously raised. There is no evidence of any agreement. It is questionable whether any such agreement would be legally permissible.

Hearing Officer’s Findings Relative to Respondent’s Arguments

and Complainant’s Responses

The Hearing Officer makes the following findings and determinations relative to the matters raised and addressed in Respondent’s Arguments.

I. Complainant’s appraiser gave consideration to the cost and income approaches in valuing both the boat and barge. He did not find these to be persuasive and relied upon the sales comparison approach to value the boat. The valuation of the barge was based more upon the appraiser’s general knowledge and experience. A barge such as the subject does not appear to be the type that would be bought and sold other than possibly for casino use. However, it is highly unlikely that another river boat casino licensee in Missouri or another state would have even considered purchasing the subject barge for use in a casino operation. An appraiser is not required to utilize an approach or approaches that cannot be developed and supported by appropriate data. Furthermore, the appraiser had investigated the market relative to barges with comparable or better hulls than the subject. Exhibit A, p. 13. The conclusion from that review of the market was that comparable barges were available for less than $100,000. While it would have strengthened the appraisal for the appraiser to have provided a listing of sources for this information, it is not fatally defective to his appraisal. In the absence of an evidentiary challenge by Respondent that would demonstrate that barges like the Scott are selling for $3 to $4 million dollars, Complainant’s evidence from its expert was not rebutted.

II. The book values assigned to the boat and barge by Complainant have no probative value for purposes of determining what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as a price for either item on January 1, 1999. Values utilized for accounting, income tax or gaming regulation purposes in the financial records of the Complainant are not indicators of market activity relative to valuation of the subject boat. Such depreciated values may or may not find support in the real world. It is not required that an appraiser disprove the book value when conducting an appraisal of personal property. The book value is irrelevant.

III. The failure to use an income approach in valuing the boat and barge was neither an error nor inappropriate on the part of Complainant’s appraiser. Nor was it absolutely preposterous as argued by Counsel for Respondent. There is nothing in this record to establish that boats or barges, like either of the two being valued in this appeal, are routinely leased to produce a stream of income. There is nothing to establish that boats and barges generally utilized in riverboat casino operations are owned by an entity other than the casino and then leased to the casino. If such were the case, then there certainly would be an appropriate income stream from which a capitalization of the income could be made to derive a value. However, any attempt to value the boat or barge in this appeal based on the income stream of the casino is completely outside of any recognized appraisal practice for valuation of the personal property. If the issue before the Commission was the value of the casino, then a completely different type of appraisal wold be in order. However, what is to be valued in this appeal is the boat and barge. Since these are not items of personal property established to be purchased by investors for lease in gaming operations, the lack of an income approach to value provides no basis upon which a rejection of the appraiser’s opinions of value can be made.

IV. Counsel for Respondent also asserts that the highest and best use of the subject boat and barge is as a casino. The concept of highest and best use as applied to valuation of personal property is defined as follows: Highest and best use for personal property: The reasonably probable and legal use of personal property, that is physically possible, appropriately supported, and financially feasible and that results in the highest value. USPAP, Appraisal Standards Board (1999). The shorthand definition can be set forth in four factors; (a) physically possible; (b) legally possible; (c) financially feasible and (d) productive to the maximum.

It is quite obvious that it is physically possible to take a boat like the subject and use it for a riverboat casino. It is likewise obvious that it is also physically possible to do the same thing to the subject barge. We know it is legally possible to make the subject boat and barge a casino because they exist as such. However, it must be recognized that this is only legally permissible because Complainant has a license to operate a casino at a certain location in the State of Missouri. Said license cannot be sold. The financial feasibility of using a boat or barge as a casino is again tied to the possessing of a gaming license. It would appear that utilization of boats and barges in conjunction with a casino would provide the maximum productivity for these items of personal property. However, once again the possession of a gaming license is the prerequisite to being able to so utilize these items of personal property.

The fact that the subject boat and barge have been improved and configured in such a way as to be utilized for the operating of a gaming facility does not establish highest and best use separate and apart from the casino license. In order to hypothecate, the highest and best use analysis tying these items of personal property to the casino, it must be shown that the most likely sale would be for this purpose, not that they are in use as a casino on tax date. The evidence on this record clearly demonstrates that neither the boat, or the barge would be readily marketable to another casino operator. The boat and barge are essentially a first generation riverboat gaming facility. It has been passed by in the rapidly changing riverboat gaming industry. New and remodeled riverboat casinos are not utilizing boats and barges like the subject.

Complainant’s evidence for valuing the boat and barge demonstrated that in a sale of these items of property, their highest and best use would no longer be as parts of a riverboat casino facility, separate and apart from a sale of the casino. The sale of the casino cannot take place. The license to operate the casino is not a saleable item.

V. Respondent’s points raised under items E and F, above, have been fully addressed in this Decision under Valuation of the Boat and Barge, supra. Accordingly, there is no further need to address these arguments.

VI. Finally, it is necessary to address Respondent’s equitable estoppel argument. Counsel for Respondent asserts Complainant had entered into an agreement with the Assessor for the assessment of the subject property. That based upon this agreement, Complainant made certain material representations of fact to the Assessor. The Assessor relied upon these representations to her detriment. Complainant is now asserting an inconsistent position by presenting evidence of fair market value of the boat and barge.

No copy of any agreement relating to how the subject personal property was to be valued for prior years or for the current assessment year (1999) was offered into evidence on behalf of Respondent. Apparently, the valuation each year of the subject boat and barge by the Assessor was done by depreciating the original costs for each of these items of personal property. In the years of valuation prior to 1999, Complainant had not pursued any appeal to the Commission. There was no evidence presented upon which a determination can be made that any agreement actually did exist between Complainant and Respondent relative to the valuation of the subject boat and barge or any other personal property owned by Complainant in Pemiscot County. Therefore, any claim of equitable estoppel based upon this purported agreement is without merit and unsupported by evidence on this record. Furthermore, Counsel for Respondent has presented to the Hearing Officer no statutory, nor case law authority, upon which a finding could be made that a local Assessor has the authority to permit taxpayers to set their own assessments, as asserted by Respondent’s Counsel to have been the case in the present appeal. In addition, the standard to be met in each assessment cycle is true value in money – fair market value, not a predetermined and agreed to formula which may or may not reflect the statutory standard.

An analysis of the equitable estoppel assertion demonstrates that it is not applicable in the present appeal. It would be completely inappropriate, arbitrary and capricious for the Hearing Officer to enforce such a defense to circumvent and ignore the clear evidence of value for the subject boat and barge.

Although, the Commission is not under the pleading requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the asserting of this affirmative defense of equitable estoppel should have been asserted in response to the initial filing of the Complaint for Review of Assessment. Respondent could have filed a motion to dismiss, with appropriate supporting affidavits and exhibits to establish the existence of the alleged agreement; the alleged material representations of fact by Complainant; the nature of the reliance by Respondent; the alleged resulting detriment to Respondent; and the alleged assertion of an inconsistent position.

As the Hearing Officer understands the argument advanced by Counsel for Respondent it would be as follows. The Complainant and Respondent had agreed, due to the difficulty and expense of undertaking an appraisal of the subject boat and barge, to value these items in accordance with the figures given in Commission Exhibit 1. Said amounts being as follows:

Boat Barge
15 year life with depreciation at 17% or 83% good.
Replacement Cost: $11,225,779.50 $5,298,448.74
Depreciation: $  1,908,382.50 $   900,736.74
Valuation: $  9,317,397.00 $4,397,712.00
Total Replacement Cost: $16,424,228.00
Total Market Value: $13,715,109.00

Commission’s Exhibit 1 only came into the record due to the Hearing Officer desiring to complete the record as to the value of other personal property that was not being appealed by Complainant (See, Tr. 4, Line 1 – Tr. 9, Line 9; Tr. 47, Line 9 – Tr. 52, Line 5). Counsel for Respondent is asserting that the above cited figures are material representations made by Complainant. He then argues that the Assessor relied upon these to her detriment in that she did not obtain an outside appraisal and relied upon these figures.

Respondent knew from the time of appeal to the Board that Complainant was challenging the above figures as representative of the true value in money for the subject boat and barge. The material representation made by Complainant by filing this appeal was that the figures were not representative of fair market value. The later appraisal submitted by Complainant is not inconsistent with that position. Respondent was on notice from the time of filing of the appeal to the Board that Complainant was disputing the value determined by the Assessor. Respondent’s failure to seek an outside appraisal and relying on original costs, less a depreciation factor, does not come within the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

The party asserting estoppel bears the burden of proving all the essential elements by clear and satisfactory evidence. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #2 v. City of St. Joseph, 8 S.W.3d 257 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999); Collins v. Director of Revenue, 2 S.W.3d 164 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999); Director of Revenue v. Oliphant, 938 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Mo. App. 1997). In the present case, Respondent has not established the existence of any agreement between the parties relative to the assessment of the subject property for tax year 1999. The alleged detriment of Respondent not obtaining an outside appraisal to offer into evidence was due to Respondent’s own action and not any material misrepresentation or assertion of an inconsistent position by Complainant. There is nothing in this record to support a conclusion that during the Board proceedings or the filing made with this Commission that Complainant asserted that it would be relying on the depreciated figures set out above.

Counsel for Respondent’s equitable estoppel argument is creative. However, it is simply not applicable in an appeal before the Commission. The facts on this record demonstrate the absence of any of the three elements necessary to establish equitable estoppel. The point is not well taken.

Conclusion

Each appeal before the Commission must be determined based on the evidentiary record developed in a given case. The evidentiary record in this appeal, presented by Complainant, was sufficient to establish the value of the boat and barge. This Decision should not be considered as establishing any hard and fast methodology for valuing casino boats and barges. It may be that market data could be presented in other cases which would demonstrate the value a prospective purchaser would pay for these items of personal property contingent upon the granting of a gaming license. Market data might also be presented which would show what an entity in possession of a gaming license would pay for the boat and barge. A methodology whereby an actual sale of a gaming operation, with appropriate adjustments to arrive at the value for just the boat and barge might be presented, where such data can be developed and adjusted from the market. A valuation of the going concern, with appropriate adjustments to account for non-personal property items and factors, might be developed. Such evidence could demonstrate and establish values different than those determined by this record. This record did not so establish such information upon which a value other than that proffered by Complainant’s expert could be found.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for Pemiscot County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 1999 is set at $1,411,200.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis City, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED February 1, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

 

ORDER

DENYING APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

OF HEARING OFFICER DECISION

On February 1, 2001, Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor, entered his Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessment by the Pemiscot County Board of Equalization and finding value for the subject property.

Respondent timely filed her Application for Review of the Decision stating six grounds or points as the basis for her Application. Counsel for Complainant timely filed his Response to Application for Review.

DECISION

The Commission upon review of the record and the Decision finds the points put forth by Respondent to be not well taken.

The Decision correctly addresses the valuation issue in this appeal. The Commission sees no value to be gained from restating the Hearing Officer’s determinations, conclusions and reasoning as they relate to each of the points asserted. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the analysis performed by the Hearing Officer in reaching his conclusion of value. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law relative to any of the points raised by Respondent. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995).

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.470 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED June 25, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Sam D. Leake, Chairman

Bruce E. Davis, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner

Aztar Missouri Gaming v. Snider (Pemiscot)

February 1st, 2001

 

 

AZTAR MISSOURI GAMING CORP., )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeals No. 99-76500 & 99-76501

)

DONNA SNIDER, ASSESSOR, )

PEMISCOT COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the Pemiscot County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE, Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject property for tax years 1999 and 2000 to be $5,113,280, assessed value of $1,636,250.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Cathy Steele, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Stephen P. Sokoloff, Kennett, Missouri.

Case heard and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUES

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 1999.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the Pemiscot County Board of Equalization which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $11,970,280 (assessed value of $3,830,490, as commercial property). A hearing was conducted on July 27, 2000, at the Pemiscot County Courthouse, Caruthersville, Missouri. Counsel for each party filed briefs in these appeals.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, and Briefs of Counsel, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant’s Evidence

The following exhibits were received into evidence on behalf of Complainant.

Exhibit A – Appraisal Report of Edward Dinan, State Certified Real Estate Appraiser.

Exhibit B – Written Direct Testimony of Edward Dinan.

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent submitted the Written Direct Testimony of Donna Snider (Exhibit 1) with a balance sheet attached. The exhibit was excluded from evidence and was only received as an offer of proof.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Hearing Officer received into evidence Commission Exhibit 1, listing and breakdown of real estate values. Tr. 9, Lines 5-9; Tr. 46, Line 5 – Tr. 47, Line 3.

2. The subject property is located at 777 E. Third Street, Caruthersville, Missouri. It is identified by parcel numbers 16521111 and 16521112. The property is assigned two parcel numbers due to computer requirements, but the property is a single tract of land. The property consists of approximately 37.5 acres of land of which approximately 19.3 acres of unprotected flood ground. The usable area is estimated at 18.2 acres. The property is improved by a one-story, with lower level mixed-use 40,000 square foot building (pavilion), two concrete gazebo structures and ancillary site improvements, including chain link fencing and asphalt paved parking. There is also an expo or convention center (a tent structure).

3. Complainant’s appraiser did not value the convention center but considered it to be personal property. The convention center will be treated as part of the real property for purposes of valuation in this appeal. The value of the convention center as determined by the Assessor was $113,280. Commission Exhibit 1.

4. Complainant’s evidence was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment and establish the true value in money for the subject land and all improvements other than the convention center as of January 1, 1999, to be $5,000,000.

5. The value of the subject property is $5,113,280, assessed value of $1,636,250.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Board of Equalization Presumption

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo 1994, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Complainant’s Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 1999. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Weight to be Given Evidence

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

Trier of Fact

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as she may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

Opinion Testimony by Experts

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350.

DECISION

The only evidence of value on this record is that provided by Complainant. Mr. Dinan’s approach to value is the proper approach under the standard of value applicable to this appeal. The subject property cannot be valued in use as a casino, no more than a property improved by a McDonald’s restaurant can be valued based upon the income it produces as a McDonald’s franchise. The valuation of property in Missouri for ad valorem property taxes is based on value in exchange, not value in use.

Respondent’s position as expressed in her written direct testimony advances a valuation based upon value in use. Even if Exhibit 1 had been received into evidence it would not have been relevant, nor substantial and persuasive evidence to establish value. Casino property cannot be valued based upon the income stream of the gaming business conducted on the premises. The property to be valued consists of the land and its improvements. Its valuation must be based upon what a willing buyer and seller would pay for that property, not what a willing buyer and seller might agree as to a price for an operating casino. The taxation of gaming operations is controlled and administered under other statutes than those relating to the assessment of real property. The operating license for a casino cannot be bought and sold along with real property. Therefore, any consideration as to what the subject property might sell for with a gaming license attached is pure speculation. Furthermore, such speculation would be valuing more than the real property, it would be valuing the license.

The Dinan appraisal is both substantial and persuasive to establish value as to the subject property. The appraiser properly viewed the property as it was improved but recognized the critical factor that his task was not to appraise a gaming facility. The appraisal problem was to simply appraise the land and improvements. Implicit in Mr. Dinan’s appraisal is the assumption that the subject property will not command a purchase price as improved as high as would be expected if it were to sell as a casino. This is a proper assumption for valuing the property in exchange – the appropriate standard. Therefore, he properly valued the property relying upon commercial land sales, commercial sales comparisons and commercial lease data, rather than looking at casino sales and casino leases, if any had even been available, or casino income.

The tent convention center might be more appropriately considered to be personal property. However, for purposes of this appeal, the Hearing Officer considers it to be real property. Mr. Dinan’s omission of valuation of this item is not fatal to his appraisal. The Hearing Officer relies upon the value determined by the Assessor on this particular item to arrive at an overall value for the property.

Respondent’s Arguments

Counsel for Respondent put forth various arguments in his Brief relative to the valuation methodology utilized by Complainant’s appraiser. Specific challenges were presented as to each of the three approaches to values and certain aspects of each. The Respondent’s arguments can be summarized as follows:

1. Complainant’s appraiser erred in not using the actual sale price of the subject parcel when it was purchased to be developed as a casino to establish land value under the cost approach.

2. Complainant’s appraiser erred in not relying only on two sales of vacant land to establish land value under the cost approach.

3. Complainant’s appraiser erred in applying depreciation to the subject improvements under the cost approach.

4. Complainant’s appraiser erred in utilizing retail lease properties (strip malls), instead of “entertainment complexes” under the income approach.

5. Complainant’s appraiser erred in utilizing comparable sales of retail/office space properties under the sales comparison approach.

Cost Approach – Land Purchase

Counsel for Respondent criticizes the failure of Mr. Dinan to utilize the actual sale price of the subject land when it was purchased by Complainant in 1995. Counsel for Respondent asserts in his Brief that the sale price at that time was $5.9 million. However, no evidence was presented which would establish what the sale price for the subject land was when Complainant originally purchased it. Respondent’s Counsel questioned relative to this amount, however, it was not established what the actual purchase price was.

The original purchase price was clearly tied to the establishment of a casino on the subject site. Without the existence of a casino license in Complainant it is highly unlikely that the subject land would have commanded a $5.9 million purchase price in 1995, assuming that was in fact the land value. The casino license was clearly a critical factor relating to the purchase of the subject land and the price paid for same.

Without the possession of the casino license, it would be pure speculation and conjecture that the subject property would have commanded a $5.9 million price in 1995. Counsel for Respondent made no effort during cross-examination to demonstrate that in point of fact river front land in Pemiscot County was selling at the same per acre rate, without a casino license being possessed by the purchaser, as that paid by Complainant for the subject site. Neither did Respondent come forward it her case in chief to so establish what the 1995 sale price actually was or that such price was reflective of land being purchased for non-casino development. The appraiser was correct in not giving consideration to the purchase of the subject land in 1995 by Complainant. Respondent’s argument is not well taken.

Cost Approach – Comparable Sales

Counsel for Respondent points out the sale of an undeveloped tract adjacent to the subject that sold for $93,750 per acre (Vacant Land Sale # 3). Mr. Dinan used this sale but made what appear to have been appropriate adjustments, the basis of which were explained in his appraisal. Likewise, Counsel for Respondent argues that one other sale of unimproved land in St. Louis County which sold for $85,505 per acre (Vacant Land Sale # 5). Counsel, in effect, argues that Mr. Dinan should have used these two sales exclusively without any adjustments and this would have produced a land value of approximately $3.33 million.

Counsel cites to no evidence on the record which would provide a basis for whatever adjustments should have been made to each of these sales that would produce a per acre value that would result in the asserted $3.33 million value. Apparently, Counsel simply made his own adjustments to each of these sales. However, adjustments such as would be required to be made to these land sales must be made by someone with the training and experience to make such adjustments. The only evidence from an expert on this record relative to calculating the vacant land value for the subject came from Mr. Dinan. That evidence will not support Mr. Sokoloff’s (or Respondent’s) unknown adjustments or opinion. The fact that there is a difference of opinion between Counsel for Respondent/Respondent and the Complainant’s expert relative to land value does not establish an error on the part of the appraiser in valuing the land.

Mr. Dinan evaluated six different land sales to arrive at a land value for his cost approach. Four of those land sales were of properties located within Pemiscot County, one was in St. Louis County and one on the Missouri River in Buchanan County. Each sale was adjusted in order to account for differences between the comparable and the subject. Each of the sale properties represent properties which are appropriate to be utilized to establish land value under the cost approach in this particular appraisal problem. The six sales gave a much superior valuation for land value under a cost approach than simply relying on the two sales with the highest per acre value as advocated by Respondent. Three of Mr. Dinan’s comparables were impacted by casinos. The other three provided good indications of land values in Pemiscot County not directly influenced by the subject casino. This mix of land sales provides substantial and persuasive evidence to support the land valuation determined by the appraiser. Respondent’s argument is not well taken.

Cost Approach – Depreciation

The argument advanced by Respondent on this point concerns the physical depreciation for the building and site improvements and external obsolescence factors employed by Mr. Dinan in his cost approach. Respondent’s argument on this point is that these adjustments were arbitrary and without any support. Counsel for Respondent made no cross-examination on these specific points. Neither was any evidence presented on behalf of Respondent which would rebut the assumptions and conclusions made by Complainant’s expert.

Mr. Dinan estimated a normal economic life of 50 years for the subject building, with the effective age being five years. The assumption of the expert of a 10% or approximately 2.5% per year for physical depreciation of the subject building is certainly reasonable. Mr. Dinan then depreciated the site improvements, parking lot, etc., at a higher depreciation since site improvements typically have a shorter life. This is a reasonable assumption to be made by the expert, based upon his experience. In like manner, the appraiser’s allocation of a 5% external or economic obsolescence due to the subject improvement being located in a small community is not unreasonable.

Respondent essentially argues that no depreciation should be allowed under the cost approach for any reason. This is not persuasive, since the subject building and site improvements were approximately four years old on tax date. Furthermore, the subject improvements are of a general nature that have not been shown to have been generally developed in the subject county, nor in other communities in Missouri of a similar size. If such were the case, Respondent should have come forward with evidence on this record to establish such a case to rebut the conclusion of Complainant’s appraiser on the matter of external depreciation. In addition, given that the appraiser did not place primary reliance, or any real weight on the cost approach Respondent’s arguments are not persuasive.

Income Approach – Retail Leases

Respondent next argues that Mr. Dinan’s use of retail lease data to develop his income approach was not appropriate because he found the highest and best use of the property to be an “entertainment complex,” as currently developed. Respondent’s argument ignores that Complainant’s appraiser performed his analysis and determined that the subject improvements provide a contributory value to the property. Furthermore, Respondent’s argument that there are numerous locations in Missouri being utilized for entertainment complexes ignores the critical element of whether such facilities are actually leased.

It is clear from Mr. Dinan’s appraisal report that in performing his income approach he properly considered the rental income stream that the subject property could command for a purpose other than a casino. There is no evidence that casino facilities are leased to casino operators. Mr. Dinan’s testimony was that these facilities don’t rent, they are owner occupied. No evidence was presented by Respondent to rebut this conclusion of Mr. Dinan.

The fact that there exist theaters and amusement parks in Branson, or an amusement park in Pacific, or other entertainment facilities at Lake Ozark, as argued by Counsel for Respondent, does not establish that these facilities are facilities that have a rental stream of income from which an income approach to value could be developed. It would have been improper for Mr. Dinan to have developed his income approach based on the ticket sales generated by an owner occupied theater or amusement park in Branson, Pacific or Lake Ozark. In like manner, Mr. Dinan was correct in not considering the casino stream of income for to do so would be to value the business and not the income stream which would be produced from the lease of the subject property.

The use of retail “strip mall” type facilities to develop the income approach was appropriate, since in the opinion of the appraiser this would be the type of rental use to which the subject building and supporting improvements would most likely be put in the absence of the casino. The six comparable rental properties utilized by Mr. Dinan were appropriate for arriving at the data necessary to conduct a proper income approach. There is no data to establish a rental rate and rental expenses to develop a stream of income for the lease of a facility such as the subject for use as a casino. Therefore, the appraiser did not err in not employing information which does not exist and cannot be developed from the market. Respondent’s argument is not well taken.

Sale Comparison Approach – Retail/Office Comparables

Respondent finally argues that the comparable sales relied upon by Complainant’s appraiser were also inappropriate because they were all used for retail/office space and were wholly different in character from the subject property. Respondent’s argument on this point suffers from the same difficulties as the argument against the income approach. Respondent’s insistence on wanting to value the subject property only as a casino, when the casino cannot be sold, results in the argument being fatally flawed.

Mr. Dinan appropriately determined that since the subject property cannot be bought and sold as a casino, it would be bought and sold for an alternative commercial use. That use would be for some type of retail, strip mall, office use. Therefore, he looked to sales of such properties to arrive at the necessary supporting information for the sales comparison approach. If, in fact, properties housing the land based support facilities for casino’s were bought and sold for further use as a casino, then it would be been appropriate to consider such sales. Clearly there are no such sales. Accordingly, the appraiser could not err in not relying on data which does not exist and cannot be developed. Respondent’s argument is not well taken.

Highest and Best Use Analysis

The highest and best use analysis presented by Complainant’s appraiser is couched in and contains typical and generally appropriate boilerplate language usually found in real estate appraisals. Mr. Dinan could have made a stronger presentation in explaining how he was dealing with the fact that he was appraising a special use, whose real estate cannot be conveyed for that special use because a gaming license is not transferable.

The Hearing Officer understands that as the property is currently developed with the gaming license, the highest and best use (most economically and legally permissible use) is, of course, the operation of a casino. Take away the gaming license and the subject property’s highest and best use can no longer legally be for a casino. Since the gaming license cannot be sold, there is not a market for the casino real property, as such, for a casino.

The Hearing Officer further understands Mr. Dinan’s analysis to be that naturally, with a gaming license, the property is being utilized to its highest and best use. Without the gaming license, Mr. Dinan values the property as if it were to be utilized for the next most profitable commercial activity. The current improvements provide a contributory value and would still provide a contributory value if not being used for a casino, but for some other alternative use. While the Hearing Officer would have liked to have seen the appraiser develop this in a stronger fashion, his failure to make such a complete and detailed analysis for this special use property is certainly not fatal to his valuation so that the appraisal should be rejected. The gaming option for use of the property which provides the current highest financial return does not have a market, because the license cannot be sold, so Mr. Dinan valued the real property based upon the highest and best use which would be legally available to the property otherwise. This was certainly appropriate.

Conclusion

Complainant presented evidence in the form of an expert opinion to establish value. Notwithstanding the arguments made by Respondent and her Counsel, Complainant’s evidence was substantial and persuasive to establish value. Complainant’s appraiser provide an appraisal utilizing appropriate methodology upon which an opinion of value could be made.

Each appeal before the Commission must be determined based on the evidentiary record developed in a given case. The evidentiary record in this appeal, presented by Complainant, was sufficient to establish the value of the real property. This Decision should not be considered as establishing any hard and fast methodology for valuing real property utilized for casinos. It may be that market data could be presented in other cases which would demonstrate the value a prospective purchaser would pay for the real property contingent upon the granting of a gaming license. Market data might also be presented which would show what an entity in possession of a gaming license would pay for the real property. A methodology whereby an actual sale of a gaming operation, with appropriate adjustments to arrive at the value for just the real property might be presented. A valuation of the going concern, with appropriate adjustments to account for non-real property items and factors, might be developed. Such evidence could demonstrate and establish values different than those determined by this record. This record did not so establish such information upon which a value other than that proffered by Complainant’s expert could be found.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for Pemiscot County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property in appeal 99-76500 for tax years 1999 and 2000 is set at $818,125.

The assessed value for the subject property in appeal 99-76501 for tax years 1999 and 2000 is set at $818,125.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with these appeals shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Pemiscot County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in these appeals. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED February 1, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

 

ORDER

DENYING APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

OF HEARING OFFICER DECISION

On February 1, 2001, Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor, entered his Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessments by the Pemiscot County Board of Equalization and finding value for the subject property.

Respondent timely filed her Application for Review of the Decision stating six grounds or points as the basis for her Application. Counsel for Complainant timely filed his Response to Application for Review.

DECISION

The Commission upon review of the record and the Decision finds the points put forth by Respondent to be not well taken.

The Decision correctly addresses the valuation issue in these appeals. The Commission sees no value to be gained from restating the Hearing Officer’s determinations, conclusions and reasoning as they relate to each of the points asserted. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the analysis performed by the Hearing Officer in reaching his conclusion of value. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law relative to any of the points raised by Respondent. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995).

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in these appeals, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.470 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED June 25, 2001.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Sam D. Leake, Chairman

Bruce E. Davis, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner