STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
|V A D REALTY LLC,||)|
|)||Appeal No. 10223|
|v.||)||Parcel No. 25T630256|
|JAKE ZIMMERMAN, ASSESSOR,||)|
|ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,||)|
DECISION AND ORDER
VAD Realty LLC, (Complainant) appeals the St. Louis County Board of Equalization’s (BOE) decision classifying the subject property as residential with an appraised value of $148,400 as of January 1, 2020. Complainant alleges misclassification and overvaluation. Complainant asserts the property should be classified as agricultural and proposes either a productivity value of $660 or a fair market value of $63,000.
The BOE decision is set aside. The property is agricultural and its market value as of January 1, 2020, was $63,000.
Complainant is represented by counsel Anthony Soukenik. Respondent is represented by counsel Tim Bowe. The parties filed post-hearing briefs.
FINDINGS OF FACT
- The Subject Property. The subject property is a vacant, undeveloped, 9.06-acre lot located in a residential subdivision in unincorporated western St. Louis County. The western lot line is 887 feet north to south. The northern lot line is 1,102 feet and lies on a northwest to southeast plane. The eastern and southern lot lines are irregular and create an approximately 340-foot long, 40-foot wide peninsula extending southeast from the main lot area and out to a public cul-de-sac. The peninsula provides the only access to the subject property from a public street. There is no road onto or within the subject property. The elevation at the far eastern edge of the peninsula adjoining the cul-de-sac is 572 feet above sea level. The western edge of the lot is dissected by two deep ravines, with a high point that is 692 feet above sea level. Given the topography and the irregular boundaries, the subject property consists almost entirely of steep inclines descending from ridges and into ravines. The lot is approximately 99 percent wooded, with a very small cleared area in the southeast corner, near the bottom of a steep slope.
Complainant has owned the subject property since 2001 and has never listed or marketed it for sale. Complainant’s owner has used the property to gather firewood for personal use and for outdoor recreation.
- Assessment and Valuation. The BOE classified the subject property as residential with an appraised value of $148,400.
- Complainant’s Evidence. Complainant introduced Exhibits A through E. Complainant’s exhibits are summarized as follows:
|Exhibit A||Restricted appraisal report prepared by Edward Dinan, MAI, and appraiser Jordan Liener. The report concludes residential development is “cost prohibitive,” the highest and best use of the subject property is for continued recreational use, and the TVM as of January 1, 2019, was $63,000.|
|Exhibit B||Dinan’s written direct testimony.|
|Exhibit C||Leiner’s written direct testimony. Leiner testified he assisted Dinan with the appraisal and concurred in the result. Respondent objected to Exhibit C because Leiner was not present to testify. The hearing officer admitted Exhibit C, stating it would be given the weight it was due.|
|Exhibit D||Written direct testimony of Nadir Djavaherian. Djavaherian is Complainant’s owner and sole member. Djavaherian testified the subject property has no public utilities and that he acquired the for harvesting firewood and outdoor recreation. Djavaherian testified he has “explored” residential development but the steep topography and limited access creates “prohibitive cost.”|
|Exhibit E||St. Louis County parcel maps with topographical intervals and parcel boundaries; four ground-level photographs. The first parcel map shows all adjacent properties are improved with homes and/or other buildings.|
Dinan’s appraisal report concluded the highest and best use of the subject property is for continued recreational use. (Ex. A at 7) Dinan used the sales comparison approach to estimate the subject’s value. Dinan compared the subject to four vacant parcels which sold between June 2016 and August 2018. Like the subject, all four parcels are located in western St. Louis County and are zoned for residential use. The parcels ranged from 9.12 acres to 11.31 acres. (Id. at 8) Like the subject, three of the four parcels are approximately 99 percent wooded. One is 80 percent wooded. Like the subject, three of the four parcels have “steeply sloping” topography. One has “moderate” topography. Like the subject, all four comparable properties are shaped irregularly, though only one has “poor” access similar to the subject. Unlike the subject, all four comparable properties have electric service. Dinan applied negative adjustments ranging from 8 percent to 18 percent, yielding adjusted values ranging from $5,794 to $11,963 per acre. The median adjusted value of the four comparable properties is $7,045, with a mean of $7,962. Dinan’s concluded value of $7,000 per acre is consistent with the median adjusted sale price of the four comparable sales. Multiplying the subject’s 9.06 acres by $7,000 results in an estimated, rounded value of $63,000. (Id.)
At the evidentiary hearing, Dinan testified the “salient point” is the subject property is a “leftover” parcel never developed along with the rest of the subdivision. Dinan testified the property’s configuration and topography mean the only access is via the steep “peninsula” adjoining the cul-de-sac on the east side of the property. While access is legally possible, Dinan testified the only viable home site is on a small portion of relatively level ground on a ridgetop along the western side of the property. Because the only home site is on the high ground on the west side, and the only access is approximately 120 feet lower on the east side, access to a home site would require clearing a path through the woods, a “tremendous” amount of grading, and the installation of an approximately 1,000-foot road supported by large retaining walls. Dinan testified the retaining walls alone would cost approximately $145,000. Finally, Dinan testified the property is not connected to sewer, water, gas, or electric service. Dinan concluded the cost to create access for a potential home site shows residential development is not economically feasible as of the valuation date.
On cross-examination, Dinan conceded it is “possible” to build on the subject property despite the steep inclines. Dinan further conceded he was unaware of any legal restriction on residential development. Nonetheless, Dinan reiterated his conclusion residential development is not economically feasible as of the valuation date.
Consistent with his written direct testimony, Djavaherian testified at the evidentiary hearing he has used the subject property to gather firewood for personal use and for outdoor recreation. Djavaherian also testified he acquired the subject property to provide a “buffer” between his home and others in the area. Djavaherian has since sold his home, but did not offer the subject property for sale along with his former home. In his written testimony, Djavaherian testified “[o]ur realtor advised against it given a typical buyer would not be interested in maintaining such a large parcel and incurring the annual real estate tax burden.” (Ex. D at 17)  He has no plans to log the subject property.
- Respondent’s Evidence. Respondent introduced Exhibit 1, the BOE decision classifying the subject property as residential and setting an “appraised value” of $148,400. Respondent introduced no other evidence.
- Classification and Value. The subject property is agricultural. The TVM as of January 1, 2020, was $63,000.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
- Assessment and Valuation. Agricultural real property is assessed at 12% of its TVM as of January 1 of each odd-numbered year. Section 137.115.5(1)(b). The TVM is “the fair market value of the property on the valuation date[.]” Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Mo. Gaming Corp., 156 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Mo. banc 2005) (internal quotation omitted). The fair market value is “the price which the property would bring from a willing buyer when offered for sale by a willing seller.” Mo. Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Comm’n, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). “True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange not value in use.” Tibbs v. Poplar Bluff Assocs. I, L.P., 599 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). “Determining the true value in money is an issue of fact for the STC.” Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008).
“For purposes of levying property taxes, the value of real property is typically determined using one or more of three generally accepted approaches.” Snider, 156 S.W.3d at 346. The three generally accepted approaches are the cost approach, the income approach, and the comparable sales approach. Id. at 346-48.
Agricultural property is typically valued according to land grades and productive values established by STC regulations. 12 CSR 30-4.010. Unlike other agricultural property, “[f]orest land, whose cover is predominantly trees and other woody vegetation, should not be assigned to a land classification grade based on its productivity for agricultural crops.” 12 CSR 30-4.010(2)(A). “Forest land may or may not be in use for timber production, wildlife management, hunting, other outdoor recreation, or similar uses[.]” Id. These regulations indicate vacant forest land used for recreational purposes may be classified as agricultural.
- Evidence. The hearing officer is the finder of fact and determines the credibility and weight of the evidence. Kelly v. Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Family Support Div., 456 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015). “Although technical rules of evidence are not controlling in administrative hearings, fundamental rules of evidence are applicable.” Mo. Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm’n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Mo. banc 1977).
- Complainant’s Burden of Proof. The taxpayer bears the burden of proof and must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was misclassified or overvalued. Westwood P’ship v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152, 161 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003). The BOE’s classification of the subject property is presumptively correct. Rinehart v. Bateman, 363 S.W.3d 357, 367 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). The BOE’s valuation is also presumptively correct. Tibbs, 599 S.W.3d at 7. The “taxpayer may rebut this presumption by presenting substantial and persuasive evidence that the valuation is erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The taxpayer also must prove “the value that should have been placed on the property.” Id. “Substantial evidence is that evidence which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, and from which the trier of fact can reasonably decide the case on the fact issues.” Savage v. State Tax Comm’n, 722 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo. banc 1986) (internal quotation omitted). Evidence is persuasive when it has “sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.” Daly v. P.D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); see also White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 305 (Mo. banc 2010) (noting the burden of persuasion is the “party’s duty to convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors that party”).
- Complainant Produced Substantial and Persuasive Evidence of Misclassification.
Section 137.016.5 provides a statutory basis for “subclassifying real property into one of the three constitutionally authorized subclassifications if the property does not otherwise fit within one of the statutory definitions set forth at section 137.016.1.” Bateman, 363 S.W.3d at 365 n.14. The subject property does not satisfy the statutory definitions of residential, commercial, or agricultural property provided in Section 137.016.1(1), (2), or (3). Consequently, the proper classification requires analysis of the eight factors set forth in Section 137.016.5. Section 137.016.5 provides:
All real property which is vacant, unused, or held for future use; which is used for a private club, a not-for-profit or other nonexempt lodge, club, business, trade, service organization, or similar entity; or for which a determination as to its classification cannot be made under the definitions set out in subsection 1 of this section, shall be classified according to its immediate most suitable economic use, which use shall be determined after consideration of:
- Immediate prior use, if any, of such property;
- Location of such property;
- Zoning classification of such property; except that, such zoning classification shall not be considered conclusive if, upon consideration of all factors, it is determined that such zoning classification does not reflect the immediate most suitable economic use of the property;
- Other legal restrictions on the use of such property;
- Availability of water, electricity, gas, sewers, street lighting, and other public services for such property;
- Size of such property;
- Access of such property to public thoroughfares; and
- Any other factors relevant to a determination of the immediate most suitable economic use of such property.
- Immediate Prior Use
The subject property is undeveloped, vacant land that is approximately 99 percent forested. The subject property has never been developed or used for residential or commercial purposes. While there is no evidence the subject property has been used to raise crops or livestock, the substantial and persuasive evidence in the record shows the immediate prior use of the property is as forest land for outdoor recreation.
The property is located in a residential subdivision in western St. Louis County. The area is mostly residential, but there are agricultural parcels. An adjacent property along the subject’s western border is classified as partially agricultural. The subject’s location in a predominantly residential area is not dispositive given the existence of the adjacent partially agricultural parcel and the presence of other agricultural parcels in the area. The location factor is neutral.
The property is zoned for residential use. Section 137.016, however, does not define classifications according to zoning. To the contrary, “a zoning classification shall not be considered conclusive, if upon consideration of all factors, the zoning classification does not reflect the immediate most suitable economic use of the property.” Section 137.016.5(3). Thus, the statute expressly contemplates classifications inconsistent with the current zoning and relegates it to one of eight non-dispositive factors. Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 S.W.3d 441, 448 (Mo. banc 2013).
The substantial, persuasive, and uncontradicted exhibits in the record establishes residential zoning does not reflect the “immediate most suitable economic use of the property.” (Ex. A at 3, 7; Ex. B at 30-37; Ex. D at 11-18) Dinan and Djavaherian’s evidentiary hearing testimony confirmed residential development was infeasible due to the subject’s steep topography, irregular configuration, and lack of utility service. The substantial and persuasive evidence in the records shows the immediate most suitable economic use is “[c]ontinued recreational use until development becomes feasible.” (Ex. A at 7; Ex. B at 30). The fact the subject is zoned residential is not conclusive.
- Other Legal Restrictions
Complainant asserts neighboring homeowners would likely mount a legal challenge to residential development. This assertion is speculative. There is no substantial and persuasive evidence of any other legal restrictions precluding residential development.
- Availability of water, utilities, and public services
The subject property does not have connections to water, utilities, or public sewers. The property has access to a public street via a cul-de-sac, but the substantial and persuasive evidence from Complainant’s appraiser and Complainant’s owner establish the subject’s topography and irregular configuration makes residential development economically infeasible as of the valuation date. The substantial and persuasive evidence in the record shows residential use is not the subject’s immediate most suitable economic use. The substantial and persuasive evidence in the record shows the subject’s immediate most suitable economic use is continued use as forest land for outdoor recreation.
The subject property is a 9.06-acre undeveloped lot. Typically, parcels of this size are suitable for multiple uses. However, the substantial and persuasive evidence in the record shows the subject’s steep topography limits possible home sites to a less than one acre portion on the highest, western edge of the property. Considered in conjunction with the subject’s steep topography, the subject’s size and irregular configuration require construction of approximately 1,000 feet of road and retaining walls traversing the peninsula from the cul-de-sac on the eastern edge of the property through wooded areas and over steep slopes in order to access the potential home site on the western edge of the property. The subject property’s size therefore creates additional costs contributing to the economic infeasibility of residential development. This factor does not favor residential classification.
- Access to Public Thoroughfares
The subject property has walk-in access from public thoroughfares. There are no interior driveways permitting vehicular access. The substantial and persuasive evidence in the records shows constructing a road on the subject property is cost-prohibitive for purposes of residential development. This factor does not favor residential classification.
- Other Factors
The subject’s history is not consistent with continued residential classification. The subject is located in a residential subdivision. Unlike every other adjacent parcel, the subject property was never developed. As Complainant’s appraiser testified, the subject is a “leftover” parcel precisely because the steep topography and irregular configuration have been and remain cost-prohibitive factors for residential development. The fact the subject has remained undeveloped while every adjacent parcel is used for entirely or partially for residential purposes is consistent with the evidence showing residential use is not an economically feasible use of the subject property.
Complainant produced substantial and persuasive evidence showing that as of the valuation date, residential development and use is cost prohibitive. The immediate most suitable economic use of the subject property is not residential use. Complainant’s evidence persuasively established the subject property is vacant forest land used for outdoor recreation. STC regulations indicate “forest land” used for “outdoor recreation, or similar uses” may qualify for agricultural classification. 12 CSR 30-4.010(2)(A). The BOE’s classification of the subject property as residential property is set aside. The subject property is agricultural.
Respondent offers five arguments in opposition to agricultural classification. None of these arguments undermine the conclusion Complainant produced substantial and persuasive evidence showing the subject property should be classified as agricultural.
First, Respondent asserts the subject property does not satisfy the Section 137.016.1(2) definition of “agricultural and horticultural property” because it was not “devoted primarily to the raising and harvesting of crops” or “to the feeding, breeding and management of livestock[.]” (Resp. Br. at 2-3, 5, 7-10, 13) The fact the subject is not used to raise crops or livestock simply reinforces the conclusion that the appropriate classification must be based on the Section 137.106.5 factors governing the classification of property that does not otherwise fit within the Section 137.016.1 definitions of residential, agricultural, or commercial property. Bateman, 363 S.W.3d at 366 n.13 (noting “section 137.016.5 provides for a means of subclassifying real property into one of the three constitutionally authorized subclassifications if the property does not otherwise fit within one of the statutory definitions set forth at section 137.016.1”). Respondent’s observation the subject property is not used for raising crops or livestock does not alter the conclusion that the Section 137.016.5 factors favor agricultural classification.
Second, Respondent cites several STC decisions for “guidance” regarding the proper classification of the subject property. (Resp. Br. at 3-5) Respondent asserts Markirk Development, LLC v. Koons, 2012WL4842834 (Mo. St. Tax Comm’n, Sep. 2, 2012) is the “[m]ost similar” case and supports residential classification. (Id. at 3) Markirk is materially distinguishable and unpersuasive.
Unlike the subject’s nine-acre, steeply sloping and wooded lot, the subject properties in Markirk were 26 residential lots platted and marketed for residential use. Makirk at 2. Unlike the subject property, the lots in Markirk had “sanitary and storm sewers, electrical, telephone and cable lines installed to the platted areas.” Id. at 2. Given these facts, the owner’s attempt to seed fescue in December 2010 – months after the planting times recommended by the University of Missouri and immediately prior to the January 1, 2011, valuation date – “accomplished nothing” and did not overcome the fact the properties were platted and marketed for residential use. Id. at 5. Markirk is materially distinguishable and does not support Respondent’s argument.
Respondent also attempts to distinguish three decisions in which the STC reclassified “seemingly similar” vacant lands from residential to agricultural. (Resp. Br. at 4-5) As in this case, the salient point in each of these three decisions is that the subject properties did not meet the Section 137.016.1 definitions of residential, agricultural, or commercial property and Section 137.016.5 factors favored agricultural classification. For instance, in Kozlowski, the hearing officer concluded a 0.93-acre vacant, wooded, and steeply sloping parcel should be classified as agricultural in part because it was not “suitable for a residence.” 2018 WL 3764601 at 9. The same is true here. Contrary to Respondent’s argument, Kozlowski supports an agricultural classification in this case.
Third, Respondent asserts 12 CSR 30-4.010, which sets agricultural productive values and provides certain forest land should not be assigned an agricultural productive value, applies only to “land that is already classified as agricultural land[.]” (Resp. Br. at 6) Respondent’s argument is based on the prefatory “Purpose” of 12 CSR 30-4.010, which is “to publish a range of productive values for agricultural and horticultural land for the ensuing tax year.” Respondent concludes this language shows the regulation “simply establishes that forest and horticultural land that are already classified as agricultural, are treated differently than cultivated agricultural land” and is “irrelevant” to the classification of the subject property. (Resp. Br. at 6) Respondent is incorrect.
The regulation includes a prefatory sentence – the “Purpose” – followed by the operative regulatory text. See State v. Shanklin, 534 S.W.3d 240, 242 (Mo. banc 2017) (holding article I, section 35 of the Missouri Constitution included “prefatory” language providing a “purpose and context” for the amendment while the subsequent “operative” language defined the legal effect of the amendment). The stated “Purpose” of 12 CSR 30-4.010 simply provides context for the subsequent and operative regulatory text establishing valuation methods for agricultural property. Nothing in the operative regulatory text distinguishes the valuation of lands “already classified” as agricultural from those reclassified as agricultural by the STC. Nor does the operative regulatory text purport to limit the STC’s authority to reclassify property pursuant to the Section 137.016.5 factors. While not dispositive as to the factual issues of the subject’s property classification, 12 CSR 30-4.010(2)(A) recognizes forest lands, including those used for “outdoor recreation,” may be classified and valued as agricultural property. As established, Complainant’s evidence persuasively demonstrated the subject property is should be classified as agricultural.
Fourth, Respondent argues the Section 137.016.5 factors do not support agricultural classification. The substantial and persuasive evidence in the record shows otherwise.
Finally, Respondent asserts the subject property should be classified as commercial because “forest land fits neatly into 137.016.1(3), RSMo as ‘all other real property not included in the property listed in subclasses (1) and (2) of Section 4(b) of Article X of the Missouri Constitution[.]'” (Resp. Br. at 13) In other words, Respondent argues that because the subject property does not meet the statutory definitions of residential or agricultural, it has to be commercial. As established, this argument overlooks the fact Section 137.016.5 provide a basis for classifying as agricultural property that does not otherwise fit the Section 137.016.1 definitions of residential, agricultural, or commercial property. The substantial and persuasive evidence in the records shows the subject property “ends up being classified as agricultural following evaluation of the factors set forth in section 137.016.5[.]” Bateman, 363 S.W.3d at 365 n.14
- Complainant Produced Substantial and Persuasive Evidence of Overvaluation.
Agricultural property may be valued according to productive values set by regulation or by its fair market value. When, as in this case, real property is classified as agricultural pursuant to Section 137.016.5, the assessment is based on “its fair market value.” Section 137.017.4. Bateman, 363 S.W.3d at 365–66; see also 12 CSR 30-4.010(2)(A) (providing forest land covered predominantly by trees and other woody vegetation should not be assigned to a land classification grade based on its productivity for agricultural crops).
Complainant’s appraiser performed a valid sales comparison approach persuasively estimating the subject’s TVM was $63,000 as of January 1, 2019. (Ex. A at 7) Aside from the BOE decision, Respondent produced no evidence contradicting this conclusion. The TVM of the subject property was $63,000 as of January 1, 2019.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The BOE’s decision classifying the subject property as residential with an appraised value of $148,400 is set aside. The subject property is agricultural with a TVM of $63,000 for tax year 2020.
Application for Review
A party may file an application for review of this decision within 30 days of the mailing date set forth in the certificate of service for this decision. The application “shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.” Section 138.432. The application must be in writing, and may be mailed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146, or emailed to Legal@stc.mo.gov. A copy of the application must be sent to each person listed below in the certificate of service. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the application for review is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432.
The Collector of St. Louis County, and the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an application for review, unless the disputed taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of section 139.031.
SO ORDERED July 1, 2022.
Eric S. Peterson
Senior Hearing Officer
State Tax Commission
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been electronically mailed and/or sent by U.S. Mail on July 1, 2022, to: Complainant(s) and/or Counsel for Complainant(s), the County Assessor and/or Counsel for Respondent and County Collector.
Amy S. Westermann
 Complainant timely filed a complaint for review of assessment. The State Tax Commission (STC) has authority to hear and decide Complainant’s appeal. Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 14; Section 138.430.1, RSMo 2000. All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000, as amended.
 The evidentiary hearing was conducted by a former STC hearing officer. The appeal was reassigned to the undersigned hearing officer for a decision and order. Section 138.431.2.
 The $7,045 median is calculated as follows: ([$6,887 + $7,203] / 2 = $7,045).
 All citations to written direct testimony refer to the numbered question and answer.
 Respondent correctly notes past STC decisions and orders provide “guidance,” not precedent. Administrative agency decisions “are not from courts of law and are not precedential.” Cent. Hardware Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 887 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Mo. banc 1994). Therefore, an administrative agency “is not bound by its previous decisions, so long as its current decision is not otherwise unreasonable or unlawful.” Laclede Gas Co.’s Verified Application to Re-Establish & Extend the Fin. Auth. Previously Approved By the Comm’n v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 526 S.W.3d 245, 252 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). STC decisions and orders are non-binding, persuasive authority aiding the consistent disposition of factually analogous cases.
 Respondent cites Rowlett v. Berry, 2018 WL 6112359 (Mo. St. Tax Comm’n, November 13, 2018); Kozlowski v. Zimmerman, 2018 WL 3764601 (Mo. St. Tax Comm’n, July 31, 2019); and Shelton v. Zimmerman, 2018 WL 3764595 (Mo. St. Tax Comm’n, July 31, 2018).
 Likewise, in Shelton, an STC hearing officer reclassified a 0.23-acre vacant parcel from residential to agricultural in part because most of the subject property was “hilly and covered with trees” and “not suitable for a residence as of January 1, 2017, even if local ordinance allowed one to be built.” Similar to Shelton and Kozlowski, the hearing officer in Rowlett reclassified a 1.4-acre, vacant, wooded, and steeply sloping parcel from residential to agricultural. Like Kozlowski, Shelton and Rowlett are factually analogous to this case and support reclassifying the subject property from residential to agricultural.
 Respondent’s argument that the valuation methods prescribed by12 CSR 30-4.010 apply only to property “already classified” as agricultural also implies the valuation of properties reclassified by the STC are valued by some other method. Respondent’s argument runs headlong into the constitutional mandate that “[t]he same percentage of value shall be applied to all properties within any subclass.” Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 4(b).
 In any event, agency regulations cannot conflict with statutory mandates. See Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 425S.W.3d 118, 125 (Mo. banc 2014).
 See also Bateman, 363 S.W.3d at 365 n.14 (noting “real property that ends up being classified as agricultural following evaluation of the factors set forth in section 137.016.5 is ‘vacant, unused’ land because it is not being ‘used for agricultural purposes,’ excluding it from the ambit of section 137.016.1(2)’s definition of ‘agricultural.'” (Emphasis in original).
 In 1995, Section 137.016 was amended and subsection 3 was renumbered subsection 5. Section 137.017.4, however, was not amended include the correct reference to Section 137.016.5. Thus, the reference in Section 137.017.4 to “agricultural and horticultural property under subsection 3 of section 137.016” is actually a reference to the multi-factor test now found in Section 137.016.5. Bateman, 363 S.W.3d 357 at 365 n.13.