State Tax Commission of Missouri
v.)Appeal Number 04-44503
TOM SCHAUWECKER, ASSESSOR,)
BOONE COUNTY, MISSOURI,)
ORDER AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION
AND DENYING APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This case involves a determination of the market value of certain business personal property owned by the taxpayer on January 1, 2004.An evidentiary hearing was held on
January 9, 2007, in Boone County, Missouri.On April 12, 2007, Senior Hearing Officer Luann Johnson issued her decision and order setting aside the value determined by the Boone County Board of Equalization and adopting the value proposed by the taxpayer.
POINTS ON APPEAL
On May 11, 2007, Respondent appealed asserted that the Hearing Officer had erred in disregarding the evidence offered by Respondent in as much as:
(1)the Commission had previously stated in P.D. George v. Daly, Appeal 97-20316, that business personal property could be valued as if in continued productive use when there was evidence that there are markets for the purchase and sale of such machinery and equipment as installed and in continued use; and, in the alternative; and
(2) the Hearing Officer had failed to include the admitted $13,362,368 in installation costs, freight and taxes when she calculated her opinion of value for the subject property.
As to Point I
Respondent’s valuation expert stated that “. . .if the 3M Columbia manufacturing facility tangible personal property were to be sold on January 1, 2004, it would likely have been sold in its present condition, assembled and in place, combined with all the other assets of a larger ongoing business enterprise, as opposed to being dismantled and sold piecemeal at a used equipment auction in order to be dismantled and carried off for use elsewhere.”Said expert then attempted to determine the value of the company and apportion a percentage of said value to the business personal property.Specifically, said expert looked at Complainant’s acquisition of the W.L. Gore facility in October, 2000 and determined that said sale indicated a value for the subject personal property of $65,300,000.Respondent’s expert did not find any sales of assembly lines without the sale of the underlying businesses.
The problem with using this allocation approach is obvious.It requires a presumption that allocation accurately reflects market value of the various components.In fact, as one of Complainant’s witnesses testified, the allocation in the W.L. Gore purchase was actually done after a purchase price has been agreed upon and is a negotiation between the buyers and sellers to minimize their respective federal income liabilities.Tr. 22, 35.In other words, the allocation may or may not represent the fair market value of any one particular asset within the total purchase.This does not constitute substantial and persuasive evidence of the actual market value of the subject property.When called upon to determine if an apportioned value is market value, we will look to see if actual sales of equipment support the proposed apportioned value.In this instance, Respondent presented no equipment sales which would support his opinion of value.
Complainant’s expert also stated:“Given the apparent financial strength and profitability of the manufacturing operations conducted at the Columbia facility, it is most likely that the exchange for the tangible personal property would occur, with the equipment in its current condition, as part of a merger or acquisition of the electronics business as a whole.”The Hearing Officer properly found that Respondent had focused on the value the machinery and equipment created for 3M (value in use) but had failed to demonstrate that a potential purchaser of the equipment (without the underlying business) would find the machinery and equipment more attractive than that which could be purchased elsewhere.She found that at least 56% of Complainant’s personal property could be valued using comparable sales reported in trade publications.She also affirmed the cost methodology Complainant’s appraiser used for the remaining 44% of Complainant’s personal property.She correctly found that a computer or piece of furniture is not worth more merely because it is owned by a profitable company.Respondent has failed to demonstrate that his proposed apportionment method more accurately reflects market value than Complainant’s market sales and appropriate cost calculations.
Respondent argues that this was the very type of situation that was contemplated in P.D. George and, on this point, we agree.However our ruling inP.D. George rejected the methodology similar to the methodology employed by Respondent’s expert in the present case.Our rejection of an “in-use” value was affirmed in the subsequent appeal identified as P.D. George v. Daly, 77 S.W. 3d 645 at page 649 wherein the court found that valuing machinery and equipment as part of an entire manufacturing facility may not represent the fair market value (value in exchange) of the subject property.
Respondent’s first point on appeal is DENIED.
As to Point II
Respondent asserts, in the alternative, that if removal or liquidation value is to be used, freight, taxes and installation should have been included in value.As pointed out by the Court of Appeals in P.D. George v. Daly, 77 S.W.3d 645, “valuation of machinery and equipment need not include installation, freight and other costs unless such costs establish a value equivalent to value in exchange, as mandated by section 137.115.”Respondent has failed to demonstrate that purchasers would be willing to pay for freight, taxes and installation in order to purchase the subject property.
Respondent’s second point on appeal is DENIED.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard of Review
The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled.The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide.St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances.The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part.St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992);Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).
The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact.Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).
The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified.Accordingly, theDecision is AFFIRMED.
Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.
If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts.If no judicial review is made within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Boone County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.
SO ORDERED October 11, 2007.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
Bruce E. Davis, Chairman
Charles Nordwald, Commissioner
Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner
DECISION AND ORDER
The decision of the Boone County Board of Equalization approving the valuation of $56,878,860 (assessed value $18,959,630) made by the Assessor, is SET ASIDE.The Commission sets value at $20,289,000 (assessed value $6,763,000).
This appeal was heard and this Decision is rendered by Senior Hearing Officer Luann Johnson.Complainant appeared by Counsel, Thomas Campbell and Kenneth Newman, St. Louis, Missouri.Respondent appeared by Counsel, John Patton, Columbia, Missouri.
The issue in this appeal is the true value in money of Complainant’s machinery and equipment; defined as the most probable price that could be commanded for the machinery and equipment in an open-market, competitive exchange with buyer and seller both acting knowledgeably and prudently.
The acquisition cost of the assets, less freight, taxes and installation, was $143,458,323.Respondent originally valued the property at $56,878,860 (assessed value $18,959,620) for tax year 2004, which value was approved by the Board of Equalization.At hearing, Respondent asserted a value of $51,000,000 (assessed value $17,000,000).At hearing, Complainant asserted a value of $20,289,000 (assessed value $6,763,000).
A hearing was held on January 9, 2007, in the Boone County Government Center, Columbia, Missouri.Complainant presented the testimony of a certified appraiser, Roger Chantal.Respondent’s valuation evidence was produced by John R. Phillips, a certified public accountant accredited in business valuation by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
Complainant offered the following exhibits:
Exhibit A – Appraisal Report of Robert Chantal
Exhibit B –Written Direct Testimony of Todd Corbo
Exhibit C– Written Direct Testimony of Roger Chantal
Exhibit D – Work File – Depreciation Tables (excluded)
Respondent offered the following exhibits:
Exhibit 1 – Appraisal Report of John Phillips
Exhibit 2 –Written Direct Testimony of John Phillips
Exhibit 3 – Written Direct Testimony of Michael Lee
Exhibit 4 –Mr. Levick’s Study (withdrawn)
Ruling on Objection
At hearing, Complainant offered Exhibit D which was the work file of its appraiser, Roger Chantal.Respondent objected to the introduction of said work file inasmuch as Respondent had requested same and Complainant had failed to provide it prior to hearing.Ruling was reserved.12 CSR 30-3.060 provides that “Any exhibit or written direct testimony which has not previously been exchanged in accordance with this rule will be excluded from admission into evidence at the evidentiary hearing.”Respondent’s objection to the introduction of Exhibit D is SUSTAINED.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.Jurisdiction.Jurisdiction is proper.Complainant timely filed its appeal from the decision of the Boone County Board of Equalization.
2.Complainant.Complainant’s Columbia facility is one of 61 manufacturing facilities operated by Complainant in 23 states.The facility manufactures electronic packaging and interconnect products, including insulation displacement connectors, trays and carriers for semiconductor packages; tape automated bonding circuits, flexible circuitry, Fresnel lenses, and anti-shoplifting marker tags.3M Flexible Circuits are the most visible product of this segment.Ex. 1, pg. 3.
3.Subject Property.The personal property which is the subject of this appeal consists of 2,351 items of computer equipment, furniture and fixtures, electronic manufacturing equipment, injection molding equipment and tools, molds, dies and jigs as more completely set out the parties’ appraisal reports.Ex. C, pg. 6, Ex. A, Ex. 1.Although Complainant lists over 5,300 entries in its fixed asset list, closer inspection indicates that many of the entries consist of merely partial payments on the same assets.Ex. C, pg. 6, Tr. 51.
4.Market Activity.The printed wire board (“PWB”) or printed circuit board (“PCB”) manufacturing industry has had a cyclical history.During the eight years following 1995, the PWB industry experienced rapid growth followed by rapid decline.Of the 75 facilities operated by the top 15 PCB fabricators, between 1995 and 2003, 20 facilities were acquired during that period, some twice; however, 35 closed, including 7 of those previously acquired.Among the 20 acquired facilities, 19 were acquired as part of the merger or acquisition of an entire company or line of business. Complainant accounts for about 30% of the flex circuits produced in the United States and Canada.Ex. 1, pg. 4-6.
There are also between 700 and 750 independent PWB manufacturing plants that make PWBs for use internally in their own electronic products.More than 75% of U.S.-made PWBs are produced by independent shops.Ex. 1, pg. 4.
5.Highest and Best Use.The current use of the property is its highest and best use.Tr. 41.The equipment is functioning in the arena in which it was manufactured to function.Tr. 49.
6.Methodology.Both the market approach and the cost approach are appropriate methods of valuing personal property.Daly v. P.D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Missouri Gaming Corp., 156 S.W.3d 341 (Mo. banc 2005).
7.Complainant’s Market Approach.Complainant’s appraiser spent eight days in the subject facility identifying the property under appeal.Tr. 42, 57, 58.Because of the custom built nature of some of Complainant’s machinery and equipment, Complainant’s appraiser was not always able to find recent comparable sales and only about 56% of the personal property was valued using the market approach.For those items which could be valued under the market approach, Complainant’s appraiser found comparable sales and made appropriate adjustments.Ex. C, pg. 11-14.Tr. 47.Sources of market information included Orion Blue Book, L&M “The Book” and Top Bid.Ex. C, pg. 18-19.
8.Complainant’s Cost Approach.For the remaining personal property, Complainant’s appraiser used the cost approach to value.His methodology included determining the original acquisition cost from the fixed asset list, indexing the cost up to current replacement cost and depreciating the item using depreciation tables set forth in Marshall Valuation Service.Ex. C, pg. 14-17.Complainant’s appraiser excluded identifiable items of installation costs.Tr. 44-45.The total freight, taxes and installation removed from the fixed asset list was $13,362,268.Tr. 45.
9.Complainant’s Opinion of Value.Complainant’s opinion of value, based upon the market and cost approach, was $20,289,000.As a cross check on his final conclusion of value, Complainant’s appraiser applied the MACRS tables recommended in Section 137.122, RSMo which will apply to personal property purchased after January 1, 2006.This cross check indicated a value of $20,803,000.Ex. C, pg. 17.
10.Respondent’s Market Approach. Because most of the personal property at the Columbia facility was in productive use, Respondent’s valuation expert rejected the auction market for most of Complainant’s personal property but, rather, “looked at the merger and acquisition market to obtain prices for equipment in comparable condition for purposes of determining fair market value of the same or similar tangible personal property when acquired by merger or acquisition in place as a part of an entire facility.”Specifically, Respondent’s valuation expert looked at Complainant’s acquisition of the W.L. Gore facility in October, 2000 and determined that said sale indicated a value for the subject personal property of $65,300,000.Ex. 2, pg. 11-13, Tr. 85, Ex. 1, pg. 21-22.
11.Respondent’s Cost Approach.Like Complainant’s appraiser, Respondent’s valuation expert trended the acquisition costs upward and applied a percent good factor.However, Respondent’s expert used an “Iowa curve” to determine remaining useful life and then “modified the Iowa curve method by adding a service factor and by discounting the future expected benefits from each machine to a present value.”Respondent’s expert utilized the same methodology he would have typically used when examining corporate acquisitions and mergersand made an assumption that these assets would be acquired as part of a larger transaction.Based upon this methodology, Respondent’s expert estimated a value for the personal property, under the cost approach, of $51,000,000.Ex. 2, pg. 15, 17, Tr. 92-94, Tr. 103-104.He testified that said methodology measured the value of machinery and equipment in “productive use.”Tr. 104.
12.Complainant’s Evidence Substantial and Persuasive.Complainant presented substantial and persuasive evidence tending to indicate that the market value for the subject personal property on January 1, 2004, was $20,289,000 (assessed value $6,763,000).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo.
Board of Equalization Presumption
There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the Pettis County Board of Equalization.Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).
Standard for Valuation
Section 137.115, RSMo 1994, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.Mo. Const. Art X, Section 4(b) (1945, amended 1982); St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.Hermel, supra, at 897.
“Market value” is defined as “…[t]he most probable price which a property would bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
a.buyer and seller are typically motivated;
b. both parties are well informed or well advised, and acting in what they consider their best interests;
c.a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market;
d.payment is made in terms of cash in United States dollars or in terms of financial arrangements comparable thereto; and
e.the price represents the normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions granted by anyone associated with the sale.”
Federal Register, vol. 55, no. 163, August 22, 1990, pages 34228 and 34229; also quoted in the Definitions section of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, 1996 ed.Exhibits A-11 and A-12, at 2.
Comparison of Value in Exchange and Value in Use
“Value in exchange” or “exchange value” is defined as “[t]he value of a commodity in terms of money to persons generally, as distinguished from use value to a specific person.” (The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, Third Edition, Appraisal Institute, 1993, at 125.) “Value in use” or “use value” is defined as “the value a specific property has for a specific use” (Ibid., at 383) and “the value of property which reflects a value to a specific user, recognizing the extent to which the property contributes to the personal requirements of the owner.”(The Appraisal of Personal Property, American Society of Appraisers, 1994 at 2).
An exchange value is an objective value determined by transactions between buyers and sellers in the open market.A use value is a subjective value of an owner, user, or potential owner based solely upon his or her personal needs for the property.By definition then, market value is the value determined by the exchange of property between an informed seller and an informed buyer after exposure in the open market and not a subjective opinion of some individual or entity.However, there is a distinction between a value in use to a specific user and a value recognized by a group of informed potential buyers that a property has for a specific use.The latter should be fully considered under a market value appraisal.Further, if there is sufficient demand for the property for the use to which it is being put by the owner, exchange value can be equivalent to the use value to the owner.The market value standard does not require appraisers to discard transactions or market demand for assembled machinery and equipment just because the market finds the property valuable for the same use that it is being put to by the owner.Such evidence should be fully considered in a market value appraisal.Conversely, if there is no evidence that there is demand for machinery and equipment assembled and in place, it would be inappropriate to value the property as assembled and in place since such valuation would not be indicative of a market value in exchange.See, Daly v. P.D. George, 77 S.W.3d 645(Mo. App. E.D. 2002).
Complainant’s Burden of Proof
In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2004.Hermel, supra, at 897.Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).
Experts – Requirement for Substantial Evidence
An expert’s opinion must be founded upon substantial information, not mere conjecture or speculation, and there must be a rational basis for the opinion.Missouri Pipeline Co. v. Wilmes, 898 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). The facts upon which an expert’s opinion is based, like the facts sufficient to support a verdict, must measure up to the legal requirements of substantiality and probative force; the question of whether such opinion is based on and supported by sufficient facts or evidence to sustain the same is a question of law for the court.Robinson v. Empiregas Inc. of Hartville, 906 S.W.2d 829 (S.D. 1995).
The state tax commission cannot ignore a lack of support in the evidence for adjustments made by the expert witnesses in the application of a particular valuation approach.Drey v. State Tax Commission, 345 S.W.2d 228, 234-236 (Mo. 1961); Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Missouri Gaming Corp., 156 S.W.3d 341, 348 (Mo. 2005).
The testimony of an expert is to be considered like any other testimony, is to be tried by the same test, and receives just so much weight and credit as the trier of fact may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances.The hearing officer, as the trier of fact, has the authority to weigh the evidence and is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and may accept it in part or reject it in part.Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. 1981); Scanlon v. Kansas City, 28 S.W.2d 84, 95 (Mo. 1930).
For ad valorem purposes appraisers are required to value property based upon its highest and best use:“The highest and best use of a property is generally accepted to be the most probable use of a property that is physically possible, legally permissible, financially feasible, and that results in the appropriately supported most profitable use of the property being appraised.In many instances the highest and best use of a given item is the original function for which it was designed and manufactured, provided the item is indeed being employed in that fashion and not merely that it may be employed in that fashion.
However, this blanket statement may not always be applicable.An important consideration in determining the highest and best use of machinery and equipment, is that machinery and equipment, in most instances, can be removed and relocated.In this context, if machinery and equipment in a manufacturing facility is not generating sufficient returns to support a fair market value-in-continued-use estimate, then the highest and best use may be some form of liquidation or piecemeal in-exchange market sale, as such sale could result in the highest value.”Valuing Machinery and Equipment:The Fundamentals of Appraising Machinery and Technical Assets, 2d Edition, American Society of Appraisers, 2005, pg. 212.
From the foregoing we see that value-in-continued-use is an acceptable way to value business personal property.But, in Missouri, we must also look at value in exchange.And, while value in exchange and value in use can, at times, be one and the same; when a party asks us to accept value in use as value in exchange, that party has the burden to demonstrate that some market exists for the subject property in its assembled form.If there is no evidence that there is demand for machinery and equipment assembled and in place, it would be inappropriate to value the property as assembled and in place since such valuation would not be indicative of a market value in exchange.See, Daly v. P.D. George, 77 S.W.3d 645(Mo. App. E.D. 2002).
Complainant demonstrated that there was an active secondary market for over half of Complainant’s business personal property, supporting a market value of $20,289,000.This conclusion would seem to be supported by the fact that there are over 700 independent PCB fabricators who may have an interest in purchasing Complainant’s equipment.
On the other hand, Respondent’s expert provides no sales of assembly lines but assumes that the subject property would be sold as part of the sale of the entire business.Respondent reports that 3M stock prices rose more than 40% between December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2003, and than states:
Given the apparent financial strength and profitability of the manufacturing operations conducted at the Columbia facility, it is most likely that the exchange for the tangible personal property would occur, with the equipment in its current condition, as part of a merger or acquisition of the electronics business as a whole.With the exception of some equipment taken offline, for the remaining bulk of the tangible personal property located at the Columbia facility, it is implausible to assume that the most likely exchange price would be obtained by dismantling and selling the equipment at a used equipment auction.Moreover, given 3M’s objection to producing more useful evidence, the financial data, budgets, and plans specific to the Columbia facility, our finding, that Columbia’s manufacturing activities are most likely to be sold as part of a going-concern, should be conceded.Ex. 1, pg. 8.
The ability of the equipment to function according to its design is certainly a factor when determining market value but the fact that 3M is profitable should not create a premium value for its equipment.Thus, a unique assemblage may be worth more because the market shows that a purchaser would pay more for that particular assemblage but a computer or piece of furniture is not worth more merely because a profitable company owns it.Respondent has focused on the value the machinery and equipment creates for 3M (value in use) but has failed to demonstrate that a potential purchaser of the equipment (without the underlying business) would find the machinery and equipment more attractive than that which could be purchased elsewhere.
The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and approved by the Boone County Board of Equalization for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.
The Commission sets value for tax year 2004 at $20,289,000 (assessed value $6,763,000).
A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision.The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial.Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.
If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with these appeals shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission.If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector ofBoone County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in these appeals.If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.
Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.
SO ORDERED April 12, 2007.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
Senior Hearing Officer