STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
| DOUG VAUGIER | ) | Appeal No. 19-34014 |
| ) | 03-6.0-23.0-4-002-019 | |
| Complainant, | ) | |
| ) | ||
| v. | ) | |
| ) | ||
| ROBERT BOYER, ASSESSOR, | ) | |
| JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSOURI, | ) | |
| ) | ||
| Respondent. | ) |
DECISION AND ORDER
Doug Vaugier (Complainant) appeals the determination of the Jefferson County Board of Equalization (BOE) that the classification of the subject property on January 1, 2019 was commercial. Robert Boyer (Respondent), Assessor of Jefferson County, Missouri[1], determined the fair market value of the subject property on January 1, 2019 was $57,400 commercial. Complainant claims the property was misclassified.
The hearing officer conducted an evidentiary hearing. Complainant did not present substantial and persuasive evidence establishing misclassification. The determination of the BOE is affirmed.
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. The Subject Property
1. The subject property is located at 3301 Ottomeyer Road, High Ridge, Missouri. The parcel number is 03-6.0-23.0-4-002-019.
2. The subject property consists of a less than acre lot. Currently, the subject property is improved with a 1,200 square foot pole barn where Complainant stores personal belongings. The outside of the property contains multiple fountains, fire pits and rock materials.
B. The BOE Decision
3. The BOE determined the fair market value of the subject property on January 1, 2019 was $47,400 commercial.
C. Complainant’s Appeal
4. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission (Commission)
5. Complainant alleged the subject property was misclassified.
D. Classification
6. Complainant submitted exhibit A which was admitted into evidence without objection. Complainant’s exhibits were as follows:
| Exhibit A | Letter from Department of Natural Resources |
Exhibit A consists of a letter from the Missouri Department of Natural Resources to Feed My People, Inc., where Complainant testified he had arranged to pump his sewage to as his property is purportedly too small for independent sewer service. Complainant testified that he had bought an adjoining parcel to the subject property and that he planned to build a home on “the next property over” (the adjoining property).
7. Respondent submitted Exhibit 1, 2, 4 through 10, 12, and 13. The exhibits were admitted into evidence without objection. Respondent’s exhibit was as follows:
| Exhibit 1 | Photographs of Building, Flatbed Trailer and Entry Door |
| Exhibit 2 | Photographs of Fountains, Fire pits and Rock Materials |
| Exhibit 3 | Not Offered |
| Exhibit 4 | Articles of Incorporation of Doug’s Outdoor Service, LLC |
| Exhibit 5 | Business Personal Property Assessment List for 2017, 2018, and 2019 |
| Exhibit 6 | Petitioner’s Statement |
| Exhibit 7 | Photograph of Building, Truck, Equipment, and Materials |
| Exhibit 8 | Photograph of Equipment and Materials |
| Exhibit 9 | Photograph of Pile of Large Rocks |
| Exhibit 10 | Photograph of 1” Minus Gravel |
| Exhibit 11 | Not Offered |
| Exhibit 12 | Photograph of Large Landscaping Rock |
| Exhibit 13 | Photographs of Ponds |
The exhibits included a photograph of a portion of the entry door to the pole barn with Complainant’s business card (landscaping business) existing thereon (Exhibit 1-B), a photograph of Complainant’s flatbed trailer included on his business’ business personal property list (Exhibit 1-A and Exhibit 5), a photograph of Complainant’s 2001 Ford F-550 included on his business’ business personal property list (Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 5), a photograph of a mini excavator included on his business’ business personal property list (Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 5), and a photograph of multiple fountains, fire pits and rock materials (Exhibit 2).
E. Determination
8. The classification of the subject property as of January 1, 2019 is commercial. The BOE determination is affirmed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
- Authority
The Commission has authority, “under such rules as may be prescribed by law, to hear appeals from local boards in individual cases and, upon such appeal, to correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.” Mo. Const. art. X, § 14. Section 138.430.1, RSMo 2000, authorizes the Commission to hear appeals concerning assessment, valuation, the method or formula used in determining valuation, or the assignment of a discriminatory assessment.[2] “The commission shall investigate all such appeals and shall correct any assessment or valuation which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.” Id. “To hear and decide appeals pursuant to section 138.430, the commission shall appoint one or more hearing officers.” Section 138.431.1. The hearing officer “shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying, or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.” Section 138.431.5.
- Evidentiary Standards
The hearing officer is the trier of fact and determines the credibility and weight of the evidence. Citizens for Rural Pres., Inc. v. Robinett, 648 S.W.2d 117, 132 (Mo. App. 1982); see also Exch. Bank of Mo. v. Gerlt, 367 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Mo. App. 2012) (the trier of fact determines credibility and is free to disbelieve all or part of a party’s evidence). The hearing officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, and “is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled to.” St. Louis Cty. v. State Tax Comm’n, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); see also Kelly v. Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Family Support Div., 456 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Mo. App. 2015) (the relative weight of any relevant factor is for the administrative hearing officer to decide). “Although technical rules of evidence are not controlling in administrative hearings, fundamental rules of evidence are applicable.” Mo. Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm’n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Mo. banc 1977).
- Complainant’s Burden of Proof
A taxpayer challenging the assessment, valuation, the method or formula used in determining valuation, or the assignment of a discriminatory assessment bears the burden of proving the assessment or valuation was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.” Section 138.430.1; Westwood P’ship v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152, 161 (Mo. App. 2003).
Substantial evidence is evidence which “has probative force upon the issues . . . and from which the trier of fact can reasonably decide the case on the fact issues.” Cupples Hesse, 329 S.W.2d at 702 (internal quotation omitted). To prevail, the taxpayer must produce “persuasive” evidence sufficient to convince the trier the disputed fact has been established. White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 305 (Mo. banc 2010); see also Daly v. P.D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Mo. App. 2002) (evidence is persuasive when it has “sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact”).
- Misclassification
Section 137.016.1 (1) states:
Residential property, all real property improved by a structure which is used or intended to be used for residential living by human occupants, vacant land in connection with an airport, land used as a golf course, manufactured home parks, bed and breakfast inns in which the owner resides and uses as a primary residence with six or fewer rooms for rent, and time-share units as defined in section 407.600, except to the extent such units are actually rented and subject to sales tax under subdivision (6) of subsection 1 of section 144.020, but residential property shall not include other similar facilities used primarily for transient housing.
“Real property is residential only to the extent that it contains a structure; the structure itself must be a dwelling unit used or intended to be used for human occupancy.” Brookside Estates v. State Tax Comm’n, 849 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. Banc 1993)
Section 137.016.1 (3) states:
Utility, industrial, commercial, railroad and other real property, all real property used directly or indirectly for any commercial, mining, industrial, manufacturing, trade, professional, business, or similar purpose, including all property centrally assessed by the state tax commission but shall not include floating docks, portions of which are separately owned and the remainder of which is designated for common ownership and in which no one person or business entity owns more than five individual units. All other real property not included in the property listed in subclasses (1) and (2) of Section 4(b) of Article X of the Missouri Constitution, as such property is defined in this section, shall be deemed to be included in the term “utility, industrial, commercial, railroad and other real property. (emphasis added)
The subject property does not qualify as residential property as it is not “improved by a structure which is used or intended to be used for residential living by human occupants.” Section 137.016.1 (1). Furthermore, Complainant testified that he had bought an adjoining parcel to the subject property and that he planned to build a home on “the next property over” (the adjoining property). Currently, the subject property is improved with a 1,200 square foot pole barn where Complainant stores personal belongings. Respondent offered photographs of the subject property, including: a photograph of a portion of the entry door to the pole barn with Complainant’s business card (landscaping business) existing thereon (Exhibit 1-B), a photograph of Complainant’s flatbed trailer included on his business’ business personal property list (Exhibit 1-A and Exhibit 5), a photograph of Complainant’s 2001 Ford F-550 included on his business’ business personal property list (Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 5), a photograph of a mini excavator included on his business’ business personal property list (Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 5), and a photograph of multiple fountains, fire pits and rock materials (Exhibit 2).
Complainant did not produce substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the BOE presumption of proper classification of the subject property as commercial as Complainant did not produce evidence showing the subject property qualifies as residential property. Pursuant to 137.016.1 (3) “[a]ll other real property not included in the property listed in subclasses (1) and (2) of Section 4(b) of Article X of the Missouri Constitution, as such property is defined in this section, shall be deemed to be included in the term “utility, industrial, commercial, railroad and other real property.” Therefore, the subject property was properly classified by the BOE.
The determination of the BOE is affirmed.
Application for Review
A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the certificate of service for this decision. The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146, or emailed to legal@stc.mo.gov, and a copy of the application must be sent to each person listed below in the certificate of service.
Failure to state the specific facts or law upon which the application for review is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432.
Disputed Taxes
The Collector of Jefferson County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an application for review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8 RSMo.
Any finding of fact which is a conclusion of law or decision shall be so deemed. Any decision which is a finding of fact or conclusion of law shall be so deemed.
SO ORDERED this 11th day of February, 2020.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
John J. Treu
Senior Hearing Officer
Certificate of Service
I certify that on February 11th, 2020, a copy of the foregoing was sent via email to
bmahn@jeffcomo.org; countyclerk@jeffcomo.org; norrick@thurmalaw.com; dvaugier@sbcglobal.net
Legal Coordinator
[1] Respondent was represented by Floyd T. Norrick
[2] All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000, as amended.