Henry Taber v. Brooks (SLCO)

November 24th, 2010

State Tax Commission of Missouri

 

HENRY TABER,)

)

Complainant,)

)

v.) Appeal Number 09-10660

)

MICHAEL BROOKS, ACTING ASSESSOR,)

ST. LOUIS COUNTY,MISSOURI,)

)

Respondent.)

 

 

DECISION AND ORDER

 

HOLDING

 

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor is AFFIRMED.True value in money for the subject property for tax years 2009 and 2010 is set at $142,300, residential assessed value of $27,040.Complainant appeared pro se.Respondent appeared by Associate County Counselor, Paula J. Lemerman.

Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation and discrimination, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuation of the subject property.The Commission takes this appeal to determine (1) the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2009; and (2) whether there was an intentional plan by the assessing officials to assess the property under appeal at a ratio greater than 19% of true value in money, or at a ratio greater than the average 2009 residential assessment ratio for St. Louis County.The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.Jurisdiction.Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper.Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.A hearing was conducted on October 7, 2010, at the St. LouisCountyGovernmentCenter,Clayton,Missouri.


2.Assessment.The Assessor appraised the property at $142,300, residential assessed value of $27,040.The Board sustained the assessment.[1]

3.Subject Property.The subject property is located at 816 Liggett Dr., Crestwood, Missouri.The property is identified by parcel number 24L130911.The property consists of 7,055 square foot lot improved with a one-story ranch-style, single-family residence built in 1984.The gross living area is 1,130 square feet and the home has a full basement.The exterior is vinyl siding over frame construction.The home has a patio, an attached two-car front entry garage, an open frame front porch, and a wood deck.

The residence has a total of five rooms, three bedrooms, two full bathrooms on the main level and a half bath in the basement.There is approximately 400 square feet of finished basement area.The interior appears to be original and would be considered outdated.The family room and bedrooms have original carpet, the kitchen and bathrooms have original vinyl flooring.The kitchen countertops and cabinets are original, and the bathroom fixtures are original.The basement floor has some cracks but does not leak.A basement window is in need of replacement.


The roof was replaced approximately seven years ago.The soffits and fascia are twelve years old and the gutters are original.The vinyl siding was added approximately five years ago.The garage doors were replaced in 1999, exterior entry doors were replaced in 2004, the deck and front porch decking were replaced in 2006.Overall the home is well maintained and the quality of construction would be considered average.[2]

4.Complainant’s Evidence.Mr. Taber testified in his own behalf.He gave his opinion of value of the property under appeal as of January 1, 2009, to be $126,600.The opinion of value was based upon four different methodologies proposed by Mr. Taber.[3]The taxpayer offered into evidence Exhibits A through X.[4]There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2010, therefore the assessed value for 2009 remains the assessed value for 2010.[5]

Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2009, to be $126,600, as proposed.[6]

Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish an intentional plan by the assessing officials to assess the property under appeal at a ratio greater than 19% of true value in money, or at a ratio greater than the average 2009 residential assessment ratio for St. Louis County.[7]

5.Respondent’s Evidence.Respondent presented the testimony and appraisal report[8] of Timothy Hannan.[9]The properties relied upon by Respondent’s appraiser were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value. The three properties were located within .15 to 1.01 miles of the subject.Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2009 – December 2008 – February 2009.The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability.The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable.All adjustments were appropriate to bring the comparables in line with the subject for purposes of the appraisal problem.


Respondent’s evidence met the standard of substantial and persuasive to establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2009, to be $155,000.However, Respondent’s appraisal was accepted only to sustain the original assessment made by the Assessor and sustained by the Board and not for the purpose of raising the assessment above that value.[10]Respondent met the standard of clear, convincing and cogent evidence in this appeal to sustain the original valuation of $142,300.[11]

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.[12]

Basis of Assessment

The Constitution mandates that real property and tangible personal property be assessed at its value or such percentage of its value as may be fixed by law for each class and for each subclass.[13]The constitutional mandate is to find the true value in money for the property under appeal. By statute real and tangible personal property is assessed at set percentages of true value in money.[14]In an overvaluation appeal, true value in money for the property being appealed must be determined based upon competent evidence on the record.

Presumption In Appeals

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization.[15]This presumption is a rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption.It places the burden of going forward with some substantial evidence on the taxpayer – Complainant.The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property.[16]As will be addressed in detail in the remainder of this Decision, Complainant failed to present substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board.

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.[17]True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use.[18]It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.[19]Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1.Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

 

2.Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.

 


3.A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

 

4.Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

 

5.Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

 

6.The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.[20]

 

Respondent’s appraiser concluded value under the Standard For Valuation.[21]

 

Methods of Valuation

Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission.It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.[22]Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.[23] Complainant failed to present a conclusion of the fair market value of the property being appealed based upon any accepted appraisal methodology.The four methods devised by Mr. Taber to conclude a value are not recognized by case law in Missouri or by any prior decisions of the Commission.Therefore, these methods and the opinions of value derived therefrom do not possess any legal relevance to establish the true value in money of the property being appealed as of January 1, 2009.Respondent concluded fair market value based upon the sales comparison approach.This approach is recognized and accepted for the purpose of establishing true value in money for ad valorem tax purposes.

Complainant Failed to Prove Value of $126,600


In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2009.[24]There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof.The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief.Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”[25]

Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[26]Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.[27]

Complainant’s Exhibits

Complainant submitted Exhibits A through X.Objections on the grounds of lack of foundation, relevance and hearsay were made to various exhibits.Exhibits excluded are maintained in the Commission file as an offer of proof, but not as part of the evidentiary record for addressing the claim of overvaluation or discrimination.

The disposition of the exhibits is as follows:

EXHIBIT

DESCRIPTION

DISPOSITION

A

Information from CNN Money.com 2-12-09

Excluded

B

Information from St. Louis Post Dispatch 3-11-09

Excluded

C

Article – Reassessment Redux – South County Time 12-31-09

Excluded

D

Median Crestwood Home Price

Excluded

E

Copy of Assessment Notice, dated 5/15/09

Received

F

Aerial Photograph showing Subject high-lighted in orange

Received

G

5 exterior and interior photographs of Subject

Received

H

Liggett, Diversey, Gillespie, Lopina and Tower Place Appraisal Changes 2009 v. 2007

Excluded

I

Comparables’ Valuations Change 2009 v. 2007

Excluded

J

St. Louis County Government Officials Change 2009 v. 2007

Excluded

K

Two Year Savings Liggett, Gillespie, Lopina, Tower Place, Diversey, St. Louis County Government Officials

Excluded

L

2009 Appraisals of St. Louis County Government Officials

Excluded

M

42 Homes used for IAV to ICVE ratios

Excluded

N

42 Homes used for IAV to ICVE ratios

Excluded

O

Copy of Kelsey Cottrell Realty’s Executive Summary 7.26.10

Excluded

P

Copy of BOE Decision, dated 8/10/09 – Value of $142,300

Received

Q

Letter to Complainant from Eugene K. Leung, dtd 10/9/09

Received

R

Portions of USPAP[28] – Opinion of Value Rules

Received

S

Owner’s Statement

Received

T

Complainant’s Four Methods for Valuation

Excluded

U

Copies of portions of Missouri Statutes 339.503(1), 137.076, 137.115.1, 138.060.1, 138.410.1, 138.430.1, 138.431.1

Received

V

Portions of USPAP Rules

Received

W

Property Record Card on Subject

Received

X

2009 Common Characteristics Analysis

Excluded

 

Exhibits Received

(Exhibits E, F, G, P, Q, R, S, U, V, & W)

 

None of the exhibits received provide any market data upon which a sales comparison analysis could be performed to establish the true value in money for the subject property.Nor does any of the information contained in these exhibits provide any competent evidence to establish value of the property under any accepted appraisal methodology.With the exception of Exhibit S, no objections were offered to the other exhibits therefore they were received into the record.Nevertheless, there is nothing contained therein which provides any proper basis upon which the Hearing Officer could conclude a fair market value as tendered by Complainant.

Exhibit S was objected to on the grounds of lack of foundation for various claims in the statement, lack of foundation for the opinions of value since they were based on accepted appraisal practice, relevance and hearsay.The objections could have been sustained; however, it is generally the practice to permit an owner to make his or her general statement concerning the basis for the appeal.Thus rather than address in detail during the hearing the various parts of the six page document as to the probative value of any of the information contained therein, the Hearing Officer overruled the objections and allowed Exhibit S to come into the record.

Mr. Tabor divided the Exhibit according to the following headings:Who I am, Why I am here, My expectations, My 2009 Appraisal, Affect of a “Stable Neighborhood,” Comparable Homes, Homes owned by St. Louis County officials, Board of Equalization Hearing, Use of the “Override” process, Appraising my home.A reading of the various subparts of the Exhibit reveals a great deal of hearsay, surmise and conjecture related to the various topics addressed.Likewise, the information set forth provides nothing of relevance to establish either a case of overvaluation or discrimination.

The document does set forth the four methodologies developed by Mr. Taber to arrive at four different values.These are discussed in detail in the following section of this Decision titled Owner’s Opinion of Value.As therein addressed, none of the conclusions of value finds a basis in proper appraisal elements or a proper appraisal foundation and therefore have no probative value in this appeal.

Exhibits Excluded

(Exhibits A, B, C,D, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, T, & X)

 

Exhibits A, B, C, D & O are hearsay documents.They provide general information that is not specific to the subject property.Taxpayers often believe that news information from national websites, local newspapers, or realtors on the general decline in home values in recent years is relevant to establish the value of their property.Such information is not.

There are well established and recognized appraisal practices that can be utilized to establish value for ad valorem tax purposes.Presenting miscellaneous information on the housing market as a whole does not meet the criteria required to prove fair market value in an appeal before the Commission.It lacks a proper foundation to establish it as an accepted appraisal methodology, because it simply isn’t.The information provided in Exhibits A, B, C, D and O is irrelevant hearsay and nothing more when it comes to the issue of what a willing buyer and seller would have paid for the property under appeal on January 1, 2009.

Exhibits H, I, J, K and L seek to address differences in how various properties were assessed by the St. Louis County Assessor in 2009.None of the information provides market data from which a determination of fair market value can be concluded.The information does not deal with sales of comparable properties, but rather simply makes comparisons between appraisals under the mass appraisal system.Comparing appraised values derived under a mass appraisal system is not a recognized appraisal methodology for finding value of the taxpayer’s property.

Exhibits M and N were copies of essentially the same information used to construct one of the four methods Mr. Tabor developed to produce one value.The information presented does not constitute the type of information generally relied upon for the appraisal of real property.It has no relevance for proving fair market value.

Exhibit T is simply a restatement of the Complainant’s four methods of valuation.Since none of them are recognized as proper appraisal approaches they have no probative value for this appeal.The section on Owner’s Opinion of Value which follows addresses in detail the evidentiary deficiencies of each of the proffered valuation methods.

Exhibit X makes a comparison between the subject and the 2009 improvements value for twelve other properties.This information provided the basis for the last of Mr. Taber’s valuation methods.Its lack of evidentiary value is addressed below in Owner’s Opinion of Value.

Owner’s Opinion of Value

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value.[29]The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation.[30] Mr. Taber testified at hearing to an opinion of value of $126,600 as given on the Complaint for Review of Assessment.In the taxpayer’s typed statement submitted at hearing[31] he proposed values of $128,070, $127,985, $127,836 and $129,517 based upon four different methods contrived by Complainant.

The four Taber methods to value his property are not any form of appraisal approach that is recognized by court decisions in Missouri.The Hearing Officer does not accept any of the calculations presented by Mr. Taber as substantial and persuasive evidence of what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as the purchase price of the property under appeal on January 1, 2009.None of the proposed values are based upon sales data.

Override Calculation

The first proposed value by Mr. Taber was derived from applying a -10% override to the subject property.The value produced by this calculation is not based upon any actual market data.It is simply an arbitrary calculation because apparently a -10% override was applied to another property in St. Louis County.Mr. Taber failed to establish that the basis for the override being applied to another property existed for the property under appeal.The value derived from the owner’s procedure is not founded upon proper appraisal elements or an accepted appraisal foundation.Therefore, the owner’s opinion concluded under this method has no probative value.

Average Decrease in Valuation

The second proposed value the Complainant tendered was based upon applying a decrease in valuation of -10.06% to the subject property.This percentage was calculated by Mr. Taber from the average percentage decrease for other properties on Liggett from the 2007 to the 2009 assessment.Averaging values of other properties or the percentage increase or decrease in the appraised values for assessment of other properties is not a methodology that is used in appraising real property.The average decrease in valuation factor derived from the assessor’s mass appraisal of property for any given set of properties is irrelevant to making a determination of what a given property would have sold for on a given date.Like Mr. Taber’s opinion of value presented in his first calculation, this opinion does not find a basis in proper appraisal elements or foundation.Accordingly, the opinion of value tendered can be given no probative weight.

Cost Value Estimate

The next method proffered by the taxpayer computed the ratio of the 2009 Improvement Appraisal Value (IAV) and the 2009 Improvements Cost Value Estimates (ICVE) from 169 residences in the neighborhood surrounding the subject property.The universe of properties would be reduced by eliminating 1.5 and 2 story homes, brick construction home, homes without basements, and homes with living areas greater or less than 300 square feet from 1,130.Finally, all homes whose IAV to ICVE ratios fall outside the 90% confidence interval would be removed, leaving according to Mr. Taber, 42 homes with an average ratio of 93.69%.This factor would then be applied to the cost of the subject improvement and the land value would be added to arrive at a “Market Survey Value.”[32]

As interesting as the mathematical gyrations are in this scheme for valuing the property under appeal, they are worthless.Complainant failed to establish that this method for arriving at what he calls a Market Survey Value is accepted for appraising real property for ad valorem tax or any other purpose.When taxpayers come before the Commission with their own contrived and developed procedures for concluding real estate values, they bear the burden of establishing that the method that they have concocted possesses sufficient reliability to have been accepted by recognized and acknowledged experts in the field.Mr. Taber failed to so establish the validity for this type of alleged valuation procedure.Therefore, as was the case with the other two opinions of value, this one too is not founded upon proper elements or a proper foundation.It has no probative value.

Average Improvements Valuation

The owner finally presents his average improvements valuation proposal.This mathematical exercise located homes in what the owner concluded to be the subject’s immediate neighborhood with the same characteristics as the subject and within 200 square feet in living area of the subject.Mr. Tabor then averaged the assessor’s 2009 improvements valuation for these properties and added the subject’s land value to arrive at the “Market Survey Value.”This method has no more validity than any of the three prior methods.It lacks proper appraisal elements and foundation.It possesses no probative value.

Summary and Conclusion

The taxpayer proffered opinions of $126,600, $128,070, $127,985, $127,826 and $129,517, none of which were demonstrated to be consistent with the Standard For Valuation, supra.None of the opinions rested upon any appraisal methodology accepted in appeals before the Commission.The owner’s opinions were not based upon proper elements and a proper foundation.They are not relevant to a determination of what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as the purchase price for the subject property on January 1, 2009.

Complainant failed to meet his burden of proof to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and to prove any of the values proposed.



Complainant Failed To Prove Discrimination

In order to obtain a reduction in assessed value based upon discrimination, the Complainant must (1) prove the true value in money of the property under appeal on January 1, 2009; and (2) show an intentional plan of discrimination by the assessing officials resulting in an assessment of that property at a greater percentage of value than other property, generally, within the same class within the same taxing jurisdiction.[33]Evidence of value and assessments of a few properties does not prove discrimination.Substantial evidence must show that all other property in the same class, generally, is actually undervalued.[34]The difference in the assessment ratio of the subject property the average assessment ratio in the subject county must be shown to be grossly excessive.[35]No other methodology is sufficient to establish discrimination.[36]

Where there is a claim of discrimination based upon a lack of valuation consistency, Complainant has the burden to prove the level of assessment for the subject property in 2009. This is done by independently determining the market value of the subject property and dividing the market value into the assessed value of the property as determined by the assessor’s office.

Complainant must then prove the average level of assessment for residential property in St. Louis County for 2009.This is done by (a) independently determining the market value of a representative sample of residential properties in St. Louis County; (b) determining the assessed value placed on the property by the assessor’s office for the relevant year; (c) dividing the assessed value by the market value to determine the level of assessment for each property in the sample; and (d) determining the mean and median of the results. The difference between the actual assessment level of the subject property and the average level of assessment for all residential property, taken from a sufficient representative sample in St. LouisCountymust demonstrate a disparity that is grossly excessive.[37]

Complainant’s discrimination claim fails because he failed to establish the market value of his property.Without establishing market value, the taxpayer cannot establish the assessment ratio for the subject property.Without establishing the assessment ratio, it cannot be establish that the property under appeal was being assessed at a higher percentage of market value that any other property.

However, even if Complainant had established market value for the subject property, the discrimination claim would still fail because it was not demonstrated that a statistically significant number of other residential properties within St. Louis County were being assessed at a lower ratio of market value than the property being appealed.Because Complainant failed to establish the market value of the subject property and failed to establish that the property was being assessed at a higher percentage of market value than a statistically significant number of other properties in St. Louis County, Mr. Taber failed to establish discrimination.

Evidence of Increase in Value

In any case in St. Louis County where the assessor presents evidence which indicates a valuation higher than the value finally determined by the assessor or the value determined by the board of equalization, whichever is higher, for that assessment period, such evidence will only be received for the purpose of sustaining the assessor’s or board’s valuation, and not for increasing the valuation of the property under appeal.[38]The evidence presented by the Respondent was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the fair market value of the property under appeal, as of January 1, 2009, to be $155,000.However, under the Commission rule just cited and Supreme Court decision[39] the assessed value cannot be increased above $27,040 in this particular appeal.


Respondent’s Evidence Sustains Value of $142,300

The Respondent has imposed upon him by the provisions of Section 137.115.1, RSMo, the burden of proof to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain a valuation on residential property which is made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program.There is a presumption in this appeal that the original valuation, which was sustained by the Board of Equalization, was made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program.There was no evidence to rebut the presumption, therefore, in order to sustain the valuation of the subject property at $142,300, appraised value, Respondent’s evidence must come within the guidelines established by the legislature and must clearly and convincingly persuade the Hearing Officer as to the value sought to be sustained.

The statutory guidelines for evidence to meet the standard of clear, convincing and cogent include the following:

(1)The findings of the assessor based on an appraisal of the property by generally accepted appraisal techniques; and

 

(2) The purchase prices from sales of at least three comparable properties and the address or location thereof.As used in this paragraph, the word comparable means that:

 


(a)Such sale was closed at a date relevant to the property valuation; and

 

(b) Such properties are not more than one mile from the site of the disputed property, except where no similar properties exist within one mile of the disputed property, the nearest comparable property shall be used.Such property shall be within five hundred square feet in size of the disputed property, and resemble the disputed property in age, floor plan, number of rooms, and other relevant characteristics.[40]

 

Clear, cogent and convincing evidence is that evidence which clearly convinces the trier of fact of the affirmative proposition to be proved.It does not mean that there may not be contrary evidence.[41] The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing must be more than a mere preponderance but does not require beyond a reasonable doubt.[42]“For evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder’s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.”[43]

The statutory elements that must be met for evidence to be clear, cogent and convincing are: (1) findings based on an appraisal; (2) use of at least three sales comparables, (3) sale at a date relevant to the property valuation, (4) properties located not more than a mile from the subject, unless no similar properties exist, (5) comparables within 500 square feet in size to the subject, and (6) resemblance to the subject in relevant characteristics.A review of the evidence found in Exhibit 1 establishes that the statutory standard has been met.

The Respondent presented an appraisal which was performed in accordance with generally accepted appraisal techniques.Three sales comparables were used.The three sales were within two months of the valuation date of January 1, 2009.The sale dates are indisputably at dates relevant for the 2009 valuation.One of the sales was only .15 of a mile from the subject, another was only .87 of a mile from the subject.Comparable 2 was 1.01 miles from the subject, or just under 53 feet beyond the preferred one mile distance.However, no evidence was presented to establish that a more comparable sale located within the one mile standard should have been used.[44]Accordingly, the use of a comparable just beyond the preferred one mile standard does not defeat the use of that sale.It was appropriate for Mr. Hannan to use Comparable 2 to arrive at his determination of value.

Each of the sale comparables were within 500 square feet of gross living area to the subject.In point of fact, the range of difference in square foot living area space was only from 90 square feet to 206 square feet smaller.Finally, each of the comparables resembled the subject in the various factors of comparability.Each comparable was a three bedroom home, like the subject.The variance in bathrooms was accounted for by appropriate adjustments.Other differences in amenities were adjusted to bring each comparable in line with the subject for the appraisal problem.

The range of net adjustments of 0.3% to 4.7% provided verification for the comparability between the sale properties and the subject.The range of gross adjustments came in somewhat above what is generally preferred.However, this was due to the need to make significant adjustments to account for differences between the subject and comparables for the subject’s inferior site, the age difference between the subject and the sale properties and to account for the subject’s condition being average as compared to good for the comparables.Mr. Hannan’s conclusion that his “comparable sales are the most similar sales found in the subject’s neighborhood and are considered the most reliable indicators of value”[45] went unchallenged by an of Complainant’s evidence, given that no sales data was tendered by Mr. Taber.

The statutory standard to qualify Exhibit 1 as clear, convincing and cogent evidence was met.Furthermore, the conclusion of value by Mr. Hannan instantly tilted the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the information presented by Mr. Taber.The fact finder’s mind was left with an abiding conviction that Respondent’s evidence was true and that the true value in money for the subject property as of January 1, 2009, was $155,000.[46]


ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2009 and 2010 is set at $27,040.

Application for Review

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Decision.The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.

Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the application for review is based will result in summary denial. [47]

Disputed Taxes

The Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED November 24, 2010.


STATE TAX COMMISSION OFMISSOURI

 

 

_____________________________________

W. B. Tichenor

Senior Hearing Officer

w.b.tichenor@stc.mo.gov

 

 

 

 

Certificate of Service

 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed postage prepaid on this 24thday of November, 2010, to:Henry Taber, 816 Liggett Avenue, St. Louis, MO 63126,Complainant; Paula Lemerman, Associate County Counselor, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105, Attorney for Respondent; Michael Brooks, ActingAssessor, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105; John Friganza, Collector, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105.

 

 

___________________________

Barbara Heller

Legal Coordinator

Barbara.Heller@stc.mo.gov

 

 

 

Contact Information for State Tax Commission:

Missouri State Tax Commission

301 W. High Street, Room 840

P.O. Box 146

Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146

573-751-2414

573-751-1341 Fax

 

 


 


[1] BOE Decision letter; Exhibit 1, Page 1 of 5.

 

[2] Exhibit1, Pages 1 & 2 of 5

 

[3] Exhibit S – Appraising my home (5th and 6th pages)

[4] See, Complainant Failed to Prove Value of $126,600Complainant’s Exhibits, infra.

[5] Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

 

[6] See, Complainant Failed to Prove Value of $126,600Owner’s Opinion of Value, infra.

[7] See, Complainant Failed To Prove Discrimination, infra.

[8] Exhibit 1

 

[9] Residential Real Estate Appraiser – St. Louis County; Passed Missouri State Exam for Certified Residential Appraiser.

 

[10] See, Evidence of Increase in Value, infra.

 

[11] See, Respondent’s Evidence Sustains Value of $142,300, infra.

[12] Article X, Section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, 138.431.4, RSMo.

 

[13] Article X, Sections 4(a) and 4(b), Mo. Const. of 1945

 

[14] Section 137.115.5, RSMo

 

[15] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958)

 

[16] Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959)

 

[17] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).

 

[18] Daly v. P. D. George Company, et al, 77 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App E.D. 2002), citing, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. STC, 852 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo. App. 1993); citing, Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S.W.2d 798, 801-803 (Mo. 1973).

 

[19] Hermel, supra.

 

[20] Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

 

[21] Exhibit 1, Certification and Signature Page.

 

[22] See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra;Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).

 

[23] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

 

[24] Hermel, supra.

 

[25] See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003); Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).

 

[26] See, Cupples-Hesse, supra.

 

[27] Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

 

[28] Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice

 

[29] Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970).

 

[30] Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

 

[31] Exhibit S

 

[32] No evidence was presented that the term “Market Survey Value” is recognized as True Value in Money, i.e. fair market value.The term was not shown to be an accepted terminology in the appraisal field.A review of The Appraisal of Real Estate, Thirteenth Edition, Appraisal Institute; Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Revised Edition, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, and the Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, Third Edition, Appraisal Institute failed to provide any definition of the term “market survey value,”

 

[33] Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 690, 695 (Mo. 1959).

 

[34] State ex rel. Plantz v. State Tax Commission, 384 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. 1964).

 

[35] Savage v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 722 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Mo. banc 1986).

 

[36] Cupples-Hesse, supra.

 

[37] Savage, supra.

 

[38] Section 138.060, RSMo; 12 CSR 30-3.075.

 

[39] The Supreme Court of Missouri has interpreted Section 138.060.The Court stated:

“Section 138.060 prohibits an assessor from advocating for or presenting evidence advocating for a higher ‘valuation’ than the ‘value’ finally determined by the assessor. … . Because the legislature uses the singular terms ‘valuation’ and ‘value’ in the statute, however, it clearly was not referring to both true market value and assessed value.While the assessor establishes both true market value and assessed value, which are necessary components of a taxpayer’s assessment, as noted previously, the assessed value is the figure that is multiplied against the actual tax rate to determine the amount of tax a property owner is required to pay.The assessed value is the ‘value that is finally determined’ by the assessor for the assessment period and is the value that limits the assessor’s advocacy and evidence.Section 138.060.By restricting the assessor from advocating for a higher assessed valuation than that finally determined by the assessor for the relevant assessment period, the legislature prevents an assessor from putting a taxpayer at risk of being penalized with a higher assessment for challenging an assessor’s prior determination of the value of the taxpayer’s property.”State ex rel. Ashby Road Partners, LLC et al v. STC and Muehlheausler, 297 S.W.3d 80, 87-88 (Mo 8/4/09)

 

[40] Section 137.115.1(1) & (2).

 

[41] Grissum v. Reesman, 505 S.W.2d 81, 85, 86 (Mo. Div. 2, 1974).

 

[42] 30 AmJur2d. 345-346, Evidence section 1167.

 

[43] Matter of O’Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. App. 1980).

 

[44] The appraiser concluded that Comparable 2 was one of the most similar sales found in the subject’s neighborhood and was considered to be a reliable indicator of value.Exhibit 1 – Comments on the Sales Comparison Approach, Page 3 of 5.

 

[45] Exhibit 1 – Comments on the Sales Comparison Approach, Page 3 of 5.

 

[46] The Hearing Officer is constrained from setting the assessed value based upon a true value in money of $155,000 by the Commission Rule and Court case cited above under Evidence of Increase in Value. Accordingly, the Assessed Value of $27,040 must be affirmed.

 

[47] Section 138.432, RSMo.