State Tax Commission of Missouri
HUNTER’S GLEN, INC.)
)
Complainant,)
)
v. )Appeals No. 10-79023 and 10-79024
)
DAVID C. CHRISTIAN, ASSESSOR,)
PLATTE COUNTY, MISSOURI)
)
Respondent.)
ORDER
SETTING ASIDE HEARING OFFICER DECISION
UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
On April 11, 2012, Senior Hearing Luann Johnson entered her Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessments by the Platte County Board of Equalization, denying Complainant’s claim of overvaluation, and finding that the Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence thereby increasing the valuation.
Complainant filed his Application for Review of the Decision.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard Upon Review
The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled.The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide.[1]
The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact.[2]
DECISION
Grounds for Application for Review
In the Complainant’s Application for Review, the following arguments are made for overturning the Decision:
1. The Hearing Officer erred in finding the Respondent’s appraisal substantial and persuasive in that:
a. The Respondent’s appraisal’s effective date was January 1, 2010 not January 1, 2009;and
b. The Respondent’s appraiser used the wrong investment class and expenses;
2. The Complainant’s evidence was substantial and persuasive; and
3. The Hearing Officer erred in denying Complainant’s presentation of rebuttal evidence.
Discussion and Rulings
Hearing Officer Erred in Finding Respondent’s Evidence to be Substantial and Persuasive
The Respondent’s appraiser determined the property’s true value as of January 1, 2010, to be $8,484,110.The Complainant argues that the Hearing Officer erred in finding the Respondent’s appraisal to be substantial and persuasive in that (1) the correct effective date would be January 1, 2009; and (2) the Respondent’s appraiser used the wrong investment class and expenses when determining the value of the property.
The Hearing Officer had a reasonable basis for her determination of expenses used in the income approach.The determination of the expenses is incorrectly characterized by the Complainant as being “adopted” by the Hearing Officer.The Hearing Officer made a determination of expenses by looking at the most reliable indicators of market expense ratios by reviewing similar properties in similar neighborhoods.The properties reviewed were appropriate. The range of expenses for similar properties was 36.8% to 56.2%.The subject’s expense ratio was 63.2%.The Hearing Officer’s determination of an expense ratio of 50% of the effective gross income was not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of her discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal.[3]
Complainant also argues that the Respondent’s appraisal was not substantial or persuasive in that the appraiser determined the value as of January 1, 2010, and not as of
January 1, 2009.This point is well taken.Section 137.115.1, RSMo states:
“…The assessor shall annually assess all real property in the following manner: new assessed values shall be determined as of January first of each odd-numbered year and shall be entered in the assessor’s books; those same assessed values shall apply in the following even-numbered year, except for new construction and property improvements which shall be valued as though they had been completed as of January first of the preceding odd-numbered year….”
The Respondent’s appraiser failed to determine the value of the property as of January first of the odd year.The Respondent presented no evidence as to the lack of change in the market from 2009 to 2010 or that no adjustments were warranted due to time.
Hearing Officer did not Err in finding the Complainant’s Evidence
was not Substantial and Persuasive;
The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances.The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part.[4]
The Hearing Officer took issue with several of the Complainant’s appraiser’s methodologies and findings including the capitalization rate and estimate of expenses.
Hearing Officer reviewed the derivation of the capitalization rate by the Complainant.The Complainant’s appraiser calculation of a cap rate was not persuasive as he did not explain why he added an effective yield rate to a market derived cap rate or why he was using a rate above market.Further, the parties stipulated to a capitalization rate of 8.875%.The only explanation the Complainant offered for not using the stipulated rate was that they were using that rate as their base.
The Hearing Officer also did not find the Complainant’s conclusion of expenses persuasive.She was not persuaded with Complainant’s use of historical expenses and expenses from one property in the market area of the subject.The expenses suggested by the Complainant were outside the range for the county and Complainant acknowledged that the deductions he used for some categories of expenses were outside his calculated range.
The Hearing Officer, after review of the evidence and the testimony of the witness, was not persuaded by the Complainant’s evidence. The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence.
Hearing Officer did not Err in Denying Complainant to Present Rebuttal Evidence
Admission of rebuttal evidence is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court.A party cannot, as a matter of right, offer in rebuttal evidence which was proper or should have been introduced in chief, even though it tends to contradict the adverse party’s evidence and, while the court may in its discretion admit such evidence, it may and generally should decline to admit the evidence.[5]
In a hearing before the State Tax Commission, parties are often ordered, as in this case, to submit exhibits and direct testimony prior to the hearing date.The parties are also ordered to submit any rebuttal and surrebuttal.In this particular case, the parties submitted their appraisals and testimony six months prior to the hearing. The parties were directed to submit any rebuttal and/or surrebuttal four months prior to the hearing.The Complainant failed to submit rebuttal evidence.The Hearing Officer did not abuse her discretion when Complainant requests to present rebuttal evidence four months after the deadline.
DECISION
A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer except her findings do not support an increase in value in that the Respondent’s appraiser’s effective date was incorrect and Respondent did not present evidence that the market had not changed.
ORDER
The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds the Hearing Officer erred in her determination to increase the value as determined by the Board of Equalization.Accordingly, the Decision is overturned.
The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2010 is set at $2,431,680.
The Decision and Order of the Hearing Officer, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law therein, is incorporated by reference, as if set out in full, in this final decision of the Commission.
Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Order.
If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts unless disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031.8, RSMo.
If no judicial review is made within thirty days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector ofPlatte, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.
SO ORDERED December 5, 2012.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
Bruce E. Davis, Chairman
Randy B. Holman, Commissioner
DECISION AND ORDER
HOLDING
Decision of the Platte County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor is SET ASIDE. True value in money for the subject properties for tax year 2010 is:
|
Appeal Number |
Market Value |
Assessed Value |
|
10-79023 |
$6,203,580 |
$1,985,150 |
|
10-79024 |
$2,280,530 |
$729,770 |
Hearing Officer finds Complainant did not rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board but Respondent’s evidence was substantial and persuasive to warrant a raise in Complainant’s market value for tax year 2010.
Complainant appeared by counsel Richard Dvorak.
Respondent appeared by counsel, John R. Shank.
Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer Luann Johnson.
EXHIBITS
Complainant’s Evidence
|
Exhibit |
Description |
|
A |
Appraisal Report of Robert L. Jackson |
|
B |
Written Direct Testimony of Robert L. Jackson |
|
C |
Demonstration Exhibit |
|
D |
Not accepted into evidence |
|
E |
Not accepted into evidence |
|
F |
Section 137.115 |
Respondent’s Evidence
|
Exhibit |
Description |
|
1 |
Appraisal Report of Eldon Kottwitz |
|
2 |
Written Direct Testimony of Eldon Kottwitz |
Hearing Officer Exhibit
Complainant’s Personal Property Declaration.
ISSUE
The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2010.
SUMMARY
The subject property is an apartment complex identified as appeals number 10-79023 and 10-79024.The assessor originally valued said apartment complex at $7,599,000,[6] assessed value of $2,431,680.[7]The Platte County Board of Equalization affirmed the assessor’s valuation.Complainant appeals asserting a value of $6,300,000[8] (assessed value $2,016,000).Respondent asserts a value of $8,484,110 (assessed value $2,714,920) and requests that the Commission issue a raise order.[9]Respondent’s evidence supports an increase in value for the subject property.
STIPULATIONS
The parties stipulated[10] as follows:
1.The correct method for valuing the subject apartment complex is the income approach to value.
2.The correct effective gross income is $1,505,931 for tax year 2010.
3.The correct “unloaded” capitalization rate is 8.875%.
DECISION AND ORDER
Findings of Fact
1.Jurisdiction is proper.Complainant timely appealed from the decision of the Platte County Board of Equalization.
2.The subject property is a 17.89 acre site improved with a 253 unit apartment complex[11] built in approximately 1972 and renovated in 1993.[12]The improvements consist of eleven, two and one-half story garden apartment buildings along with a clubhouse with a full finished basement.[13]The units consist of one bedroom, two bedroom and three bedroom units.[14]The property is identified as parcel numbers 19-4.0-19-200-006-034-000 and 19-4.0-19-200-001-061-000, more commonly known as 6201 NW 70th Street, Kansas City, Platte County, Missouri 64151.
3.The income approach is the most reliable method of determining value for the subject property for tax year 2010.[15]
4.Under the two year assessment cycle, the economic conditions in existence on January 1, 2009, should be used to determine value for the subject property as of January 1, 2010.[16]
5.The appropriate Effective Gross Income (potential gross income plus income from all other sources less vacancy and collection loss) for the subject property was $1,505,931.[17]
6.The market indicates a range of expenses for apartment buildings of $2,030 per unit to $4,551 per unit.The median is $3,100 per unit while the average is $3,214 per unit.[18]Expense ratios for comparables in Platte County range from $2,888 to $3,150[19] or about 50% of Effective Gross Income for Class C apartments, such as the subject.[20]
7.Respondent’s appraiser proposed expenses of $2,976 per unit,[21] within the range of expenses for Platte County,[22] and 50% of Effective Gross income, or $752,965,[23] as suggested by Platte County comparables.The area “north of the river” (Platte and Clay Counties) is a separate submarket in the Kansas City area.Although it has suffered some in the economic downturn, it was not impacted “as severe or as hard.”[24]The most reliable indicators of the appropriate market derived expense ratio for the subject property would be expense ratios from similar properties in similar neighborhoods north of the river.
8.Respondent’s estimate of expenses is supported by substantial and persuasive evidence of local market expenses. The correct deduction for expenses is $752,965, leaving a net operating income of $752,965.Real estate taxes have not been deducted from Respondent’s expense comparables.[25]Thus, using a 50% ratio for the subject property includes real estate taxes in expenses and indicates that an effective tax rate adjustment to the capitalization rate would be inappropriate.
9.Complainant asserts that the proper expense for the subject of $3,412 per unit based upon (a) actual historical expenses; (b) market comparables; (c) Institute of Real Estate Management publications and (d) the National Apartment Association publications,[26]although Complainant’s appraiser relied primarily on historical expenses and utilized only one comparable located “north of the river”.[27]Per unit expenses were $2,030, $2,355, $3,040, $3,180, $4,175 and $4,551 which leads Complainant’s appraiser to opine that the appropriate expense per unit for the subject property is $3,412 or $863,307.[28]
Complainant’s proposed expenses are outside the range suggested for Platte or Clay County, Missouri ($2,888 to $3,150).Complainant’s appraiser acknowledges that his 15.72% deduction for repairs and maintenance is outside even his own range of 4.9% to 12.1% for this expense category.[29]Complainant’s appraiser further acknowledges that this excessive expense is a “red flag” but apparently did not view same as a problem because his dollar amount per unit was within the range even those his percentage was not.[30]Dollars per unit is only an acceptable unit of comparison when the properties have substantially similar age, income and unit mix, which was not found in Complainant’s evidence where Complainant’s comparables had 13, 39, 52, 96, 156 and 210 units while the subject has 253 units.Likewise, the subject property was built in 1972 while Complainants comparables were built in 1921, 1921, 1970, 1985, 1987 and 1987.[31]
10.Missouri is a value in exchange, not a value in use, state.Use of historical information, which is not supported by market data, particularly without a reasonable explanation for the anomaly, is an inappropriate form of value in use.[32]All things being equal, a reasonable buyer would anticipate that the subject property should be able to generate the same net operating income as any other similar class C property under reasonable management.Market value is not adjusted because of poor management practices.After the close of the taxpayer’s evidence and the county’s evidence, the counsel for Complainant attempted to introduce a witness who he asserted would be able to explain the excessive expenses.However, if this evidence was available, it should have been presented as part of Complainant’s case in chief.Pursuant to 12 CSR 30-3.060, direct testimony which has not been exchanged prior to hearing is not admissible at hearing.
11.Complainant’s evidence is not substantial and persuasive to support his proposed expense adjustment for a Platte County property.
12The correct net operating income for the subject property is $752,965.($1,505,931 – $752,965 = $752,965).
13.Complainant’s appraiser shows market cap rates of 8.29% to 8.96%, including real estate in the comparable’s expenses but not as an effective rate.[33]From this, he concluded an appropriate capitalization rate for the subject property of 9.0% in a market extraction methodology.[34]If Complainant’s appraiser had stopped right there, he would have at least been close to an acceptable capitalization rate, although unquestionably on the high side.
However, he then proposed taking the lowest cap rate of 8.29% under the market derived methodology as the return rate on a band of investment methodology and adding the effective yield rate of .11% for a cap rate of 8.97%, say 9.0%.[35](0.75 x 0.829 = 0.0622 + 0.25 x 0.11 = 0.0275; 0.0622 + 0.0275 = 0.0897) No explanation was given for why one would add an equity yield rate to a market derived cap rate that unquestionable already has an equity yield rate included therein.Perhaps Complainant’s appraiser should have used the interest rate of 6.75% which he initially proposed in his narrative concerning the band of investment, but it did not get carried into his actual calculation, thus overstating this portion of his capitalization rate calculation.[36]
Finally, Complainant’s appraiser takes this 9% market extracted/band of investment calculated capitalization rate and then adds an additional 1.5371% effective tax rate.[37]No actual real estate taxes were extracted from the Complainant’s proposed comparables.
Even though Complainant may not have included real estate taxes in the subject expenses in his calculations to this point; it is not appropriate to load them onto a market comparison capitalization rate which has been has been calculated using income and expense statements containing real estate taxes as an expense.[38]
14.Complainant’s capitalization rate of 10.5371% is erroneously calculated and is not helpful in determining value for the subject property.
15.Respondent stipulated a capitalization of rate of 8.875% which Counsel for Complainant seemed to agree to but later suggested that the agreement was to a “base” or “unloaded” rate of 8.875%.[39]As shown in finding 13 above, a market derived cap rate should not be “loaded” with an effective tax rate.Said market derived capitalization rate should also not include an additional equity yield rate.Therefore, an “unloaded” rate would be appropriate in this situation.
Respondent’s appraiser found five sales of local apartment comparables indicating overall (direct) capitalization rates of 6.98% to 9.47%.[40]Inasmuch as Respondent’s market derived expenses included real estate taxes, it would be appropriate to utilize an overall rate.
The sale closest to the tax day indicated an overall capitalization rate of 8.6%.Respondent’s appraiser found the direct capitalization method to be more reliable than the band of investment and determined a capitalization rate of 8.7% to be reasonable.[41]
16.The most recent sale and Respondent’s appraiser’s determination of an appropriate capitalization rate support the parties’ agreed upon “unloaded” rate of 8.875%.The correct capitalization rate for the subject property is 8.875%.
17.The market value of the subject property for tax year 2010 was $8,484,112 ($752,965/.08875 = $8,484,112). Say $8,484,110.The correct assessed value for the subject property for said tax year was $2,714,915, say $2,714,920.
18.Complainant’s appraiser asserts a $200,000 adjustment to account for personal property is appropriate based upon a Marshall Swift cost calculation; however he also concedes that apartment complexes are not sold without their personal property and that there are no sales of personal property from apartment complexes.[42]Respondent presented evidence demonstrating that Complainant has failed to declare $200,000 in personal property, instead reporting only $2,649 in furniture, fixtures and equipment.[43]
Personal property is assessed at 33 1/3% of its market value while commercial real estate is assessed at 32% of its market value.We could order the county to add this personal property onto Complainant’s personal property tax bill, but including same in real estate gives Complainant a slight tax advantage.For these reasons, we find that Complainant is not entitled to have an additional deduction from value for business personal property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION
Jurisdiction
The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.[44]
Official and Judicial Notice
Agencies shall take official notice of all matters of which the courts take judicial notice.[45]
Courts will take judicial notice of their own records in the same cases.[46]In addition, courts may take judicial notice of records in earlier cases when justice requires[47] or when it is necessary for a full understanding of the instant appeal.[48] Courts may take judicial notice of their own records in prior proceedings involving the same parties and basically the same facts.[49]
Presumptions In Appeals
There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization.[50]
The presumption in favor of the Board is not evidence.A presumption simply accepts something as true without any substantial proof to the contrary.In an evidentiary hearing before the Commission, the valuation determined by the Board, even if simply to sustain the value made by the Assessor, is accepted as true only until and so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.
The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer, or respondent when advocating a value different than that determined by the Board, presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property.[51]
Standard for Valuation
Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.[52]It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.[53]Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.
Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
1.Buyer and seller are typically motivated.
2.Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.
3.A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.
4.Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.
5.Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.
6.The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.[54]
Duty to Investigate
In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property.The Hearing Officer’s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties.[55]
Weight to be Given Evidence
The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled.The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide.[56]
Trier of Fact
The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances.The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part.[57]
Methods of Valuation
Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission.It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.[58]
Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.[59]
Opinion Testimony by Experts
An expert’s opinion must be founded upon substantial information, not mere conjecture or speculation, and there must be a rational basis for the opinion.[60]The state tax commission cannot ignore a lack of support in the evidence for adjustments made by the expert witnesses in the application of a particular valuation approach.[61]
The testimony of an expert is to be considered like any other testimony, is to be tried by the same test, and receives just so much weight and credit as the trier of fact may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances.The hearing officer, as the trier of fact, has the authority to weigh the evidence and is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and may accept it in part or reject it in part.[62]
If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.[63]
Respondent’s Burden of Proof
Respondent, when advocating a value different from that determined by the original valuation or a valuation made by the Board of Equalization, must meet the same burden of proof to present substantial and persuasive evidence of the value advocated as required of the Complainant under the principles established by case law.[64]
Complainant’s Burden of Proof
In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2010.[65]There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof.The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief.Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”[66]
Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[67]Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.[68]
A taxpayer does not meet his burden if evidence on any essential element of his case leaves the Commission “in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise.”[69]
Respondent Proves Value
Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence to establish a fair market value as of January 1, 2010, to be $8,484,110.Respondent’s appraiser developed an opinion of value relying upon an established and recognized approach for the valuation of real property, the income approach.The income approach is generally recognized to be a reliable methodology to be used with income producing properties.Not only was Respondent’s expenses supported by market data from the neighboring area, but Respondent’s appraiser also correctly applied the income approach to value.
Beyond articulating the appropriate methodology, the only issue to be decided by the hearing officer was the correct expenses.When faced with a choice between market derived data and historical data, without a reasonable explanation for the anomaly, the preference must go to market data.[70]
Complainant Failed to Prove Value
If below market income (or above market expenses) are prudent, the hearing officer can consider them when determining value.However, it is against public policy to allow a taxpayer to take unilateral action to devalue its property.[71]Complainant has wholly failed to explain why its above market expenses are prudent.There can be no justification for accepting unexplained excessive expenses.Complainant has failed to present substantial and persuasive evidence in support of its opinion of value.
ORDER
The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for Platte County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.
The assessed value for the subject properties for tax year 2010 are:
|
Appeal Number |
Market Value |
Assessed Value |
|
10-79023 |
$6,203,580 |
$1,985,150 |
|
10-79024 |
$2,280,530 |
$729,770 |
A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing date shown in the Certificate of Service.The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.
Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. [72]
The Collector of Platte County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending a filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.
Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.
SO ORDERED April 11, 2012.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
Luann Johnson
Senior Hearing Officer
[1] St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
[2] Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).
[3] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).
[4] St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).
[7]Assessed value for appeal number 10-79023 was $1,055,830.Assessed value for appeal number 10-79024 was $388,094.
[32]Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States/Marriott Hotel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 852 S.W.2d 376, 382 (E.D. 1993)
[38] “The overall capitalization rate. . .expresses the relationship between the net income from the property before recapture but after taxes and the property value.”Property Assessment Valuation, IAAO, 1977, p. 244.
[40] The direct relationship between net income and the sale price or value can be expressed by an overall rate. . .The overall capitalization rate, then, expresses the relationship between the net income from the property before recapture but after taxes and the property value. Property Assessment Valuation, IAAO, 1977, p. 243-244.
[46] State ex rel. Horton v. Bourke, 129 S.W.2d 866, 869 (1939); Barth v. Kansas City Elevated Railway Company, 44 S.W. 788, 781 (1898).
[47] Burton v. Moulder, 245 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo. 1952); Knorp v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943); Bushman v. Barlow, 15 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Mo. banc 1929)
[48] State ex rel. St. Louis Public Service Company v. Public Service Commission, 291 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Mo. banc 1956).
[49] In re Murphy, 732 S.W.2d 895, 902 (Mo. banc 1987); State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Mo. banc 1984); State v. Keeble, 399 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Mo. 1966).
[50] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).
[51] Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).
[52] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).
[54] Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.
[56] St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
[57] St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).
[58] See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra;Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).
[59] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).
[61] Drey v. State Tax Commission, 345 S.W. 2d 228, 234-236 (Mo. 1961), Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Missouri Gaming Corp., 156 S.W. 3d, 341, 348 (Mo. 2005).
[62] Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W. 2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W. 2d 605, 607 (Mo. 1981); Scanlon v. Kansas City, 28 S.W. 2d 84, 95 (Mo. 1930).
[63] Section 490.065, RSMo; State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. SC. 2004); Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).
[66] See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).
[70] Spencer Creek Apartments v. Zimmerman, 38 Proceedings and Decisions 289 (Appeals Number 1979-7726 and 1999-7727 (1983); The Commission rejected Complainant’s income approach because Complainant used actual rents without proving that they were market rents.This, even though Respondent never challenged whether they were market rents or not.The Commission found that using market rents to estimate gross income was a crucial element to a credible income approach to value.