Koelle & H. Roy Paris v. Copeland (Franklin)

February 26th, 2010

State Tax Commission of Missouri

 

KOELLE & H. ROY PARIS,)

)

Complainants,)

)

v.) Appeal Number 09-57021

)

TOM COPELAND, ASSESSOR,)

FRANKLIN COUNTY, MISSOURI,)

)

Respondent.)

 

 

DECISION AND ORDER

 

HOLDING

 

Decision of the Franklin County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor is SET ASIDE.True value in money for the subject property for tax years 2009 and 2010 is set at $170,000, residential assessed value of $32,300.Complainant, H. Roy Paris appeared pro se.Respondent appeared in person and by County Counselor, Mark Vincent.Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

Complainants appeal, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the Franklin County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuation of the subject property.The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2009.

A hearing was conducted on January 12, 2010, at the Franklin County Government Building, Union, Missouri.The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.Jurisdiction.Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper.Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Franklin County Board of Equalization.


2.Assessment.The Assessor appraised the subject property at $163,390, residential assessed value of $31,044.

3.Subject Property.The subject property is located at 4576 Prairie Fork Road in western unincorporated Franklin County, Missouri.The property is identified by map parcel number 12-5-22-5-15.The property consists of a 5.635 acre site improved by a one story frame single family structure of average quality construction.The house was built in 1986 and appears to be in normal condition for a home of that age.The residence has six rooms, including two bedrooms.There are 2 bath rooms.The home has 1,260 square feet of living area.There is a full basement with 630 square feet of finished living area.The home has an attached two-car garage.The property was purchased by Complainants in March 2007 for $152,000.

4.No New Construction and Improvement.There had been some repairs to the rear deck of the home during 2009.However, no evidence was presented to establish that such repairs significantly increased the value of the home so as to warrant a different value for the 2010 tax year.The repairs did not qualify as new construction and improvement to the subject property.The 2009 assessment remains as the assessment for 2010.[1]

5.Complainants’ Evidence.Mr. Paris testified in his own behalf.He gave his opinion of fair market value for the property under appeal as of January 1, 2009, to be $150,980.This opinion was based on the 2007 purchase of the property and the fact that the purchase price included the refrigerator, stove, washer and dryer with a value of approximately, $1,020.By subtracting this amount from the 2007 purchase price, Mr. Paris arrived at his opinion of value.

Complainants offered two exhibits into evidence.Exhibit A was an appraisal report dated March 9, 2007, with a concluded value of $155,000.Exhibit B was a copy of the 2007 Sales Contract for the purchase of the property.Objection was made to Exhibit A as to the valuation of the property as of January 1, 2009, on the grounds of Lack of Foundation.Counsel for Respondent had no objection to the exhibit to establish value as of March 9, 2007.Exhibit was only received as to value for that date and not to establish value as of January 1, 2009.

Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2009, to be $150,980, as proposed.

6.Respondent’s Evidence.Respondent presented the testimony and appraisal report[2] of Carl L. Sohn, Real Estate Appraiser for Franklin County.Mr. Sohn arrived at an opinion of value as of January 1, 2009, of $170,000.The appraiser developed a sales comparison approach to value, relying on three sales to determine the indicated true value in money. The properties relied upon by Respondent’s appraiser were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value.Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2009.The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability.


Respondent’s evidence met the standard of substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2009, to be $170,000.


CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.[3]

Presumption In Appeals

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the CountyBoardof Equalization.[4]The presumption in favor of the Board is not evidence.A presumption simply accepts something as true without any substantial proof to the contrary.In an evidentiary hearing before the Commission, the valuation determined by the Board, even if simply to sustain the value made by the Assessor, is accepted as true only until and so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer, or respondent when advocating a value different than that determined by the Board, presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property.[5]Complainant failed to present evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the decision of the Board.Respondent’s evidence was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption and establish the true value in money for the property.

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.[6]True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use.[7]It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.[8]Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1.Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

 

2.Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.

 


3.A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

 

4.Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

 

5.Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

 

6.The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.[9]

 

Methods of Valuation

Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission.It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.[10]Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.[11] Complainant’s failed to present evidence to establish value based upon a recognized approach to value for appraising property for ad valorem tax purposes.Respondent


presented a opinion of value derived from the proper application of a recognized approach to appraising property in appeals before the Commission.

Complainants’ Burden of Proof


In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2009.[12]There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof.The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief.Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”[13]

Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[14]Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.[15]

An opinion of value unsupported by market data relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2009 does not meet the mandated burden of proof for the Complainants to establish value.

Owner’s Opinion of Value

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value.[16]The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation.[17]The opinion of value based on the 2007 purchase price, less an allowance for appliances, is not grounded upon property element or a proper foundation.Therefore, no probative weight can be given to the owner’s opinion of fair market value.

Respondent Proves Value

Respondent, when advocating a value different from that determined by the original valuation or a valuation made by the Board of Equalization, must meet the same burden of proof to present substantial and persuasive evidence of the value advocated as required of the Complainant under the principles established by case law.[18]Respondent’s appraiser developed an opinion of value relying upon an established and recognized approach for the valuation of real property, the sales comparison or market approach.The sales comparison approach is generally recognized to be the most reliable methodology to be utilized in the valuation of single-family residences.Adjustments made by the appraiser were appropriate to bring the sale properties in line with the subject.The range of gross adjustments from 17% to 23% is within the well accepted standard for gross adjustments to generally fall below 25%.The range of net adjustments varied only from a -10.3% to 8.45%.This is a very small percentage of net adjustments and the range provides credibility to the overall appraisal under the sales comparison approach.

Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence to establish a fair market value as of January 1, 2009, to be $170,000 for the subject.[19]


ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for Franklin County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2009 and 2010 is set at $32,300.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Decision.The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.

Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. [20]

The Collector of Franklin County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED February 26, 2010.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OFMISSOURI

 

 

_____________________________________

W. B. Tichenor

Senior Hearing Officer

 

 

 


Certificate of Service

 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed postage prepaid on this 26thday of February, 2010, to:H. Roy Paris, 4576 Prairie Ford Rd., New Haven, MO 63068, Complainant; Mark Vincent, Franklin County Counselor, P.O. Box 439, Union, MO 63084, Attorney for Respondent; Tom Copeland, Assessor, 400 E. Locust, Suite 105A, Union, MO 63084; Debbie Door, Clerk, Franklin County Courthouse, 400 E. Locust, Suite 201, Union, MO 63084; Linda Emmons, Collector; Franklin County Courthouse, 400 E. Locust, Suite 103, Union, MO 63084.

 

 

___________________________

Barbara Heller

Legal Coordinator

 

 

 


[1] Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

 

[2] Exhibit 1.

 

[3] Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, 138.431.4, RSMo.

 

[4] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

 

[5] Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

 

[6] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).

 

[7] Daly v. P. D. George Company, et al, 77 SW3d 645, 649 (Mo.App E.D. 2002), citing, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. STC, 852 SW2d 376, 380 (Mo.App. 1993); citing, Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S.W.2d 798, 801-803 (Mo. 1973).

 

[8] Hermel, supra.

 

[9] Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary; Exhibit 1, p.4.

 

[10] See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra;Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).

 

[11] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

 

[12] Hermel, supra.

 

[13] See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).

 

[14] See, Cupples-Hesse, supra.

 

[15] Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

 

[16] Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970).

 

[17] Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

 

[18] Hermel, Cupples-Hesse, Brooks, supra.

 

[19] Exhibit 1.

 

[20] Section 138.432, RSMo.