Michelle Sleet v. Jake Zimmerman, Assessor St Louis County

September 5th, 2014

State Tax Commission of Missouri

 

MICHELLE SLEET, )  
  )  
Complainant, )  
  )  
) Appeal Number 13-13166
  )  
JAKE ZIMMERMAN, ASSESSOR, )  
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )  
  )  
)  

 

 

DECISION AND ORDER

 

HOLDING

 

Decision of the County Board of Equalization affirming the assessment made by the Assessor is AFFIRMED. Complainant did not present substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board of Equalization. Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence to support the presumption of correct assessment by the Board of Equalization.

True value in money for the subject property for tax years 2013 and 2014 is set at $488,400, residential assessed value of $92,790.

Complainant appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared by attorney Paula Lemerman

Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer John Treu.


ISSUE

Complainant appeals, on the ground of discrimination, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuation of the subject property. However, it is clear, based upon the exhibits offered and the testimony given by Complainant, that the issue in this case was overvaluation. The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2013. The value as of January 1 of the odd numbered year remains the value as of January 1 of the following even numbered year unless there is new construction and improvement to the property. Section 137.115.1 RSMo

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

  1. Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.
  2. Evidentiary Hearing. The Evidentiary Hearing was held on August 20, 2014 at the St. Louis County Administration Building, Clayton, Missouri.
  3. Identification of Subject Property. The subject property is identified by map parcel number or locator number 17R210372. It is further identified as 412 Argus Manor Court, Chesterfield, St. Louis County, Missouri.(Ex. 1)
  4. Description of Subject Property. The subject property consists of a 21,210 +/- square foot tract of land improved by a single family, residential two story style home with a quality meeting or exceeding applicable building codes, with 3,976 square feet of living area. Amenities include four bedrooms, two and a half bathrooms, a deck, two fireplaces, approximately 1300 square feet of finished basement, and a three car attached garage. (Ex. 1)
  5. Assessment. The Assessor appraised the property at $488,400. The Board of Equalization sustained the appraisal of the property at $488,400. (Ex. 1)
  6. Complainant’s Evidence.   Complainant offered into evidence Exhibit A through Exhibit F. Exhibit A consisted of a Roof Replacement Bid. Exhibit B consisted of an email regarding the roof. Exhibit C consisted of a Concrete Bid to replace the driveway. Exhibit D consisted of purported comparables. Exhibit E consisted of an email to the State Tax Commission. Exhibit F consisted of photos of the subject property and road. Exhibits A through E were objected to, objection overruled and the exhibits were received into the evidentiary record. Exhibit F was received into evidence without objection. Complainant testified about a leaky roof, warped floors and leaking doors. However, Complainant presented not credible evidence of the cost to repair such. In fact, Complainant’s bid for replacement of the entire roof appeared misplaced as the testimony showed the roof was only leaking in a relatively limited area above the garage. Complainant’s testimony about the driveway deficiencies seemed overstated. Complainant did not present convincing evidence the entire driveway needed to be replaced.
  7. No Evidence of New Construction & Improvement. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2013, to January 1, 2014, therefore the assessed value for 2013 remains the assessed value for 2014. Section 137.115.1, RSMo.
  8. Respondent’s Evidence. Respondent offered into evidence Exhibit 1 – Appraisal Report dated 5/13/2014 with an Effective Date of 1/1/2013 – Gerald Keeven, Jr., Missouri State Certified Residential Real Estate Appraiser, reaching an appraised value of $506,000 ($17,600 above the Assessor and Board of Equalization value). Respondent also offered Exhibit 2, which consisted of a 2007 MARIS listing of the subject property   Exhibit 1 was received into evidence without objection. Exhibit 2 was objected to, objection was overruled and the exhibit was received into the evidentiary record.

Respondent’s appraiser used six comparable properties to arrive at a value for the subject property. The sales comparables were between .02 and .38 miles of the subject property. The sales dates of the comparables fell between February 2012 and December 2012. The sales prices of the comparables fell between $500,000 and $550,000, with the adjusted sales prices for such falling between $475,700 and $523,800. The gross adjustments to the comparables fell between 7.9% and 13.7%. The condition of the subject property and all of the comparables was determined to be the same. A downward adjustment of $25,000 was made to comparables #1, #2, #4 and #5 as they were deemed to be of higher quality as compared to the subject property. (Ex. 1)

The testimony of the Respondent’s appraiser seemed equivocal at times on at least one issue, if not more. Regarding the condition of the roof, he testified that he was not a building inspector. When asked about whether he saw any evidence of damage to the roof, he seemed uncomfortable to pose a clear opinion, as it would seem a Missouri State Certified Residential Real Estate Appraiser should be able to do. Such would seem to go directly to the overall condition of the subject property, including, but not limited to, the condition of exterior walls, concrete or pavement, soffits and in this case the condition of the roof and as such the opinion of value.

Notwithstanding this concern, Complainant had the ultimate burden of proof in this case as to any necessary and cost of any repairs. The fact that Respondent’s appraiser came to a value $17,600 above the value being affirmed this date also is pertinent.

  1. Presumption of Correct Assessment Not Rebutted. Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2013, to be $422,000 to $433,000, as proposed. Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence to support the valuation of the Board of Equalization and not for the purpose of raising the assessment above that value.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Article X, Section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, 138.431.4, RSMo.

Basis of Assessment

            The Constitution mandates that real property and tangible personal property be assessed at its value or such percentage of its value as may be fixed by law for each class and for each subclass. Article X, Sections 4(a) and 4(b), Mo. Const. of 1945. The constitutional mandate is to find the true value in money for the property under appeal. By statute real and tangible personal property are assessed at set percentages of true value in money. Section 137.115.5, RSMo – residential property at 19% of true value in money; commercial property at 32% of true value in money and agricultural property at 12% of true value in money.

Presumption In Appeal

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958). This presumption is a rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption. It places the burden of going forward with some substantial evidence on the taxpayer – Complainant. When some substantial evidence is produced by the Complainant, “however slight”, the presumption disappears and the Hearing Officer, as trier of facts, receives the issue free of the presumption. United Missouri Bank of Kansas City v. March, 650 S.W.2d 678, 680-81 (Mo. App. 1983), citing to State ex rel. Christian v. Lawry, 405 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Mo. App. 1966) and cases therein cited. The presumption is not evidence of value. The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property. Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse, supra. Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).


Complainants’ Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2013. Hermel, supra. There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof. The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief.   Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.” See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003); Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991). A valuation which does not reflect the fair market value (true value in money) of the property under appeal is an unlawful, unfair and improper assessment.

Owner’s Opinion of Value

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value.   Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970).   The owner’s opinion is without probative value; however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

“Where the basis for a test as to the reliability of the testimony is not supported by a statement of facts on which it is based, or the basis of fact does not appear to be sufficient, the testimony should be rejected.” Carmel Energy at 783. A taxpayer does not meet his burden if evidence on any essential element of his case leaves the Commission “in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise.” See, Rossman v. G.G.C. Corp. of Missouri, 596 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Mo. App. 1980). Such was the case in the present appeal. Although Complainant, testified about damage to the roof of her property, the testimony ultimately revealed the damage to the roof was limited to an area above the garage. The Hearing Officer has no doubt that a small portion of the roof needs repair; however, the Hearing Officer would have to speculate as to the cost of such repair and the breadth of such. Complainant presented an estimate to replace the entire roof, but no admissible evidence was offered that the entire roof needed to be replaced. Unfortunately, upon questioning of Respondent’s appraiser regarding the roof, his equivocal responses were of little assistance in determining if the roof in its current condition, whatever, it may be, may impact its most probable price to sell on 1/1/2013. Nevertheless, there was no admissible evidence of the cost to repair the portion of the roof which required repair.

Board Presumption

The Assessor’s original value in this appeal was determined by the Board to be correct. Accordingly, the taxpayer must rebut that presumption in order to prevail. The taxpayer must establish by substantial and persuasive evidence that the value concluded by the Board is in error and what the correct value should be. The burden, of course, is discharged by simply establishing the fair market value of the property as of the valuation date, since once fair market value is established it, a fortiori, proves that the Board’s value was in error. The computer-assisted presumption plays no role in this process.

Computer-Assisted Presumption

            The computer assisted presumption can only come into play in those instances where the Respondent is seeking to have the Assessor’s original valuation affirmed. If in a given appeal the Respondent is offering evidence that would establish a value less than the original valuation, then the computer-assisted presumption is not applicable to that appeal. Even if the Board has reduced the valuation and the Respondent’s evidence is offered to increase the value, but not to the level of the original valuation, the computer-assisted presumption does not come into play.

If the Board of Equalization sustained the valuation of the Assessor, as in this case, such does not negate the fact that the Board presumption remains operative as to evidence which is presented by the taxpayer and Respondent. The computer-assisted presumption only comes into play if the Board of Equalization lowered the value of the Assessor and Respondent is seeking to sustain the original assessment and it has not been shown that the Assessor’s valuation was not the result of a computer assisted method. The Board valuation is assumed to be an independent valuation.

Respondent’s Burden of Proof

Respondent, when advocating a value different from that determined by the original valuation or a valuation made by the Board of Equalization, must meet the same burden of proof to present substantial and persuasive evidence of the value advocated as required of the Complainant under the principles established by case law. Hermel, Cupples-Hesse, Brooks, supra.


Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).  True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use. Daly v. P. D. George Company, et al, 77 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App E.D. 2002), citing, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. STC, 852 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo. App. 1993); citing, Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S.W.2d 798, 801-803 (Mo. 1973).

It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, supra.

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

  1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

 

  1. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.

 

  1. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

 

  1. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

 

  1. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

 

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by   special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction. Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate    Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation,  J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5;   Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of   Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal  Practice, Glossary.

 

Hearsay

            Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition (1999), p. 726, defines hearsay as follows: “Traditionally, testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what he or she knows personally, but what others have said, and that is therefore dependent upon the credibility of someone other than the witness. Such testimony is generally inadmissible under the rules of evidence.” McCormick on Evidence, Third Edition, (1984), p. 729, defines the term as; “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” The Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence Missouri Practice, William A. Schroeder – 2012, Principle 800.c, p. 504,

follows the definition given by the Federal Rules and cited by McCormick. The out of court statement can take the form of either oral or written assertions. Therefore, documents which make assertions of facts are hearsay, just as well, as the speech of another person.

The hearsay rule provides that “no assertion offered as testimony can be received unless it is or has been open to test by cross-examination or an opportunity for cross-examination, except as otherwise provide by the rules of evidence, by court rules or by statute.” Black’s, supra – hearsay rule, p. 726. The rationale behind the rule is quite simply that out of court hearsay statements are not made under oath and cannot be subject to cross-examination. Accordingly, when various documents, such as but not limited to, Internet, newspaper and magazine articles are offered as exhibits in a hearing before the Commission, unless the document falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, upon objection such must be excluded.

Investigation by Hearing Officer

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer may inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer’s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon his inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo. The Hearing Officer during the evidentiary hearing made inquiry of Complainant and Respondent’s appraiser.

Weight to be Given Evidence

            The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968). The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

                                                                  Discrimination

 

Complainant filed this appeal as a discrimination case; however, as set forth above, it was apparent, based upon the evidence, that it was truly an overvaluation case. Nevertheless, discrimination will be addressed. In order to obtain a reduction in assessed value based upon discrimination, the Complainants must (1) prove the true value in money of their property on January 1, 2013; and (2) show an intentional plan of discrimination by the assessing officials resulting in an assessment of that property at a greater percentage of value than other property, generally, within the same class within the same taxing jurisdiction. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 690, 695 (Mo. 1959). Evidence of value and assessments of a few properties does not prove discrimination. Substantial evidence must show that all other property in the same class, generally, is actually undervalued.  State ex rel. Plantz v. State Tax Commission, 384 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. 1964). The difference in the assessment ratio of the subject property the average assessment ratio in the subject county must be shown to be grossly excessive. Savage v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 722 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Mo. banc 1986).No other methodology is sufficient to establish discrimination. Cupples-Hesse, supra.

Complainant Fails To Prove Discrimination

Where there is a claim of discrimination based upon a lack of valuation consistency, Complainants have the burden to prove the level of assessment for the subject property in 2013. This is done by independently determining the market value of the subject property and dividing the market value into the assessed value of the property as determined by the assessor’s office.

Complainants must then prove the average level of assessment for residential property in St. Louis County for 2013. This is done by (a) independently determining the market value of a representative sample of residential properties in St. Louis County; (b) determining the assessed value placed on the property by the assessor’s office for the relevant year; (c) dividing the assessed value by the market value to determine the level of assessment for each property in the sample; and (d) determining the mean and median of the results.

 

The difference between the actual assessment level of the subject property and the average level of assessment for all residential property, taken from a sufficient representative sample in St. Louis County must demonstrate a disparity that is grossly excessive. Savage, supra.

Complainant’s discrimination claim would have failed because she failed to establish the market value of her property. Without establishing their market value, she could not establish her assessment ratio. Without establishing her ratio, she could not establish that she was being assessed at a higher percentage of market value that any other property.

However, even if Complainant had established their market value, her discrimination claim would still fail because she did not demonstrate that a statistically significant number of other residential properties within St. Louis County are being assessed at a lower ratio of market value than her property.

Respondent Proves Value

Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence to support a fair market value as of January 1, 2013, to be $488,400 for the subject property. Respondent’s appraiser developed an opinion of value relying upon an established and recognized approach for the valuation of real property, the sales comparison or market approach. The sales comparison approach is generally recognized to be the most reliable methodology to be utilized in the valuation of single-family residences. The adjustments made by the appraiser were consistent with generally accepted guidelines for the appraisal of property of the subject’s type. The adjustments properly accounted for the various differences between the subject and each comparable.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2013 and 2014 is set at $92,790.

Application for Review

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Decision. The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.

          Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the application for review is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo

Disputed Taxes

The Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED this 5th day of September, 2014.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

 

John Treu

Senior Hearing Officer

Delivery or Notice was made via email, fax, or personally on September 5th, 2014 or by mail to the following Individuals of this Decision/Order/Holding

Michelle Sleet, 412 Argus Manor Court, Chesterfield, MO 63017, Complainant

Paula Lemerman, Associate County Counsel, Attorney for Respondent, PLemerman@stlouisco.com

Jake Zimmerman, Assessor, syoutzy@stlouisco.com

Mark Devore, Collector, MDevore@stlouisco.com

 

 

Jacklyn Wood

Legal Coordinator