State Tax Commission of Missouri
M’SHOOGY ANIMAL RESCUE,)
)
Complainant,)
)
v.)Appeal No.06-40501 & 06-40502
)
RONALD CHRISTMAS, ASSESSOR,)
ANDREW COUNTY, MISSOURI,)
)
Respondent.)
DECISION UPON REMAND FROM COURT OF APPEALS
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.Remand from Court of Appeals.By Opinion Filed: November 24, 2009, the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District reversed the Order of the Commission issued October 11, 2007, and the Decision of the Hearing Officer issued June 14, 2007.[i]The Court remanded the case to the Commission for consideration and further proceedings consistent with the Opinion of the Court of the issues of (1) use of a part of the house on the exempt property as a residence and (2) occasional personal use of the claimed motor vehicles as exempt property.
2.Order for Reporting on Case Status.By Order dated December 2, 2009, Respondent was given until December 21, 2009, to report if review of the Court of Appeals Judgment would be sought.No report was provided.No appeal has been taken by either party from the Court of Appeals Judgment.
3.Judgment of Court of Appeals.The Court found “The use of property in rescuing and housing injured and abandoned animals is beneficial to mankind and society in general and, if rendered in a not-for-profit manner, is charitable in nature.”[ii]
4.Sufficiency of Evidence.The Court determined that on the issues of low cost veterinary services, educational activities, assistance to state and local law enforcement officials in handling injured and abandoned animals, and lessening a government burden, the testimony of Mr. Silverglat standing alone was sufficient to establish these activities and uses to qualify the subject property for exempt status.[iii]
5.Partial Use of House.The Court in remanding the case to the Commission on the matter of the use of part of the house as a residence noted the following:
“The provision of a residence occupied by key personnel, who were necessary to the efficient operation of the charity and needed to be located nearby, may be deemed sufficiently connected to the charitable purpose to justify the claimed exemption.Abbott Ambulance, Inc. v. Leggett, 926 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996).Silverglats testified that he and his wife resided in four rooms of the house because someone had to be present 24-hours a day to care for and treat the animals.To the extent this testimony is found credible by the trier of fact, anexemption would certainly seem appropriate.”[iv]
6.Silverglat Testimony Controlling on Use of House.The testimony of Mr. Silverglat with regard to the use of the house to support the exempt use of the remainder of the subject property, like his testimony on the matters of the low cost veterinary services, educational activities, assistance to state and local law enforcement officials in handling injured and abandoned animals, is sufficient to establish occupancy of the house as a residence is necessary to the efficient operation of the charity, needs to be located on the property, and is sufficiently connected to the charitable purpose to justify exemption of the house.
7.Silverglat Testimony Controlling on Use of Motor Vehicles.The testimony of Mr. Silverglat with regard to the use of the motor vehicles to support the exempt use of the remainder of the subject property, like his testimony on the matters of the low cost veterinary services, educational activities, assistance to state and local law enforcement officials in handling injured and abandoned animals, is sufficient to establish the use of the vehicles is necessary to the efficient operation of the charity, and is sufficiently connected to the charitable purpose to justify exemption of the motor vehicles.
ORDER
The assessment of the subject property made by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for Andrew County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.
The county clerk is ordered to enter the subject property (Uniform Parcel Number 13-2.0-03-0-00-07.00 – Real Property at 11519 State Route C, Savannah, Missouri and Uniform Parcel Number -05-5000235 – Personal Property) on the list of exempt property into the supplemental tax book for the county for the tax year 2006.
A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service.The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.
Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. [v]
The Collector of Andrew County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.
Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.
SO ORDERED February 26, 2010.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
W. B. Tichenor
Senior Hearing Officer
ORDER
AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION
UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
On June 14, 2007, Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor entered his Decision and Order (Decision) affirming the assessments by the Andrew County Board of Equalization and finding the subject real and personal property was not exempt from taxation under section 137.100(5) RSMo.
Complainant timely filed its Application for Review of the Decision.Respondent timely filed his Response.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION
Hearing Officer Decision Not Arbitrary or Capricious
A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer.There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer.A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal.Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).
Complainant’s Argument
Complainant asserts the Hearing Officer erred in determining that Complainant’s activities do not constitute a charitable use under Missouri Law and in applying the standards of Franciscan Tertiary Province v. STC, 566 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. banc 1978) and Salvation Army v. Hoehn, et al, 188 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. banc 1945).The Commission is not so persuaded.
Charitable Use Argument
Complainant puts forth its argument relative a charitable use of the subject real and personal property along four lines.The lines of argument being the Complainant’s property is used to provide a charitable benefit to animals, a direct benefit to human beings, educational activities and lessening the burden of government.
Charitable Benefit to Animals
Complainant asserts that certain “charities which provide benefits to animals or the environment have nevertheless been fully accepted as qualified charities under both federal and state law.”It is further argued that Complainant “and similar organizations have fully qualified as exempt from sales and use tax under Missouri law.”Complainant also claims “many other public charities benefiting animals and the environment have qualified as charitable organizations exempt from real and personal property taxes under state laws.”
However, Complainant fails to point to a single place in the evidentiary record where it was shown that any animal rescue corporation has been granted tax exempt status from ad valorem property taxes in Missouri.It has not occurred in Missouri and no citation was provided to any such holding in any sister jurisdiction.Being granted a sales tax exemption is a factor which can be considered in exemption cases under 137.100, however, it is not dispositive on the issue.For the Hearing Officer to have concluded that keeping of animals constitutes a charitable use of real and personal property under section 137.100(5) RSMo would have meant the Hearing Officer was in effect rewriting the statute and case law to create an exempt use for care of animals.He properly declined to do.Likewise, the Commission is not persuaded that the reach of the statute extends to the care of keeping of animals as a charitable use of property.
The Hearing Officer did not err in his determinations on this point as challenged by Complainant.
Direct Benefit to Human Beings
Complainant’s next point is the assertion that low-cost or no-cost spaying and neutering provides a direct benefit to persons in reducing the number of stray animals.Complainant’s witness testified that there is a veterinary clinic operating on the property.This clinic is open to the public and fees are charged.This is simply a business enterprise.
There was no testimony of low or no cost spaying and neutering.The evidence was that people are charged for veterinary services to “try to cover the expenses.”The only no charge service is “life-threatening emergency” to an animal that a person cannot afford the veterinary services. Persons seeking elective veterinary services are charged a fee.Tr. 37, Line 12 – Tr. 38, Line 14.
The operation of the veterinarian clinic is simply a business enterprise in which the fees charged are used to cover the cost of operating the clinic.The record did not provide any evidence as to financial statements on the operation of the clinic, so it was not established if the fees charged cover the cost of operation or how any income over and above expenses are used.
However, the operation of a business enterprise even if any net income was going to a charitable, religious or educational entity does not render the business enterprise and the property it occupies as tax exempt.There is no citation to any case law to establish that the operation of a veterinarian clinic has qualified as a tax exempt use of real or personal property in Missouri or any other jurisdiction.
There is no documentation or testimony in the record which in any manner addressed the matter of alleged reduction in stray animals because of the veterinary services available at the clinic on the subject property.Nor does the record address the assertion made in Complainant’s Application for Review concerning emergency assistance with pets in times of floods, house fires, domestic abuse or death.Accordingly, the Hearing Officer could not have erred in failing to give consideration to alleged activities which were not addressed in the record.Therefore, the record failed to establish a direct benefit to humans from the operation of a veterinary clinic which would qualify as a charitable activity.
The Hearing Officer did not err in his determinations on this point as challenged by Complainant.
Educational Activities
Complainant argues that the Hearing Officer ignored or dismissed the direct benefits Complainant provides through educational activities.The argument is that the exposure of school groups and adults to wild animals helps teach people about the world around them.The Commission finds that the Hearing Officer specifically addressed the asserted educational activities on page 7 of the Decision.
In the words of the Decision, “…, the evidence is completely lacking as to what the alleged educational activities consist of, how often they are conducted, what the actual program of education is that is presented.No evidence was presented to establish what the content of the ‘education programs’ might be.In the absence of definitive evidence of past and continuing educational activities beyond simply conducting a tour of the facilities and explaining about animal rescue, the claim for an exemption on an educational ground fails.”
The Commission agrees.Complainant did not establish on the record anything concerning alleged educational activities.The Hearing Officer did not ignore the asserted “direct benefits.”He found there was no evidence upon which a reasonable mind could conclude any educational benefit, direct or indirect.Therefore, he properly applied the law to the evidentiary record and declined to grant an exemption for an educational use, when the evidence failed to establish any such use which would warrant exemption.
The Hearing Officer did not err in his determinations on this point as challenged by Complainant.
Lessening the Burden of Government
Complainant next asserts the Hearing Officer omitted any discussion of the activities of the Appellant which “lessen the burdens of government.”Because the Hearing Officer declined to expand the definition of charity to include animals, a discussion of any potential lessening of the burdens of government would not appear to be required in his Decision.Here again, the evidentiary record is severely lacking on this point.Although, Complainant asserts assistance to state and local law enforcement officials in handling wild and domestic animals, no evidence was presented to establish the frequency or number of incidents of such assistance.However, such assistance is an activity of Complainant, it is not a use of the subject property, which simply houses animals.
The argument made in the Application for Review that the use of the Complainant’s property to house animals reduces the necessity for government to maintain animal control facilities was simply not established on the record.There was no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that because of the use of the subject property in keeping animals that any government had been able to do away with an animal control facility.
Complainant’s other assertion relating to keeping of animals reducing “taxpayer’s burden in meeting requirements of state statutes, federal statutes and international treaties requiring the protection and preservation of wildlife and migratory birds,” was not established on the record.There was no demonstration of any state or federal statute or international treaty obligation which is required to be met by the use of the subject property in keeping a variety of animals, which may or may not be protected in some fashion by statute or treaties.
In like manner, no evidence was presented on the subject of Complainant providing work release and parolee workfare employment.Even if such evidence was in the record, this would not establish the use of Complainant’s property to keep and care for animals as being an exempt use.
In summary, Complainant essentially puts forth this argument based upon an assertion of facts which do not appear in the record.Furthermore, in general the arguments made relate more to the activities of Complainant and not to the use of the real and personal property.
The Hearing Officer did not err in his determinations on this point as challenged by Complainant.
Franciscan and Salvation Army Not Controlling
The second alleged point of error relates to the Hearing Officer’s reliance upon the two seminal cases in Missouri on the granting of exemption from ad valorem taxation on the basis of charitable use of the property.Complainant’s argument essentially boils down to the Supreme Court of Missouri was addressing issues in Franciscan and Salvation Army that related to humans, and therefore, the Hearing Officer should have ignored the holdings in those two cases.In other words, Complainant would have had the Hearing Officer and now the Commission create a new line of case law establishing a classification of charity relating to the housing and care of animals.The Hearing Officer declined to take such a course of action and the Commission believes properly so.The Hearing Officer did not err in his determinations on this point as challenged by Complainant.
Complainant had the burden to present substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board of Equalization.Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978).In order to meet this burden in an appeal seeking exemption from taxation, the Complainant must meet the substantial burden to establish that the property falls within an exempted class under the provisions of Section 137.100. State ex rel. Council Apartments v. Leachman, 603 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Mo. 1980).It is well established that taxation is the rule and exemption from taxation is the exception.Exemption is not favored in the law.(See, Missouri Church of Scientology v. STC, 560 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Mo. banc 1977); CSCEA v. Nelson, 898 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Mo. banc 1995), citing Scientology).
The Hearing Officer concluded that Complainant failed to meet its burden of proof under the facts in the record and the controlling law.The Commission agrees and declines to take the step of carving out a new tax exemption for the care and housing of animals.If such an exemption is to be established it is a matter to be addressed by the courts or the legislature and not the Commission in its quasi-judicial role.
ORDER
The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified.Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.
Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.
If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts.If no judicial review is made within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Andrew County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.
SO ORDERED October 11, 2007.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
Bruce E. Davis, Chairman
Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner
Charles Nordwald, Commissioner
DECISION AND ORDER
HOLDING
Assessments by Assessor that subject properties were not tax exempt was sustained by Andrew County Board of Equalization.Hearing Officer finds subject property to not be exempt under Section 137.100(5), assessments AFFIRMED.
Complainant appeared by Counsel, James Nadolski, St. Joseph, Missouri.
Respondent appeared by Counsel, Steven Stevenson, Prosecuting Attorney.
ISSUE
The Commission takes this appeal to determine whether the subject real and personal property is exempt from taxation for the tax year 2006.
SUMMARY
Complainant appeals the decision of the Andrew County Board of Equalization on the ground of exemption under Section 137.100, RSMo.Respondent assessed the personal property (Appeal No. 06-40501) at an appraised value of $81,891.89, assessed value of $27,270.Respondent assessed the real property at an appraised value of $147,900, assessed value of $28,100, as residential property and $27,300, assessed value of $3,280, assessed value as agricultural property.The Board of Equalization sustained the assessments.
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on May 15, 2007, before Senior Hearing OfficerW. B. Tichenor at the Andrew County Courthouse, Savannah, Missouri.The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record and the Briefs filed by the parties, enters the following Decision and Order.
Complainant’s Evidence
Complainant offered into evidence Exhibit A, the written direct testimony of Gary Silverglat, the founder and president of Complainant.Attached to and incorporated into Exhibit A were the following documents:
Exhibit IArticles of Incorporation of M’Shoogy Animal Rescue as a Missouri General Not For profit Corporation
Exhibit IICertificate of Corporate Records of Secretary of State of Missouri For Complainant, dated January 4, 2001
Exhibit IIICopy of Internal Revenue Service 501(c)(3) Determination Letter dated October 29, 2001
Exhibit IVCopy of Missouri Sales Tax Exemption Letter, effective from 3/2/07 to 3/2/10
Exhibit VCopy of Missouri Veterinary Medical Board Veterinary Facility License for Angel’s Vet Express
Exhibit VICopy of Federal Fish and Wildlife Permit for Complainant, dated 4/29/05, expiration 3/31/10
Exhibit VIICopy of Missouri Dept. of Agricultural, Animal Care Facility License, expires 1/31/08
Exhibit VIIICopy of Missouri Dept. of Conservation Wildlife Rehabilitation permit #271, expires 12/31/07
Exhibit IXCopy of Complainant’s informational brochure
Exhibit XCopy of Board of Equalization Decision Notices, Dated August 10, 2006
Exhibit A, with the attached Exhibits I through X were received into evidence.Exhibit A referenced an Exhibit XI, however, no such document was attached to the copy of Exhibit A filed with the Commission.
Respondent’s Evidence
Respondent did not file any exhibits or written direct testimony.Counsel for Respondent conducted cross-examination of Complainant’s witness.
FACTS
1.Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper.Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Andrew County Board of Equalization.
2.Complainant is a not for profit corporation, organized under the laws of the State of Missouri, with 501 (c)(3) tax exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service of the United States.Exhibits I, II, III.
3.The stated corporate purpose of Complainant is: to educate the community and to provide, assist and protect all animals that are stray, wild, abused, injured, without shelter, or owners, and to increase and promote public awareness and appreciation for all animals and to provide shelter, medical care and food for all unwanted animals.Exhibit I.
4.The activities which the Complainant performs are:Rescue injured and abandoned animals, adoption of animals, provide low-cost veterinary services for the public
(operation of a public veterinary clinic), spaying and neutering of animals, providing of educational tours and programs.Exhibit A, Q & A 13 & 18; Tr. 37, Lines 13 – 20.
5.Exemption from state Sales and Use tax does not establish the use of real or personal property that qualifies for exemption under Section 137.100(5), RSMo.
6.Holding of a Federal Fish and Wildlife Permit, a Veterinary Facility Certification, an Animal Care Facility License, and/or a Wildlife Rehabilitation Permit does not establish the use of real or personal property that qualifies for exemption under Section 137.100(5), RSMo. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION
Jurisdiction
The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.Article X, Section 14, Missouri Constitution of 1945; Constitution of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.460(2), RSMo.
Burden of Proof
Complainant has the burden to present substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board of Equalization.Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978).In order to meet this burden in an appeal seeking exemption from taxation, the Complainant must meet the substantial burden to establish that the property falls within an exempted class under the provisions of Section 137.100. State ex rel. Council Apartments v. Leachman, 603 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Mo. 1980).It is well established that taxation is the rule and exemption from taxation is the exception.Exemption is not favored in the law.(See, Missouri Church of Scientology v. STC, 560 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Mo. banc 1977); CSCEA v.
Nelson, 898 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Mo. banc 1995), citing Scientology).Complainant seeks exemption of its property from taxation pursuant to Section 137.100(5), RSMo:
“The following subjects are exempt from taxation for state, county or localpurposes: …
(5) All property, real and personal, actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, or for purposes purely charitable and not held for private or corporate profit, except that the exemption herein granted does not include real property not actually used or occupied for the purpose of the organization but held or used as investment even though the income or rentals received therefrom is used wholly for religious, educational or charitable purposes; …”
Complainant’s substantial burden of proof has not been met in the present case.
Franciscan Tertiary Test
In meeting its burden of proof that the subject property is used “exclusively for … purposes purely charitable, and not held for private or corporate profit….”Complainant must
meet the three prong test set forth by the Missouri Supreme Court in Franciscan Tertiary Province v. STC, 566 S.W.2d 213, 223-224 (Mo. banc 1978).The court said:
“The first prerequisite for property to be exempt as charitable under §137.100 is that it be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis.It must be dedicated un-conditionally to the charitable activity in such a way that there will be no profit, presently or prospectively, to individuals or corporations.Any gain achieved in use of the building must be devoted to attainment of the charitable objectives of the project…. [A]n exemption will not be granted covering property which houses a business operated for the purpose of gaining a profit, even though it is turned over to a parent organization to be used for what are admittedly independently…charitable purposes.…
Another prerequisite for charitable exemption is that the dominant use of the property must be for the benefit of an indefinite number of people, for thepurpose, as expressed in Salvation Army, of “relieving their bodies of disease, suffering, or constraint…or by erecting or maintaining pubic buildings…lessening the burdens of government.” 188 S.W.2d at 830. Thus it is required that there be the element of direct or indirect benefit to society in addition to and as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons directly served by the humanitarian activity.
Id. at 224.
The three tests to be met under Franciscan are:
1.Property must be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis;
2.Property must be actually and regularly used exclusively for a charitable purpose; and
3.Property must be used for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons and for society in general, directly or indirectly.
The critical issue in the present case involves the question of whether the activities which are conducted at the subject real property – housing of rescued animals and the activities – and conducted by the subject personal property (miscellaneous motor vehicles) – traveling to rescue animals – are charitable or educational activities.Because the answer to this point of inquiry determines the case, the Hearing Officer will not address the additional issues which arose in the hearing of this case.Those include (1) use of part of a house on the property as a residence; (2) operation of a veterinary clinic on the subject property; and (3) mixed use of motor vehicles – personal and corporate use.It is noted that no listing of the subject personal property was submitted into evidence, nor was any detailed description of the real property, improvements, buildings, etc., or deed of conveyance establishing corporate ownership, with or without any reversion to individuals or another entity.
It appears that that the subject real property (whatever that may include) and the subject personal property (whatever it may be) is owned by Complainant, and it appears that Complainant operates on a not-for-profit basis.However, the linchpin issue is whether the actual and regular use of the real and personal property is for an educational or charitable purpose.No claim was asserted as to any religious exemption under Section 137.100(5).
The only asserted educational activities conducted on the subject property are field trips and tours.However, the evidence is completely lacking as to what the alleged educational activities consist of, how often they are conducted, what the actual program of education is that is presented.No evidence was presented to establish what the content of the “education programs” might be.In the absence of definitive evidence of past and continuing educational activities beyond simply conducting a tour of the facilities and explaining about animal rescue, the claim for an exemption on an educational ground fails.
It is now possible to turn to the matter of a “charitable use” of the real and personal property.In order for Complainant’s property to be exempt it must be actually and regularly used for a charitable purpose.In simplest terms the actual and regular use of the property is to rescue and house rescued animals.Does this activity constitute a charitable activity, or a charitable use?
The Franciscan case relies upon the holding of the Supreme Court of Missouri in the case of Salvation Army v. Hoehn, et al, 188 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. banc 1945).In Salvation Army, the Court stated the following, cited to In re Rahn’s Estate, 291 S.W. 120:
“Probably the most comprehensive and carefully drawn definition of a charity that has ever been formulated is that it is a gift to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.”
The critical and controlling language of the Court’s holding has to do with “persons.”Charity is rendered toward persons, individuals, people, not animals.It is the hearts and minds of persons that must be influenced for a religious or educational purpose.It is the bodies of persons that are to be relieved from disease, suffering and constraint, not animals.It is persons, not animals, who are to be assisted in establishing themselves for life if charity is to be rendered.
The entire thrust of the language of the Court deals not with animals, but with human beings.As laudable as the activities of the Complainant may be in the minds of various people, those activities are directed toward rescuing animals, not charity under the controlling case law.As such, the use of the real and personal property is not a charitable use.Complainant’s property, real and personal, does not qualify under Section 137.100(5) as exempt from ad valorem taxation.
ORDER
The assessments of the subject properties made by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for Andrew County for the subject tax day are AFFIRMED.
The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 06-40501 for tax year 2006 is set at $27,270.
The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 06-40502 for tax year 2006 is set at $31,380.
Complainant may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision.The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial.Section 138.432, RSMo 2000.
If an application for review of this decision is made to theCommission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission.If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Andrew County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.
Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.
SO ORDERED June 14, 2007.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
W. B. Tichenor
Senior Hearing Officer