State Tax Commission of Missouri
ORVAL GRAHAM, | ) | |
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Complainant, | ) | |
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) | Appeal No. 13-32515 | |
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SCOTT SHIPMAN, ASSESSOR | ) | |
ST. CHARLES COUNTY, MISSOURI, | ) | |
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ORDER
AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION
UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
On April 9, 2013, Hearing Officer Maureen Monaghan entered her Decision and Order (Decision) setting value for the subject property at $175,000. Complainant filed his Application for Review of the Decision on April 28, 2013. Complainant seems to agree that the correct market value for the subject property on January 1, 2013 and January 1, 2014 is $175,000. Respondent filed a Response.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard Upon Review
A party subject to a Decision and Order of a hearing officer with the State Tax Commission may file an application requesting the case be reviewed by the Commission. The Commission may then summarily allow or deny their request. The Commission may affirm, modify, reverse or set aside the decision. The Commission may take any additional evidence and conduct further hearings. See Section 138.432. RSMo.
DECISION
Complainant’s Claims of Error
Inasmuch as Complainant appears to agree with the Hearing Officer’s determination of value stating : “I believe this to be a fair and Total Market Value would remain at $175,000,” it is difficult to ascertain why Complainant has appealed; but it appears that his objections are to the way the Hearing Officer excluded his evidence. The crux of his argument seems to be that certain documents were permissible before the local Board of Equalization but were excluded from the State Tax Commission hearing.
Discussion and Rulings
Hearings before the State Tax Commission are contested cases under Section 536.063 RSMo. Rules of evidence apply in Tax Commission hearings. 12 CSR 30-3.010(5). This means that the Hearing Officer can exclude offered evidence that is not relevant or is hearsay. The fact that said offered evidence may have been accepted by a Board of Equalization does not establish its admissibility in a Tax Commission case.
Hearsay
Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition (1999), p. 726, defines hearsay as follows: “Traditionally, testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what he or she knows personally, but what others have said, and that is therefore dependent upon the credibility of someone other than the witness. Such testimony is generally inadmissible under the rules of evidence.” McCormick on Evidence, Third Edition, (1984), p. 729, defines the term as; “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” The Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence Missouri Practice, William A. Schroeder – 2012, Principle 800.c, p. 504,
follows the definition given by the Federal Rules and cited by McCormick. The out of court statement can take the form of either oral or written assertions. Therefore, documents which make assertions of facts are hearsay, just as well, as the speech of another person.
The hearsay rule provides that “no assertion offered as testimony can be received unless it is or has been open to test by cross-examination or an opportunity for cross-examination, except as otherwise provide by the rules of evidence, by court rules or by statute.” Black’s, supra – hearsay rule, p. 726. The rationale behind the rule is quite simply that out of court hearsay statements are not made under oath and cannot be subject to cross-examination. Accordingly, when various documents, such as, but not limited to, Internet, newspaper and magazine articles are offered as exhibits in a hearing before the Commission, such must be excluded, unless the document falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, upon objection such must be excluded.
Thus it was appropriate for the Hearing Officer to exclude Exhibit 2(B) – “Advertisement”.
Relevance
The principle of relevance is the second critical evidentiary factor that must be considered when testimony and documents are tendered for admission into an evidentiary record. For facts, information or opinions to be relevant they must be connected in a logical manner and tend to prove or disprove a matter that is at issue in the proceeding. Black’s, supra – relevant, p. 1293. McCormick explains that “there are two components to relevant evidence: materiality and probative value. Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues of the case. If the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial. . . . The second aspect of relevance is probative value, the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.” McCormick, supra – p. 541. Evidence, that tends to prove or disprove a fact that is at issue or of consequence, is relevant. Missouri Practice, supra – p. 95.
In appeals on the value of property, the issue is what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as the purchase price on the applicable valuation date. The issue is not what real estate price trends in general may have been during any given period of time. The issue is specific to the property that is under appeal. Therefore, general statements, claims, conclusions and opinions as to what the “market for homes” has or hasn’t done do not meet the factors of materiality and probative value and are accordingly irrelevant. The fact that some report provides general information on home values is addressing a matter that is not at issue in an appeal. Such information is not material. Furthermore, such general data does not tend to prove what the property under appeal was worth on the given valuation date. For example, a report that home prices in the nation, region or a certain metropolitan area over a four or five year period decreased by a certain average percentage provides no factual information as to the price or value of any given home. In other words, such information is not probative on the issue of value. It does nothing to prove that a given property is worth one amount or another.
Thus, it was appropriate for the Hearing Officer to exclude Exhibit 2(B) – “Advertisement”; and Exhibit C – “Valuation Notices” which do not address the valuation under appeal.
Owner’s Opinion of Value
The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).
“Where the basis for a test as to the reliability of the testimony is not supported by a statement of facts on which it is based, or the basis of fact does not appear to be sufficient, the testimony should be rejected.” Carmel Energy at 783.A taxpayer does not meet his burden if evidence on any essential element of his case leaves the Commission “in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise.” See, Rossman v. G.G.C. Corp. of Missouri, 596 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Mo. App. 1980).
Although an owner is competent to testify as to the value of his property, without being a certified appraiser, he is not competent to “adjust” land or improvement values of comparable sales. Thus, it was appropriate for the Hearing Officer to exclude Complainant’s Exhibits A – “Total Market Values”; Exhibit 3 -“Total Market Values”; Exhibit 4 – “Land Valuation Grid”; Exhibits 6-7 – “Photographs of Lots”; and Exhibit D – “Reports on Comparable Properties”.
Summary and Conclusion
The Hearing Officer was justified in excluding the above mentioned exhibits which Complainant attempted to put into evidence.
ORDER
The Decision and Order of the Hearing Officer, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law therein, is AFFIRMED and incorporated by reference, as if set out in full, in this final decision of the Commission.
Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Order.
If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts unless disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031.8, RSMo.
If no judicial review is made within thirty days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Charles County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.
SO ORDERED this 12th day of August, 2014.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
Bruce E. Davis, Chairman
Randy B. Holman, Commissioner
Victor Callahan, Commissioner
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed postage prepaid this 14st day of August, 2014, to: Orval Graham, 7737 Boatside Dr., Dardenne Prairie, MO 63368-7036, Complainant; Amanda Jennings, Assistant County Counselor, 100 North Third Street, Room 216, St. Charles, MO 63301, Attorney for Respondent; Scott Shipman, Assessor, 201 North Second, Room 247, St. Charles, MO 63301-2870; Ruth Miller, Registrar, 201 North Second Street, Room 529, St. Charles, MO 63301; Michelle McBride, Collector, 201 North Second Street, Room 134, St. Charles, MO 63301
Jacklyn Wood
Legal Coordinator
State Tax Commission of Missouri
ORVAL GRAHAM, |
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Complainant, |
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v. |
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Appeal Number(s) 13-32515 |
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SCOTT SHIPMAN, ASSESSOR, |
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ST. CHARLES COUNTY, MISSOURI, |
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Respondent. |
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DECISION AND ORDER
HOLDING
Decision of the County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor is SET ASIDE.
True value in money for the subject property for tax years 2013 and 2014 is set at $175,000, residential assessed value of $33,250.
Complainant appeared in person.
Respondent appeared by counsel, Assistant County Counselor Amanda Jennings
Case heard and decided by Chief Counsel Maureen Monaghan.
ISSUE
Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the St. Charles County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuation of the subject property.The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2013.
[1]The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.Jurisdiction.Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper.Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Charles County Board of Equalization.
2.Evidentiary Hearing.The Evidentiary Hearing was held on March 19, 2014, at the St. Charles County Administration Building, St. Charles, Missouri.
3.Identification of Subject Property.The subject property is identified by map parcel number A964000312.It is further identified as 7737 Boatside, Dardenne Prairie, Missouri.
4.Description of Subject Property.The subject property consists of a .2 acre tract of land improved by single-family, residential ranch-style home of average quality, with 1,978 square feet of living area.Amenities include three bedrooms, two bathrooms, basement, patio/covered porch and a two-car garage.
6.Assessment.The Assessor appraised the property at $185,613, an assessed residential value of $35,266.The Board of Equalization sustained the assessment.
7.Complainant’s Evidence.Complainant offered the following:
Exhibit |
Description |
Note |
A |
Total Market Values |
Complainant compares the valuations placed on three properties.Assessor objected on improper foundation.Sustained. |
2(B) |
Advertisement on 7492 Pierside |
Objection by Assessor.Objection sustained, however, the sale price and description of the property is in the Assessor’s appraisal. |
3 |
Total Market Values |
Land per square foot comparison.Objection sustained |
4 |
Land Valuation Grid |
Objection sustained |
5 |
Appraisal History of Subject Property |
Objection sustained. |
6-7 |
Photographs of Lots |
Presented for Land Valuation analysis.Objection sustained. |
C |
Valuation Notices |
Only Notice for 2013 admitted into evidence. |
D |
Reports on Comparable Properties |
Objection of improper foundation sustained. |
8.No Evidence of New Construction & Improvement.There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2013, to January 1, 2014, therefore the assessed value for 2013 remains the assessed value for 2014.[2]
9.Presumption of Correct Assessment Not Rebutted.Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board.See, Presumption In Appeal and Complainant Fails To Prove Value, infra.
10.Respondent’s Evidence.Respondent offered into evidence Exhibit 1 – Appraisal Report dated January 1, 2013, by Cathy Hunolt.The Exhibit was received into evidence without objection.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION
Jurisdiction
The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.[3]
Basis of Assessment
The Constitution mandates that real property and tangible personal property be assessed at its value or such percentage of its value as may be fixed by law for each class and for each subclass.[4]The constitutional mandate is to find the true value in money for the property under appeal. By statute real and tangible personal property is assessed at set percentages of true value in money.[5]
Presumption In Appeal
There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization.[6]This presumption is a rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption.It places the burden of going forward with substantial evidence on the taxpayer – Complainant.The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property.[7]
Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[8]Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.The persuasiveness of
Standard for Valuation
Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.[9]True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use.[10]It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.[11]Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.
Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
1.Buyer and seller are typically motivated.
2.Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.
3.A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.
4.Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.
5.Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.
6.The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.[12]
Relevance
The principle of relevance is a critical evidentiary factor that must be considered when testimony and documents are tendered for admission into an evidentiary record.For facts, information or opinions to be relevant they must be connected in a logical manner and tend to prove or disprove a matter that is at issue in the proceeding.[13]There are two components to relevant evidence: materiality and probative value.“Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues of the case.If the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial.. . .The second aspect of relevance is probative value, the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.”
[14]Evidence, that tends to prove or disprove a fact that is at issue or of consequence, is relevant.[15]
Weight to be Given Evidence
The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled.The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide.[16]
The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances.The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part.[17]
Methods of Valuation
Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission.It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.[18]Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.[19] The Supreme Court of Missouri has also held that evidence of the actual sales price of property is admissible to establish value at the time of an assessment, provided that such evidence involves a voluntary purchase not too remote in time.The actual sale price is a method that may be considered for estimating true value.[20]
Opinion Testimony by Experts
If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.[21]
Complainants’ Burden of Proof
In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2013.[22]There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof.The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief.Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”[23]A valuation which does not reflect the fair market value (true value in money) of the property under appeal is an unlawful, unfair and improper assessment.
Owner’s Opinion of Value
The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value.[24]The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation.[25]“Where the basis for a test as to the reliability of the testimony is not supported by a statement of facts on which it is based, or the basis of fact does not appear to be sufficient, the testimony should be rejected.”
A taxpayer does not meet his burden if evidence on any essential element of his case leaves the Commission “in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise.”[27]
Evidence of Value
Both parties presented evidence and exhibits.Complainant wished to compare his property with 7492 Pierside and wished to present evidence that the Assessor’s land values were incorrect.The property at 7492 Pierside was a comparable used by the Assessor’s appraiser.The appraiser, unlike the Complainant, used market data to make adjustments to the comparable sales price to determine a valuation of the subject property.The Complainant also presented photographs and the Assessor’s valuation as to land values in the County.The evidence did not provide information for the Hearing Officer to find the true value of the subject property.
Respondent presented Exhibit 1 – an appraisal report for the subject property.The Appraiser, after development of the cost and sales approach, concluded a value of $175,000.The appraiser relied most heavily on the sales comparison approach.The appraiser selected four properties within .94 miles of the subject.The properties sold between May 2011 to June 2013.Adjustments were made for date of sale, site view, fireplaces, garages, square footage and basement.The range of values after adjustments was $163,070 to $186,675. The appraiser concluded a value of $175,000.The evidence was substantial and persuasive for a finding of value.
ORDER
The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Charles County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.
The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2013 and 2014 is set at $33,250.
Application for Review
A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Decision.The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri,P.O. Box 146,Jefferson City,MO65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.
Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the application for review is based will result in summary denial. [28]
Disputed Taxes
The Collector of St. Charles County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.
Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.
SO ORDERED April 9, 2014.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OFMISSOURI
Maureen Monaghan
Hearing Officer
[1] The value as of 1/1/11 remains the value as of 1/1/12 unless there is new construction and improvement to the property.Section 137.115.1 RSMo
[5] Section 137.115.5, RSMo – residential property at 19% of true value in money; commercial property at 32% of true value in money and agricultural property at 12% of true value in money
[6] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958)
[7] Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959)
[8] See, Cupples-Hesse, supra.
Substantial and persuasive evidence is not an extremely high standard of evidentiary proof.It is the lowest of the three standards for evidence (substantial & persuasive, clear and convincing, and beyond a reasonable doubt).It requires a small amount of evidence to cross the threshold to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board.The definitions, relevant to substantial evidence, do not support a position that substantial and persuasive evidence is an extremely or very high standard.
“Substantial evidence: Evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; evidence beyond a scintilla.”Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, p. 580
The word scintilla is defined as “1. a spark,2. a particle; the least trace.” Webster’s New World Dictionary, Second College Edition.Black’s definition at 1347 is “A spark or trace <the standard is that there must be more than a scintilla of evidence>.”There must be more than a spark or trace for evidence to have attained the standard of substantial.Once there is something more than a spark or trace the evidence has reached the level of substantial.Substantial evidence and the term preponderance of the evidence are essentially the same.“Preponderance of the evidence.The greater weight of the evidence; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”Black’s at 1201Substantial evidence is that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion.Preponderance is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, i.e. support the proposed conclusion.
[9] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993)
[10] Daly v. P. D. George Company, et al, 77 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App E.D. 2002), citing, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. STC, 852 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo. App. 1993); citing, Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S.W.2d 798, 801-803 (Mo. 1973)
[12] Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.
[16] St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968)
[17] St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981)
[18] See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra;Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).
[19] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).
[21] Section 490.065, RSMo; State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. SC. 2004); Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).
[23] See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991)
[24] Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970)
[25] Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).