State Tax Commission of Missouri
RICHARD COX,)
)
Complainant,)
)
v. )Appeal Nos.11-10511 & 11-10512
)
JAKE ZIMMERMAN, ASSESSOR,)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,)
)
Respondent.)
ORDER
AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION
UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
On July 17, 2012, Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor entered his Decision and Order (Decision) affirming the assessments by the St. Louis County Board of Equalization and denying Complainant’s claim of overvaluation.
Complainant filed his Application for Review of the Decision.[1]
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard Upon Review
The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled.The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide.[2]
The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of the owner and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances.The Hearing Officer is not bound by the owner’s opinions of value.[3]
The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact.[4]
DECISION
Complainant failed to state specific findings of facts or application of law in the Decision of the Hearing Officer that were alleged to have been in error.Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the application for review is based results in summary denial.[5]
A review of the record in the present appeals provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer.There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer.A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in these appeals.[6]
ORDER
The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified.Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed, exemption is denied.The Decision and Order of the Hearing Officer, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law therein, is incorporated by reference, as if set out in full, in this final decision of the Commission.
Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Order.
If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts unless disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031.8, RSMo.
If no judicial review is made within thirty days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.
SO ORDERED September 20, 2012.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
Bruce E. Davis, Chairman
Randy B. Holman, Commissioner
RICHARD COX,)
)
Complainant,)
)
v.) Appeal Nos.11-10511 & 11-10512
)
JAKE ZIMMERMAN, ASSESSOR,)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY,MISSOURI,)
)
Respondent.)
DECISION AND ORDER
HOLDING
Decisions of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessments made by the Assessor are AFFIRMED.
True value in money for the subject property in Appeal 11-10511 for tax years 2011 and 2012 is set at $126,000, residential assessed value of $23,940.
True value in money for the subject property in Appeal 11-10512 for tax years 2011 and 2012 is set at $96,000, residential assessed value of $18,240.
Complainant appeared pro se.
Respondent appeared by Associate County Counselor, Paula J. Lemerman.
Case decided by Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor.
ISSUE
Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation and violation of Section 137.073.2, RSMo, the decisions of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuations of the subject properties.The Commission takes these appeals to determine the true value in money for the subject properties on January 1, 2011.The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the information presented by Complainant, enters the following Decision and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.Jurisdiction.Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper.Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.
2.Submission on Complainant’s Documents.On March 22, 2012, a Prehearing Conference was held in these appeals at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri.Complainant and Counsel for Respondent were present for said Prehearing Conference.At the Prehearing Conference, the Hearing Officer determined that Complainant was appealing his assessments on the same grounds on which he had appealed in past assessment cycles.[7]The prior appeals had each resulted in Complainant failing to present substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessments.On April 2, 2012, the Hearing Officer issued his Order for Submission of Documents by Complainant to Establish True Value in money, Claim Under Section 137.073, RSMo, and Other Grounds for Appeal.Said Order is incorporated by reference in this Decision as if set out in full herein.
3.Subject Property – Appeal 11-10511.The subject property is located at 11037 Easy Street, St. Ann, Missouri.The property is identified by parcel number 13M210461.The property consists of approximate 21,840 square foot lot improved by a one-story brick ranch style, single-family structure of average quality construction.The house appears to be in average condition.The residence has a total of six rooms, which includes three bedrooms, and 2 full baths.There is a full unfinished basement and an attached two-car garage.[8]
4.Subject Property – Appeal 11-10512.The subject property is located at 3847 Fee Fee Road, Bridgeton, Missouri.The property is identified by locator number 12M420670.The property consists of 7,500 square foot lot improved by a one-story brick old style bungalow, single-family structure of average quality construction.The original part of the house was built in 1940.An addition of 1,254 square feet was added after World War II for a total gross living area of 2,066 square feet.The house appears to be in average condition.The residence has a total of six or nine rooms, which includes three bedrooms and either 2 full or two full and one half baths.There is a reported partial basement or cellar.[9]
5.Assessment – Subject Property – Appeal 11-10511.The Assessor appraised the property at $126,000, a residential assessed value of $23,940.The Board sustained the assessment.[10]This is a reduction in value from $148,100 for the 2009 – 2010 assessment.[11]
6.Assessment – Subject Property – Appeal 11-10512.The Assessor appraised the property at $96,000, a residential assessed value of $18,240.The Board sustained the assessment.[12]This is a reduction in value from $102,500 for the 2009 – 2010 assessment.[13]
7.Complainant’s Evidence.Complainant presented the following exhibits in these appeals.
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EXHIBIT |
DESCRIPTION |
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A |
Copy of Pages 1 and 6 of SS for SCS for SCS HB Nos. 1150,1237 & 1327 – 91st General Assembly – 2002 (§137.073.1, RSMo) |
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B |
2011 Tax Bills on the properties under appeal (2 separate documents) |
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C |
Letter dated 12/11/06 to Complainant from Speaker of Missouri House of Representatives |
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D |
Letter dated 8/27/07 to Complainant from Michael R. Gibbons, Mo. State Senator |
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E |
Copy of p. 214 Vernon’s Annotated Missouri Statutes Notes of Decision for §137.073.1, RSMo |
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F |
Typed Statement on Burden of Proof – Dictionary definitions of certain terms. |
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G |
Application of RSMo 137.073 Chart |
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H |
BOE Decision p. 3 dated 6/21/05 |
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No exhibit |
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J |
Letter dated 1/19/07 to Complainant from Jessica Stoney and Stephen M. Tyals |
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K |
Cover page and page 7 of Property Tax Appeals Before The State Tax Commission of Missouri, published by the Commission, Revised July, 2007 |
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L |
Complainant’s narrative statement |
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M |
Complainant’s narrative statement |
Mr. Cox put forth an opinion of value for the property in Appeal 11-10511 of $76,615.95 in Exhibit L.[15]Mr. Cox put forth an opinion of value for the property in Appeal 11-10512 of $38,457.17 in Exhibit M.[16]
There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2011, to January 1, 2012, for either property.Therefore the assessed values for 2011 remain the assessed values for 2012 for the respective properties.[17]
Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2011, for either property.See, Complainant’s Burden of Proof – Complainant Exhibits, infra.
5.Respondent’s Evidence.By the Order, dated, 4/2/12, if it was determined that Complainant had established prima facie his opinion of market value for either property, Respondent would be given the opportunity to submit his appraisal or other documents on the issue of true value in money and the other issues raised by Complainant.Accordingly, Respondent was not required to file and exchange any exhibits.Respondent’s right to submit evidence in this appeal has not been waived or barred.In the event that the Commission or a court should determined that the Hearing Officer has erred in his decision and order, then upon remand Respondent would be permitted to submit evidence on the issue of the true value in money for each of the properties.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION
Jurisdiction
The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.[18]
Basis of Assessment
The Constitution mandates that real property and tangible personal property be assessed at its value or such percentage of its value as may be fixed by law for each class and for each subclass.[19]The constitutional mandate is to find the true value in money for the property under appeal. By statute real and tangible personal property is assessed at set percentages of true value in money.[20]In an overvaluation appeal, true value in money for the property being appealed must be determined based upon the evidence on the record that is probative on the issue of the fair market value of the property under appeal.As will be addressed below, Complainant failed to present substantial and persuasive evidence on the issue of fair market value in this appeal.
Presumption In Appeals
There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization.[21]This presumption is a rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption.It places the burden of going forward with some substantial evidence on the taxpayer – Complainant.[22]The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property.[23]Complainant failed to present any relevant evidence on the issue of the fair market value of the property under appeal.Accordingly, the Board presumption was not rebutted.
Official and Judicial Notice
Agencies shall take official notice of all matters of which the courts take judicial notice.[24]
Courts will take judicial notice of their own records in the same cases.[25]In addition, courts may take judicial notice of records in earlier cases when justice requires[26] or when it is necessary for a full understanding of the instant appeal.[27] Courts may take judicial notice of their own records in prior proceedings involving the same parties and basically the same facts.[28]
The Hearing Officer takes official notice that the property in Appeal 11-10511 was the subject of appeals in 2006,[29] and 2007,[30] and 2009.[31]The Hearing Officer takes official notice that the property in Appeal 11-10512 was the subject of appeals in 2006,[32] 2007,[33] and 2009.[34] In each of the previous appeals, the theory and methodology advanced by the Complainant was the same as is now put forth in these two appeals.The Commission in each the 2006 and 2007 appeals affirmed the Hearing Officer’s Decisions and rejected the methodology submitted by Complainant.In the 2009 appeals, Complainant did not file an application for review of the Hearing Officer’s Decision.
Standard for Valuation
Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.[35]True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use.[36]It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.[37]Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive
and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.
Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
1.Buyer and seller are typically motivated.
2.Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.
3.A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.
4.Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.
5.Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.
6.The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.[38]
The Standard for Valuation mandates that a taxpayer present evidence that is relevant to the standard.In other words, in the present appeals, the Complainant should have provided evidence to establish what properties similar to the properties under appeal were selling for at a time relevant to January 1, 2011, adjusted for differences between the sale properties and the property being valued.This Mr. Cox completely failed to do.None of the documents presented by the taxpayer provide any information that is material to the Standard for Valuation.
Methods of Valuation
Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission.It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.[39]Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.[40]Mr. Cox presented no evidence that established a value for either property based upon a recognized appraisal methodology for ad valorem tax valuations.
The method to arrive at an opinion of value used by Mr. Cox was not an approach to value accepted in appeals before the Commission.Taxpayers who present their own theories and self-contrived methods, outside of those recognized by the Commission and the courts, to support their opinion of fair market value present nothing that is relevant on the issue the Hearing Officer must decide.It does not matter if the calculations for the proposed methodology are correct.The underlying premise supporting the method is fatally flawed.Mr. Cox did not present a method for valuing his property.He made a series of calculations regarding the consumer price index as applied to the amount of taxes assessed against his two properties since 2002.In effect, the taxpayer is challenging the amount of taxes levied against his property.He did not directly and properly challenge the value set by the Board of Equalization for either of the properties.
Complainant’s Burden of Proof
In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2011.[41]There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof.The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief.Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”[42]
Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[43]Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.[44]As is addressed below, Complainant failed to meet his burden of proof in either appeal.
Owner’s Opinion of Value
The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value.[45]The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation.[46]In these appeals the owner’s opinion of value is derived from his calculation of what he honestly, but erroneously believes, is a limit imposed by Section 137.073.2, RSMo on the amount of taxes that can be levied against his properties.The error in Mr. Cox’s belief will be addressed in detail below.
The bottom line is that the opinions of value presented for each of the properties by Mr. Cox are not based upon proper elements or a proper foundation.Therefore the owner’s opinions of value have no probative weight whatsoever.More specifically, none of the documents submitted by Mr. Cox provide any evidence that the opinions of value presented are in fact indicative of the market value of the subject properties on January 1, 2011.There is nothing in Complainant’s exhibits that provide data from the market to address what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as the purchase price for either of the properties under appeal on the valuation date.
Complainant’s Exhibits
The various exhibits submitted by Mr. Cox to establish his prima facie case that the property in Appeal 09-10511 should be valued at $76,615.95 and the property in Appeal 09-10512 should be valued at $38,457.17 lack any relevance to the sole issue in these appeals, i.e. what a willing buyer and seller would agree to as the purchase price of the subject properties on January 1, 2011.Irrelevant documents cannot meet the standard of being substantial and persuasive evidence.Each of the Exhibits will be discussed in detail below as to their lack of relevance and failure to present a substantial and persuasive basis to establish true value in money.
Exhibit A – Partial Copy HB Nos. 1150, 1237 & 1327
Exhibit A is a copy of a portion of section 137.073 enacted by the Missouri General Assembly in 2002 by House Bills 1150, 1237 and 1327.The portion of the statute that Mr. Cox draws attention to[47] and relies upon as the basis of his alleged overpayment of taxes theory appears in subsection 2 of 137.073[48] and reads as follows:
As provided in section 22 of article X of the constitution, a political subdivision may also revise each levy to allow for inflationary assessment growth occurring within the politicalsubdivision. The inflationary growth factor for any such subclass of real property or personal property shall be limited to the actual assessment growth in such subclass orclass, exclusive of new construction and improvements, and exclusive of the assessed value on any real property which was assessed by the assessor of a county or city in the current year in a different subclass of real property, but not to exceed the consumer price index or five percent, whichever is lower.
Mr. Cox concludes from the foregoing provision that the taxes on his two properties could not be increased from 2002 by more than the CPI for a given year or five percent, whichever is lower.The conclusion of the taxpayer is in error.
The language on which Mr. Cox rests his argument does not have reference to the increase in the true value in money of real property or its assessed valuation.It is noted the only reference to assessed valuation and the assessor’s responsibility is found in the first sentence of the subsection.The assessor has the duty to notify each political subdivision wholly or partially within the assessment jurisdiction of the change in value in the aggregate, exclusive of new construction and improvements.The remainder of this subsection has nothing to do with valuation of real property.The subsection has to do with revision of rates of levy.
The effect of this subsection is to allow taxing entities in the various counties to revise tax levies in accordance with the provisions set forth in section 22 of Article X of the Missouri Constitution.This section of the constitution reads as follows:
Section 22. (a) Counties and other political subdivisions are hereby prohibited from levying any tax, license or fees, not authorized by law, charter or self-enforcing provisions of the constitution when this section is adopted or from increasing the current levy of an existing tax, license or fees, above that current levy authorized by law or charter when this section is adopted without the approval of the required majority of the qualified voters of that county or other political subdivision voting thereon. If the definition of the base of an existing tax, license or fees, is broadened, the maximum authorized current levy of taxation on the new base in each county or other political subdivision shall be reduced to yield the same estimated gross revenue as on the prior base. If the assessed valuation of property as finally equalized, excluding the value of new construction and improvements, increases by a larger percentage than the increase in the general price level from the previous year, the maximum authorized current levy applied thereto in each county or other political subdivision shall be reduced to yield the same gross revenue from existing property, adjusted for changes in the general price level, as could have been collected at the existing authorized levy on the prior assessed value.
There is nothing in this constitutional provision which addresses the valuation of real property.Section 22 does not limit the rate of increase in the valuation of real estate.The provision relates to tax levies, not assessment of property.The language in Section 137.073 cited to by Mr. Cox limiting the inflationary growth factor to the consumer price index or five percent, whichever is lower applies to tax levies.It is not applicable to the setting of the true value in money on real property.It is not applicable to the calculation of the assessed value on real property.
Complainant’s argument on this point is based upon a complete misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misapplication of section 137.073.The section is irrelevant to the valuation and assessment of real property.
Exhibit B – 2011 Tax Bills
The two exhibit B’s provide nothing to establish that the true value in money for the two properties under appeal are as asserted by Mr. Cox either on his Complaints for Review of Assessment or in his Exhibits L and M.To the extent that the Exhibits provide the respective tax levy or rate per $100 of assessed valuation for the later calculation by Mr. Cox in Exhibit L and M they establish that Mr. Cox used the appropriate tax rate in his calculations.However, the cited rates have nothing of relevance to establish what a willing buyer and seller would have paid for either property on January 1, 2011.
Exhibit C – Letter from Speaker Jetton
Speaker Jetton’s letter of December 11, 2006, to Mr. Cox is irrelevant on the issue of value of the subject properties.The letter addresses only that House Bills No. 1150, 1237 and 1327 were, “intended to protect property owners from cities or counties being able to levy excessive increases in property taxes.”The letter says nothing about the valuation of real property.The exhibit provides no substantial and persuasive evidence on the issue of value.All the letter confirms is that House Bills 1150, 1237 & 1327 had been truly agreed to and finally passed.There is no issue that section 137.073.2 was enacted.However, the exhibit provides nothing of relevance on the issue of value or on the matter of whether Mr. Cox has correctly applied 137.073.2 in the present case.
Exhibit D – Letter from Senator Gibbons
The letter from Senator Gibbons to Mr. Cox addresses the rate of tax levy, not assessment of real estate.It has no probative benefit relative to determining the true value in money for the subject property for the 2011 – 2012 assessment cycle.It is not substantial and persuasive evidence of value.Furthermore, the letter is irrelevant to establishing the claim that Mr. Cox makes under section 137.073.2.
Exhibit E – 137.073 Notes of Decision
Exhibit E is a copy of a page from Vernon’s Annotated Missouri Revised Statutes which provides some Notes of Decision under section 137.073.Complainant provided no information in Exhibits L and M as to the purpose in offering this exhibit.There is nothing contained in it that is relevant to the issue before the Hearing Officer in this appeal.[49]
The Hearing Officer observes the citations[50] to the Asarco[51] Southwestern Bell[52] and Missouri Pacific[53] cases.Further research shows that no other cases presently have been decided under section 137.073 addressing the purpose of the law.A review of these three cases demonstrates that none of them individually or the three of them together establish that the true value in money or the assessed value of real property can be calculated and determined as has been proposed by Mr. Cox.Section 137.073 nowhere provides any formula or basis for the calculation of true value in money for real property for ad valorem assessment purposes.Nothing in the cases cited establish that the methodology that Mr. Cox puts forth in his appeal under 137.073.2 is proper for either finding value or establishing a basis for a refund or credit for past real estate taxes paid.
Exhibit F – Burden of Proof
Mr. Cox has provided dictionary definitions of the words, “clear,” “convincing,” “cogent,” “evidence,” and “sustain.”These are provided with regard to the Complainant’s reference to a statement on page 2 of the St. Louis County – Change of Assessment Notice.The statement is reported by Mr. Cox to have read: “the burden of proof, supported by clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain such valuation shall be on the Assessor at any hearing or appeal.
The Respondent has imposed upon him by the provisions of Section 137.115.1, RSMo, the burden of proof to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain a valuation on residential property which is made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program.The statutory guidelines for evidence to meet the standard of clear, convincing and cogent include the following:
(1)The findings of the assessor based on an appraisal of the property by generally accepted appraisal techniques; and
(2) The purchase prices from sales of at least three comparable properties and the address or location thereof.As used in this paragraph, the word comparable means that:
(a)Such sale was closed at a date relevant to the property valuation; and
(b) Such properties are not more than one mile from the site of the disputed property, except where no similar properties exist within one mile of the disputed property, the nearest comparable property shall be used.Such property shall be within five hundred square feet in size of the disputed property, and resemble the disputed property in age, floor plan, number of rooms, and other relevant characteristics.[54]
Clear, cogent and convincing evidence is that evidence which clearly convinces the trier of fact of the affirmative proposition to be proved.It does not mean that there may not be contrary evidence.[55]The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing must be more than a mere preponderance but does not require beyond a reasonable doubt.[56]“For evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder’s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.”[57]
A taxpayer is not relieved of his burden of proof under this statutory provision.As has been set out above (See, Complainant’s Burden of Proof, supra), Mr. Cox is the moving party in these appeals.He is seeking relief and therefore he has the initial burden of proof to establish his prima facie case.The Assessor may or may not seek to sustain the valuation presumed to have been done by a computer assisted methodology.In the event that the Assessor would, then the clear, convincing and cogent standard would be applicable.However, if the Assessor was not seeking to sustain that value, then he would not be under that evidentiary burden.In any event, for Complainant to advance his case, he must meet his burden of proof to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board.Failing to do so, the Board presumption stands and the assessor is under no burden to present evidence to sustain his original valuation.
Exhibit F is not probative on any matter presently before the Hearing Officer.It is not relevant to either the issue of true value in money, or Complainant’s claim under 137.073.2.
Exhibit G – Tax Calculation Chart
Mr. Cox presents as his Exhibit G a chart on which he has calculated, based upon the annual consumer price index (CPI), what he believes to be, based upon his erroneous interpretation of 137.073, the annual tax limit and the alleged overpayment on the property in appeal No. 11-10511 (Locator No.13M210461 – Easy Street Property).No similar chart was included in the documents filed with the Commission for the property in Appeal 11-10512.
The Exhibit also has a series of calculations that concludes an amount of total credit due taxpayer for the property.Here again, nothing in this Exhibit addresses the critical question[58] of what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as the purchase price for either of the properties under appeal on January 1, 2011.
In other words, Exhibit G has no relevancy to the issue of overvaluation.Nothing in Mr. Cox’s chart and calculations provide any basis upon which a reasonable mind could conclude the fair market value of either property, let alone determine if the property had been overvalued by the Board of Equalization.
Exhibit H – BOE Signature Page – 2005
The next Exhibit presented by Mr. Cox is a copy of the BOE signature page, dated 6/21/05 in which the Board concluded the value for the property in Appeal 11-10511 as of January 1, 2005, to be $126,200.[59]Complainant provided nothing in Exhibit L to explain how this document would prove the value of the Easy Street property as of January 1, 2011, to be $76,615.95 or $81,773.20, as proposed.Exhibit H has no relevance to the issue of the true value in money of the property under appeal in Appeal 11-10511 as of January 1, 2011.
Exhibit J – Washington University Letter
This exhibit simply advises that the language contained in HB 1150 et al was passed in May 2002 and the statute as amended in 2002 contained the same language as was in Mr. Cox’s copy of the bill.Nothing in the exhibit provides any data to establish the true value in money of either property under appeal.Nothing in the letter establishes that the formula used by Mr. Cox in calculating what he erroneously believes is the limit on taxes for his two properties is authorized by the statute.The exhibit has no relevance to a determination of true value in money or to establish a claim for relief under 137.073.2.
Exhibit K – STC Pamphlet
Mr. Cox next submitted a copy of one of the pages from the Commission’s pamphlet provided to taxpayers to inform them concerning presenting an appeal before the Commission.The taxpayer draws attention to one particular Question and Answer on this page of the pamphlet.The Question and Answer is:“Would copies of the Assessor’s Records on other homes in my neighborhood be good to prove value?No.The value placed on other homes by the assessor does not prove the value of your home.”
Complainant did not provide any information in Exhibits L or M as to how this material is relevant to his claim of overvaluation or his claim under 137.073.2.The information provided in the pamphlet is to simply advise complainants before the Commission that citing appraised or assessed values from the assessor’s records on neighboring properties do not establish the value of another property.Sales data on comparable properties has relevance, but appraised values by the assessor are not relevant.Exhibit K is irrelevant to making a prima facie case in these appeals that either property is overvalued or that section 137.073.2 has any applicability to the assessment of the properties under appeal.
Exhibits L & M – Narrative Statement
The narrative statements[60] provided by Mr. Cox sets forth his assertion that section 137.073 RSMo provides the mechanism for fixing value on his properties and he states his conclusion of value for the property in Appeal 11-10511 to be $76,615.95 and the value for the property in Appeal 11-10512 to be $38,457.17.Mr. Cox’s testimony provides no market derived data to establish either of the asserted values.The information provided in Exhibits L and M has no relevancy to the true value in money of either of the subject properties.
Section 137.073 RSMo Argument
The other argument that Mr. Cox makes (and has made in his prior appeals) concerns section 137.073.Specifically, Mr. Cox is under the mistaken belief and impression that the taxes on his properties cannot be increased at a rate greater than the inflationary growth factor provided in the statute, in subsection 2.The actual language of the statute reads:
“The inflationary growth factor for any such subclass of real property or personal property shall be limited to the actual assessment growth in such subclass or class, exclusive of new construction and improvements, and exclusive of the assessed value on any real property which was assessed by the assessor of a county or city in the current year in a different subclass of real property, but not to exceed the consumer price index or five percent, whichever is lower.”
The defect in the taxpayer’s reasoning is that the statute does not apply to the increase in taxes on a specific individual property.The section of law on which Mr. Cox bases his argument has to do with a revision of applicable rates of levy for each subclass of real property or personal property.Nowhere in the statute is there authorization for the Commission to reduce the value of a property below its true value in money to reduce taxes to reflect the inflationary growth factor.
The claim Mr. Cox is making in his two appeals is not that his properties are overvalued, since he has presented no evidence even remotely addressing what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as the purchase price on January 1, 2011.The real assertion of Mr. Cox is that he apparently believes that one or more taxing jurisdictions are in violation of the provisions of 137.073.The obligation of the Assessor, the Board of Equalization and the Commission is to find the true value in money for each of Complainant’s properties.Complainant having failed to make a prima facie case by presenting substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board cannot have the values of either of his properties reduced, irrespective of his mistaken belief as to the impact and effect of section 137.073.
The Commission does not have the responsibility or the authority to enforce the section 137.073 and roll back levies in taxing jurisdictions. Subsection 8 of section 137.073 spells out the necessary course of action for a taxpayer who believes that a taxing jurisdiction has failed to comply with 137.073.[61]The proper course of action for Mr. Cox since he is convinced that taxing jurisdictions are not complying with 137.073 is to follow the statutorily mandated procedure under subsection 8.
Summary
Complainant failed to present any evidence based upon actual sales data or any recognized appraisal methodology to prove the true value in money of either of the properties which he owns.None of the exhibits or testimony had any relevance to the issue of overvaluation.Without relevant evidence that meets the standard of substantial and persuasive, the taxpayer cannot make a prima facie case that either of his properties was overvalued in the 2011-12 assessment.
Complainant’s claim under section 137.073.2 is not applicable to a determination of what a willing buyer and seller would have paid for either of the properties under appeal on January 1, 2011.The Commission does not have any jurisdiction with regard to a claimed violation under section 137.073 RSMo.
ORDER
The assessed valuations for the subject properties as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day are AFFIRMED.
The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal 11-10511 for tax years 2011 and 2012 is set at $23,940.
The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal 11-10512 for tax years 2011 and 2012 is set at $18,240.
Application for Review
Complainant may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service.The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.
Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the application for review is based will result in summary denial. [62]
Disputed Taxes
The Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.
Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.
SO ORDERED July 17, 2012.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OFMISSOURI
W. B. Tichenor
Senior Hearing Officer
[2] St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
[3] St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).
[4] Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).
[6] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).
[8] Exhibits 1, 2 & 3– Cox v. Muehlheausler, Appeal No. 07-10194, and Finding of Fact 6, DECISION Appeal Nos. 09-10645 & 09-10646, dated 5/12/10.
[9] Exhibits 1, 2 & 3 – Cox v. Muehlheausler, Appeal No. 07-10193, and Finding of Fact 5, DECISION Appeal Nos. 09-10645 & 09-10646, dated 5/12/10.
[14] Complainant on his list of exhibits in Exhibits L and M identified Exhibit I as – Appraisals Reference Other Homes.No document marked Exhibit I was received by the Commission.
[21] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958)
[22] United Missouri Bank of Kansas City v. March, 650 S.W.2d 678, 680-81 (Mo. App. 1983), citing to State ex rel. Christian v. Lawry, 405 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Mo. App. 1966) and cases therein cited.
[23] Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959)
[25] State ex rel. Horton v. Bourke, 129 S.W.2d 866, 869 (1939); Barth v. Kansas City Elevated Railway Company, 44 S.W. 788, 781 (1898).
[26]. Burton v. Moulder, 245 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo. 1952); Knorp v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943); Bushman v. Barlow, 15 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Mo. banc 1929)
[27] State ex rel St. Louis Public Service Company v. Public Service Commission, 291 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Mo. banc 1956).
[28] In re Murphy, 732 S.W.2d 895, 902 (Mo. banc 1987); State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Mo. banc 1984); State v. Keeble, 399 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Mo. 1966).
[29] Cox v. Muehlheausler, STC appeal No. 06-10011, Order Affirming Hearing Officer Decision, 2/26/07; Hearing Officer Decision and Order, 1/10/07.
[30] Cox v. Muehlheausler, STC appeal No. 07-10194, Order Affirming Hearing Officer Decision, 8/12/08; Hearing Officer Decision and Order, 6/24/08.
[32] Cox v. Muehlheausler, STC appeal No. 06-10012, Order Affirming Hearing Officer Decision, 2/26/07; Hearing Officer Decision and Order, 1/10/07.
[33] Cox v. Muehlheausler, STC appeal No. 07-10193, Order Affirming Hearing Officer Decision, 8/12/08; Hearing Officer Decision and Order, 6/24/08.
[35] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).
[36] Daly v. P. D. George Company, et al, 77 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App E.D. 2002), citing, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. STC, 852 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo. App. 1993); citing, Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S.W.2d 798, 801-803 (Mo. 1973).
[38] Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.
[39] See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra;Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).
[40] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).
[42] See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).
[45] Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970).
[46] Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).
[48] 2. Whenever changes in assessed valuation are entered in the assessor’s books for any personal property, in the aggregate, or for any subclass of real property as such subclasses are established in section 4(b) of article X of the Missouri Constitution and defined in section 137.016, the county clerk in all counties and the assessor of St. Louis City shall notify each political subdivision wholly or partially within the county or St. Louis City of the change in valuation of each subclass of real property, individually, and personal property, in the aggregate, exclusive of new construction and improvements. All political subdivisions shall immediately revise the applicable rates of levy for each purpose for each subclass of real property, individually, and personal property, in the aggregate, for which taxes are levied to the extent necessary to produce from all taxable property, exclusive of new construction and improvements, substantially the same amount of tax revenue as was produced in the previous year for each subclass of real property, individually, and personal property, in the aggregate, except that the rate may not exceed the most recent voter-approved rate. Such tax revenue shall not include any receipts from ad valorem levies on any real property which was assessed by the assessor of a county or city in such previous year but is assessed by the assessor of a county or city in the current year in a different subclass of real property. Where the taxing authority is a school district for the purposes of revising the applicable rates of levy for each subclass of real property, the tax revenues from state-assessed railroad and utility property shall be apportioned and attributed to each subclass of real property based on the percentage of the total assessed valuation of the county that each subclass of real property represents in the current taxable year. As provided in section 22 of article X of the constitution, a political subdivision may also revise each levy to allow for inflationary assessment growth occurring within the political subdivision. The inflationary growth factor for any such subclass of real property or personal property shall be limited to the actual assessment growth in such subclass or class, exclusive of new construction and improvements, and exclusive of the assessed value on any real property which was assessed by the assessor of a county or city in the current year in a different subclass of real property, but not to exceed the consumer price index or five percent, whichever is lower. Should the tax revenue of a political subdivision from the various tax rates determined in this subsection be different than the tax revenue that would have been determined from a single tax rate as calculated pursuant to the method of calculation in this subsection prior to January 1, 2003, then the political subdivision shall revise the tax rates of those subclasses of real property, individually, and/or personal property, in the aggregate, in which there is a tax rate reduction, pursuant to the provisions of this subsection. Such revision shall yield an amount equal to such difference and shall be apportioned among such subclasses of real property, individually, and/or personal property, in the aggregate, based on the relative assessed valuation of the class or subclasses of property experiencing a tax rate reduction. Such revision in the tax rates of each class or subclass shall be made by computing the percentage of current year adjusted assessed valuation of each class or subclass with a tax rate reduction to the total current year adjusted assessed valuation of the class or subclasses with a tax rate reduction, multiplying the resulting percentages by the revenue difference between the single rate calculation and the calculations pursuant to this subsection and dividing by the respective adjusted current year assessed valuation of each class or subclass to determine the adjustment to the rate to be levied upon each class or subclass of property. The adjustment computed herein shall be multiplied by one hundred, rounded to four decimals in the manner provided in this subsection, and added to the initial rate computed for each class or subclass of property. Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection to the contrary, no revision to the rate of levy for personal property shall cause such levy to increase over the levy for personal property from the prior year.
[59] Decision in Cox v. Muehlheausler – 06-10011 establishes this to be the value of the property on Easy Street for the 2005-06 assessment.
[61] 8. Whenever a taxpayer has cause to believe that a taxing authority has not complied with the provisions of this section, the taxpayer may make a formal complaint with the prosecuting attorney of the county. Where the prosecuting attorney fails to bring an action within ten days of the filing of the complaint, the taxpayer may bring a civil action pursuant to this section and institute an action as representative of a class of all taxpayers within a taxing authority if the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, if there are questions of law or fact common to the class, if the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and if the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. In any class action maintained pursuant to this section, the court may direct to the members of the class a notice to be published at least once each week for four consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation published in the county where the civil action is commenced and in other counties within the jurisdiction of a taxing authority. The notice shall advise each member that the court will exclude him or her from the class if he or she so requests by a specified date, that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion, and that any member who does not request exclusion may, if he or she desires, enter an appearance. In any class action brought pursuant to this section, the court, in addition to the relief requested, shall assess against the taxing authority found to be in violation of this section the reasonable costs of bringing the action, including reasonable attorney’s fees, provided no attorney’s fees shall be awarded any attorney or association of attorneys who receive public funds from any source for their services. Any action brought pursuant to this section shall be set for hearing as soon as practicable after the cause is at issue.