State Tax Commission of Missouri
ROBERT & DONNA BATEMAN,)
v.)Appeal Nos.09-32010 & 09-32011
CATHY RINEHART, ASSESSOR,)
CLAY COUNTY, MISSOURI,)
AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION
UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
On December 22, 2009, Senior Hearing Officer Luann Johnson entered her Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessments by the Clay County Board of Equalization.
Complainants timely filed their Application for Review of the Decision.Respondent timely filed her Response.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard Upon Review
The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide.The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of witnesses and give it as much weight and credit as she may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances.The Hearing Officer is not bound by the testimony of witnesses but may believe all or none of their testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part.The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact.
A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer.There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer.A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal.
The Decision sets out all relevant factors regarding the subject tracts of vacant and unused land.The Hearing Officer reviewed each of the elements for the classification of vacant and unused land under Section 137.016.5, RSMo.The arguments presented by Complainants against a commercial classification are unpersuasive.The fact of the marketing of the property by Complainants for commercial development is their admission that the highest and best use of the two properties would not be for residential development, but would be for a commercial use.
In like manner, the most suitable immediate economic use under the statutory elements as a commercial property is supported by Complainants’ commercial marketing of the property.The zoning of the properties under appeal is neither conclusive, nor persuasive on the point of its most suitable economic use.The fact that a proposed change in zoning in the past for a specific commercial use was rejected provides no basis to conclude that the property would not be used for some other commercial use.It is obvious by the property being marketed for commercial development that any prospective purchaser would understand that a rezoning would be required.Furthermore, it is equally obvious that Complainants fully understood that also by the fact the property was marketed for commercial development.
Zoning is but one factor to be considered in the analysis required when dealing with vacant and unused land.When all other factors are considered, as was done by the Hearing Officer, and it is determined that the existing zoning does not reflect the immediate most suitable economic use, then it is not controlling.Such is the case in the present appeal.The highest economic return to the owner upon selling the property is for future commercial development as demonstrated and verified by Complainants’ marketing of same.
The Hearing Officer did not err in her determinations as challenged by Complainant.
The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified.Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.The Decision and Order of the hearing officer, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law therein, is incorporated by reference, as if set out in full, in this final decision of the Commission.
Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Order.
If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts unless disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031.8, RSMo.
If no judicial review is made within thirty days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Clay County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.
SO ORDERED April 13, 2010.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
Bruce E. Davis, Chairman
Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner
DECISION AND ORDER
Decision of the Clay Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor is SET ASIDE.The Hearing Officer finds that the subject parcels were incorrectly classified as agricultural property and assessed at 12% of value.The proper classification of the subject parcels is commercial.The proper assessment ratio on commercial properties is 32%.
The Hearing Officer finds Complainants did not rebut the presumption of correct valuation by the Board.
True value in money for the subject property in Appeal Number 09-32010 is $160,300 as determined by the Assessor and approved by the Board of Equalization.The corrected assessed value for Appeal Number 09-32010, for tax years 2009 and 2010, is $51,300.
True value in money for the subject property in Appeal Number 09-32011 is $161,800 as determined by the Assessor and approved by the Board of Equalization.The corrected assessed value for Appeal Number 09-32011, for tax years 2009 and 2010, is $51,780.
Complainant, Robert Bateman, appeared pro se.
Respondent appeared by Counsel, Patricia Hughes.
Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer Luann Johnson.
The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money and classification for the subject properties on January 1, 2009, and January 1, 2010.
Complainants appeal, on the ground of overvaluation and classification, the decision of the Clay County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuation and classification of the subject property.
In Appeal Number 09-32010, the Assessor determined an appraised value of $160,300 (assessed value of $19,240, as agricultural property).Complainants proposed a value of $15,900 (assessed value of $3,020, as residential property).
In Appeal Number 09-32011, the Assessor determined an appraised value of $161,800 (assessed value of $19,420, as agricultural property).Complainants proposed a value of $5,200 (assessed value of $990, as residential property).
A hearing was conducted on November 17, 2009, at the Clay County Administration Building, Courthouse Square, Liberty, Missouri.
The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.
Complainants entered a statement, Complainants’ Exhibit A, arguing that the most suitable economic use of the subject parcels was for residential purposes.Complainants further argued that the parcels should be valued at some prior residential value.No market evidence was presented which tended to support any opinion of value.Likewise, Complainant, Robert Bateman, testified at hearing that he wasn’t stating an opinion of value.
Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Mr. Gary E. Maurer, appraiser for Clay County.The appraiser testified as to his appraisal of the subject properties.The Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, was received into evidence to support the value originally determined by the Assessor and approved by the Board of Equalization.Mr. Maurer arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property in Appeal Number 09-32010 of $183,600, based upon a sales comparison approach to value.Mr. Maurer arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property in Appeal Number 09-32011 of $161,800, based upon a sales comparison approach to value.In performing his sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of properties deemed comparable to the subject properties.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.Jurisdiction over these appeals is proper.Complainants timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Clay County Board of Equalization.
2.The subject properties are contiguous parcels located at the Southeast Corner of Northeast 68th Street and North Oak in Gladstone, Missouri.Together they contain 1.22 acres.
3.The property in Appeal Number 09-32010 is identified as parcel number 13-618-00-03-023-00.The parcel contains 28,247 square feet and is unimproved.Complainants listed this property for sale up until shortly before the hearing date, along with the property in Appeal Number 09-32011, for $450,000 for commercial development.Complainants purchased the property sometime around 2001 for $120,000.At the time of purchase, the property was improved with an older home in poor condition.The home was subsequently demolished.This parcel fronts on North Oak Trafficway, a major thoroughfare.
4.The property in Appeal Number 09-32011 is identified as parcel number 13-618-00-03-021-00.The parcel contains 24,896 square feet and is unimproved.Complainants listed this property for sale up until shortly before the hearing date, along with the property in Appeal Number 09-32010, for $450,000 for commercial development.Complainants purchased the property sometime around 2001 for $35,000.This parcel does not have direct access to North Oak Trafficway but, rather, lies behind the parcel in Appeal Number 09-32010.
5.The subject parcels are adjacent lots in Block 7, BOLLING HEIGHTS, a subdivision of land in the City of Gladstone, Clay County, Missouri.(Resp. Ex. 1, pg. 14)As discussed below, the most suitable economic use of the subject properties is as an assemblage for commercial development.The fact that these properties are currently listed as separate parcels in the tax books requires that value be apportioned but does not limit the assessor’s ability to consider the parcels jointly for the purpose of classification.For purposes of discussion, “subject property” shall denote both parcels unless a single parcel is identified.
By law “the assessor shall consolidate all lands owned by one person in a section, and all town lots owned by one person in a square or block, into one tract, lot or call, when practicable….”The assessor is encouraged to consolidate these parcels in the future.
6.Property which is not in use on the tax day, or which has no clear use on the tax day, is classified according to its most suitable economic use.Most suitable economic use looks at:
(1) Immediate prior use, if any, of such property;
The subject properties are vacant and unused.The most recent use of Lot 9 was for residential purposes but said use ended in 2001.There is no record of any use of Lot 10.According to Mr. Maurer, no agricultural or horticultural use had been made of the property since before 1953.According to Mr. Maurer and the taxpayers, the property has been marketed in 2008 and 2009 as an assemblage for commercial development.The property had also been considered for commercial development as an assemblage in 2000.(Resp. Ex. 1, pg. 17).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “immediate” as “Occurring without delay [or] not separated by other persons or things [or] having a direct impact.”In this case, prior use of the property was separated from the present by a long period of dormancy.Therefore, we cannot find that the immediate prior use of the property was for residential development.The law, itself, contemplates that a period of dormancy will nullify this requirement.The law requires that we look to “immediate prior use, if any.”If we were required to go back to the last prior use, the requirement would not contain this qualifier.The law does not require that we examine periods of use that occurred prior to significant periods of vacancy.
(2)Location of such property;
The subject property is located at Northeast 68th Street and North Oak Trafficway.The only residential property around the subject property lies to the southeast.All other surrounding properties are commercial. (Resp. Ex. 1, p. 17).The subject property lies directly on North Oak Trafficway, a major five lane thoroughfare in the City of Gladstone.
(3)Zoning classification of such property; except that, such zoning classification shall not be considered conclusive if, upon consideration of all factors, it is determined that such zoning classification does not reflect the immediate most suitable economic use of the property;
Current zoning is R1 (residential).Prior to 2001, prior owners had attempted to get the zoning changed to C3, which request for change was denied.Respondent suggests that a less intensive commercial zoning would have been acceptable.(Resp. Ex. 1, pg. 17-18).
(4)Other legal restrictions on the use of such property;
No evidence was presented of other legal restrictions on the use of the subject property.Northeast 68th Street to the north is a private, vacated right-of-way.A private development agreement would have to be negotiated for access for ingress and egress on the north side of the property.However, the property has access to North Oak Trafficway through the contiguous parcel. (Resp. Ex. 1, pg. 32).
(5)Availability of water, electricity, gas, sewers, street lighting, and other public services for such property;
The property is improved with a sidewalk, curb, and curb cut with a gravel pad.All utilities are available.(Resp. Ex. 1, pg. 16).Improvements are suitable for either commercial or residential development.
(6)Size of such property; Property size makes it useful for either residential or commercial development.
(7)Access of such property to public thoroughfares; and
The property has access to North Oak Trafficway, a major five lane thoroughfare in the City of Gladstone.
(8)Any other factors relevant to a determination of the immediate most suitable economic use of such property.
7.There is no evidence that the parcels are being used for agricultural purposes or that the most suitable economic use of the property would be for agricultural purposes.Given all the above, it seems evident that the property should not be assessed as agricultural property.Mr. Maurer’s assertions that commercial property can be assessed at an agricultural rate is simply erroneous.Section 137.017.4, RSMo allows vacant and unused agricultural property to be assessed at 12%.There is no similar provision in law for vacant and unused commercial property.
8.There is very little evidence that the immediate most suitable economic use of the properties would be for residential improvement, as Complainant urges.Although some time at least 9 years ago, one lot had been used for residential purposes, there was no evidence of current residential use or any plans for residential development.The only residential property around the subject properties lies to the southeast.All other surrounding properties are commercial.In fact, Complainant, Robert Bateman, testified that as recently as a month prior to hearing he was marketing the properties as an assemblage for commercial development.Complainant’s own actions suggest that his current assertion of a most suitable economic use as residential is without credibility.
9.The subject property is in an area of primarily commercial development; good access is available to major thoroughfares; utilities are available; the assemblage size allows for commercial development; lower intensity commercial zoning is probable.There are no other legal restrictions on the use of the property for commercial development.The most suitable economic use of the subject property is commercial.
10.There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2010.
11.Respondent’s appraiser presented eight sales of small acreages in support of the Board’s value.Those sales indicated adjusted square foot values of $7.54; $7.53; $7.54; $5.64; $5.23; $5.39; $9.53 and $3.64.All sales occurred prior to the tax day.Zonings were a mix of commercial and residential.Mr. Maurer estimated a value of $6.50 per square foot for the subject properties indicating a value for parcel 13-618-00-03-021.00 (Appeal Number 09-32011) of $161,800and a value for parcel number 13-618-00-03-023.00 (Appeal Number 09-32010) of $183,600.(Resp. Ex. 1, pgs. 37-42)Mr. Maurer introduced the evidence for the purpose of supporting the lower values proposed by the Board of Equalization.Mr. Maurer also presented sales occurring after the tax day which tend to indicate that values are going up rather than down.One one-acre tract at the 10200 block of North Oak Trafficway sold in March of 2009 for $570,000.(Resp. Ex. 1, pg. 38).
12.Complainant presented no evidence of market value and testified at hearing that he was not stating an opinion of value.He asked that the property be assessed at some past value calculation.No support for such value was entered into evidence.
13.Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct value and assessment by the Board.However, this Hearing Officer notes that the County has inappropriately assessed the subject property by assigning a 12% assessment ratio to a property which must be assessed at 32%.Therefore, the Board’s market value is adopted but the assessed value is corrected to conform to statute.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION
The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.
Official and Judicial Notice
Agencies shall take official notice of all matters of which the courts take judicial notice.
Courts will take judicial notice of their own records in the same cases.In addition, courts may take judicial notice of records in earlier cases when justice requires or when it is necessary for a full understanding of the instant appeal. Courts may take judicial notice of their own records in prior proceedings involving the same parties and basically the same facts.
Presumptions In Appeals
There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the CountyBoardof Equalization.
The presumption in favor of the Board is not evidence.A presumption simply accepts something as true without any substantial proof to the contrary.In an evidentiary hearing before the Commission, the valuation determined by the Board, even if simply to sustain the value made by the Assessor, is accepted as true only until and so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.
The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer, or respondent when advocating a value different than that determined by the Board, presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property.
Standard for Valuation
Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.
Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
1.Buyer and seller are typically motivated.
2.Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.
3.A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.
4.Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.
5.Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.
6.The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.
Duty to Investigate
In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property.The Hearing Officer’s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties.
Weight to be Given Evidence
The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled.The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide.
Trier of Fact
The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances.The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part.
Methods of Valuation
Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission.It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.
Missouricourts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.
Section 137.115.5, RSMo 2000 provides:All subclasses of real property, as such subclasses are established in section 4(b) of article X of the Missouri Constitution and defined in section 137.016, shall be assessed at the following percentages of true value:
(1)For real property in subclass (1) [residential], nineteen percent,
(2)For real property in subclass (2), [agricultural and horticultural] twelve percent; and
(3)For real property in subclass (3), [utility, industrial, commercial, railroad, and other real property] thirty-two percent.
Opinion Testimony by Experts
If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Complainants’ Burden of Proof
There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof. The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief.Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”
Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.
Owner’s Opinion of Value
The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value.The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation.“Where the basis for a test as to the reliability of the testimony is not supported by a statement of facts on which it is based, or the basis of fact does not appear to be sufficient, the testimony should be rejected.”
A taxpayer does not meet his burden if evidence on any essential element of his case leaves the Commission “in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise.”
Complainants Failed to Prove Misclassification
In order to prevail, Complainants needed to demonstrate that the immediate most suitable economic use of this vacant and unused property was more properly residential rather than commercial.Complainants argue that the zoning, access and utilities were not suitable for commercial development; and that the prior use of the property had been residential; and therefore, the immediate most suitable economic use for the property was for residential development.The very fact that Complainants were actively marketing the property for commercial development would suggest that their arguments against commercial development as the immediate most suitable economic use, are flawed.Nor is the Hearing Officer persuaded that the rejection of the C-3 zoning change requested in 2000 is conclusive on the issue of whether or not the subject properties can be rezoned for a lower intensity commercial use.Clearly, the City does not object to commercial development along this stretch of North Oak Trafficway.Properties on the North, South and West are all zoned C-1 and CP1 for local business districts. (Resp. Ex. 1, pg. 17).In light of all the evidence, it appears more likely than not that the immediate most suitable economic use of the subject properties is as an assemblage for commercial development.Complainants have failed to rebut the presumption in favor of the Board of Equalization.
Respondent Proves Value
Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence in support of the value initially determined by the Assessor and approved by the Board of Equalization.
Respondent Erred in Applying Assessment Ratio
Respondent valued the subject parcels using comparable sales of commercial properties.But, for some reason, concluded that it was appropriate to apply a 12% assessment ratio to a commercial property.
When questioned by the Hearing Officer, the appraiser stated:“The State, in 1985, 1986, through a couple of House Bills, said that the assessor’s office could value property at its highest and best use at fair market value, and give it a 12% assessment and it was basically set for the developers because in the state of Missouri all commercial property has a surtax and they didn’t feel the developers should be penalized for having vacant ground that is just sitting there doing absolutely nothing.They said to give them a 12% assessment rather than a 19% or 32%”.
The appraiser needs to review the law.Real property in subclass 3 is assessed at 32% of market value.
The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for Clay County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.
The Board’s market value for the subject property in Appeal Number 09-32010, for tax years 2009 and 2010 is affirmed at $160,300.The Clerk is ORDERED to place an assessed value of $51,300 on the books for tax years 2009 and 2010.
The Board’s market value for the subject property in Appeal Number 09-32011, for tax years 2009 and 2010 is affirmed at $161,800.The Clerk is ORDERED to place an assessed value of $51,780 on the books for tax years 2009 and 2010.
A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing date shown in the Certificate of Service.The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.
Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. 
The Collector of Clay County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending a filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of 139.031.8 RSMo.
Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.
SO ORDERED December 22, 2009.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OFMISSOURI
Senior Hearing Officer
 Hearing Officer found properties were incorrectly assessed at 12% as agricultural property.Classification was corrected to a commercial assessment at 32% of the appraised value determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board for each parcel.
 St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
 St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992);Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).
 Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).
 Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).
 137.106.5 RSMo:(3) Zoning classification of such property; except that, such zoning classification shall not be considered conclusive if, upon consideration of all factors, it is determined that such zoning classification does not reflect the immediate most suitable economic use of the property;
 State ex rel. Horton v. Bourke, 129 S.W.2d 866, 869 (1939); Barth v. Kansas City Elevated Railway Company, 44 S.W. 788, 781 (1898).
 Burton v. Moulder, 245 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo. 1952); Knorp v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943); Bushman v. Barlow, 15 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Mo. banc 1929)
 State ex rel St. Louis Public Service Company v. Public Service Commission, 291 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Mo. banc 1956).
 In re Murphy, 732 S.W.2d 895, 902 (Mo. banc 1987); State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Mo. banc 1984); State v. Keeble, 399 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Mo. 1966).
 Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).
 Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).
 St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).
 Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.
 St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
 St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).
 See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra;Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).
 St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).
 Section 490.065, RSMo; State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. SC. 2004); Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).
 See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).
 Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970).
 Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).