Robert J Hellmann Jr v. Jake Zimmerman, Assessor St. Louis County

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

 

ROBERT HELLMANN, JR	)	Appeal No.  15-14881
	)	15-14882
Complainant,	)	15-14884
	)
v.	)
	)
JAKE ZIMMERMAN, ASSESSOR	)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

 

ORDER AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION

            On November 8, 2016, Senior Hearing Officer Amy Westermann issued her order affirming the value placed upon the subject properties by the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, finding that Complainant failed to present substantial and persuasive evidence demonstrating market value.  Complainant filed an Application for Review of the Decision.  Respondent filed a Response.  Complainant filed a Reply.

Standard Upon Review

A party subject to a Decision and Order of a Hearing Officer with the State Tax Commission may file an application requesting the case be reviewed by the Commission.  The Commission may then summarily allow or deny their request.  The Commission may affirm, modify, reverse or set aside the decision.  The Commission may take any additional evidence and conduct further hearings.

 

Procedural History

            On November 18, 2015, Senior Hearing Officer John Treu ordered the parties to file any and all documents to be used as evidence in the appeal on or before April 15, 2016.  The documents included any written direct testimony of the parties.  The Hearing Officer warned the parties their failure to file the exhibits would result in sanctions, including dismissal.

On January 29, 2016, Senior Hearing Officer Amy Westermann was assigned to the appeal.  The Hearing Officer set the appeals for prehearing proceedings on April 6, 2016.  The Hearing Officer requested the parties to bring all information pertinent to value with them to such hearing.  The Complainant communicated with the Senior Hearing Officer requesting that the prehearing conference date be changed.  The parties exchanged emails approximately twenty times to accommodate the Complainant’s schedule and discuss the procedures.

On May 25, 2016, Senior Hearing Officer Westermann set eight of Complainant’s appeals for hearing on July 26, 2016 at 9:30 A.M. The Hearing Officer ordered the Complainant to file exhibits by July 1, 2016.  The Hearing Officer ordered the Respondent to file exhibits by July 18, 2016.  The Complainant did not file exhibits as ordered; Respondent filed exhibits and complied with the Order.

On July 26, 2016, Complainant dismissed five of his appeals prior to hearing.  Respondent moved to exclude Complainant’s exhibits for failing to abide by the exchange order.  The Hearing Officer granted the motion to exclude, however, the Hearing Officer allowed the Complainant to testify as the properties, their condition and his opinion of value.  Complainant testified as to the appropriate deduction to market value for condition and damage issues.

Complainant’s Points on Review

            Complainant asserts the following points in support of his Application for Review:

1. The Decision is erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, constitutes an abuse of discretion and is contrary to Missouri law in that Complainant presented competent and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the BOE’s determination of value.
2. The Decision is erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, constitutes an abuse of discretion and is contrary to Missouri law in that Complainant’s evidence should not have been excluded.

DISCUSSION AND RULING

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled.  The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization.  Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).   It places the burden of going forward with some substantial and persuasive evidence squarely on the Complainant.  Respondent has no burden to fulfill.  The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted if the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property. Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value.   Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970).   However, the owner’s opinion is without probative value where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation.  Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

Complainant failed to demonstrate that the decision of the Hearing Officer was erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unreasonable or contrary to Missouri law.  The Assessor determined the values of the properties and such determinations were affirmed by the BOE.  Complainant proposed deductions to be made to the value established due to his estimates of damages and repair costs.  When pressed, the Complainant provided an opinion of value.

Complainant did not present substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the BOE.  Complainant did not present substantial and persuasive evidence of as to the true market value of the subject property.  Even though the Hearing Officer excluded exhibits for failure to comply with the order, Hearing Officer permitted the Complainant to testify to the contents of the exhibits.  Complainant testified as to the condition of the properties.  The condition of a property is relevant when determining value.  In determining true value, such information may be used as a deduction or an adjustment.  However, condition information alone does not establish market value of a property.

The Decision of the Hearing Officer was based upon an appropriate application of the law to the facts presented in this Complaint for Review of Assessment.  We find no error by the Hearing Officer.

ORDER

The Decision and Order of the Hearing Officer, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law is AFFIRMED. It is incorporated by reference, as if set forth herein verbatim, in full, in this final decision of the Commission.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Order.

If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts unless disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031.8, RSMo.

If no judicial review is made within thirty days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.

SO ORDERED this 21st day of February, 2017.

 

STATE TAX COMMISSION

 

Bruce E. Davis, Chairman

 

 

Victor Callahan, Commissioner

 

Certificate of Service

 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been sent electronically or mailed postage prepaid this 21st day of February, 2017, to: Complainants(s) counsel and/or Complainants, the county Assessor and/or Counsel for Respondent and county Collector.

Jacklyn Wood

Legal Coordinator

 

Contact Information for State Tax Commission:

Missouri State Tax Commission

301 W. High Street, Room 840

P.O. Box 146

Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146

573-751-2414

573-751-1341 Fax

 

 

 

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

 

ROBERT J. HELLMANN, JR.,	)
	)
Complainant,	)
	)
v.	) ) )	Appeal Nos. 15-14881 15-14882 15-14884
	)
JAKE ZIMMERMAN, ASSESSOR	)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

 

DECISION AND ORDER

 

HOLDING

 

The assessments made by the Board of Equalization of St. Louis County (BOE) in each of the above-referenced appeals^[1] are AFFIRMED.  Complainant Robert J. Hellmann, Jr., (Complainant) did not present substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the BOE.

Complainant appeared pro se.

Respondent Jake Zimmerman, St. Louis County Assessor, (Respondent) appeared by Steven Robson, Assistant County Counselor.

Cases heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer Amy S. Westermann.

ISSUE

In each appeal, Complainant appealed on the ground of overvaluation.  Respondent initially set the true market value (TMV) of the subject properties, as residential property, and the BOE sustained Respondent, as follows:

Appeal No.	Parcel No.	Address	Respondent’s Valuation	BOE’s Valuation	Complainant’s Proposed Valuation
15-14881	20N110335	12051 Gailcrest Lane, St. Louis County, Missouri	$1,590,000	$1,590,000	$744,700
15-14882	24R340558	860 Sugar Hill Drive, St. Louis County, Missouri	$169,600	$169,600	$121,600
15-14884	23Q610800	1120H Wicklow, St. Louis County, Missouri	$76,400	$76,400	$30,400

 

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the TMV of the subject properties on January 1, 2015.

The Senior Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over these appeals is proper.  Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission.
2. Evidentiary Hearing. The issue of overvaluation was presented at evidentiary hearings on July 26, 2016, at the St. Louis County Government Administration Building, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, Missouri.
3. Identification of Subject Properties. The subject properties are identified in the table, above.  (Complaints; Exhibits 1)
4. Description of Subject Properties.
5. Appeal No. 15-14881, Parcel No. 20N110355, 12051 Gailcrest Lane, St. Louis County, Missouri:  This property consists of a 2.01 acre residential lot improved by a 12,954 square foot, single family, two-story home built in 1990.  (St. Louis County Real Estate Information Database)  The home contains a total of 20 rooms; five bedrooms; six full bathrooms; three half bathrooms; an attached garage; and a basement with 4,821 square feet of finished area.  The exterior consists of brick construction.  The subject property also includes an in-ground pool, a hot tub, and a clay tennis court.  (St. Louis County Real Estate Information Database)  This property is Complainant’s personal residence.
6. Appeal No. 15-14882, Parcel No. 24R340558, 860 Sugar Hill Drive, St. Louis County, Missouri:  This property consists of an approximately 14,900 square foot residential lot improved by a 1,593 square foot, single family, ranch style home built in 1972.  (St. Louis County Real Estate Information Database)  The home contains a total of seven rooms; three bedrooms; two full bathrooms; one half bathroom; an attached two-car garage; and two concrete patios.  (St. Louis County Real Estate Information Database)  This property is leased by Complainant to others.
7. Appeal No. 15-14884, Parcel No. 23Q610800, 1120H Wicklow, St. Louis County, Missouri:  This property consists of an approximately 1,140 square foot, single family, two-story, condominium style home built in 1969.  (St. Louis County Real Estate Information Database)  The home contains a total of six rooms; two bedrooms; one full bathroom; one half bathroom; a full unfinished basement; and one concrete patio.  The exterior is frame construction.  (St. Louis County Real Estate Information Database)  This property is leased by Complainant to others.
8. Assessment. Respondent set a TMV for the subject properties as shown in the table, above.
9. Board of Equalization. The BOE sustained Respondent’s valuation of the subject properties as shown in the table, above.
10. Complainant’s Evidence.^[2] Complainant testified in his own behalf with regard to all three properties.
11.     Appeal No. 15-14881, Parcel No. 20N110355, 12051 Gailcrest Lane, St. Louis County, Missouri:  Complainant testified that he had purchased the subject property in 1989 and the residence was built in 1991.  Complainant testified that he did not recall the exact purchase price or cost to build and did not recall whether the subject property had been listed with a realtor or publicly advertised.  Complainant testified that the subject property was encumbered by a line of credit.  Complainant testified that he did not know the extent of the line of credit.  Complainant testified that he had not received any offers to purchase the subject property and that the subject property had not been listed for sale within the three years preceding the Evidentiary Hearing but, if it were listed for sale, his asking price would be $700,000.  Complainant testified that no improvements had been made to the subject property between January 2013 and January 2015. Complainant testified that the subject property had been appraised by U.S. Bank within three years prior to the Evidentiary Hearing.  Complainant did not state the valuation U.S. Bank had given the subject property.  Complainant opined that the subject property’s TMV as of January 1, 2015, was $744,700.  

Complainant testified at length that the TMV of the subject property should be reduced due to several condition issues.  Complainant testified that the swimming pool, decking, and pump system had been damaged by a pool company’s actions, which became evident in February 2014.  Complainant testified that from 2014 and forward the pool was unusable.  Complainant testified that he filed a claim for the damage with the pool company at that time.  Complainant testified that he was not sure whether an insurance policy would cover the damages to the pool.  Complainant testified that the pool had not been repaired by the time of the Evidentiary Hearing.  Complainant testified that litigation over the damage to the pool was possible and that the damage amounted to approximately $250,000.  Complainant testified that a few days prior to the Evidentiary Hearing he had received certified letters from the pool company that he believed caused the damage but that he had not opened the letters.  Complainant testified that he had been in an ongoing dispute with the pool company to pay for the damage and that he was certain the matter “would end up in court.”  Complainant further testified that the tennis court needed $10,000 of repairs due to damage caused by Metropolitan Sewer District and that the residence needed a new roof estimated at $56,800.  Complainant testified that the pool area would require new fencing that would be more expensive than the current fencing because it would need to meet current building codes.  Complainant testified that such new fencing would cost roughly $30,000.  Complainant testified that a buyer of the subject property would expect certain amenities, such as a working pool, to go along with a certain price point.

1978. Appeal No. 15-14882, Parcel No. 24R340558, 860 Sugar Hill Drive, St. Louis County, Missouri:  Complainant testified that he had purchased the subject property in 1978.  Complainant testified that the subject property was not encumbered by a mortgage.  Complainant testified that he had not received any specific offers to purchase the subject property and that the subject property had not been listed for sale within the three years preceding the Evidentiary Hearing but, if it were listed for sale, his asking price would be $110,000 to $120,000.  Complainant testified that no improvements had been made to the subject property between January 2013 and January 2015. Complainant opined that the subject property’s TMV as of January 1, 2015, was $110,000.  

Complainant testified that a tenant had caused damage to the subject property, which included a broken toilet, water damaged/destroyed flooring on the main floor, and a burned backyard from using a “chiminea.”  Complainant testified that he had involved State Farm Insurance but that he had not cashed any checks from the insurance company.  Complainant testified that insurance proceeds would be forthcoming but that no final amount for the damage had been decided. Complainant testified that no renter had occupied the subject property since May 2015 and that the subject property was being renovated.

On cross examination, Complainant testified that he had known about damage to the subject property caused by the tenant in August 2014 but that he did not know the extent of the damage until he began renovating the subject property.  Complainant testified that, even with the damage, the property was habitable between August 2014 and May 2015 when the renovations began.

1982. Appeal No. 15-14884, Parcel No. 23Q610800, 1120H Wicklow, St. Louis County, Missouri:  Complainant testified that he had purchased the subject property in 1982.  Complainant testified that the subject property was not encumbered by a mortgage.  Complainant testified that he had not received any specific offers to purchase the subject property and that the subject property had not been listed for sale within the three years preceding the Evidentiary Hearing but, if it were listed for sale, his asking price would be $45,000.  Complainant testified that no improvements had been made to the subject property between January 2013 and January 2015. Complainant opined that the subject property’s TMV as of January 1, 2015, was $30,400.  

Complainant testified to several condition issues and repairs that had been made in previous years, including “gutting” the property due to water and sewage backup problems.  Complainant testified that the sill plate under the front wall of the subject property was rotted and that the walls, ceilings, carpet, and HVAC system had all been ruined due to the water and sewage.  Complainant testified that he had experienced problems with the condominium management association and that a lien had been filed on the subject property.

8. Respondent’s Evidence. Respondent offered as evidence the BOE’s Notice of Decision in each appeal.  (Exhibit 1 15-14881, Exhibit 1 15-14882, Exhibit 1 15-14884)

Hearing no legal objection, the Senior Hearing Officer received Respondent’s exhibits into the record.  Although Respondent did not present any witnesses at the hearings, the Senior Hearing Officer provided Complainant the opportunity to question Counsel for Respondent about Respondent’s exhibits.  With regard to Appeal No. 15-14881, Complainant asked whether Respondent would have valued the subject property at 1,590,000 as of January 1, 2015, even if Respondent had been aware that the pool was not functioning or usable at that time.  Counsel for Respondent replied that the valuation had been calculated by a computer model and had been independently upheld by the BOE and that Respondent believed the valuation was correct, even including the condition issues with the subject property, specifically the pool.

9. Presumption of Correct Assessment Not Rebutted. Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the BOE in any of the appeals.
10. No Evidence of New Construction & Improvement. There was no evidence of new construction and/or improvements to any of the three subject properties from January 1, 2015, to January 1, 2016; therefore, the assessed value for 2015 remains the assessed value for 2016.  Section 137.115.1 RSMo.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious, including the application of any abatement.  The Senior Hearing Officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the Board of Equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.  Article X, Section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, 138.431.4, RSMo. 

Basis of Assessment

The Constitution mandates that real property and tangible personal property be assessed at its value or such percentage of its value as may be fixed by law for each class and for each subclass.  Article X, Sections 4(a) and 4(b), Mo. Const. of 1945.  The constitutional mandate is to find the true value in money for the property under appeal.  By statute, real property and tangible personal property are assessed at set percentages of true value in money:  residential property at 19%; commercial property at 32%; and agricultural property at 12%.  Section 137.115.5 RSMo (2000) as amended.

Investigation by Hearing Officer

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer may inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification, or assessment of the property.  Section 138.430.2 RSMo (2000) as amended.  The Hearing Officer’s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon his inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties.  Id.

During the hearing, the Senior Hearing Officer inquired of Complainant.

Board Presumption and Computer-Assisted Presumption

            There exists a presumption of correct assessment by the BOE – the BOE presumption.  In charter counties or the City of St. Louis, there exists by statutory mandate a presumption that the Assessor’s original valuation was made by a computer, computer-assisted method, or a computer program – the computer-assisted presumption.  These two presumptions operate with regard to the parties in different ways.

The BOE presumption operates in every case to require the taxpayer to present evidence to rebut it.  If Respondent is seeking to prove a value different than that set by the BOE, then it also would be applicable to the Respondent.

Respondent’s original value in this appeal was determined by the BOE to be correct.  Accordingly, Complainant must rebut that presumption in order to prevail.  Complainant must establish by substantial and persuasive evidence that the value concluded by the BOE is in error and what the correct value should be.  The burden, of course, is discharged by simply establishing the TMV (true market value) of the property as of the valuation date because, once fair market value is established, it a fortiori proves that the BOE’s value was in error.  The computer-assisted presumption plays no role in this process.

The computer-assisted presumption is applicable only if (1) the BOE lowered the value of the Assessor and Respondent is seeking to sustain the original assessment and (2) it has not been shown that the Assessor’s valuation was not the result of a computer assisted method.  The BOE’s valuation is assumed to be an independent valuation.

In the present appeal, the BOE sustained the initial valuations of Respondent in each of the appeals, and Complainant is seeking to change the BOE’s assessment; therefore, only the BOE presumption applies.

Complainant’s Burden of Proof

To obtain a reduction in assessed valuation based upon an alleged overvaluation, the Complainant must prove the true value in money of the subject property on the subject tax day.  Hermel, Inc., v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).  True value in money is defined as the price that the subject property would bring when offered for sale by one willing but not obligated to sell it and bought by one willing or desirous to purchase but not compelled to do so.  Rinehart v. Bateman, 363 S.W.3d 357, 365 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012); Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008); Greene County v. Hermel, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 762, 771 (Mo. 1974).  True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not in terms of value in use.  Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 499 S.W.2d 798, 801-803 (Mo. 1973).  In sum, true value in money is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.  Hermel, Inc., 564 S.W.2d at 897.

“’True value’ is never an absolute figure, but is merely an estimate of the fair market value on the valuation date.”  Drury Chesterfield, Inc., v. Muehlheausler, 347 S.W.3d 107, 112 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011), citing St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n of Mo., 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993).  “Fair market value typically is defined as the price which the property would bring when offered for sale by a willing seller who is not obligated to sell, and purchased by a willing buyer who is not compelled to buy.”  Drury Chesterfield, Inc., 347 S.W.3d at 112 (quotation omitted).

A presumption exists that the assessed value fixed by the BOE is correct.  Rinehart, 363 S.W.3d at 367; Cohen, 251 S.W.3d at 348; Hermel, Inc., 564 S.W.2d at 895.  “Substantial and persuasive controverting evidence is required to rebut the presumption, with the burden of proof resting on the taxpayer.” Cohen, 251 S.W.3d at 348.  Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Cupples Hesse Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).  Persuasive evidence is evidence that has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.  Cupples Hesse Corp., 329 S.W.2d at 702.  The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.   Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).

There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof.  The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief.   Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”  Westwood Partnership, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003); Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991).

Generally, a property owner, while not an expert, is competent to testify to the reasonable market value of his own land.  Cohen, 251 S.W.3d at 348-49; Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992).  “However, when an owner’s opinion is based on improper elements or foundation, his opinion loses its probative value.”  Carmel Energy, Inc., 827 S.W.2d at 783.  A taxpayer does not meet his burden if evidence on any essential element of his case leaves the Commission “in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise.”  See Rossman v. G.G.C. Corp. of Missouri, 596 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

Weight to be Given Evidence

The Senior Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule, or method in determining true value in money and is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled.  The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Senior Hearing Officer to decide.  St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Senior Hearing Officer, as the trier of fact, may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as deemed necessary when viewed in connection with all other circumstances.  Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991).  The Senior Hearing Officer, as the trier of fact, is not bound by the opinions of experts but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony or accept it in part or reject it in part.  Exchange Bank of Missouri v. Gerlt, 367 S.W.3d 132, 135-36 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012).

Methods of Valuation

Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission.  It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.   See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, Inc., 564 S.W.2d at 897; Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).  Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach, and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.   St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. 1974).

“For purposes of levying property taxes, the value of real property is typically determined using one or more of three generally accepted approaches.”  Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Missouri Gaming Corp., 156 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Mo. banc 2005), citing St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977).  “Each valuation approach is applied with reference to a specific use of the property—its highest and best use.” Snider, 156 S.W.3d at 346-47, citing Aspenhof  Corp., 789 S.W.2d at 869.  “The method used depends on several variables inherent in the highest and best use of the property in question.”  Snider, 156 S.W.3d at 347.  “Each method uses its own unique factors to calculate the property’s true value in money.”  Id.  “The ‘comparable sales approach’ uses prices paid for similar properties in arms-length transactions and adjusts those prices to account for differences between the properties.  Id. at 348.  “Comparable sales consist of evidence of sales reasonably related in time and distance and involve land comparable in character.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  “This approach is most appropriate when there is an active market for the type of property at issue such that sufficient data [is] available to make a comparative analysis.”  Id.

Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

 

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.

 

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

 

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

 

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

 

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by  special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

 

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; see also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

Discussion

In all of these cases, Complainant’s evidence was neither substantial nor persuasive to support his proposed opinions of the TMV of the subject properties as of January 1, 2015.  Substantial evidence is that which is relevant, adequate, and reasonably supports a conclusion.  Cupples Hesse Corp., 329 S.W.2d at 702.  Persuasive evidence is that which causes the trier of fact to believe, more likely than not, the conclusion advocated is the correct conclusion.  Id.  In particular, Complainant, who is not a certified residential real estate appraiser, did not use any of the court approved methods of valuation to arrive at an opinion of TMV for the three properties.  Furthermore, although Complainant testified at length concerning the damaged and deteriorated condition of each of the three properties, this testimony did not compel the conclusion that the BOE’s valuation was incorrect or show the impact of condition on the market values.  Complainant’s testimony indicated that the damaged and deteriorated condition of the properties existed prior to January 1, 2015.  Complainant’s testimony also indicated that the BOE had independently reviewed Complainant’s documentary evidence in making its determinations to sustain Respondent’s initial valuations of the three properties.

ORDER

The true market valuations for the subject properties as determined by the BOE are AFFIRMED.  The TMV and the assessed values for the subject properties for tax years 2015 and 2016 are as follows:

Appeal No.	Parcel No.	Address	BOE’s Valuation	Assessed Value
15-14881	20N110335	12051 Gailcrest Lane, St. Louis County, Missouri	$1,590,000	$302,100
15-14882	24R340558	860 Sugar Hill Drive, St. Louis County, Missouri	$169,600	$32,224
15-14884	23Q610800	1120H Wicklow, St. Louis County, Missouri	$76,400	$14,516

 

Application for Review

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Decision.  The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.  Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.

            Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the application for review is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo

 

Disputed Taxes

The Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.  Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED November 8, 2016.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Amy S. Westermann

Senior Hearing Officer

 

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been sent electronically or mailed postage prepaid this 8th day of November, 2016, to: Complainants(s) counsel and/or Complainant, the County Assessor and/or Counsel for Respondent and County Collector.

 

Jacklyn Wood

Legal Coordinator

 

[1] Given that the subject properties in the three appeals referenced above are all owned by Complainant and involve similar issues and conclusions, for efficiency in administration, the decisions in these appeals have been consolidated.

^[2]  Prior to the presentation of evidence in these cases, Respondent made an oral motion to exclude Complainant’s documentary evidence and exhibits on the ground that said evidence and exhibits had not been filed by the deadline, July 1, 2016, which had been set by Order of the Senior Hearing Officer.  After hearing argument from both parties and considering the lengthy procedural history of the cases, the Senior Hearing Officer sustained Respondent’s objection and excluded Complainant’s documentary evidence and exhibits.  On cross examination, Complainant admitted that he had not attended a scheduled Pre-hearing Conference and had not provided his evidence and exhibits prior to the date of the Evidentiary Hearing of July 26, 2016, as ordered.  Complainant was originally ordered to file and exchange exhibits in an Order dated November 18, 2015.  Such Order was vacated on April 12, 2016, and the parties were ordered to exchange exhibits and evidence, although no specific date was set for the exchange to occur.  On May 25, 2016, Complainant was notified of the requirement to file his evidence and exhibits with the Commission and provide a copy to Respondent on or before July 1, 2016.  On July 19, 2016, Complainant and Respondent were advised of the fact that no evidence or exhibits had been filed by Complainant on or before July 1, 2016.  Complainant could have attempted to remedy his failure to timely file his evidence and exhibits prior to the date of the Evidentiary Hearing, but Complainant did not do so.