Stanley Cotlar v. Brooks (SLCO)

July 1st, 2010

State Tax Commission of Missouri

 

STANLEYCOTLAR,)

)

Complainant,)

)

v.) Appeal Number 09-12279

)

MICHAEL BROOKS,)

ACTING ASSESSOR,)

ST. LOUIS COUNTY,MISSOURI,)

)

Respondent.)

 

DECISION AND ORDER

 

HOLDING

 

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor is AFFIRMED.True value in money for the subject property for tax years 2009 and 2010 is set at $331,200, residential assessed value of $62,930.Complainant appeared pro se.Respondent appeared by Associate County Counselor Paula J. Lemerman.

Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuation of the subject property.The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2009.The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.


FINDINGS OF FACT

1.Jurisdiction.Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper.Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.Evidentiary hearing was held on June 21, 2010, at theSt. LouisCountyGovernmentCenter,Clayton,Missouri.

2.Assessment.The Assessor appraised the property at $331,200, residential assessment of $62,930.The Board of Equalization sustained that assessment.[1]

3.Subject Property.The subject property is located at 14733 Whitebrook Drive, Chesterfield, Missouri.The property is identified by parcel number 17R149217.The property consists of 4,050 square foot lot improved by an attached villa, single-family structure of good quality construction.The structure was built in 1997 and appears to be in average condition.The residence has a total of five rooms, with one bedroom, one full and one half bath on the main floor, and contains 1,752 square feet of living area.There is a full basement, with 1,050 square feet of finish, with additional living area, two bedrooms and a full bath.The property has an attached front entry two-car garage.[2]

4.Complainant’s Evidence.Mr. Cotlar testified his opinion of fair market value as of January 1, 2009 was $290,000.The opinion was based upon the subject having been a display unit when purchased in 1997.It had no add-ons.Property values have been down and properties are not selling.Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2009, to be $290,000, as proposed.There was no evidence of new construction and improvement during 2009.Therefore the value set for 2009 remains the vale for 2010.[3]

5.Respondent’s Evidence.Respondent offered into evidence as Exhibit 1 the appraisal report of Sarah Curran, Missouri State Certified Residential Real Estate Appraiser.Ms. Curran testified in support of her appraisal.Exhibit 1 was received into evidence.Ms. Curran concluded a value for the subject property as of January 1, 2009, of $353,000 relying on the sales comparison approach to value.The properties relied upon by Respondent’s appraiser were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The properties were located within less than a tenth of a mile of the subject, on the subject street.Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2009.The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability.

Respondent’s evidence met the standard of substantial and persuasive to establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2009, to be $353,000.However, Respondent’s appraisal was accepted only to sustain the original assessment made by the Assessor and sustained by the Board and not for the purpose of raising the assessment above that value.Respondent meet the standard of clear, convincing and cogent evidence in this appeal to sustain the original valuation of $331,200.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.[4]

Presumptions In Appeals

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the CountyBoardof Equalization.[5]The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer, presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property.[6]Complainant failed to present any evidence upon which it could be concluded that the Board’s valuation was erroneous, or what the fair market value of the subject property was on January 1, 2009.Accordingly, the presumption of correct assessment was not rebutted.

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.[7]It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.[8]Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1.Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

 

2.Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.

 

3.A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

 

4.Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

 

5.Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

 

6.The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.[9]

 

Respondent’s appraiser utilized the Standard for Valuation in her appraisal.[10]

Methods of Valuation

Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission.It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.[11]Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.[12]Complainant did not present an opinion of value derived from any of the recognized methods for the appraisal of real property inMissouri.Respondent’s appraiser, on the other hand, concluded the fair market value of the property under appeal relying on the comparable sales approach.In the valuation of an owner occupied residence, this method is generally recognized as the most reliable approach to value when sufficient relevant sales data exists for the appraisal problem.Such sales data existed in this instance and was properly utilized by the appraiser.

Complainant’s Burden of Proof


In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2009.[13]There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof.The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief.Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”[14]

Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[15]Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.[16]

Owner’s Opinion of Value

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value.[17]The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation.[18]Mr. Cotlar’s opinion of value was not based upon any accepted appraisal methodology for the valuation of real property for ad valorem tax purposes in an appeal before the Commission.The owner’s argument that a comparison must be made between what the comparable properties originally were purchased for by the seller in the transaction used to value his property was not shown to be a practice or methodology relied upon by real estate appraisers.The purchase price of a property six, eight or a dozen years ago is irrelevant to establishing value for the 2009-2010 assessment period.The further argument of some type of comparison between what the subject was originally purchased for and what each comp originally sold for is likewise not a practice or approach to value recognizes by appraisers, the Courts or the Commission.Accordingly, the opinion of value proffered by Mr. Cotlar was based upon improper elements and an improper foundation.Therefore, it can be given no probative weight in this appeal.Complainant failed to meet his burden of proof.

The other factors which Mr. Cotlar addressed relative to the subject not having had any add-ons when purchased in 1997, that it was a display home, lowering of the value in a prior appeal and real estate property values being down provide no market data that is relevant to a valuation for January 1, 2009.None of the testimony provided on any of these elements established that on January 1, 2009, the price most likely to be paid in a transaction between a willing buyer and willing seller of the property under appeal would have been $290,000.

Evidence of Increase in Value

In any case in St. Louis County where the assessor presents evidence which indicates a valuation higher than the value finally determined by the assessor or the value determined by the board of equalization, whichever is higher, for that assessment period, such evidence will only be received for the purpose of sustaining the assessor’s or board’s valuation, and not for increasing the valuation of the property under appeal.[19]The evidence presented by the Respondent was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the fair market value of the property under appeal, as of January 1, 2009, to be $353,000.However, under the Commission rule just cited and Supreme Court decision[20] the assessed value cannot be increased above $62,930 in this particular appeal.

Respondent’s Burden of Proof

The Respondent has imposed upon him by the provisions of Section 137.115.1, RSMo, the burden of proof to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain a valuation on residential property which is made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program.There is a presumption in this appeal that the original valuation, which was sustained by the Board of Equalization, was made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program.There was no evidence to rebut the presumption, therefore, in order to sustain the valuation of the subject property at $331,200, appraised value, Respondent’s evidence must come within the guidelines established by the legislature and must clearly and convincingly persuade the Hearing Officer as to the value sought to be sustained.

The statutory guidelines for evidence to meet the standard of clear, convincing and cogent include the following:

(1)The findings of the assessor based on an appraisal of the property by generally accepted appraisal techniques; and

 

(2) The purchase prices from sales of at least three comparable properties and the address or location thereof.As used in this paragraph, the word comparable means that:

 


(a)Such sale was closed at a date relevant to the property valuation; and

 

(b) Such properties are not more than one mile from the site of the disputed property, except where no similar properties exist within one mile of the disputed property, the nearest comparable property shall be used.Such property shall be within five hundred square feet in size of the disputed property, and resemble the disputed property in age, floor plan, number of rooms, and other relevant characteristics.[21]

 

Clear, cogent and convincing evidence is that evidence which clearly convinces the trier of fact of the affirmative proposition to be proved.It does not mean that there may not be contrary evidence.[22]The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing must be more than a mere preponderance but does not require beyond a reasonable doubt.[23]“For evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder’s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.”[24]The appraisal performed by Ms. Curran constitutes clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the true value of the property under appeal as of January 1, 2009, was at least $331,200 as set by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization.Accordingly, that value must be affirmed by the Hearing Officer.


ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization forSt. LouisCountyfor the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2009 and 2010 is set at $62,930.

Application for Review

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Decision.The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.

Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. [25]

Disputed Taxes

The Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending a filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED July 2, 2010.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OFMISSOURI

 

 

_____________________________________

W. B. Tichenor

Senior Hearing Officer

 

 

 

Certificate of Service

 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed postage prepaid on this 2ndday of July, 2010, to:Stanley Cotlar, 14733 Whitebrook Dr., Chesterfield, MO 63017,Complainant; Paula Lemerman, Associate County Counselor, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105, Attorney for Respondent; Michael Brooks, ActingAssessor, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105; John Friganza, Collector, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105.

 

 

___________________________

Barbara Heller

Legal Coordinator

 

 

 


[1] BOE Decision Letter; Exhibit 1. page 1 of 4

 

[2] Exhibit 1; Sales Grid; pages 1 & 2 of 4

 

[3] Section 137.115, RSMo

 

[4] Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, 138.431.4, RSMo.

 

[5] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

 

[6] Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

 

[7] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).

 

[8] Hermel, supra.

 

[9] Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

 

[10] Exhibit 1 – Certification Page

 

[11] See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra;Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).

 

[12] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

 

[13] Hermel, supra.

 

[14] See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).

 

[15] See, Cupples-Hesse, supra.

 

[16] Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Divisi