Steven & Diane Okenfuss, et al. v. O’Flaherty (Jackson)

December 16th, 2004

 

STEVEN & DIANE OKENFUSS, ) Appeals No. 03-30074 through 30081

FLOYD & MARY SUE YOUNG, ) Appeals No. 03-30082 through 30087

ANTHONY DIPARDO, ) Appeals No. 03-30088 through 30095

RICHARD SCALETTY, ) Appeals No. 03-30096 through 30103

LARRY & MARCIA WALLACE, ) Appeals No. 03-30104 through 30119

BRUCE & SHARON CHEVALIER, ) Appeals No. 03-30120 through 30127

LARRY & DEBI STUCKER, ) Appeals No. 03-30128 through 30142

)

Complainants, )

)

v. )

)

)

MICHAEL O’FLAHERTY, )

DIRECTOR OF ASSESSMENT, )

JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

The highest and best use of the subject properties are for individual ownership. The correct market value of each unit is set out in Findings of Fact, Paragraph 11.

ISSUE

The issue in the above appeal is the true value in money on the subject properties on tax days January 1, 2003, and January 1, 2004. The resolution of this issue requires a determination of the highest and best use of the properties. Complainants argue that the highest and best use is the continued use as rental properties. Respondent argues that the highest and best use is for sale as individual condominium units.

SUMMARY

The properties under appeal are townhouse style condominium units grouped together in fourplexes.

An evidentiary hearing was held on October 21, 2004, in the Jackson County Courthouse, Kansas City, Missouri before Luann Johnson, Hearing Officer. Complainants were represented by David Sperry, Esq. Respondent was represented by Arthur Hogge, Esq. The parties were further represented by state licensed appraisers. All exhibits submitted by the parties are received into evidence.

The various values proposed by the parties are set out in Finding of Fact, Paragraph 3 below.

The Commission finds that the true value of the subject property on the subject tax days is as set out in Finding of Fact, Paragraph 11 below.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over these appeals is proper. Complainants timely appealed from the decisions of the Jackson County Board of Equalization. Complaints for Review of Assessment. At the request of Complainants, the appeals were consolidated for evidentiary purposes. Tr. 16, 17.

2. The subject properties are two and three bedroom, two story townhouse style condominiums with 2 and one-half baths and an attached garage. Some have basements. All units were built in 1994. Respondent’s Exhibit A, all appeals. The condominiums are grouped together in fourplexes. Each condominium represents a separate parcel and a separate appeal.

3. The original assessments, the value determined by the Board of Equalization, and the proposed values of the parties are as follows:

 

Appeal Number

Original Assessment

Board of Equalization

Proposed By Assessor

Proposed By Taxpayer

03-30074

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30075

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30076

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30077

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30078

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30079

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30080

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30081

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30082

$97,300

$87,570

$95,700

$66,875

03-30083

$92,300

$83,070

$92,300

$61,875

03-30084

$92,300

$83,070

$92,300

$61,875

03-30085

$97,300

$87,570

$95,700

$66,875

03-30086

$97,300

$87,570

$96,700

$63,000

03-30087

$92,300

$83,070

$92,300

$63,000

03-30088

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30089

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30090

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30091

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30092

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30093

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30094

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30095

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30096

$97,300

$87,570

$96,700

$66,875

03-30097

$92,300

$83,070

$92,300

$61,875

03-30098

$92,300

$83,070

$92,300

$61,875

03-30099

$97,300

$87,570

$96,700

$66,875

03-30100

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30101

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30102

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30103

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30104

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30105

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30106

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30107

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30108

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30109

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30100

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30111

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30112

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30113

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30114

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30115

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30116

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30117

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30118

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30119

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30120

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30121

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30122

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30123

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30123

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30125

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30126

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30127

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30128

$97,300

$87,570

$96,700

$63,750

03-30129

$106,000

$95,400

$98,700

$67,500

03-30130

$97,300

$87,570

$96,700

$63,750

03-30131

$109,600

$98,460

$101,400

$69,375

03-30132

$92,300

$83,070

$92,300

$61,875

03-30133

$92,300

$83,070

$92,300

$61,875

03-30134

$97,300

$87,570

$95,700

$66,875

03-30135

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30136

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30137

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30138

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30139

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

03-30140

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30141

$85,200

$76,680

$85,200

$60,000

03-30142

$88,000

$79,200

$88,000

$65,000

 

In some instances, the value finally determined by the assessor’s office was larger than the value initially determined by that office. However, the assessor’s office did not advocate a higher value.

4. The subject properties are located in the Blue Springs, Missouri school district; minutes away from main highways and interstates and ten to fifteen minutes away from one of the largest shopping districts in Jackson County, Missouri. Employment opportunities in the area are good. Recreational areas are nearby. Marketing time for similar townhouse style condominiums in the area is less than 3 months. Property values are increasing. Respondent’s Exhibit A, all appeals.

5. All properties are in good condition. Respondent’s Exhibit A, all appeals. The properties have experienced some problems with their siding, but most of those problems occurred after the tax day. Tr. 40. Complainants’ appraiser did not adjust for siding conditions because the properties that were being appraised “would have been in as good of condition as they could possibly be.” Tr. 98. However, Respondent’s appraiser allowed a $4,000 adjustment, per unit, for siding problems in her sales approach even though the problems may not have been evident on the tax day. Tr. 105.

6. Because only a few individuals own the majority of the units in this subdivision, sales are rare. However, when units sell, they sell for substantially more than Complainants’ assertion of value. An interior unit with walkout basement sold for $101,000 in October of 2002; an end unit with a walkout basement sold in October 2001 for $106,000; and, in September of 2000 and interior unit on a slab sold for $84,000. Tr. 101. Sales of similar properties in a subdivision one and one-quarter miles away from the subject subdivision show similar high values for individual units. Tr. 100.

7. There is a “glut” of rental units in the area and, with lower interest rates, more individuals are turning to purchasing homes rather than renting. Tr. 88, 91.

8. The use of the property that will produce the greatest return in the reasonably near future, also called the highest and best use, is for sale as individual units.

9. Complainants’ appraisal reports are not reliable indicators of value for the subject properties because said appraisal reports are not based upon the highest and best use and fail to consider actual market value of the condominiums.

10. Respondent’s appraisal reports are reliable indicators of value for the subject properties because they consider the appropriate highest and best use and use market sales based upon said highest and best use.

11. The correct value for parcels under appeal are as follows:

 

Appeal Number

Market Value

Assessed Value

03-30074

$88,000

$16,720

03-30075

$85,200

$16,190

03-30076

$85,200

$16,190

03-30077

$88,000

$16,720

03-30078

$88,000

$16,720

03-30079

$85,200

$16,190

03-30080

$85,200

$16,190

03-30081

$88,000

$16,720

03-30082

$95,700

$18,180

03-30083

$92,300

$17,540

03-30084

$92,300

$17,540

03-30085

$95,700

$18,180

03-30086

$96,700

$18,380

03-30087

$92,300

$17,540

03-30088

$88,000

$16,720

03-30089

$85,200

$16,190

03-30090

$85,200

$16,190

03-30091

$88,000

$16,720

03-30092

$88,000

$16,720

03-30093

$85,200

$16,190

03-30094

$85,200

$16,190

03-30095

$88,000

$16,720

03-30096

$96,700

$18,380

03-30097

$92,300

$17,540

03-30098

$92,300

$17,540

03-30099

$96,700

$18,380

03-30100

$88,000

$16,720

03-30101

$85,200

$16,190

03-30102

$85,200

$16,190

03-30103

$88,000

$16,720

03-30104

$88,000

$16,720

03-30105

$85,200

$16,190

03-30106

$85,200

$16,190

03-30107

$88,000

$16,720

03-30108

$88,000

$16,720

03-30109

$85,200

$16,190

03-30100

$85,200

$16,190

03-30111

$88,000

$16,720

03-30112

$88,000

$16,720

03-30113

$85,200

$16,190

03-30114

$85,200

$16,190

03-30115

$88,000

$16,720

03-30116

$88,000

$16,720

03-30117

$85,200

$16,190

03-30118

$85,200

$16,190

03-30119

$88,000

$16.720

03-30120

$88,000

$16,720

03-30121

$85,200

$16,190

03-30122

$85,200

$16,190

03-30123

$88,000

$16,720

03-30123

$88,000

$16,720

03-30125

$85,200

$16,190

03-30126

$85,200

$16,190

03-30127

$88,000

$16,720

03-30128

$96,700

$18,380

03-30129

$98,700

$18,750

03-30130

$96,700

$18,380

03-30131

$101,400

$19,270

03-30132

$92,300

$17,540

03-30133

$92,300

$17,540

03-30134

$95,700

$18,180

03-30135

$88,000

$16,720

03-30136

$85,200

$16,190

03-30137

$85,200

$16,190

03-30138

$88,000

$16,720

03-30139

$88,000

$16,720

03-30140

$85,200

$16,190

03-30141

$85,200

$16,190

03-30142

$88,000

$16,720

 

12. No evidence was presented which would indicated that any new construction or property improvements occurred during tax year 2003 which would warrant a change in value for tax year 2004.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Burden of Proof

In order to prevail Complainants must demonstrate, by substantial and persuasive evidence, that the market value of their properties, on January 1, 2003, were as proposed in Finding of Fact, Paragraph 3.

Substantial evidence is that evidence which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, i.e., evidence favoring facts which are such that reasonable men may differ as to whether it established them, and from which the Commission can reasonably decide an appeal on the factual issues. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Highest and Best Use

A property’s true value in money is a function of the property’s highest and best use, which has been defined as “the use of the property that will produce the greatest return in the reasonably near future.” Aspenhof Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 789 S.W. 2d 867, 869. (Mo. App. 1990). Highest and best use has also been defined as “the use which will most likely produce the highest market value, greatest financial return, or the most profit from the use of a particular piece of real estate.” Brain Trust, Inc. v. City of Raytown, 523 S.W.2d 156, 159. (Mo. App. 1975).

True Value in Money

Section 137.115, RSMo requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and purchased by one who is desiring to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

DISCUSSION

Highest and Best Use

Complainants have failed to meet their burden of proof inasmuch as they have failed to demonstrate that the highest and best use of the subject properties would be their continued use as rental units. Having failed to meet this test, they have also failed to present reliable evidence of market value.

Complainants’ appraiser asserted “I feel the property owner is the best determination [of] use.” Tr. 87; highest and best use is “what the property owner desires” Tr. 92; and “Ownership determines highest and best use.” Tr. 94. None of these statements are accurate. The use an owner makes of his property may, or may not, be the highest and best use of the property. Missouri defines market value as value in exchange, not value in use.

Highest and best use is the use which will most likely produce the highest market value, greatest financial return, or the most profit from the use of a particular piece of real estate. Brain Trust, supra.

The evidence in these appeals is that (1) there is a glut of rental units in the area; (2) falling interest rates have resulted in more individuals purchasing homes and has reduced the pool of possible tenants for the subject properties; (3) these condominiums are capable of individual sale and there is a ready market for condominiums; and (4) the subject properties have a substantially higher value for sale as owner occupied units than for rent. Given all these facts, it is clear that the use which will most likely produce the highest market value (value in exchange) is for sale as owner-occupied units.

Market Value

Because Complainants’ appraiser misunderstood the concept of highest and best use, he presented evidence of value based upon continued use as rental properties without any recognition of potential uses which were more economically feasible. Thus, Mr. Cardwell prepared an income approach and a sales comparison approach which substantially understated the actual value of the units. Although Mr. Cardwell assigned a value to each unit, he arrived at his per unit value solely by determining what he thought the fourplex would sell for for continued use as a rental property using sales of fourplex properties which were twice as old as the subject units. Mr. Cardwell made no attempt to ascertain the selling prices of individual condominium units in spite of the fact that individual units were selling within this particular subdivision and nearby subdivisions.

Likewise, Complainants’ presentation of unadjusted sales prices for fourplexes in less desirable locations; different school districts; without lots; and not platted for condominium use, were not reliable indicators of value for the subject properties.

And, the fact that the county had, in all years previous to the subject tax year, valued the subject units as fourplexes and assigned values of $55,000 per unit to the parcels is not indicative of the market value of the subject parcels. The county is never bound by past practices; this is especially true when those past practices do not result in market value. The evidence suggests that the county became aware that it had a problem with undervaluation of condominium units and that the substantial increases in market value in tax year 2003 were due to an effort by the county to correct underassessments.

Finally, Complainants’ argument that the Board of Equalization had reduced the assessed value on similar properties owned by Complainants is not helpful or relevant to a determination of the market value of the subject properties. Even if the Board had acted in an inconsistent manner, which fact has not been proven, it would not have changed the market value of the subject units.

The only reliable evidence of market value for these condominium units were sales of other condominium units. Respondent’s appraiser presented evidence demonstrating that individual condominiums in the same subdivision and a nearby subdivision had been selling for $84,000 to $106,000. Furthermore, the fact that marketing time for said units were only three months and the fact that a subdivision less than two miles away is wholly owner-occupied, indicates that there is a high demand for condominium units.

Respondent’s appraiser appropriately calculated market value based on these sales and made adjustments for market reaction to areas of significant variation, including an adjustment for the condition of the siding on the subject units.

The mostly likely price the individual parcels would bring if placed on the market are as proposed by Respondent.

DISCUSSION

The fundamental flaw in Complainants’ case is the belief that use controls value. The fallacy is obvious. Such a practice would allow the subject units to be valued at $60,000 to $65,000 because they were being used as rental property while requiring that exactly the same properties in the same subdivision be valued as high as $106,000 solely because they were owner-occupied. Such a practice violates the Uniformity Clause of our Constitution and demonstrates why value in exchange, rather than value in use, must be the criteria for establishing market value.

ORDER

The assessed values as determined by the Board of Equalization, are SET ASIDE. The Clerk is hereby ordered to place new assessed values on the parcels as set out in Findings of Fact, Paragraph 11.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of a hearing officer decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial.

If an application for review of a hearing officer decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Jackson as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED December 16, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Luann Johnson

Hearing Officer

ORDER

AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION

UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

On December 16, 2004, Hearing Officer Luann Johnson entered her Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessments by the Jackson County Board of Equalization and setting true value in money at the values originally set by the Respondent.

Complainants timely filed Application (Motion) for Review of the Decision. Respondent timely filed his Response and Suggestions in Support Thereof.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standard Upon Review

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as she may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

DECISION

Complainants raise essentially two grounds in their appeal. The first ground for appeal is that the Hearing Officer erred in her analysis and Finding of Fact that the highest and best use for the subject properties would be for sale as individual owner occupied units, as opposed to rental units. Finding of Fact 8, Decision, p. 6. The second ground asserted is that the Hearing Officer erred in her analysis and Finding of Fact which rejected the income approach to determine value and relied upon the sales comparison approach. Finding of Fact 9 & 10, Decision, p. 6. The Hearing Officer addressed in detail the importance and application of the concept of highest and best use. Decision, pp. 10-11. The Hearing Officer likewise discussed the basis for her dismissal of the Complainants’ income analysis and her acceptance of Respondent’s sales analysis. Decision, pp. 11-13.

A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused her discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980). The Hearing Officer was persuaded that the Respondent’s opinions of value were supported by substantial and persuasive evidence. She did not find Complainants’ evidence to meet that necessary standard.

The Hearing Officer did not err in her determinations as challenged by Complainants.

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in these appeals, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED April 14, 2005.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Bruce E. Davis, Chairman

Sam D. Leake, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner