William Nelson v. Brooks (SLCO)

September 3rd, 2010

State Tax Commission of Missouri

 

WILLIAM C. NELSON,)

)

Complainant,)

)

v.) Appeal Number 09-10201

)

MICHAEL BROOKS,)

ACTING ASSESSOR,)

ST. LOUIS COUNTY,MISSOURI,)

)

Respondent.)

 

 

DECISION AND ORDER

 

HOLDING

 

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization reducing the assessment made by the Assessor is SET ASIDE.True value in money for the subject property for tax years 2009 and 2010 is set at $214,700, residential assessed value of $40,790.Complainant appeared pro se.Respondent appeared by Associate County Counselor Paula Lemerman.

Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which reduced the valuation of the subject property.The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2009.The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

 

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.Jurisdiction.Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper.Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.A hearing was conducted on July 29, 2010, at the St. LouisCountyGovernmentCenter,Clayton,Missouri.


2.Assessment.The Assessor appraised the property under appeal at $214,700, a residential assessed value of $40,790.The Board reduced the value to $210,000, a residential assessed value of $39,900.[1]

3.Subject Property.The subject property is located at 2193 Federal Way, Chesterfield, Missouri.The property is identified by locator number 20T330243.The property consists of 12,443 square foot lot improved by a ranch-style, single-family residence built in 1977.The gross living area is 1,895 square feet.The exterior materials are brick and vinyl.The home has a patio, deck and a two-car basement garage.There are seven rooms, three bedrooms and two full bathrooms.The basement is unfinished.There is some evidence of water entering the unfinished basement along the front wall.There are also some foundation cracks along the north wall and the east wall that are visible from both the interior and exterior of the house.The beam that runs along the basement ceiling is pulling away from the foundation wall in the garage side of the basement.The kitchen has been remodeled with a new countertop, sink, painted cabinets, and flooring.The master bath has also been updated with a new shower, toilet, sink and fixtures.Overall the structure appears to be in average condition for its age, and the quality of materials and workmanship is average, consistent with surrounding properties.There was no sale of the property within three years prior to the tax date of January 1, 2009.


4.Complainant’s Evidence.Mr. Nelson testified in his own behalf.He stated his opinion of value for the subject as of January 1, 2009, to be $197,000.No market data evidence was presented in support of this opinion of value.The owner presented two exhibits, Exhibit A – Foundation Repair Proposal and Exhibit B – Six photographs of the foundation cracking problem.Both exhibits were received into evidence.

There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2010, therefore the assessed value for 2009 remains the assessed value for 2010.[2]

Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2009, to be $197,000, as proposed.

5.Respondent’s Evidence.Respondent presented the appraisal report and testimony of Ms. Sarah Curran, Missouri State Certified Residential Real Estate Appraiser.Ms. Curran concluded an opinion of fair market value for the subject as of January 1, 2009, of $227,000, in support of the Assessor’s original value of $214,700.The properties relied upon by Respondent’s appraiser were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The properties were located within two-tenths of a mile of the subject.Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2009.The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability.The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable.All adjustments were appropriate to bring the comparables in line with the subject for purposes of the appraisal


problem.In particular Ms. Curran made a significant adjustment for condition accounting for the issue of cracks in the subject basement.


Respondent’s evidence met the standard of substantial and persuasive to establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2009, to be $227,000.However, Respondent’s appraisal was accepted only to sustain the original assessment made by the Assessor of $214,700 and not for the purpose of raising the assessment above that value.See, Evidence of Increase in Value, infra.Respondent meet the standard of clear, convincing and cogent evidence in this appeal to sustain the original valuation of $214,700.See, Respondent Proves Value of $214,700, infra.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.[3]

Presumption In Appeals

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization.[4]This presumption is a rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption.It places the burden of going forward with some substantial evidence on the taxpayer – Complainant.The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property.[5]Complainant did not present any evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board.Respondent


presented substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption and establish fair market value.

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.[6]True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use.[7]It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.[8]Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1.Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

 

2.Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.

 


3.A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

 

4.Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

 

5.Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

 

6.The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.[9]

 

Respondent’s appraiser concluded value under the Standard for Valuation.[10]


Methods of Valuation

Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission.It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.[11]Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.[12]Complainant did not present an opinion of value that was derived from any of the three accepted appraisal methodologies.Respondent’s appraiser concluded the fair market value of the subject property relying on the sales comparison approach.This approach is generally recognized to be the strongest methodology for the valuation of an owner occupied residential property where sufficient relevant sales data exists.Ms. Curran was able to locate four comparable sales to perform the sales comparison approach.

Complainant Fails To Prove Value of $197,000


In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2009.[13]There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof.The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief.Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”[14]

Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[15] Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.[16]

Owner’s Opinion of Value

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value.[17]The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation.[18]“Where the basis for a test as to the reliability of the testimony is not supported by a statement of facts on which it is based, or the basis of fact does not appear to be sufficient, the testimony should be rejected.”[19]Mr. Nelson gave his opinion of the fair market value of his property as of January 1, 2009, to be $197,000.However, there was no statement of facts upon which the opinion was based.Disagreement by a taxpayer with the sale properties used by the Respondent’s appraiser does not constitute facts supporting the owner’s opinion of value.

No evidence of market data to substantiate the owner’s opinion was presented.The only evidence presented by Mr. Nelson to establish fair market value was his statement of opinion.That is insufficient to meet the standard of substantial and persuasive evidence.An owner’s opinion unsupported by relevant market data is not based upon proper elements or a proper foundation.Such an opinion of value can be accorded no probative weight.

A taxpayer does not meet his burden if evidence on any essential element of his case leaves the Commission “in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise.”[20]In the present case, all that the Hearing Officer has is speculation, conjecture and surmise as to the elements and foundation that went into Mr. Nelson’s opinion of value.A decision cannot rest on those elements.

Complainant did not meet his burden of proof and therefore failed to prove the value of $197,000.



Evidence of Increase in Value

In any case in St. Louis County where the assessor presents evidence which indicates a valuation higher than the value finally determined by the assessor or the value determined by the board of equalization, whichever is higher, for that assessment period, such evidence will only be received for the purpose of sustaining the assessor’s or board’s valuation, and not for increasing the valuation of the property under appeal.[21]The evidence presented by the Respondent was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the fair market value of the property under appeal, as of January 1, 2009, to be $227,000.However, under the Commission rule just cited and Supreme Court decision[22] the assessed value cannot be increased above $40,790[23] in this particular appeal.

Respondent Proves Value of $214,700

The Respondent has imposed upon him by the provisions of Section 137.115.1, RSMo, the burden of proof to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain a valuation on residential property which is made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program.There is a presumption in this appeal that the original valuation, which was sustained by the Board of Equalization, was made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program.There was no evidence to rebut the presumption, therefore, in order to sustain the valuation of the subject property at $214,700, appraised value, Respondent’s evidence must come within the guidelines established by the legislature and must clearly and convincingly persuade the Hearing Officer as to the value sought to be sustained.

The statutory guidelines for evidence to meet the standard of clear, convincing and cogent include the following:


(1)The findings of the assessor based on an appraisal of the property by generally accepted appraisal techniques; and

 

(2) The purchase prices from sales of at least three comparable properties and the address or location thereof.As used in this paragraph, the word comparable means that:

 


(a)Such sale was closed at a date relevant to the property valuation; and

 

(b) Such properties are not more than one mile from the site of the disputed property, except where no similar properties exist within one mile of the disputed property, the nearest comparable property shall be used.Such property shall be within five hundred square feet in size of the disputed property, and resemble the disputed property in age, floor plan, number of rooms, and other relevant characteristics.[24]

 

Clear, cogent and convincing evidence is that evidence which clearly convinces the trier of fact of the affirmative proposition to be proved.It does not mean that there may not be contrary evidence.[25]The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing must be more than a mere preponderance but does not require beyond a reasonable doubt.[26]“For evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder’s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.”[27]The appraisal report of Ms. Curran met the statutory guidelines for clear, cogent and convincing evidence.The opinion of value concluded of $227,000 clearly and convincingly establishes the value of the subject property on January 1, 2009, to be at least $214,700 as originally determined by the Assessor.


ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2009 and 2010 is set at $40,790.

Application for Review

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Decision.The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.

Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. [28]

Disputed Taxes

The Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed.Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED September 3, 2010.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OFMISSOURI

 

 

_____________________________________

W. B. Tichenor

Senior Hearing Officer

w.b.tichenor@stc.mo.gov

 

 

 

 

Certificate of Service

 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed postage prepaid on this 3rdday of September, 2010, to:William Nelson, 2193 Federal Way, Chesterfield, MO 63017,Complainant;Paula Lemerman, Associate County Counselor, Attorney for Respondent, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105; Michael Brooks, Acting Assessor, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105; John Friganza, Collector, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105.

 

 

___________________________

Barbara Heller

Legal Coordinator

Barbara.Heller@stc.mo.gov

 

 

 

Contact Information for State Tax Commission:

Missouri State Tax Commission

301 W. High Street, Room 840

P.O. Box 146

Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146

573-751-2414

573-751-1341 Fax

 

 

 


[1] BOE Decision letter, Exhibit 1, Page 1 of 5

 

[2] Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

 

[3] Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, 138.431.4, RSMo.

 

[4] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958)

 

[5] Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959)

 

[6] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).

 

[7] Daly v. P. D. George Company, et al, 77 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App E.D. 2002), citing, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. STC, 852 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo. App. 1993); citing, Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S.W.2d 798, 801-803 (Mo. 1973).

 

[8] Hermel, supra.

 

[9] Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

 

[10] Exhibit 1, Certification/Signature Page

 

[11] See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra;Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).

 

[12] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

 

[13] Hermel, supra.

 

[14] See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).

 

[15] See, Cupples-Hesse, supra.

 

[16] Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

 

[17] Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970).

 

[18] Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

 

[19] Carmel Energy at 783.

 

[20] See, Rossman v. G.G.C. Corp. of Missouri, 596 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Mo. App. 1980).

 

[21] Section 138.060, RSMo; 12 CSR 30-3.075.

 

[22] The Supreme Court of Missouri has interpreted Section 138.060.The Court stated:

“Section 138.060 prohibits an assessor from advocating for or presenting evidence advocating for a higher ‘valuation’ than the ‘value’ finally determined by the assessor. … . Because the legislature uses the singular terms ‘valuation’ and ‘value’ in the statute, however, it clearly was not referring to both true market value and assessed value.While the assessor establishes both true market value and assessed value, which are necessary components of a taxpayer’s assessment, as noted previously, the assessed value is the figure that is multiplied against the actual tax rate to determine the amount of tax a property owner is required to pay.The assessed value is the ‘value that is finally determined’ by the assessor for the assessment period and is the value that limits the assessor’s advocacy and evidence.Section 138.060.By restricting the assessor from advocating for a higher assessed valuation than that finally determined by the assessor for the relevant assessment period, the legislature prevents an assessor from putting a taxpayer at risk of being penalized with a higher assessment for challenging an assessor’s prior determination of the value of the taxpayer’s property.”State ex rel. Ashby Road Partners, LLC et al v. STC and Muehlheausler, 297 SW3d 80, 87-88 (Mo 8/4/09)

 

[23] The assessed value for the Assessor’s original appraised value of $214,700.

 

[24] Section 137.115.1(1) & (2).

 

[25] Grissum v. Reesman, 505 S.W.2d 81, 85, 86 (Mo. Div. 2, 1974).

 

[26] 30 AmJur2d. 345-346, Evidence section 1167.

 

[27] Matter of O’Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. App. 1980).

 

[28] Section 138.432, RSMo.