Alumax Foils v Daly

 

ALUMAX FOILS, INC., ) Appeal No. 00-20050

BACHMAN MACHINE COMPANY, ) Appeal No. 00-20051

BOXES, INC., ) Appeal No. 00-20052

LINCOLN INDUSTRIAL, ) Appeal No. 00-20053

NESTLE USA, INC., ) Appeal No. 00-20055

THE DIAL CORPORATION, ) Appeal No. 00-20057

PRECOAT METALS, ) Appeal No. 00-20058

CPI PROPERTIES, ) Appeal No. 00-20059

NORDYNE INCORPORATED, ) Appeal No. 00-20060

P.D. GEORGE COMPANY, ) Appeal No. 00-20061

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, ) Appeal No. 00-20062

WARNER-JENKINSON COMPANY, ) Appeal No. 00-20064

)

Complainants, )

)

v. )

)

GREGORY DALY, )

LICENSE COLLECTOR, )

ST. LOUIS CITY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

 DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the St. Louis City Merchants’ and Manufacturers’ Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the License Collector, SET ASIDE, the Commission finds the true value in money for the subject property for tax year 2000 to be:

ISSUE

The issue in these appeals is: What was the true value in money as of January 1, 2000, of Complainants’ machinery and equipment, specifically, what is the most probable price that could be commanded for the machinery and equipment in an open-market, competitive exchange with buyer and seller both acting knowledgeably and prudently?

SUMMARY

The above-captioned Complainants appeal their 2000 assessments as finalized and equalized by the St. Louis City Board of Merchants’ and Manufacturers’ Tax Equalization. The 2000 assessment history for each Complainant follows:

00-20050 Alumax Foils, Inc.
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$6,062,310
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $6,062,310 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$1,779,500
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$6,062,310

00-20051 Bachman Machine
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$7,034,049
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $7,034,049 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$5,290,795
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$7,034,049

 

00-20052 Boxes, Inc.
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$3,772,515
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $3,772,515 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$2,419,585
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$3,772,515

 

00-20053 Lincoln Industrial
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$6,744,858
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $6,744,858 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$3,452,455
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$6,744,858

 

00-20055 Nestle USA, Inc.
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$7,740,187
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $7,740,187 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$3,813,144
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$7,740,187

00-20057 The Dial Corporation
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$15,727,524
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $15,727,524 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$6,028,630
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$15,727,524

 

00-20058 Precoat Metals
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$7,406,754
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $7,406,754 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$5,111,870
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$7,406,754

00-20059 CPI Properties LLC
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$4,117,776
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $4,117,776 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$ 913,445
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$4,117,776

00-20060 Nordyne, Inc.
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$20,125,887
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $20,125,887 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$ 6,414,895
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$20,125,887

00-20061 P. D. George Company
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$6,351,243
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $6,351,243 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$2,215,470
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$6,351,243

00-20062 St. Louis Post Dispatch
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$10,571,016
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $10,571,016 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$1,059,215
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$10,571,016

00-20064 Warner-Jenkinson Company
Assessed Value as Approved by the Board for 2000		$23,387,571
Assessed Value as Reviewed by the Board for 2000		Appeal rejected, Recommended assessment of $23,387,571 approved
Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing		$ 5,024,211
Respondent’s proposed assessment at hearing		$23,387,571

A hearing was conducted on December 4, 2001, by Hearing Officer Aimee L. Smashey at the St. Louis City Hall, St. Louis, Missouri. Complainant appeared by Counsel, Thomas L. Caradonna, St. Louis, Missouri. Respondent appeared by Counsel, Mark J. O’Toole, Assistant City Counselor, St. Louis, Missouri.

Complainants’ Evidence

In each of the above-referenced appeals, the Complainants offered into evidence the appraisal report (Complainants’ Exhibit A), cost approach demonstration (Complainants’ Exhibit B) and written direct testimony (Complainants’ Exhibit C) of Allen D. Bealmear, ASA, CEA, President of MB Valuation Services. The exhibits were received into evidence.

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent did not offer identical sets of exhibits in each of the appeal, but generally offered Complainant’s 2000 Manufacturer’s Property Declaration, Complainant’s Fixed Asset Listing, the 2000 Notice of Assessment Change, the Board’s 2000 Decision Letter, the 2000 Manufacturer’s Tax Bill, the 2000 Complaint for Review of Assessment, a Depreciation Summary, an Equipment Sales Chart, and the Direct Testimony of David G. F. Schmidt.

The Board Decision Letters and Complaints for Review of Assessment filed with the Commission were not received as exhibits as they are part of the pleadings in each appeal. The Manufacturer’s Tax bills were excluded from evidence upon Complainants’ motion. The Depreciation Summary was objected to at hearing and it’s receipt was taken under advisement. This Hearing Officer overrules Complainants’ objections and admits the Depreciation Summaries. The remainder of Respondent’s proffered exhibits were received into evidence.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over these appeals is proper. Complainants timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis City Merchants’ and Manufacturers’ Tax Equalization Board.

2. The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20050 – Alumax Foils, Inc., Personal Property Account No. 942269237-2000-AL8010632, consists of 481 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes dust collection systems, casting lines, incinerators, furnaces, roll grinders, and rolling mills (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20051 – Bachman Machine, Co., Personal Property Account No. 430672522-2000-8010633, consists of 288 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes machining centers, machining bar code centers, lathes, a jig grinder, EDMs, press lines, and a coordinate measuring machine (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20052 – Boxes, Inc., Personal Property Account No. 431131581-2000-AL8010645, consists of 87 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes a box machine, CAD cutting table, tray machine, label laminator, printer/folder/gluer machines, and a conveying and strapping system (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20053 – Lincoln Industrial, Personal Property Account No. 012966053-2000-AL8010636, consists of 1,769 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes a transfer machine, an automatic bar machine, a rotary surface grinder, furnaces, an air compressor, automatic screw machines, machining centers, a washing system, assembly lines, and turning centers (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20055 – Nestle USA, Inc., Personal Property Account No. 951572209-2000-AL8010642, consists of 5,653 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes polishing pans, conveyor systems, a packaging line, packaging machines, bag filling machines, tablet machines, a power transfer station, air dryers, an air compressor, a mixer, an air transporting system, separators, an elevator transfer system, coating pan machines, tablet press machines, box filling lines, tablet sizer machines, extensive storage systems, hoppers, grinders, an engine lathe, and dry packaging machines (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20057- The Dial Corporation, Personal Property Account No. 510374887-2000-AL8010639, consists of 1,580 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes a sulfonation system, a chemical test station, a personnel lift, a liquid process batch mixing system, a cooling tower, palletizers, a truck and rail loading system, filling lines, a conveyor system, a spray dryer, running bins, various tanks and batteries, dust collectors, a vertical machining center, chemical analyzer systems, a liquid filling maching line, product cooler equipment, product detergent scoop distribution system, and a reject recycle line for dry detergent (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20058 – Precoat Metals, Personal Property Account No. 131885030-2000-AL5162880, consists of 138 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes forklifts, bridge cranes, a power shear, an aerial platform, a roll grinder, coil coating lines, and a cut-to-length line (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20059 – CPI Properties, LLC., Personal Property Account No. 431729900-2000-AL8010635, consists of 752 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes studio systems, cameras, printers, a film recorder, inspection stands, a film processor, a vertical milling machine, color paper processors, an electrolytic unit, slitters, a spectrophotometer, a film coater, a tank system, video measurement sets, cable analyzers, and a plotter (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20060 – Nordyne Incorporated, Personal Property Account No. 050414381-2000-AL8010638, consists of 2,526 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes press brakes, punch presses, bridge cranes, conveyors, fabricators, roll forming lines, a brazing line, a helium reclaim system, an expanding press, power shears, turret punches, a coil feeder, fin presses and die sets, expanders, surface grinders, a hairpin bender, air compressors, leak detectors, a custom fabricating and bending line, a parts identification system, a parts tracking system, a refrigerant reclaim system, flue seam formers, welders, and a toggle lock machine (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20061 – P.D. George Company , Personal Property Account No. 430287315-2000-AL8010647, consists of 2,002 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes tanks, a forklift, air compressors, a pilot plant, a truck scale, an unloading system, reactors, aerial platforms, a burner, a boiler, a heater, a mixing station, mills, and dispersers (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20062 – St. Louis Post Dispatch, Personal Property Account No. 430496290-2000-AL8010641, consists of 607 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes vacuum handling units, an image setter, tying machines, scanners, a proofer, printing presses, a collator, processors, exposer/processors, a handling system, strapping machines, aerial platforms, an engine lathe, a laser imager, and a vertical milling machine (Exhibit A).

The personal property which is the subject of Appeal No. 00-20064 – Warner-Jenkinson Company, Personal Property Account No. 131185700-2000-AL8010663, consists of 1,084 pieces of machinery and equipment (Tr. 3 – 4) which includes forklifts, an air compressor, a packaging machine, a central panel for the tank storage area, an LS particle size analyzer, HPLC millipores, a liquid chromatograph, a diode array detector, boilers, a process control system, a spray drying system, a granulator system, tanks, a crystallization system, an ice maker, reactors, filter presses, a centrifuge, and a membrane separation system (Exhibit A).

3. A market value appraisal inherently requires a highest and best use analysis. A highest and best use analysis is the mechanism in an appraisal that zeroes in on (1) the use of the property that will produce the highest return in an exchange (2) whether there is sufficient demand to make such an exchange probable. This analysis shows the appraiser what to appraise it as, and therefore, how to approach the cost, sales comparison, and income approaches.

4. The subject equipment was predominantly standard machinery and equipment.

5. Such equipment is regularly traded in the used machinery and equipment market.

6. There was no market data presented that would indicate a demand for the machinery and equipment as assembled and in place at the subject sites.

7. Complainants’ appraisals primarily relied upon the selling prices of comparable machinery and equipment from the used machinery and equipment market. Complainants’ evidence provided the best indication of the worth of the subject property in the open market.

8. The market values of Complainants’ machinery and equipment located in St. Louis City as of January 1, 2000, were:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear these appeals and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo.

Board of Equalization Presumption

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the St. Louis City Merchants’ and Manufacturers’ Tax Equalization Board. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo 1994, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. Mo. Const. Art X, Section 4(b) (1945, amended 1982); St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, supra, at 897.

Market Value

Market value is defined as “…[t]he most probable price which a property would bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus. Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

a. buyer and seller are typically motivated;

b. both parties are well informed or well advised, and acting in what they consider their best interests;

c. a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market;

d. payment is made in terms of cash in United States dollars or in terms of financial arrangements comparable thereto; and

e. the price represents the normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions granted by anyone associated with the sale.”

Federal Register, vol. 55, no. 163, August 22, 1990, pages 34228 and 34229; also quoted in the Definitions section of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, 1996 ed.

Comparison of Value in Exchange and Value in Use

Value in exchange or exchange value is defined as “[t]he value of a commodity in terms of money to persons generally, as distinguished from use value to a specific person.” (The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, Third Edition, Appraisal Institute, 1993, at 125).

Value in use or use value is defined as “the value a specific property has for a specific use” (Ibid. at 383) and “the value of property which reflects a value to a specific user, recognizing the extent to which the property contributes to the personal requirements of the owner.” (The Appraisal of Personal Property, American Society of Appraisers, 1994 at 2).

An exchange value is an objective value determined by transactions between buyers and sellers in the open market. A use value is a subjective value of an owner, user, or potential owner based solely upon his or her personal needs for the property. By definition then, market value is the value determined by the exchange of property between an informed seller and an informed buyer after exposure in the open market and not a subjective opinion of some individual or entity. However, there is a distinction between a value in use to a specific user and a value recognized by a group of informed potential buyers that a property has for a specific use. The latter should be fully considered under a market value appraisal. Further, if there is sufficient demand for the property for the use to which it is being put by the owner, exchange value can be equivalent to the use value to the owner. The market value standard does not require appraisers to discard transactions or market demand for assembled machinery and equipment just because the market finds the property valuable for the same use that it is being put to by the owner. Such evidence should be fully considered in a market value appraisal. Conversely, if there is no evidence that there is demand for machinery and equipment assembled and in place, it would be inappropriate to value the property as assembled and in place since such valuation would not be indicative of a market value in exchange. See, Daly v. P.D. George, 2002 WL 553712 (Mo. App. E.D., 2002).

Complainants’ Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2000. Hermel, supra, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

DECISION

As in recent appeals, the parties dispute the specific market that would have sufficient demand and result in the highest value for the subject property. Complainants’ appraisal opines that the most probable exchange of the machinery and equipment in these appeals would be a sale as individual pieces of used machinery and equipment. Respondent’s appraiser opines a value in continued use and estimates the depreciated value of the machinery and equipment as installed and in operation.

It is well-established that Missouri law requires that property be valued at its market value, an exchange-driven value, for property tax assessment purposes. (See, Conclusions of Law: Standard for Value and Market Value, supra at 11). Inherent in a market value standard is the necessity for a highest and best use analysis because the standard requires a well-informed potential buyer and a well-informed seller each acting in his or her best interests. While there may be several markets for the property, a well-informed seller looking out for his or her best interests will chose to sell in the market that produces the highest value. In contrast, there may be few markets for the property and a well-informed buyer will not pay more for the property than the amount it will command in a market with sufficient demand. A highest and best use analysis is the mechanism in an appraisal that zeroes in on (1) the use of the property that will produce the highest return in an exchange; and (2) whether there is sufficient demand to make such an exchange probable. This analysis shows the appraiser what to appraise the property as, and therefore, how to approach the cost, sales comparison, and income approaches.

Complainants’ Approach to Value

Each of the twelve Complainants offered an appraisal report and the testimony of Mr. Allen D. Bealmear, a machinery and equipment appraiser. Mr. Bealmear and his staff inventoried and inspected the machinery and equipment at the subject site(s) in St. Louis City (Complainants’ Exhibit C, generally at 7 – 8; Complainants’ Exhibit A at 7 – 8). As part of their inventory, they ascertained which equipment had been added or removed between the tax date and the date of their inspection and inventory.

The appraisals were performed based upon a fair market value standard. Mr. Bealmear defines fair market value as “[t]he estimated amount expressed in terms of money that may reasonably be expected for an item of property between a willing buyer and a willing seller with equity to both, neither under compulsion to buy or sell and both fully aware of all relevant facts.” (Complainants’ Exhibit C, generally at 8). Mr. Bealmear and his staff researched the market for market sales data of the type of machinery and equipment under consideration and determined that the most probable exchange of such machinery and equipment would be individual sales in the used machinery and equipment market (Complainants’ Exhibit C, at 8, 9, & 19). They had no market sales data that showed such property would likely sell as assembled in place (Complainants’ Exhibit C, at 19; Tr. 8, 9, 10, & 13). Accordingly, he appraised the subject machinery and equipment as if it were individual pieces of machinery and equipment available for sale and, relying primarily on the sales comparison approach, concluded the following market values:

Respondent’s Approach to Value

Respondent presented evidence and testimony in support of the 2000 values determined by the Merchant’s and Manufacturer’s Tax Equalization Board for the subject machinery and equipment. Respondent presented the testimony of its Auditor, David G.F. Schmidt. Mr Schmidt reviewed the License Collector’s records for each Complainant and the relevant filings for the 2000 tax year. He testified that the basis for Respondent’s valuation of the subject machinery and equipment of each Complainant is a calculation of the original cost less depreciation of the equipment which is then depreciated at a rate of 10% per year down to a floor of 30% for property acquired 7 years prior to the tax date.

Conclusion

The trier of fact has the duty to evaluate the evidence presented to determine its sufficiency and persuasiveness in establishing market value. The opinion evidence offered by Complainants’ appraiser evaluates the marketplace, market supply and demand elements, sales of like or similar equipment, and calculates most equipment values based upon the most comparable market data. Complainants’ evidence provides a persuasive indication of how and at what price the subject machinery and equipment would sell. Complainants’ evidence is substantial and persuasive in support of their proposed market values. Respondent’s evidence articulates the cost methodology employed to calculate the current valuations for Manufacturer’s License Tax assessment purposes. The cost approach methodology is a valid methodology, but its indicated values are only as sound as the data used in the methodology. Respondent presented insufficient market data to overcome or rebut Complainants’ market data and establish that the depreciation schedule utilized by Respondent’s office provides a sound indication of the depreciation that the market would impute to the subject machinery and equipment.

Accordingly, this Hearing Officer holds that Complainants’ evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of the St. Louis City Merchants’ and Manufacturers’ Tax Equalization Board.

ORDER

The assessed valuations for the subject property as determined by the License Collector and affirmed by the Merchants’ and Manufacturers’ Board of Equalization Board for St. Louis City for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE. The assessed valuation for the subject machinery and equipment for the 2000 tax year is hereby set at:

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of a hearing officer decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous.

If an application for review of a hearing officer decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the License Collector of St. Louis City as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED July 16, 2002.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Aimee L. Smashey

Hearing Officer

 

ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC

Upon information provided by Counsel for Respondent, review of the Hearing Officer’s Decision and Order, dated July 16, 2002, and the record, said Decision and Order is amended nunc pro tunc as follows:

1. On page 1, the figure $1,779,500 which appears at the end of the line reading: 00-20050 Alumax Foils, Inc., is stricken and the following figure is inserted in lieu thereof: $5,339,035.

2. On page 2, the figure $1,779,500 which appears at the end of the line reading: Complainant’s proposed assessment at hearing, under the heading 00-20050 Alumax Foils, Inc., is stricken and the following figure is inserted in lieu thereof: $5,339,035.

3. On page 10, Finding of Fact 8, the figure $1,779,500 which appears at the end of the line reading: 00-20050 Alumax Foils, Inc., is stricken and the following figure is inserted in lieu thereof: $5,339,035.

4. On page 16, the figure $1,779,500 which appears at the end of the line reading: 00-20050 Alumax Foils, Inc., is stricken and the following figure is inserted in lieu thereof: $5,339,035.

5. On page 17 and 18, the assessed values set forth for each appeal are stricken and the following assessed values are inserted in lieu thereof:

In all other respects said Decision and Order is ratified as originally issued.

SO ORDERED: August 16, 2002.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

 

ORDER

AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION,

AS CORRECTED BY ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC,

UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

On July 16, 2002, Hearing Officer Aimee L. Smashey entered her Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessments by the St. Louis City Merchants’ and Manufacturers’ Board of Equalization and finding value for each of Complainants’ properties.

Respondent’s Grounds for Review

Respondent timely filed his Application for Review of the Decision. Respondent’s Application for Review set forth various errors relative to calculations of assessed values for each of the Complainants’ properties. By Order Nunc Pro Tunc of the Chief Hearing Officer, dated August 16, 2002, the assessed values set forth in the Hearing Officer’s Decision and Order of July 16, 2002, were corrected to the figures set forth in Respondent’s Application for Review filed with the Commission on August 15, 2002. Respondent’s Application for Review did not state any further grounds for reversal or modification of the August 15, 2002, Decision.

Standard Upon Review

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as she may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

DECISION

A review of the record in these appeals provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer, as corrected by the Order Nunc Pro Tunc of the Chief Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused her discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

The Order Nunc Pro Tunc properly addressed the miscalculations in the original Decision and Order as set forth in Respondent’s Application for Review. No other grounds were set forth for reversal or further modification of the original Decision and Order.

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in these appeals, as corrected by the Order Nunc Pro Tunc, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or further modified. Accordingly, the Decision, as corrected by the Order Nunc Pro Tunc, is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.470 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED September 18, 2002.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Sam D. Leake, Chairman

Bruce E. Davis, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner