Park 370 Development v. Muehlheausler (SLCO)

December 19th, 2003

 

PARK 370 DEVELOPMENT LLC )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeals Number 02-10275 thru 02-10286

)

PHILIP A. MUEHLHEAUSLER, )

ACTING ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

On September 16, 2002, Complainant appealed the classification and valuation of the subject properties. The case was submitted to the Tax Commission on Stipulations of Fact. Respondent filed a brief. Complainant did not file a brief. Complainant is represented by Steven Koslovsky, Attorney at Law. Respondent is represented by Robert J. Droney, Attorney at Law. The case has been assigned to Hearing Officer Luann Johnson for decision and order.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

The only issue in this case is the proper classification of the subject property, and any concurrent valuation change resulting from a change in classification. For tax year 2002, Respondent changed the classification of the subject properties to Acommercial.@ Said change resulted in an increase in value for the parcels. The correct classification of the subject parcels is Aagricultural.@ The decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization is SET ASIDE.

VALUES

 

Appeal/Parcel No.

Assessor & Board

Market/Assessed

Taxpayer

Market/Assessed

Tax Commission

Market/Assessed

02-10275

09M440038

$153,800/$49,200

$7,046/$845

$7,046/$845

02-10276

09M430138

$855,000/$273,760

$39,201/$4,704

$39,201/$4,704

02-10277

08M410041

$814,000/$260,510

$37,305/$4,476

$37,305/$4,476

02-10278

08M410030

$293,600/$93,950

$13,453/$1,614

$13,453/$1,614

02-10279

08M230025

$748,800/$239,620

$34,311/$4,117

$34,311/$4,117

02-10280

08M210094

$254,400/$81,410

$11,676/$1,401

$11,676/$1,401

02-10281

08M140067

$224,400/$78,210

$11,197/$1,344

$11,197/$1,344

02-10282

08M120070

$144,100/$45,150

$6,467/$766

$6,467/$766

02-10283

08M120069

$284,500/$91,040

$13,034/$1,564

$13,034/$1,564

02-10284

08M120047

$192,100/$61,470

$8,802/$1,056

$8,802/$1,056

02-10285

08M120036

$186,000/$59,520

$8,523/$1,023

$8,523/$1,023

02-10286

08M120025

$192,200/$61,500

$8,802/$1,056

$8,802/$1,056

STIPULATED FACTS

1. Complainant purchased the above-referenced parcels in 2002.

2. Prior to and after Complainant=s purchase, the parcels have been used for agricultural purposes.

3. After purchase, Complainant platted the parcels for future commercial development.

4. Complainant has constructed infrastructure and brought utilities to the subject properties.

5. Complainant has obtained rezoning for the subject properties.

6. Complainant markets the subject properties for commercial development.

7. Prior to 2002, the properties were classified as Aagricultural.@ For tax year 2002, Respondent changed the classification of the properties to Acommercial.@

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

All real property used for agricultural purposes and devoted primarily to the raising and harvesting of crops and to the feeding, breeding and management of livestock is Aagricultural and horticultural property.@ Section 137.016.1(2), RSMo.

After it has been established that the land is actually agricultural and horticultural property, as defined in Section 137.016, and is being valued and assessed accordingly, the land shall remain in this category as long as the owner of the land complies with the provisions of Sections 137.015 to 137.021. Section 137.017.2, RSMo.

Continuance of valuation and assessment for general property taxation under the provisions of Sections 137.017 to 137-021 shall depend upon continuance of the land being used as agricultural and horticultural property, as defined in Section 137.016, and compliance with the other requirements of Sections 137.017 to 137.021 and not upon continuance in the same owner of title to the land. Section 137.017.3, RSMo.

The filing of a real property subdivision plat with the recorder of deeds shall not, singularly, result in a change in classification or an increase in the appraised value of such property. Section 137.119, RSMo.

DECISION AND ORDER

Respondent contends that said parcels are vacant and unused and held for future development and should be classified and valued as commercial property. We disagree. Property which is being actively used for agricultural purposes is to be classified as agricultural property. The fact that the owner changes; or the owner files a subdivision plat; or the owner has plans for future development does not change the current classification of the property if agricultural use continues.

The values previously determined by the Assessor and approved by the Board of Equalization are SET ASIDE. The Assessor is ordered to place the following assessed values on the books for tax year 2002:

For appeal 02-10275, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $845, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10276, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $4,704, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10277, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $4,476, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10278, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $1,614, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10279, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $4,117, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10280, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $1,401, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10281, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $1,344, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10282, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $766, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10283, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $1,564, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10284, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $1,056, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10285, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $1,023, as agricultural graded land.

For appeal 02-10286, the assessed value for the subject property is set at $1,056, as agricultural graded land.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of a hearing officer decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial.

If an application for review of a hearing officer decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with these appeals shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in these appeals. If any protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED December 19, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Luann Johnson, Hearing Officer

Kenneth & Carole Token v. Overschmidt (Franklin)

December 10th, 2003

KENNETH & CAROLE TOKEN, )

)

Complainants, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 03-57007, 03-57008

& 03-57009

)

BILL OVERSCHMIDT, ASSESSOR, )

FRANKLIN COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

 

 

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the Franklin County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE, Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject properties for tax years 2003 and 2004 to be as follows:

Appeal No. 03-57007: $235,725 – residential, assessed value of $44,790
$1,290 – agricultural, assessed value of $155
Appeal No. 03-57008: $1,275 – agricultural, assessed value of $154
Appeal No. 03-57009: $2,085 – agricultural, assessed value of $251

 

Complainant, Kenneth Token, appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Mark Vincent, County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

The Commission takes these appeals to determine whether portions of the subject properties should be given agricultural grading and assessed at 12% of the appropriate agricultural use value, or whether certain portions of the subject properties should be valued at their fair market value as vacant and unused agricultural land and assessed at 12% of the fair market value?

SUMMARY

Complainants appeal the decision of the Franklin County Board of Equalization which sustained the valuation and classification of the subject property. The Assessor valued a portion of the property as residential and the remainder as vacant and unused agricultural land, instead of agricultural graded land. Complainant did not challenge the valuation of the residential portion of the subject property as it related to the residence and the homesite as had been assessed in 2002, but challenged assessing the remainder as vacant and unused agricultural land and proposed the land be valued according to agricultural grades in existence in 2002 and assessed accordingly. A hearing was conducted on November 13, 2003, at the Franklin County North Annex Building, Union, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainants= Evidence

Mr. Token appeared and testified in his own behalf. The following exhibits were received into evidence in support of Complainants= case.

Exhibit A    A chronology of activity on the subject property – Grand Ridge Farm.

Exhibit B    Mr. Token=s written presentation as to relevant information relating to the use of Grand Ridge Farm.

Exhibit C    Three brochures on agroforestry.

(1) Grow Native, published by the Missouri Department of Conservation.

(2) Marketing Specialty Forest Products, Scott J. Josiah, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

(3) Productive Conservation, Scott J. Josiah, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

Exhibit D    Photographs of portions of Grand Ridge Farm.

Mr. Token=s argument that Grand Ridge Farm should be returned to agricultural grading as it was in the 2001-02 assessment cycle is grounded in the following points: (1) when Complainants purchased the Farm it was agricultural graded land; (2) Grand Ridge Farm is surrounded by properties that are indistinguishable in appearance from the subject tracts and these surrounding and adjoining properties are classified as agricultural graded land; (3) Complainants have made investments in the Farm which are directed toward agricultural activity; and (4) Complainants have increased the agricultural activity on the Farm.

Respondent=s Evidence

Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Ms. Lori Rae Ruby, appraiser for Franklin County. The appraiser testified as to her appraisal of the land for the subject properties. The Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, of Ms. Ruby was received into evidence. Exhibit 1 was offered to support the valuations determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board.

The property record cards on the subject properties for 2002, at the request of the Hearing Officer, were received into evidence as Exhibit 2. These property record cards are identified as follows:

2A 2002    Property Record Card for the property in Appeal No. 03-57007.

2B 2002    Property Record Card for the property in Appeal No. 03-57008.

2C 2002    Property Record Card for the property in Appeal No. 03-57009.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainants timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Franklin County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject properties in each appeal are located at 949 Grand Ridge Drive in an unincorporated area of Franklin County. Combined the properties constitute a contiguous tract of land comprising 39.4 acres of land. The land is zoned under the zoning ordinances of Franklin County as Agricultural Non Urban.

3. Appeal No. 03-57007: The tract in appeal 03-57007 (Lot 1) consists of 9.6 acres of land. It is identified by parcel number 08-5-21.0-0-003-012.000. Lot 1 is improved with a residential structure built in 1995. Complainants did not challenge the valuation of the residence and a one acre home site and its classification as residential. The fair market value assigned by the Assessor to the one acre homesite and residence for tax year 2003 was $235,725. The remaining 8.6 acres of Lot 1 were valued by the Assessor at $46,535 and assessed as residential land. Complainants challenge the residential classification of the 8.6 acres and the valuation at fair market value, instead of valuing under agricultural grades. In the 2001-02 assessment cycle the Assessor placed the 8.6 acres in agricultural grade 6 with a value of $1,290. Exhibit 2A.

4. Appeal No. 03-57008: The tract in appeal 03-57008 (Lot 2) consists of 9.5 acres of land. It is identified by parcel number 08-5-21.0-0-003-012.100. Lot 2 is unimproved and consists of meadow and forest. For 2003 the Assessor valued Lot 2 at $50,790 and assessed it at 12%, for an assessed value of $6,096. Complainants challenge the valuation at fair market value, instead of valuing under agricultural grades. In the 2001-02 assessment cycle the Assessor placed 7.5 acres in agricultural grade 6 with a value of $1,125. The remaining 2 acres were graded as agricultural grade 7 with a value of $150. The combined agricultural graded value for the tract in 2001-02 being $1,280. Exhibit 2B.

5. Appeal No. 03-57009: The tract in appeal 03-57009 (Lot 3) consists of 20.3 acres of land. It is identified by parcel number 08-5-21.0-0-003-012.200. Lot 3 is unimproved and consists of meadow and forest, with a lake of approximately 4 acres. Complainants challenge the valuation at fair market value, instead of valuing under agricultural grades. For 2003 the Assessor valued Lot 3 at $108,760 and assessed it at 12%, for an assessed value of $13,051. In the 2001-02 assessment cycle the Assessor placed 7.5 acres in agricultural grade 6 with a value of $1,125. The remaining 12.8 acres was graded as agricultural grade 7 with a value of $960. The combined agricultural graded value for the tract in 2001-02 being $2,090. Exhibit 2C.

6. Agricultural Grade 6 Land is generally unsuited for cultivation and limited largely to pasture and sparse woodland. Such land is of moderate to steep slopes (8-20%) and has sever erosion hazards present. 12 CSR 30-4.010(1)(F).

7. Agricultural Grade 7 Land is generally unsuited for cultivation and may have other severe limitations for grazing and forestry that cannot be corrected. Such land is of very steep slopes (over 15%) and has severe erosion potential and very shallow topsoil. 12 CSR 30-4.010(1)(G).

8. Forest land, whose cover is predominantly trees and other woody vegetation, of two or more acres in area, which if cleared and used for agricultural crops, would fall into land grades # 6 or #7 should be placed in land grade # 7. Forest land may or may not be in use for timber production, wildlife management, hunting, other outdoor recreation or similar uses. 12 CSR 30-4.010(2).

9. Thirty-eight and four tenths acres of the combined subject parcels fit within the agricultural grades of 6 or 7. Exhibits 2A, 2B and 2C.

10. Complainants did not offer any evidence as to the fair market value of the land comprising Grand Ridge Farm. The fair market value of the disputed land is as follows: (1) Appeal 03-57007 – $51,320; (2) Appeal 03-57008 – $50,790; and (3) Appeal 03-57009 – $108,760.

11. Complainants purchased the approximately 40 acre tract in October, 2001. In January 2002, Complainants began the development of various portions of the property for Agroforesty with native plants. Complainants= plan of utilization of the subject farm which was commenced in 2002 is to plant and grow native plants for commercial and residential landscaping and for medicinal purposes for the pharmaceutical industry, using the forest land, meadows and lake at Grand Ridge Farm. Plants, roots and seeds from native plants and other plants to be planted at Grand Ridge Farm will be sold to area nurseries, landscape contractors, and medicinal herb buyers. Mr. Token is registered with the Missouri Department of Conservation as a Professional Wholesale Grower under the Grow Native program. He has researched agroforestry and its potential use for Grand Ridge Farm. Exhibits A, B, C & Testimony of Mr. Token

12. Mr. Token had a horticultural survey completed. He cleared forest access routes and prepared planting sites. Approximately 250 plants were set out in 25 different sites on Grand Ridge Farm. Approximately 3 to 5 acres, plus the 5 acre lake have been developed for agroforestry activity at the current time. Areas of cleared land have been planted with native grasses in trial plantings. The agroforestry farming will never involve the utilization of the entirety of the approximately 38.4 acres for which Complainants are seeking agricultural grading. Exhibits B, D & Testimony of Mr. Token.

13. During 2002, Mr. Token expended approximately $2,600 for the purchase of machinery to implement his agroforestry development. He expended $200 for the purchase of seeds, roots, and plants. Approximately 600 man hours of labor were expended in preparing planting sites, planting of seeds, roots and plants, and in otherwise farming his agroforestry sites. Exhibits B, D & Testimony of Mr. Token.

14. During 2003, an additional $900 has been expended on seeds, roots and plants. Initial plans have been developed for a $2,000 greenhouse to be used for the growing of seedlings and plants for transplanting on Grand Ridge Farm. A total of approximately 750 man hours have been used to carry out agroforestry activities in 2003. Exhibits B, D & Testimony of Mr. Token.

15. The Missouri Department of Conservation promotes the growing of native plants and provides information and assistance as to development of land for growing and marketing native plants. Exhibit C, Grow Native brochure.

16. Mr. Token has investigated forestry programs of the Missouri Department of Conservation (MDC) and has been initially advised that his plans and objectives for native plant agroforestry are compatible with the Forest Stewardship Program. Mr. Token signed a Forest Stewardship Program Agreement with a representative of the Department of Conservation in September 2003. No MDC forestry or land conservation program was in place on Grand Ridge Farm as of January 1, 2003. Exhibit A & Testimony of Mr. Token.

17. The development and utilization of Grand Ridge Farm for agroforestry constitutes an agricultural use which requires the subject farm to be valued according to the appropriate agricultural grades as existed on the land for the 2001-02 assessment cycle.

Appeal No. 03-57007: 8.6 acres agricultural grade 6 – $1,290.
Appeal No. 03-57008: 7.5 acres agricultural grade 6 – $1,125.
2.0 acres agricultural grade 7 – $150.
Appeal No. 03-57009: 7.5 acres agricultural grade 6 – $1,125.
12.8 acres agricultural grade 7 – $960.

 

 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Board of Equalization Presumption

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

The presumption in favor of the Board is not evidence. A presumption simply accepts something as true without any substantial proof to the contrary. In an evidentiary hearing before the Commission, the valuation or classification determined by the Board, even if simply to sustain the value made by the Assessor (which is not presumed to be correct), or the classification made by the Assessor, is accepted as true only until and so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.

Duty to Investigate

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer=s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo.

Weight to be Given Evidence

The Hearing Officer is free to consider all pertinent facts and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

Trier of Fact

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of a witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

Complainants= Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of the correct classification and grading and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed classification and grading is appropriate for the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002).

Classification of Agricultural Land

All real property used for agricultural purposes and devoted primarily to the raising and harvesting of crops shall be classified as Agricultural and horticultural property and assessed at twelve percent (12%) of true value. Sections 137.016.1(2) & 137.115.5(2), RSMo.

For general assessment purposes, the true value in money of land which is in use as agricultural and horticultural property, shall be that value which such land has for agricultural or horticultural use. After it has been established that land is actually agricultural or horticultural property, and is being valued and assessed accordingly, the land shall remain in this category so long as the owner of the land continues to use the land for agricultural and horticultural purposes. Continuance of valuation and assessment for general property taxation shall depend upon continuance of the land being used as agricultural and horticultural property and not upon continuance in the same owner of title to the land. For general assessment purposes, the true value in money of vacant and unused land which is classified as agricultural and horticultural property shall be its fair market value. Section 137.017, RSMo.

DECISION

The decision in this case rests upon whether agroforestry is an agricultural use. This is a case of first impression for the Commission. No other similar appeal relative to the raising and harvesting of native or exotic plants for landscaping or herbal medicinal purposes has come before the Commission. However, if agroforestry is the raising and harvesting of crops then it is appropriate for land devoted to such use to be classified as agricultural land and valued according to agricultural grades established by Commission rule.

It is important to recognize and remember that Commission decisions are driven by the evidence in a given case. In other words, the essential facts developed in the record provide the basis upon which the decision must be rendered. Each decision may vary depending on the particular facts in a given case.

Specifically, the fact that Complainant is cultivating various plants on Grand Ridge Farm does not necessarily mean that another landowner, who just happens to have some of the same plants growing on his land, is automatically entitled to agricultural grading of that property. For example, the fact that a landowner has ginseng on a two-acre tract of land on which a residence is located does not require that a portion of that land be given an agricultural grade. That, of course, is not the situation in the present case.

There are a variety of factors which come into play as to whether the subject property is vacant and unused agricultural land or is being actively devoted to agricultural use. These are: (1) agroforesty as a category of agricultural use; (2) classification for the immediate prior assessment cycle; (3) activities of Complainant with regard to agroforestry prior to January 1, 2003; (4) activities of Complainant with regard to agroforestry subsequent to January 1, 2003; (5) extent of area devoted to and needed to support agroforestry at Grand Ridge Farm; and (6) topography of Grand Ridge Farm.

Agroforestry

The use of land for agroforestry, as being developed and practiced by Complainant on Grand Ridge, is a use of real property for agricultural purposes. Agroforesty can consist of the planting of trees, such as black walnut, spaced sufficiently apart so as to permit row cropping or

pasturing and haying operations in the area around and between rows of trees. The agroforestry being practiced by Complainants is of a different variety than this.

The fact that certain of the crops which are being cultivated and harvested are plants or roots which are native to the area does not alter the fact that the activities by Complainant constitute the raising and harvesting of crops. Nor does the fact that other plants Complainant has planted are what might otherwise be called exotic plants mean that the activity being conducted is not an agricultural activity. In some ways, the utilization of the subject tracts by Complainant is not unlike those instances where a farm that was devoted to the raising of cattle is changed to the raising of emu or ostrich. Except in this instance, Mr. Token is cultivating some plants which naturally grow within and on forested land, as opposed to more open areas. At the same time Mr. Token is working with development and utilization of open areas of Grand Ridge for the growing a native grasses for seed production.

The investment of time, energy and financial resources into the development of Grand Ridge Farm for agroforestry evidences a very serious committment by Complainant. This is not a landowner attempting to establish an agricultural use based simply upon the fact that some plants which might be used for medicinal, culinary or ornamental uses happen to exist on a tract of land. Agroforestry, in whatever variety of shapes it might take, is clearly the utilization of land for growing and harvesting crops. Thus, when established as Complainant has demonstrated, this factor weighs heavily against the subject tracts being vacant and unused agricultural land, and strongly on the side of an actual agricultural use.

Prior Classification

The matter of the prior classification of Grand Ridge Farm is important due to the fact that this is a clear indication that during the 2001-02 assessment cycle the subject tracts were recognized as appropriate for agricultural classification. There is no evidence on the record as to what the particular agricultural activity on Grand Ridge Farm was prior to the purchase by the Tokens. However, it was sufficient for the Assessor to value the land under the agricultural land use grades established by Commission rule.

The prior classification is also important due to the statutory requirement that once land as been established as actually agricultural property it is to remain in that catagory, so long as the land continues in an agricultural use. It is also important to recognize that a change in ownership cannot trigger taking land out of agricultural classification and assessing it as vacant and unsued agricultural land. It is the actual utilization of the land, not the ownership which is controlling. Therefore, the fact that the prior owner may have been utilizing the land under appeal for simply pasture or haying purposes does not mean that Complainant must continue that particular use of the land in order to continue to receive the benefit of agricultural grading of the land. It clearly appears from the fact that the entirety of the Grand Ridge Farm previously was placed in agricultural grades 6 and 7, except for the one acre homesite, that the agricultural use for the farm would be restricted to essentially pasturing or possibly haying on the non-timber acres.

The factor of the prior classification establishes the appropriate agricultural grades for the farm under agricultural use. It does not weigh either for or against a determination of the land being vacant and unused agricultural land or land that should be valued under agricultural grades. This is due to the fact that the prior classification as agricultural graded land does not estalbish the land use as of January 2003. It does however establish that if an agricultural use, even different from that in effect prior to the 2001 classification, existed as of January, 2003, then the agricultural grade classification is appropriate.

Pre-1/1/03 Activities

The activities of Mr. Token after his purchase of the Farm in late 2001 and through 2002 clearly evidence a desire and intent to develop and utilize his land for agroforestry. The range of activities go far beyond simply planting a wildflower garden, stocking a fishing pond with water lilies or creating feeding stations for deer and birds. Activities like these would not appear in any manner to qualify as the raising and harvesting of crops. If this were all that Complainant was doing a claim for agricultural use would be unfounded.

However, that is not the case. The labor and money put into the Farm for the cultivation of the various plants which Mr. Token seeks to develop under his agroforestry operation provide clear evidence of the plan and intention to utilize Grand Ridge Farm for this new and innovative method of agricultural use. It is obvious that the type of agroforestry which Complainant is fostering does not necessarily result in a harvest each growing season, as is the case when corn, wheat, beans, etc., are being cultivated and harvested. This, however, does not alter the fact that the cultivation of native plants under an agroforesty operation is anything less than an agricultural use.

Some of the work, such as clearing of trails into the wooded areas where native plants grow, is not direct cultivation. However, such activity is necessary in order to be able to cultivate and harvest crops. Clearing of forest areas for the better growing of native plants is likewise required to be able to increase the productivity of various of the native plants. Clearing of other areas as test plots for raising of native and ornamental grasses is part of the plans for future cultivation of Grand Ridge Farm. All of these steps taken pre-2003, evidence an agricultural use and preparation for continued agricultural use under an agroforestry operation.

Post-1/1/03 Activities

The additional activities conducted by Mr. Token during 2003 are important because they are further evidence of his committment to the enlargement of agroforestry at Grand Ridge. Even though these activities are after the tax date for the 2003 assessment cycle it is appropriate for consideration to be given to them. If, instead of continuing the agroforestry planning and production in 2003, Mr. Token had begun developing Grand Ridge Farm to be subdivided into one or two acre lots and had proceeded to sell off lots, this would be evidence of a non-agricultural use. Mr Token=s plans for the construction of a greenhouse for the raising of plants to be set out at Grand Ridge give further evidence of the continuation of an agricultural enterprise.

By being recognized as a professional wholesale grower under the MDC Grow Native program, Grand Ridge Farm is able to market native plants to retail nurseries, landscape contractors, and to medicinal herb buyers. This puts Mr. Token=s use of the land into a situation essentially the same as any other land owner who would utilize his farm for the growing and marketing of fruits and vegetables which might be sold at farmer=s markets, directly to groceries or wholesale suppliers. Therefore, the accumulation of the activity in furtherance of the goal of utilization of Grand Ridge for agroforestry gives additional weight to actual agricultural use which requires the land to be valued under the appropriate agricultural grades, instead of being assessed as vacant and unused agricultural land.

Forest Stewardship Program

The investigation by Mr. Token of the Forest Stewardship Program (FSP) with the Missouri Department of Conservation (MDC) is not conclusive as to agricultural use as of January, 2003, since Grand Ridge was not in enrolled in that program at that time. However, the evidence is clear that Mr. Token has pursued a course of action to attempt to utilize state conservation programs with reference to the timber areas of Grand Ridge. It appears that there is some level of misunderstanding between the parties relative to whether Grand Ridge would be reclassified as agricultural graded land if Mr. Token places qualifying acreage in the FSP. Mr. Token was under the impression that Grand Ridge would be reclassified as of January 1, 2004, as agricultural graded land, except for one acre which would be classified as residential, along with the Complainants= house. Mr. Token believes, based upon a letter dated April 17, 2003, that the FSP is a program that Respondent approves of for agricultural classification. The Assessor=s staff desires to see a complete formalized agreement relative to the FSP, rather than the document signed by Mr. Token and the MDC state forester for Franklin County in September, 2003. If, in point of fact, the September, 2003, agreement is all that is required by the MDC for the Grand Ridge timber acreage to be enrolled in the FSP, the appropriate documentation should be provided from MDC to Complainants and Respondent relative to this.

As Mr. Token proceeds to formalize and finalize the placing of the Grand Ridge timber land in the FSP prior to the end of 2003 or during 2004, this would appear to present an additional factor in favor of agricultural grading of the subject tracts. However, at this point the matter of how the Assessor may wish to treat the classification of Grand Ridge based upon the actual implementation of a FSP agreement between Complainants and the Department of Conservation is for the Assessor to address in his discretion. If in fact it is the policy of the Respondent to give agricultural grades to forest land or other lands that are in certain Department of Conservation programs, then it would be clear that Grand Ridge would have to be treated in the same manner as other tracts in Franklin County in this regard. In other words, if the Assessor=s policy is to give agricultural land grade values to forest land in MDC programs, then Grand Ridge would have to be afforded that same benefit.

Agroforestry Area

The next factor which needs to be examined relates to the area of Grand Ridge Farm which is be devoted to or has potential development for agroforestry. Across this state there are vast tracts of wooded acreage which are contiguous to open tracts of land devoted to agricultural use. Such forested acreage is graded as agricultural land. A given farm may be utilized for mainly row crop production of corn and beans and all of the adjoining timber land is agricultural grade land, irrespective of whether there is any plan for timber harvesting. Likewise a farm that is utilized for pasturing and haying will have all of its timber acreage valued as graded agricultural land, instead of assessing it as vacant and unused agricultural land.

The Commission has recognized since the early days of reassessment in the mid 1980’s that timber land that is a contiguous part of a farm is to be agricultural graded land. A large portion of Grand Ridge is forest land, predominately covered by timber. However, much of Complainants= agroforestry activity is carried out within the actual timber land. This is simply the utilization of forest land for an agricultural use different from timber harvesting.

The development and utilization of open spaces of Grand Ridge for seed production of native grasses is not dissimilar to a farm which is a haying or pasturing operation with adjoining wooded areas all of which are valued according to agricultural land grades. The Hearing Officer recognizes that this particular facet of Mr. Token=s agricultural operation has been in basically a testing or exploratory stage to determine what native grasses may prove to be the most appropriate for production at Grand Ridge. During the initial developmental stages in 2002 and 2003, most of Mr. Token=s activity has been directed toward utilization of the forest acreage for agroforestry. Additional cultivation of water plants in the lake and grasses in the open spaces cannot necessarily achieved over night. It does not appear that one can complete an agroforestry of the type contemplated by Mr. Token in a day, nor even in a single growing season.

The very nature of the type of agroforestry, water plant cultivation and native seed production which are in the infant stages at Grand Ridge result in an area of less than ten acres actually being under utilization in 2002 and 2003. However, this factor must be taken and understood within the overall context of what comprises Grand Ridge. A large portion of the acreage is dominated by woodland. There is a lake of approximately four acres. The open areas which might be considered as pasture or meadow land are not conducive to the production of row crops.

The Hearing Officer understands that at no time will the entirety of all the forest land at Grand Ridge be planted to ginsing, native ferms, shitake mushrooms, goldenseal, black cohosh, pickerel weed, or other medicinal or ornamental plants. Nor will every square foot of open, non-woodland space necessarily be sown to blue stem, Indian, buffalo, or other native grasses. Such an intensive level of activity is not required in order to establish an agricultural use. A farm of with some 20 acres of good pasture would easily support the grazing of a number of horses. The

fact that the land owner only grazes one or two horses will not result in a denial of agricultural grading for what is clearly an agricultural use.

As previously referenced, if all Mr. Token had done was to plant a few wild flowers in a flower garden around his house, or set out a water lily or two on his lake, the Hearing Officer would not consider that sufficient to establish the raising and harvesting of crops. However, Complainants have done much more than this. The area of Grand Ridge being utilized by Complanants for the particular type of agroforesty and raising of crops is sufficient to demonstrate a general agricultural use consistent with the type of land which comprises Grand Ridge.

The evidence is insufficient to establish that one can reasonably allocate certain acreas to agricultural use and other acreas to vacant and unused agricultural land. This would be no more practical or feasible to attempt than to allocate all timber land on Missouri farms to vacant and unused agricultural land, unless timber was being actively harvested. The actual agricultural use being carried out on Grand Ridge is of sufficient level to logically apply agricultural land grading to the entirety of the farm, except for a one acre residential tract, rather than attempt an arbitrary split-off between agricultural graded and vacant and unused agricultural land.

Topography

The final factor which the Hearing Officer has considered is the overall topograph of Grand Ridge. For this purpose, the Hearing Officer is using the word topograph to refer to the general lay of the land and its features. Although no topographical map or aerial photograph of Grand Ridge was offered into evidence, from Exhibits 1 and D, and the photographs contained therein and Exhibits 2A, 2B and 2C (agricultural land grades for each tract), a generally good idea of the lay of the land and its features can be determined.

Grand Ridge is generally hilly to rolling land. It is of sufficient slope that it not would be practical or advantageous to clear the timber and attempt to farm the land either by sowing pasture grasses or row crops. To do so would result in serious erosion issues. The soil types which support the forested areas would not be conducive to planting of generally recognized farm crops, however, native plants which grow in timber will be able to grow and thrive. The combination of the meadows, the lake and wooded acreage does not lend itself to any type of cultivated farming, other than those types of raising and harvesting of crops being developed by Mr. Token. Even attempts to row crop the open areas around the lake would create problems of erosion.

Grazing of livestock would appear to be an option for Grand Ridge, however, with the vast amount of woods, this option would not be greatly attractive to certain owners. Apparently, Mr. Token does not desire to run livestock at Grand Ridge. He is not required to do so in order to obtain agricultural land grading for the farm. Mr. Token has elected to pursue a land utilization which appears to conform to and be in harmony with the overall topograph of the 40 acres at Grand Ridge. The type and extent of the agroforestry and other agricultural operations conducted and planned may be the most suitable economic use for Grand Ridge, given the general topography. It is certain that Complainants are so convinced from the investment of time and money that has been and is planned to be invested in their farm to pursue agroforesty.

Conclusion

The agroforestry being developed on the subject lands constitutes raising and harvesting of crops. Grand Ridge Farm is not vacant and unused. Complainants are putting selected areas of their acreage to very specific agricultural uses which are compatable with the land. Given the evidence in this case, it is not necessary that the entirety of the acreage in dispute be under cultivation or agroforesty utilization. Since actual agricultural activity is being conducted on the subject lands, as opposed to simply letting the ground lie fallow, unattended, or unutilized in any crop raising and harvesting fashion, the acreage previously given agricultural grades in the immediate prior assessment cycle should continue as agricultural graded land. One acre which surrounds and upon which is located Complainants= home is to be classified as residential property, in accordance with the classification previously applied by the assessor and the valuation determined by the Assessor for 2003.

ORDER

The assessed valuations for the subject properties as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for Franklin County for the subject tax day are SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal 03-57007 for tax years 2003 and 2004 is set at $44,945, ($44,790, as residential property and $155, as agricultural property, valued at agricultural grades).

The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal 03-57008 for tax years 2003 and 2004 is set at $154, as agricultural graded land.

The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal 03-57009 for tax years 2003 and 2004 is set at $251, as agricultural graded land.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with these appeals shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Franklin County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in these appeals. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED December 10, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Hearing Officer

ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC

The Decision and Order (Decision) issued December 10, 2003, upon review of the record and information from Respondent that the calculations shown on page 14 of Exhibit 1 did not clearly set forth that adjustments for the one acre home site and the neighborhood factor were to be made to the home site value and the extra feature value. The Hearing Officer had understood that said adjustments were included in amounts given for parcel 0852100003012.000 (Appeal 03-57007).

Accordingly, the Hearing Officer now corrects his Decision nunc pro tunc to correctly reflect the one acre home site adjustment and neighborhood factor adjustment, as follows:

1. On page 1 under HOLDING, for Appeal No. 03-57007 the figure $235,725 is stricken and the figure $240,660 is inserted in lieu thereof.

2. On page 1 under HOLDING, for Appeal No. 03-57007 the figure $44,790 is stricken and the figure $45,725 is inserted in lieu thereof.

3. On page 4 under FINDING OF FACT 3, in the fifth (5th) line, the figure $235,725 is stricken and the figure $240,660 is inserted in lieu thereof.

4. On page 22 under ORDER in the fifth (5th) line, the figure $44,945 is stricken and the figure $45,880 is inserted in lieu thereof.

5. On page 22 under ORDER in the fifth (5th) line, the figure $44,790 is stricken and the figure $45,725 is inserted in lieu thereof.

In all other respects the Decision and Order dated December 10, 2003, is ratified and affirmed, with the aforemade corrections.

SO ORDERED: December 19, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Hearing Officer

Ozark Steam Engine Association v. Twitty (Greene)

May 6th, 2003

 

OZARK STEAM ENGINE ASSOC., )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeals Number 02-33001 & 02-33002

)

JEAN TWITTY, ASSESSOR, )

GREENE COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

 

DECISION AND ORDER

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the non-exempt status of its property for tax year 2002.

On March 25, 2003, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Tax Commission hearing officer, Luann Johnson, at the Greene County Courthouse in Springfield, Missouri. Complainant was represented by Evelyn Mangan, Esq. Respondent was represented by Glenn Green, Esq.

ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether thirty-three (33) acres, used to house and exhibit steam powered farm equipment, is exempt from taxation because it is used for a charitable purpose, to wit, educating the public concerning historical agricultural practices.

HOLDING

Each tax exemption case is peculiarly one which must be decided upon its own facts. It is the public policy of the state that property actually and regularly used exclusively for charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation, and taxing authorities are not to be permitted to defeat that policy by unreasonable or unrealistic application of the “strict construction” rule. Missouri United Methodist Retirement Homes v. State Tax Commission, 522 S.W.2d 745, 751 (Mo. banc 1975). However, taxation is the rule and claims of exemption from taxation are not favored. A property owner that claims entitlement to exemption from taxation bears a substantial burden of proof on all issues. Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention v. Mitchell, 658 S.W.2d 1 (1983). Complainant has failed to meet its burden of proof supporting its claim of entitlement to a tax exemption.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Greene County Board of Equalization.

2. On November 14, 1962, Ozark Steam Engine Association, Inc. was formed as a general not for profit corporation under the laws of the State of Missouri (Exhibit A). The purpose of the corporation, as stated in the amended articles filed January 6, 2000, is:

“The corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, educational, religious or scientific purposes within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and is organized in furtherance thereof to promote cooperation in all matters of interest to the individuals who are deeply interested to preserve the old-time steam engines which did so much in the pioneering effort of generations both past and present; to develop an increased civic interest; to create and maintain good clean and wholesome entertainment and education to all participants; to compile and distribute information to its members for their benefit; to aid and protect its members and to do all things that are properly within the scope of such an association for the welfare of its members and its Community and State” (Exhibit B).

3. In the event of dissolution of the corporation, no part of the assets of the corporation can be distributed to, nor inure to the benefit of, any individual. Transfer of the assets or the proceeds of the sale of assets can only be made to organizations created and operated for nonprofit purposes (Exhibit B).

4. The corporation was granted IRS tax exempt status in December, 1999 (Exhibit D).

5. On the tax day, the corporation had approximately 90 members. Each member pays dues of $10 per year. Monthly membership meetings are held. Monthly meetings are not open to the public.

6. The corporation owns agricultural real property having a market value of $35,000 allocated as follows: Parcel No. 17-10-300-021 has a market value of $33,000 (assessed value $3,960). Parcel No. 17-10-400-022 has a market value of $2,000 (assessed value $240). The corporation owns $30,000 to $40,000 of antique farm equipment which it parks on the above mentioned parcels. The market value of the real property is not in dispute.

7. Once a year, for three or four days in September, the corporation holds a “Steam-O-Rama” where it opens its doors to the general public and holds demonstrations of steam powered farming practices, a flea market and a craft sale.

Outside groups and individuals may bring gas and steamed powered equipment to exhibit at the Steam-O-Rama. There is no charge to equipment exhibitors or their family members. There is a charge for flea market exhibitors.

There is a gate fee of $5 per person. However, children under 12 are admitted free; there is a senior citizen discount; and school, scouts and other groups are admitted free. Approximately 15 percent of all admissions were free in 2002. There is no limit on the number of groups which can obtain free admission.

On Thursday evening a cookout and entertainment is provided for members only. The arts and crafts portion of the Steam-O-Rama is where “our ladies” sell crafts they have made for their own profit.

8. In April each year Complainant allows the Gas Engine Club to use its grounds free of charge for a swap meet. No evidence was presented concerning the possible not-for-profit status of the Gas Engine Club or the use of the funds generated from said swap meet.

9. In June of each year Complainant allows the Girl Scouts to use the property free of charge for camp outs.

10. Complainant maintains an RV park on the grounds. The RV park has no electricity. There is no charge for the use of the RV park, but it is only open during the Steam-O-Rama.

11. Complainant has no educational committee and publishes no educational material. Public educational functions are limited to on site demonstrations of equipment and any information that the equipment operator verbalizes as individuals pass by the demonstration during Steam-O-Rama. Private educational functions and historical discussions occur at membership meetings.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Burden of Proof

Although a taxing statute is construed strictly against the state, an exemption statute is strictly construed against the one claiming the exemption. State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Goldberg, 578 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Mo. banc 1979).

In order to prevail, Complainant must demonstrate by substantial and persuasive evidence, that it is entitled to an exemption.

Substantial evidence is that evidence which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, i.e., evidence favoring facts which are such that reasonable men may differ as to whether it established them, and from which the Commission can reasonably decide an appeal on the factual issues. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

Statutory Exemptions

Properties which can be exempted from taxation are set out within our Constitution and the statutes enacted to enforce that Constitution, to wit:

“. . .all property, real and personal, not held for private or corporate profit and used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, for purposes purely charitable, . . .may be exempt from taxation by general law but any such law may provide for approximate restitution to the respective political subdivisions of revenues lost by reason of the exemption. All laws exempting from taxation property other than the property enumerated in this article, shall be void. Article X, Section 6, Mo. Const. of 1945.

 

In support of this Constitutional provision, the Legislature has enacted Section 137.110, RSMo, which provides in relevant part:

The following property shall be exempt from taxation:

(5) All property, real and personal, actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, or for purposes purely charitable and not held for private or corporate profit, except that the exemption herein granted does not include real property not actually used or occupied for the purpose of the organization but held or used as investment even though the income or rentals received therefrom is used wholly for religious, education or charitable purposes; Section 137.110, RSMo.

 

Case Law on Charitable Use

In order for a property to be exempt from taxation for state, county or local purposes, the following tests must be met:

1. The property must be actually and regularly used exclusively for a charitable purpose, as charity is defined by Salvation Army v. Hoehn, 188 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. banc 1945). “Charity” is therein defined as “. . .a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining the public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.” Salvation Army at 830.

2. The property must be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis. The property “must be dedicated unconditionally to the charitable activity in such a way that there will be no profit, presently or prospectively, to individuals or corporations. Any gain achieved in use of the building must be devoted to achievement of the charitable objectives of the project.” Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213, at 224 (Mo. banc 1978).

3. The dominant use of the property must be for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons and must directly or indirectly benefit society generally. “It is required that there be the element of direct or indirect benefit to society in addition to and as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons directly served by the humanitarian activity”. Franciscan at 224. See also, Barnes Hospital v. Leggett, 589 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. banc 1979).

DISCUSSION

The test to be applied for determination of a charitable use that would bring this property within the parameter of the statute has three prongs, each of which must be satisfied by the evidence offered by the Complainant.

The first prong of the test is that the subject property must be actually and regularly used exclusively for a charitable [educational] purpose. In this regard, the subject property fails to meet the exemption test. The actual and regular use of the property is for the storage of vintage farm equipment. The maintenance and restoration of vintage farm equipment is a noble and worthwhile endeavor however, in and of itself, this purpose does not qualify for a tax exemption. To qualify for an exemption, there must be a dominant use which meets the definition of a gift as that term is used in Salvation Army. Complainant asserts that the qualifying gift is education. However, the facts demonstrate that very little education actually occurs on the property. For three or four days a year the property is open to the public and demonstrations occur occasionally. While the property is open to the public, there are also non-educational activities occurring such as swap meets, flea markets, craft sales and social functions. It is not possible to find that these social and non-educational functions are “very limited” or “inconsequential” nor is it possible to find that educational activities are the dominant use of the property.

These facts are distinguishable from the facts in The Engineers Club of St. Louis v. State Tax Commission, 524 SW 2d 839 (1975) where the Engineers Club used its property to conduct public meetings and educational seminars throughout the entire year; worked with schools of engineering in the State of Missouri to review curricula and explore new teaching avenues; had an outreach program to high schools, secondary schools and junior engineers; maintained a public affairs committee that sponsored public meetings on various public issues relating to engineering; and where the Engineers Club’s stated purpose included advancing the field of engineering, making technical and scientific information available to the general public, and aiding in the solution of public questions involving engineering and scientific problems. The court found the Club’s educational activities to be “extensive” including actively participating in civic planning issues such as mass transit, airport planning, water quality, concrete design and solid waste disposal. The court further found that any social activities were “very limited” and “inconsequential.”

Complainant has failed to establish a dominate educational use for the subject property which would qualify said property for a tax exemption.

The second prong of the test requires that the property be both owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis. There is no dispute that Complainant is a not-for-profit corporation. However, an IRS letter is only on part of the test. There is a reasonable question as to whether or not the property is actually operated on a not-for-profit basis. While it is probably true that Complainant is not receiving a significant profit from the use of the property, the fact remains that other individuals operating a swap meet and craft booths are using the property to make a profit for themselves. Complainant can argue that the profit it makes from the use of the property is incidental to its corporate purpose however it can not make the same argument for the individuals who are selling their wares from Complainant’s property.

The final test which must be passed if the property is to be exempt is that the dominant use must be for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons and provide a direct or indirect benefit to society in general. Complainant has not yet demonstrated that the dominant use of the real property actual provides such a benefit to society.

ORDER

The non-exempt status the subject property, as determined by the Assessor and approved by the Board of Equalization, is AFFIRMED.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of a hearing officer decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial.

If an application for review of a hearing officer decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Greene County as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED May 6, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Luann Johnson

Hearing Officer

Westwood Country Club of St. Louis (SLCO)

April 22nd, 2003

 

WESTWOOD COUNTRY CLUB OF ST. LOUIS, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 02-10271

)

PHILIP A. MUEHLHEAUSLER, )

ACTING ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the change in classification made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE.

Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2002 to be $1,107,660.

Complainants appeared by Counsel, Byron E. Francis, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case submitted on briefs and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

The Commission takes this appeal to determine whether the Assessor of St. Louis County has the authority under Section 137.115, RSMo to change the classification on real property in an even-numbered year, thereby changing the assessed value, in the absence of new construction or property improvements to the affected real property.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which sustained the action of the Assessor in changing the classification and thereby increasing the assessed value of the subject property.

Evidentiary hearing was waived and the legal issue was submitted on briefs. Counsel for Complainant filed his Brief on February 13, 2003, and his reply brief on April 7, 2003. Counsel for Respondent filed her Brief with the Commission on March 18, 2003.

The Hearing Officer, having considered the arguments and points of law set forth in the Briefs and Reply Briefs enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 11801 Conway Road, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 19 N 410051.

3. No evidence was proffered by Respondent, nor was any claim made by Respondent, that there had been new construction and improvement to the subject property during tax year 2001 upon which a change in assessed valuation would be warranted.

4. There is no dispute as to the fair market value of the subject property.

5. The assessed value of the subject property for tax year 2001 was $1,107,660. The assessor changed the assessed value to $1,470,830.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Two-Year Assessment Cycle

The Assessor shall annually assess all real property in the following manner: new assessed values shall be determined as of January first of each odd-numbered year and shall be entered in the assessor’s books; those same assessed values shall apply in the following even-numbered year, except for new construction and property improvements which shall be valued as though they had been completed as of January first of the preceding odd-numbered year. Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

Statutes Given Effect As Written

Statutes are to be given effect as written and there is no need for construction of a statute which is clear on its face. The plain language of the statue is to be given effect. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Boston, 72 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); Bright v. Bright, 989 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999); McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1996).

DECISION

The answer to the issue presented in this case is answered by the clear and unequivocal language of the controlling statute, Section 137.115.1, RSMo. See, Two-Year Assessment Cycle, supra.

Because the word “shall” is used throughout the statute, the assessor is mandated to use the same assessment in the even-numbered year as was used in the preceding odd-numbered year with the sole exception being where there has been new construction and property improvements. In the present case, the qualify condition of new construction or property improvements does not exist. There was no new construction or property improvements to the subject during the year 2001. The plain language of the statute must be given effect. See, Statutes Given Effect As Written, supra. The compulsory language of the statute mandates the rejection of the assessment made by the Respondent on the subject property for the year 2002.

The Commission has twice held that Section 137.115.1 deprives an Assessor of the ability to increase the assessed value of real property in even-numbered years. In Ostrander v. Zimmerman, STC No. 96-32502, March 13, 1997, the taxpayer moved into his newly constructed house on the day before Thanksgiving, 1995. From December 1, 1995, through December 31, 1995, the property was assessed as an improved parcel at an appraised value of $159,075. For 1996, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the property utilizing a Certificate of Value showing that the taxpayer had actually paid $181,725 for the property. The taxpayer argued that the assessor was bound by the assessed value established for 1995, the odd-numbered year. The Commission agreed, holding that the post-occupancy valuation for 1995 “must be carried forward for the 1996 assessment of the property.”

In Marks v. Raines, STC No. 98-73000, November 25, 1998, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the taxpayers’ residence for 1998 based upon improvements to the property including a concrete driveway, retaining sea wall and boat dock. Taxpayers introduced evidence showing that such improvements had been placed on the property prior to January 1, 1997, and had apparently not been reflected on the assessor’s records for 1997. The Commission found for the taxpayer, holding that there was no new construction or improvements during 1997 which would trigger a new assessed value for 1998 under Section 137.115. The Hearing Officer found against the Assessor “as a matter of law, that since no new construction and improvements had taken place during 1997, he has no legal authority to change the assessment for 1998.”

The underlying principle involved in both Ostrander and Marks are applicable and controlling in the present case. There was no new construction or property improvements on the subject property during 2001. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, Respondent has no legal authority to change the assessment for 2002.

Respondent’s reliance on Nike IHM, Inc., et al. v. Zimmerman, STC Nos. 00-33023 through 00-33028, February 5, 2002, is unfounded. Nike involved the issue of exemption pursuant to Section 172.273, RSMo 1986 as amended, which was held by the Missouri Supreme Court to be unconstitutional on August 1, 2000. Nike and other tenants had, for a period of years, been deemed exempt pursuant to such statute. The Assessor filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute and, on January 1, 2000, the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Missouri. In 2000, the Assessor initially assessed the properties involved, but withdrew the assessments upon direction of legal counsel, thereby continuing to treat the properties in the Research Park as exempt. On August 1, 2000, the Missouri Supreme Court issued its opinion declaring Section 172.273 unconstitutional. The Assessor immediately reacted to such decision and, through the St. Charles County Board of Equalization, assessed the properties at issue for 2000. The tenants appealed to the Commission.

The case was presented to the Commission on stipulated facts. The issue before the Commission was whether the Assessor, and the county Board of Equalization, were authorized to assess the properties under the circumstances involved. In its decision, the Commission never reached the issue of whether the assessments violated the two-year assessment cycle. Rather, the Commission held that it was its duty, pursuant to Section 138.380, to place upon the assessment rolls any property which, during the year involved, may be discovered to have, for any reason, escaped taxation. The Commission held that it was bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri and that, accordingly, the properties involved were not exempt on January 1, 2000. Therefore, the Commission treated the properties involved as omitted property. (Nike decision is on appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District).

The present case is not a case of “omitted” property, or, for that matter, property which has escaped taxation for some reason. Rather, it is a case in which Respondent has simply increased the assessed value of the subject property based upon an appellate decision involving different properties in another county. The increase in assessed value by the Respondent did not come about as a result of new construction or improvements. Section 137.115.1, as construed by the prior decisions of this Commission, clearly states that an assessor is bound by the assessed value established in the prior odd-numbered year in the succeeding even-numbered year “except for new construction and property improvements.” Because there is no new construction to the subject, Respondent was not authorized to raise the assessed value of the subject property for 2002 and such assessed value must be returned to the 2001 value.

Respondent’s argument that he did not increase the value of the subject property in the second year of the assessment cycle misses the mark. The mandate of the controlling statute is that the assessed value cannot be increase in the absence of new construction and improvements. There are two ways in which the assessed value can be increase, one of which is to increase the value in true money. The other means of changing the assessed value is by changing the classification. The change in classification in the present case wrongfully breached the statutory line. It increased the assessed value. This is exactly what the plain language of the statute does not authorize.

The language of the St. Louis Court of Appeals (now the Eastern District) in the case of Hannibal ex rel. Bassen v. Bowman, et al., 71 S.W. 1122, 1123, is especially applicable to the present case. The Bowman court, in an assessment case, stated:

“He (the assessor) can only proceed at the time and in the manner pointed out by statute, and, to justify the assessment, he must be able to put his finger on the statute which gives him the authority to make it.”

In the present case, Respondent has not and cannot “put his finger” on a statute giving him authority to change the assessment on the subject property in an even-numbered year. The hand of Complainant rests squarely on the plain language of the controlling statute which bars the change in classification which the Respondent made. The action of the Respondent must be reversed. The subject must be assessed at its 2001 assessed value.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2002 is set at $1,107,660.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED April 22, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

Sunset Country Club v. Muehlheausler (SLCO)

April 22nd, 2003

 

SUNSET COUNTRY CLUB, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 02-10270

)

PHILIP A. MUEHLHEAUSLER, )

ACTING ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the change in classification made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE.

Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2002 to be $1,110,870.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Byron E. Francis, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case submitted on briefs and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

The Commission takes this appeal to determine whether the Assessor of St. Louis County has the authority under Section 137.115, RSMo to change the classification on real property in an even-numbered year, thereby changing the assessed value, in the absence of new construction or property improvements to the affected real property.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which sustained the action of the Assessor in changing the classification and thereby increasing the assessed value of the subject property.

Evidentiary hearing was waived and the legal issue was submitted on briefs. Counsel for Complainant filed his Brief on February 13, 2003, and his reply brief on April 7, 2003. Counsel for Respondent filed her Brief with the Commission on March 18, 2003.

The Hearing Officer, having considered the arguments and points of law set forth in the Briefs and Reply Briefs enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 9555 S. Geyer Road, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 27M610138.

3. No evidence was proffered by Respondent, nor was any claim made by Respondent, that there had been new construction and improvement to the subject property during tax year 2001 upon which a change in assessed valuation would be warranted.

4. There is no dispute as to the fair market value of the subject property.

5. The assessed value of the subject property for tax year 2001 was $1,110,870. The assessor changed the assessed value to $1,376,340.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Two-Year Assessment Cycle

The Assessor shall annually assess all real property in the following manner: new assessed values shall be determined as of January first of each odd-numbered year and shall be entered in the assessor’s books; those same assessed values shall apply in the following even-numbered year, except for new construction and property improvements which shall be valued as though they had been completed as of January first of the preceding odd-numbered year. Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

Statutes Given Effect As Written

Statutes are to be given effect as written and there is no need for construction of a statute which is clear on its face. The plain language of the statue is to be given effect. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Boston, 72 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); Bright v. Bright, 989 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999); McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1996).

DECISION

The answer to the issue presented in this case is answered by the clear and unequivocal language of the controlling statute, Section 137.115.1, RSMo. See, Two-Year Assessment Cycle, supra.

Because the word “shall” is used throughout the statute, the assessor is mandated to use the same assessment in the even-numbered year as was used in the preceding odd-numbered year with the sole exception being where there has been new construction and property improvements. In the present case, the qualify condition of new construction or property improvements does not exist. There was no new construction or property improvements to the subject during the year 2001. The plain language of the statute must be given effect. See, Statutes Given Effect As Written, supra. The compulsory language of the statute mandates the rejection of the assessment made by the Respondent on the subject property for the year 2002.

The Commission has twice held that Section 137.115.1 deprives an Assessor of the ability to increase the assessed value of real property in even-numbered years. In Ostrander v. Zimmerman, STC No. 96-32502, March 13, 1997, the taxpayer moved into his newly constructed house on the day before Thanksgiving, 1995. From December 1, 1995, through December 31, 1995, the property was assessed as an improved parcel at an appraised value of $159,075. For 1996, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the property utilizing a Certificate of Value showing that the taxpayer had actually paid $181,725 for the property. The taxpayer argued that the assessor was bound by the assessed value established for 1995, the odd-numbered year. The Commission agreed, holding that the post-occupancy valuation for 1995 “must be carried forward for the 1996 assessment of the property.”

In Marks v. Raines, STC No. 98-73000, November 25, 1998, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the taxpayers’ residence for 1998 based upon improvements to the property including a concrete driveway, retaining sea wall and boat dock. Taxpayers introduced evidence showing that such improvements had been placed on the property prior to January 1, 1997, and had apparently not been reflected on the assessor’s records for 1997. The Commission found for the taxpayer, holding that there was no new construction or improvements during 1997 which would trigger a new assessed value for 1998 under Section 137.115. The Hearing Officer found against the Assessor “as a matter of law, that since no new construction and improvements had taken place during 1997, he has no legal authority to change the assessment for 1998.”

The underlying principle involved in both Ostrander and Marks are applicable and controlling in the present case. There was no new construction or property improvements on the subject property during 2001. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, Respondent has no legal authority to change the assessment for 2002.

Respondent’s reliance on Nike IHM, Inc., et al. v. Zimmerman, STC Nos. 00-33023 through 00-33028, February 5, 2002, is unfounded. Nike involved the issue of exemption pursuant to Section 172.273, RSMo 1986 as amended, which was held by the Missouri Supreme Court to be unconstitutional on August 1, 2000. Nike and other tenants had, for a period of years, been deemed exempt pursuant to such statute. The Assessor filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute and, on January 1, 2000, the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Missouri. In 2000, the Assessor initially assessed the properties involved, but withdrew the assessments upon direction of legal counsel, thereby continuing to treat the properties in the Research Park as exempt. On August 1, 2000, the Missouri Supreme Court issued its opinion declaring Section 172.273 unconstitutional. The Assessor immediately reacted to such decision and, through the St. Charles County Board of Equalization, assessed the properties at issue for 2000. The tenants appealed to the Commission.

The case was presented to the Commission on stipulated facts. The issue before the Commission was whether the Assessor, and the county Board of Equalization, were authorized to assess the properties under the circumstances involved. In its decision, the Commission never reached the issue of whether the assessments violated the two-year assessment cycle. Rather, the Commission held that it was its duty, pursuant to Section 138.380, to place upon the assessment rolls any property which, during the year involved, may be discovered to have, for any reason, escaped taxation. The Commission held that it was bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri and that, accordingly, the properties involved were not exempt on January 1, 2000. Therefore, the Commission treated the properties involved as omitted property. (Nike decision is on appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District).

The present case is not a case of “omitted” property, or, for that matter, property which has escaped taxation for some reason. Rather, it is a case in which Respondent has simply increased the assessed value of the subject property based upon an appellate decision involving different properties in another county. The increase in assessed value by the Respondent did not come about as a result of new construction or improvements. Section 137.115.1, as construed by the prior decisions of this Commission, clearly states that an assessor is bound by the assessed value established in the prior odd-numbered year in the succeeding even-numbered year “except for new construction and property improvements.” Because there is no new construction to the subject, Respondent was not authorized to raise the assessed value of the subject property for 2002 and such assessed value must be returned to the 2001 value.

Respondent’s argument that he did not increase the value of the subject property in the second year of the assessment cycle misses the mark. The mandate of the controlling statute is that the assessed value cannot be increase in the absence of new construction and improvements. There are two ways in which the assessed value can be increase, one of which is to increase the value in true money. The other means of changing the assessed value is by changing the classification. The change in classification in the present case wrongfully breached the statutory line. It increased the assessed value. This is exactly what the plain language of the statute does not authorize.

The language of the St. Louis Court of Appeals (now the Eastern District) in the case of Hannibal ex rel. Bassen v. Bowman, et al., 71 S.W. 1122, 1123, is especially applicable to the present case. The Bowman court, in an assessment case, stated:

“He (the assessor) can only proceed at the time and in the manner pointed out by statute, and, to justify the assessment, he must be able to put his finger on the statute which gives him the authority to make it.”

In the present case, Respondent has not and cannot “put his finger” on a statute giving him authority to change the assessment on the subject property in an even-numbered year. The hand of Complainant rests squarely on the plain language of the controlling statute which bars the change in classification which the Respondent made. The action of the Respondent must be reversed. The subject must be assessed at its 2001 assessed value.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2002 is set at $1,110,870.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED April 22, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

St. Louis Country Club v. Muehlheausler (SLCO)

April 22nd, 2003

 

ST. LOUIS COUNTRY CLUB, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeals Number 02-10266 thru 02-10269

)

PHILIP A. MUEHLHEAUSLER, )

ACTING ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decisions of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the change in classification made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE in Appeals 02-10266, 02-10267 and 02-10268 and AFFIRMED in Appeal 02-10269.

Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10266 for tax year 2002 to be $2,045,010.

Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10267 for tax year 2002 to be $78,380.

Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10268 for tax year 2002 to be $82,930.

Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10269 for tax year 2002 to be $28,210.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Byron E. Francis, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case submitted on briefs and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

The Commission takes this appeal to determine whether the Assessor of St. Louis County has the authority under Section 137.115, RSMo to change the classification on real property in an even-numbered year, thereby changing the assessed value, in the absence of new construction or property improvements to the affected real property.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which sustained the action of the Assessor in changing the classification and thereby increasing the assessed value of the subject property.

Evidentiary hearing was waived and the legal issue was submitted on briefs. Counsel for Complainant filed his Brief on February 13, 2003, and his reply brief on April 7, 2003. Counsel for Respondent filed her Brief with the Commission on March 18, 2003.

The Hearing Officer, having considered the arguments and points of law set forth in the Briefs and Reply Briefs enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over these appeals is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property in Appeal No. 02-10266 is located at 400 Barnes Road, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 18L210016. The subject property in Appeal No. 02-10267 is located at 540 Barnes Road, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 19L430084. The subject property in Appeal No. 02-10268 is located at 403 Barnes Road, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 18L110048. The subject property in Appeal No. 02-10269 is located at 402 Barnes Road, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 19L440049.

3. No evidence was proffered by Respondent, nor was any claim made by Respondent, that there had been new construction and improvement to the subject property during tax year 2001 upon which a change in assessed valuation would be warranted.

4. There is no dispute as to the fair market value of the subject property.

5. The assessed value of the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10266 for tax year 2001 was $2,045,010. The assessor changed the assessed value to $2,651,540.

6. The assessed value of the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10267 for tax year 2001 was $78,380. The assessor changed the assessed value to $109,130.

7. The assessed value of the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10268 for tax year 2001 was $82,930. The assessor changed the assessed value to $93,620.

8. The assessed value of the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10269 for tax year 2001 was $28,210. The assessor left the assessed value at $28,210.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Two-Year Assessment Cycle

The Assessor shall annually assess all real property in the following manner: new assessed values shall be determined as of January first of each odd-numbered year and shall be entered in the assessor’s books; those same assessed values shall apply in the following even-numbered year, except for new construction and property improvements which shall be valued as though they had been completed as of January first of the preceding odd-numbered year. Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

Statutes Given Effect As Written

Statutes are to be given effect as written and there is no need for construction of a statute which is clear on its face. The plain language of the statue is to be given effect. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Boston, 72 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); Bright v. Bright, 989 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999); McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1996).

DECISION

The answer to the issue presented in this case is answered by the clear and unequivocal language of the controlling statute, Section 137.115.1, RSMo. See, Two-Year Assessment Cycle, supra.

Because the word “shall” is used throughout the statute, the assessor is mandated to use the same assessment in the even-numbered year as was used in the preceding odd-numbered year with the sole exception being where there has been new construction and property improvements. In the present case, the qualify condition of new construction or property improvements does not exist. There was no new construction or property improvements to the subject during the year 2001. The plain language of the statute must be given effect. See, Statutes Given Effect As Written, supra. The compulsory language of the statute mandates the rejection of the assessment made by the Respondent on the subject property for the year 2002.

The Commission has twice held that Section 137.115.1 deprives an Assessor of the ability to increase the assessed value of real property in even-numbered years. In Ostrander v. Zimmerman, STC No. 96-32502, March 13, 1997, the taxpayer moved into his newly constructed house on the day before Thanksgiving, 1995. From December 1, 1995, through December 31, 1995, the property was assessed as an improved parcel at an appraised value of $159,075. For 1996, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the property utilizing a Certificate of Value showing that the taxpayer had actually paid $181,725 for the property. The taxpayer argued that the assessor was bound by the assessed value established for 1995, the odd-numbered year. The Commission agreed, holding that the post-occupancy valuation for 1995 “must be carried forward for the 1996 assessment of the property.”

In Marks v. Raines, STC No. 98-73000, November 25, 1998, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the taxpayers’ residence for 1998 based upon improvements to the property including a concrete driveway, retaining sea wall and boat dock. Taxpayers introduced evidence showing that such improvements had been placed on the property prior to January 1, 1997, and had apparently not been reflected on the assessor’s records for 1997. The Commission found for the taxpayer, holding that there was no new construction or improvements during 1997 which would trigger a new assessed value for 1998 under Section 137.115. The Hearing Officer found against the Assessor “as a matter of law, that since no new construction and improvements had taken place during 1997, he has no legal authority to change the assessment for 1998.”

The underlying principle involved in both Ostrander and Marks are applicable and controlling in the present case. There was no new construction or property improvements on the subject property during 2001. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, Respondent has no legal authority to change the assessment for 2002.

Respondent’s reliance on Nike IHM, Inc., et al. v. Zimmerman, STC Nos. 00-33023 through 00-33028, February 5, 2002, is unfounded. Nike involved the issue of exemption pursuant to Section 172.273, RSMo 1986 as amended, which was held by the Missouri Supreme Court to be unconstitutional on August 1, 2000. Nike and other tenants had, for a period of years, been deemed exempt pursuant to such statute. The Assessor filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute and, on January 1, 2000, the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Missouri. In 2000, the Assessor initially assessed the properties involved, but withdrew the assessments upon direction of legal counsel, thereby continuing to treat the properties in the Research Park as exempt. On August 1, 2000, the Missouri Supreme Court issued its opinion declaring Section 172.273 unconstitutional. The Assessor immediately reacted to such decision and, through the St. Charles County Board of Equalization, assessed the properties at issue for 2000. The tenants appealed to the Commission.

The case was presented to the Commission on stipulated facts. The issue before the Commission was whether the Assessor, and the county Board of Equalization, were authorized to assess the properties under the circumstances involved. In its decision, the Commission never reached the issue of whether the assessments violated the two-year assessment cycle. Rather, the Commission held that it was its duty, pursuant to Section 138.380, to place upon the assessment rolls any property which, during the year involved, may be discovered to have, for any reason, escaped taxation. The Commission held that it was bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri and that, accordingly, the properties involved were not exempt on January 1, 2000. Therefore, the Commission treated the properties involved as omitted property. (Nike decision is on appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District).

The present case is not a case of “omitted” property, or, for that matter, property which has escaped taxation for some reason. Rather, it is a case in which Respondent has simply increased the assessed value of the subject property based upon an appellate decision involving different properties in another county. The increase in assessed value by the Respondent did not come about as a result of new construction or improvements. Section 137.115.1, as construed by the prior decisions of this Commission, clearly states that an assessor is bound by the assessed value established in the prior odd-numbered year in the succeeding even-numbered year “except for new construction and property improvements.” Because there is no new construction to the subject, Respondent was not authorized to raise the assessed value of the subject property for 2002 and such assessed value must be returned to the 2001 value.

Respondent’s argument that he did not increase the value of the subject property in the second year of the assessment cycle misses the mark. The mandate of the controlling statute is that the assessed value cannot be increase in the absence of new construction and improvements. There are two ways in which the assessed value can be increase, one of which is to increase the value in true money. The other means of changing the assessed value is by changing the classification. The change in classification in the present case wrongfully breached the statutory line. It increased the assessed value. This is exactly what the plain language of the statute does not authorize.

The language of the St. Louis Court of Appeals (now the Eastern District) in the case of Hannibal ex rel. Bassen v. Bowman, et al., 71 S.W. 1122, 1123, is especially applicable to the present case. The Bowman court, in an assessment case, stated:

“He (the assessor) can only proceed at the time and in the manner pointed out by statute, and, to justify the assessment, he must be able to put his finger on the statute which gives him the authority to make it.”

In the present case, Respondent has not and cannot “put his finger” on a statute giving him authority to change the assessment on the subject property in an even-numbered year. The hand of Complainant rests squarely on the plain language of the controlling statute which bars the change in classification which the Respondent made. The action of the Respondent must be reversed. The subject must be assessed at its 2001 assessed value.

ORDER

The assessed valuations for the subject properties as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day are SET ASIDE in part and AFFIRMED in part.

The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10266 for tax year 2002 is set at $2,045,010.

The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10267 for tax year 2002 is set at $78,380.

The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10268 for tax year 2002 is set at $82,930.

The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10269 for tax year 2002 is set at $28,210, as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with these appeals shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in these appeals. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED April 22, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

Log Cabin Club v. Muehlheausler (SLCO)

April 22nd, 2003

 

LOG CABIN CLUB, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 02-10265

)

PHILIP A. MUEHLHEAUSLER, )

ACTING ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the change in classification made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE.

Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2002 to be $678,450.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Byron E. Francis, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case submitted on briefs and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

The Commission takes this appeal to determine whether the Assessor of St. Louis County has the authority under Section 137.115, RSMo to change the classification on real property in an even-numbered year, thereby changing the assessed value, in the absence of new construction or property improvements to the affected real property.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which sustained the action of the Assessor in changing the classification and thereby increasing the assessed value of the subject property.

Evidentiary hearing was waived and the legal issue was submitted on briefs. Counsel for Complainant filed his Brief on February 13, 2003, and his reply brief on April 7, 2003. Counsel for Respondent filed her Brief with the Commission on March 18, 2003.

The Hearing Officer, having considered the arguments and points of law set forth in the Briefs and Reply Briefs enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 1140 Log Cabin Lance, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 19L140134.

3. No evidence was proffered by Respondent, nor was any claim made by Respondent, that there had been new construction and improvement to the subject property during tax year 2001 upon which a change in assessed valuation would be warranted.

4. There is no dispute as to the fair market value of the subject property.

5. The assessed value of the subject property for tax year 2001 was $678,450. The assessor changed the assessed value to $740,630.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Two-Year Assessment Cycle

The Assessor shall annually assess all real property in the following manner: new assessed values shall be determined as of January first of each odd-numbered year and shall be entered in the assessor’s books; those same assessed values shall apply in the following even-numbered year, except for new construction and property improvements which shall be valued as though they had been completed as of January first of the preceding odd-numbered year. Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

Statutes Given Effect As Written

Statutes are to be given effect as written and there is no need for construction of a statute which is clear on its face. The plain language of the statue is to be given effect. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Boston, 72 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); Bright v. Bright, 989 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999); McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1996).

DECISION

The answer to the issue presented in this case is answered by the clear and unequivocal language of the controlling statute, Section 137.115.1, RSMo. See, Two-Year Assessment Cycle, supra.

Because the word “shall” is used throughout the statute, the assessor is mandated to use the same assessment in the even-numbered year as was used in the preceding odd-numbered year with the sole exception being where there has been new construction and property improvements. In the present case, the qualify condition of new construction or property improvements does not exist. There was no new construction or property improvements to the subject during the year 2001. The plain language of the statute must be given effect. See, Statutes Given Effect As Written, supra. The compulsory language of the statute mandates the rejection of the assessment made by the Respondent on the subject property for the year 2002.

The Commission has twice held that Section 137.115.1 deprives an Assessor of the ability to increase the assessed value of real property in even-numbered years. In Ostrander v. Zimmerman, STC No. 96-32502, March 13, 1997, the taxpayer moved into his newly constructed house on the day before Thanksgiving, 1995. From December 1, 1995, through December 31, 1995, the property was assessed as an improved parcel at an appraised value of $159,075. For 1996, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the property utilizing a Certificate of Value showing that the taxpayer had actually paid $181,725 for the property. The taxpayer argued that the assessor was bound by the assessed value established for 1995, the odd-numbered year. The Commission agreed, holding that the post-occupancy valuation for 1995 “must be carried forward for the 1996 assessment of the property.”

In Marks v. Raines, STC No. 98-73000, November 25, 1998, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the taxpayers’ residence for 1998 based upon improvements to the property including a concrete driveway, retaining sea wall and boat dock. Taxpayers introduced evidence showing that such improvements had been placed on the property prior to January 1, 1997, and had apparently not been reflected on the assessor’s records for 1997. The Commission found for the taxpayer, holding that there was no new construction or improvements during 1997 which would trigger a new assessed value for 1998 under Section 137.115. The Hearing Officer found against the Assessor “as a matter of law, that since no new construction and improvements had taken place during 1997, he has no legal authority to change the assessment for 1998.”

The underlying principle involved in both Ostrander and Marks are applicable and controlling in the present case. There was no new construction or property improvements on the subject property during 2001. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, Respondent has no legal authority to change the assessment for 2002.

Respondent’s reliance on Nike IHM, Inc., et al. v. Zimmerman, STC Nos. 00-33023 through 00-33028, February 5, 2002, is unfounded. Nike involved the issue of exemption pursuant to Section 172.273, RSMo 1986 as amended, which was held by the Missouri Supreme Court to be unconstitutional on August 1, 2000. Nike and other tenants had, for a period of years, been deemed exempt pursuant to such statute. The Assessor filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute and, on January 1, 2000, the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Missouri. In 2000, the Assessor initially assessed the properties involved, but withdrew the assessments upon direction of legal counsel, thereby continuing to treat the properties in the Research Park as exempt. On August 1, 2000, the Missouri Supreme Court issued its opinion declaring Section 172.273 unconstitutional. The Assessor immediately reacted to such decision and, through the St. Charles County Board of Equalization, assessed the properties at issue for 2000. The tenants appealed to the Commission.

The case was presented to the Commission on stipulated facts. The issue before the Commission was whether the Assessor, and the county Board of Equalization, were authorized to assess the properties under the circumstances involved. In its decision, the Commission never reached the issue of whether the assessments violated the two-year assessment cycle. Rather, the Commission held that it was its duty, pursuant to Section 138.380, to place upon the assessment rolls any property which, during the year involved, may be discovered to have, for any reason, escaped taxation. The Commission held that it was bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri and that, accordingly, the properties involved were not exempt on January 1, 2000. Therefore, the Commission treated the properties involved as omitted property. (Nike decision is on appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District).

The present case is not a case of “omitted” property, or, for that matter, property which has escaped taxation for some reason. Rather, it is a case in which Respondent has simply increased the assessed value of the subject property based upon an appellate decision involving different properties in another county. The increase in assessed value by the Respondent did not come about as a result of new construction or improvements. Section 137.115.1, as construed by the prior decisions of this Commission, clearly states that an assessor is bound by the assessed value established in the prior odd-numbered year in the succeeding even-numbered year “except for new construction and property improvements.” Because there is no new construction to the subject, Respondent was not authorized to raise the assessed value of the subject property for 2002 and such assessed value must be returned to the 2001 value.

Respondent’s argument that he did not increase the value of the subject property in the second year of the assessment cycle misses the mark. The mandate of the controlling statute is that the assessed value cannot be increase in the absence of new construction and improvements. There are two ways in which the assessed value can be increase, one of which is to increase the value in true money. The other means of changing the assessed value is by changing the classification. The change in classification in the present case wrongfully breached the statutory line. It increased the assessed value. This is exactly what the plain language of the statute does not authorize.

The language of the St. Louis Court of Appeals (now the Eastern District) in the case of Hannibal ex rel. Bassen v. Bowman, et al., 71 S.W. 1122, 1123, is especially applicable to the present case. The Bowman court, in an assessment case, stated:

“He (the assessor) can only proceed at the time and in the manner pointed out by statute, and, to justify the assessment, he must be able to put his finger on the statute which gives him the authority to make it.”

In the present case, Respondent has not and cannot “put his finger” on a statute giving him authority to change the assessment on the subject property in an even-numbered year. The hand of Complainant rests squarely on the plain language of the controlling statute which bars the change in classification which the Respondent made. The action of the Respondent must be reversed. The subject must be assessed at its 2001 assessed value.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2002 is set at $678,450.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED April 22, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

Forest Hills Country Club v. Muehlheausler (SLCO)

April 22nd, 2003

 

FOREST HILLS COUNTRY CLUB, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 02-10264

)

PHILIP A. MUEHLHEAUSLER, )

ACTING ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

 DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the change in classification made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE.

Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2002 to be $861,670.

Complainants appeared by Counsel, Byron E. Francis, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case submitted on briefs and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

The Commission takes this appeal to determine whether the Assessor of St. Louis County has the authority under Section 137.115, RSMo to change the classification on real property in an even-numbered year, thereby changing the assessed value, in the absence of new construction or property improvements to the affected real property.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which sustained the action of the Assessor in changing the classification and thereby increasing the assessed value of the subject property.

Evidentiary hearing was waived and the legal issue was submitted on briefs. Counsel for Complainant file his Brief on February 13, 2003, and his reply brief on April 7, 2003. Counsel for Respondent filed her Brief with the Commission on March 18, 2003.

The Hearing Officer, having considered the arguments and points of law set forth in the Briefs and Reply Briefs enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 36 Forest Club Drive, Chesterfield, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 21T440161.

3. No evidence was proffered by Respondent, nor was any claim made by Respondent, that there had been new construction and improvement to the subject property during tax year 2001 upon which a change in assessed valuation would be warranted.

4. There is no dispute as to the fair market value of the subject property.

5. The assessed value of the subject property for tax year 2001 was $861,670. The assessor changed the assessed value to $1,071,490.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Two-Year Assessment Cycle

The Assessor shall annually assess all real property in the following manner: new assessed values shall be determined as of January first of each odd-numbered year and shall be entered in the assessor’s books; those same assessed values shall apply in the following even-numbered year, except for new construction and property improvements which shall be valued as though they had been completed as of January first of the preceding odd-numbered year. Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

Statutes Given Effect As Written

Statutes are to be given effect as written and there is no need for construction of a statute which is clear on its face. The plain language of the statue is to be given effect. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Boston, 72 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); Bright v. Bright, 989 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999); McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1996).

DECISION

The answer to the issue presented in this case is answered by the clear and unequivocal language of the controlling statute, Section 137.115.1, RSMo. See, Two-Year Assessment Cycle, supra.

Because the word “shall” is used throughout the statute, the assessor is mandated to use the same assessment in the even-numbered year as was used in the preceding odd-numbered year with the sole exception being where there has been new construction and property improvements. In the present case, the qualify condition of new construction or property improvements does not exist. There was no new construction or property improvements to the subject during the year 2001. The plain language of the statute must be given effect. See, Statutes Given Effect As Written, supra. The compulsory language of the statute mandates the rejection of the assessment made by the Respondent on the subject property for the year 2002.

The Commission has twice held that Section 137.115.1 deprives an Assessor of the ability to increase the assessed value of real property in even-numbered years. In Ostrander v. Zimmerman, STC No. 96-32502, March 13, 1997, the taxpayer moved into his newly constructed house on the day before Thanksgiving, 1995. From December 1, 1995, through December 31, 1995, the property was assessed as an improved parcel at an appraised value of $159,075. For 1996, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the property utilizing a Certificate of Value showing that the taxpayer had actually paid $181,725 for the property. The taxpayer argued that the assessor was bound by the assessed value established for 1995, the odd-numbered year. The Commission agreed, holding that the post-occupancy valuation for 1995 “must be carried forward for the 1996 assessment of the property.”

In Marks v. Raines, STC No. 98-73000, November 25, 1998, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the taxpayers’ residence for 1998 based upon improvements to the property including a concrete driveway, retaining sea wall and boat dock. Taxpayers introduced evidence showing that such improvements had been placed on the property prior to January 1, 1997, and had apparently not been reflected on the assessor’s records for 1997. The Commission found for the taxpayer, holding that there was no new construction or improvements during 1997 which would trigger a new assessed value for 1998 under Section 137.115. The Hearing Officer found against the Assessor “as a matter of law, that since no new construction and improvements had taken place during 1997, he has no legal authority to change the assessment for 1998.”

The underlying principle involved in both Ostrander and Marks are applicable and controlling in the present case. There was no new construction or property improvements on the subject property during 2001. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, Respondent has no legal authority to change the assessment for 2002.

Respondent’s reliance on Nike IHM, Inc., et al. v. Zimmerman, STC Nos. 00-33023 through 00-33028, February 5, 2002, is unfounded. Nike involved the issue of exemption pursuant to Section 172.273, RSMo 1986 as amended, which was held by the Missouri Supreme Court to be unconstitutional on August 1, 2000. Nike and other tenants had, for a period of years, been deemed exempt pursuant to such statute. The Assessor filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute and, on January 1, 2000, the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Missouri. In 2000, the Assessor initially assessed the properties involved, but withdrew the assessments upon direction of legal counsel, thereby continuing to treat the properties in the Research Park as exempt. On August 1, 2000, the Missouri Supreme Court issued its opinion declaring Section 172.273 unconstitutional. The Assessor immediately reacted to such decision and, through the St. Charles County Board of Equalization, assessed the properties at issue for 2000. The tenants appealed to the Commission.

The case was presented to the Commission on stipulated facts. The issue before the Commission was whether the Assessor, and the county Board of Equalization, were authorized to assess the properties under the circumstances involved. In its decision, the Commission never reached the issue of whether the assessments violated the two-year assessment cycle. Rather, the Commission held that it was its duty, pursuant to Section 138.380, to place upon the assessment rolls any property which, during the year involved, may be discovered to have, for any reason, escaped taxation. The Commission held that it was bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri and that, accordingly, the properties involved were not exempt on January 1, 2000. Therefore, the Commission treated the properties involved as omitted property. (Nike decision is on appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District).

The present case is not a case of “omitted” property, or, for that matter, property which has escaped taxation for some reason. Rather, it is a case in which Respondent has simply increased the assessed value of the subject property based upon an appellate decision involving different properties in another county. The increase in assessed value by the Respondent did not come about as a result of new construction or improvements. Section 137.115.1, as construed by the prior decisions of this Commission, clearly states that an assessor is bound by the assessed value established in the prior odd-numbered year in the succeeding even-numbered year “except for new construction and property improvements.” Because there is no new construction to the subject, Respondent was not authorized to raise the assessed value of the subject property for 2002 and such assessed value must be returned to the 2001 value.

Respondent’s argument that he did not increase the value of the subject property in the second year of the assessment cycle misses the mark. The mandate of the controlling statute is that the assessed value cannot be increase in the absence of new construction and improvements. There are two ways in which the assessed value can be increase, one of which is to increase the value in true money. The other means of changing the assessed value is by changing the classification. The change in classification in the present case wrongfully breached the statutory line. It increased the assessed value. This is exactly what the plain language of the statute does not authorize.

The language of the St. Louis Court of Appeals (now the Eastern District) in the case of Hannibal ex rel. Bassen v. Bowman, et al., 71 S.W. 1122, 1123, is especially applicable to the present case. The Bowman court, in an assessment case, stated:

“He (the assessor) can only proceed at the time and in the manner pointed out by statute, and, to justify the assessment, he must be able to put his finger on the statute which gives him the authority to make it.”

In the present case, Respondent has not and cannot “put his finger” on a statute giving him authority to change the assessment on the subject property in an even-numbered year. The hand of Complainant rests squarely on the plain language of the controlling statute which bars the change in classification which the Respondent made. The action of the Respondent must be reversed. The subject must be assessed at its 2001 assessed value.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2002 is set at $861,670.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED April 22, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

Bogey, Inc. v. Muehlheausler (SLCO)

April 22nd, 2003

 

BOGEY, INC., )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeals Number 02-10262 & 02-10263

)

PHILIP A. MUEHLHEAUSLER, )

ACTING ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

 DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decisions of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the change in classification made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE.

Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10262 for tax year 2002 to be $274,070.

Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10263 for tax year 2002 to be $529,380.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Byron E. Francis, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case submitted on briefs and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

The Commission takes this appeal to determine whether the Assessor of St. Louis County has the authority under Section 137.115, RSMo to change the classification on real property in an even-numbered year, thereby changing the assessed value, in the absence of new construction or property improvements to the affected real property.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which sustained the action of the Assessor in changing the classification and thereby increasing the assessed value of the subject property.

Evidentiary hearing was waived and the legal issue was submitted on briefs. Counsel for Complainant filed his Brief on February 13, 2003, and his reply brief on April 7, 2003. Counsel for Respondent filed her Brief with the Commission on March 18, 2003.

The Hearing Officer, having considered the arguments and points of law set forth in the Briefs and Reply Briefs enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property in Appeal No. 02-10262 is located at 9266 Clayton Road, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 19L240069. The subject property in Appeal No. 02-10263 is located at 9260 Clayton Road, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 19L220115.

3. No evidence was proffered by Respondent, nor was any claim made by Respondent, that there had been new construction and improvement to the subject property during tax year 2001 upon which a change in assessed valuation would be warranted.

4. There is no dispute as to the fair market value of the subject property.

5. The assessed value of the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10262 for tax year 2001 was $274,070. The assessor changed the assessed value to $364,320.

6. The assessed value of the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10263 for tax year 2001 was $529,380. The assessor changed the assessed value to $556,020.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Two-Year Assessment Cycle

The Assessor shall annually assess all real property in the following manner: new assessed values shall be determined as of January first of each odd-numbered year and shall be entered in the assessor’s books; those same assessed values shall apply in the following even-numbered year, except for new construction and property improvements which shall be valued as though they had been completed as of January first of the preceding odd-numbered year. Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

Statutes Given Effect As Written

Statutes are to be given effect as written and there is no need for construction of a statute which is clear on its face. The plain language of the statue is to be given effect. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Boston, 72 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); Bright v. Bright, 989 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999); McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1996).

DECISION

The answer to the issue presented in this case is answered by the clear and unequivocal language of the controlling statute, Section 137.115.1, RSMo. See, Two-Year Assessment Cycle, supra.

Because the word “shall” is used throughout the statute, the assessor is mandated to use the same assessment in the even-numbered year as was used in the preceding odd-numbered year with the sole exception being where there has been new construction and property improvements. In the present case, the qualify condition of new construction or property improvements does not exist. There was no new construction or property improvements to the subject during the year 2001. The plain language of the statute must be given effect. See, Statutes Given Effect As Written, supra. The compulsory language of the statute mandates the rejection of the assessment made by the Respondent on the subject property for the year 2002.

The Commission has twice held that Section 137.115.1 deprives an Assessor of the ability to increase the assessed value of real property in even-numbered years. In Ostrander v. Zimmerman, STC No. 96-32502, March 13, 1997, the taxpayer moved into his newly constructed house on the day before Thanksgiving, 1995. From December 1, 1995, through December 31, 1995, the property was assessed as an improved parcel at an appraised value of $159,075. For 1996, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the property utilizing a Certificate of Value showing that the taxpayer had actually paid $181,725 for the property. The taxpayer argued that the assessor was bound by the assessed value established for 1995, the odd-numbered year. The Commission agreed, holding that the post-occupancy valuation for 1995 “must be carried forward for the 1996 assessment of the property.”

In Marks v. Raines, STC No. 98-73000, November 25, 1998, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the taxpayers’ residence for 1998 based upon improvements to the property including a concrete driveway, retaining sea wall and boat dock. Taxpayers introduced evidence showing that such improvements had been placed on the property prior to January 1, 1997, and had apparently not been reflected on the assessor’s records for 1997. The Commission found for the taxpayer, holding that there was no new construction or improvements during 1997 which would trigger a new assessed value for 1998 under Section 137.115. The Hearing Officer found against the Assessor “as a matter of law, that since no new construction and improvements had taken place during 1997, he has no legal authority to change the assessment for 1998.”

The underlying principle involved in both Ostrander and Marks are applicable and controlling in the present case. There was no new construction or property improvements on the subject property during 2001. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, Respondent has no legal authority to change the assessment for 2002.

Respondent’s reliance on Nike IHM, Inc., et al. v. Zimmerman, STC Nos. 00-33023 through 00-33028, February 5, 2002, is unfounded. Nike involved the issue of exemption pursuant to Section 172.273, RSMo 1986 as amended, which was held by the Missouri Supreme Court to be unconstitutional on August 1, 2000. Nike and other tenants had, for a period of years, been deemed exempt pursuant to such statute. The Assessor filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute and, on January 1, 2000, the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Missouri. In 2000, the Assessor initially assessed the properties involved, but withdrew the assessments upon direction of legal counsel, thereby continuing to treat the properties in the Research Park as exempt. On August 1, 2000, the Missouri Supreme Court issued its opinion declaring Section 172.273 unconstitutional. The Assessor immediately reacted to such decision and, through the St. Charles County Board of Equalization, assessed the properties at issue for 2000. The tenants appealed to the Commission.

The case was presented to the Commission on stipulated facts. The issue before the Commission was whether the Assessor, and the county Board of Equalization, were authorized to assess the properties under the circumstances involved. In its decision, the Commission never reached the issue of whether the assessments violated the two-year assessment cycle. Rather, the Commission held that it was its duty, pursuant to Section 138.380, to place upon the assessment rolls any property which, during the year involved, may be discovered to have, for any reason, escaped taxation. The Commission held that it was bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri and that, accordingly, the properties involved were not exempt on January 1, 2000. Therefore, the Commission treated the properties involved as omitted property. (Nike decision is on appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District).

The present case is not a case of “omitted” property, or, for that matter, property which has escaped taxation for some reason. Rather, it is a case in which Respondent has simply increased the assessed value of the subject property based upon an appellate decision involving different properties in another county. The increase in assessed value by the Respondent did not come about as a result of new construction or improvements. Section 137.115.1, as construed by the prior decisions of this Commission, clearly states that an assessor is bound by the assessed value established in the prior odd-numbered year in the succeeding even-numbered year “except for new construction and property improvements.” Because there is no new construction to the subject, Respondent was not authorized to raise the assessed value of the subject property for 2002 and such assessed value must be returned to the 2001 value.

Respondent’s argument that he did not increase the value of the subject property in the second year of the assessment cycle misses the mark. The mandate of the controlling statute is that the assessed value cannot be increase in the absence of new construction and improvements. There are two ways in which the assessed value can be increase, one of which is to increase the value in true money. The other means of changing the assessed value is by changing the classification. The change in classification in the present case wrongfully breached the statutory line. It increased the assessed value. This is exactly what the plain language of the statute does not authorize.

The language of the St. Louis Court of Appeals (now the Eastern District) in the case of Hannibal ex rel. Bassen v. Bowman, et al., 71 S.W. 1122, 1123, is especially applicable to the present case. The Bowman court, in an assessment case, stated:

“He (the assessor) can only proceed at the time and in the manner pointed out by statute, and, to justify the assessment, he must be able to put his finger on the statute which gives him the authority to make it.”

In the present case, Respondent has not and cannot “put his finger” on a statute giving him authority to change the assessment on the subject property in an even-numbered year. The hand of Complainant rests squarely on the plain language of the controlling statute which bars the change in classification which the Respondent made. The action of the Respondent must be reversed. The subject must be assessed at its 2001 assessed value.

ORDER

The assessed valuations for the subject properties as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day are SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10262 for tax year 2002 is set at $274,070.

The assessed value for the subject property in Appeal No. 02-10263 for tax year 2002 is set at $529,380.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with these appeals shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in these appeals. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED April 22, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer

Golf Club Investment Company v. Muehlheasler (SLCO)

April 22nd, 2003

 

GOLF CLUB INVESTMENT COMPANY, )

)

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 02-10261

)

PHILIP A. MUEHLHEAUSLER, )

ACTING ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the change in classification made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE. Hearing Officer finds the assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2002 to be $2,041,320.

Complainant appeared by Counsel, Byron E. Francis, St. Louis, Missouri.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case submitted on briefs and decided by Chief Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

The Commission takes this appeal to determine whether the Assessor of St. Louis County has the authority under Section 137.115, RSMo to change the classification on real property in an even-numbered year, thereby changing the assessed value, in the absence of new construction or property improvements to the affected real property.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which sustained the action of the Assessor in changing the classification and thereby increasing the assessed value of the subject property.

Evidentiary hearing was waived and the legal issue was submitted on briefs. Counsel for Complainant filed his Brief on February 13, 2003, and his reply brief on April 7, 2003. Counsel for Respondent filed her Brief with the Commission on March 18, 2003.

The Hearing Officer, having considered the arguments and points of law set forth in the Briefs and Reply Briefs enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 12925 Ladue Road, St. Louis, Missouri. It is identified by locator number 17P120011.

3. No evidence was proffered by Respondent, nor was any claim made by Respondent, that there had been new construction and improvement to the subject property during tax year 2001 upon which a change in assessed valuation would be warranted.

4. There is no dispute as to the fair market value of the subject property.

5. The assessed value of the subject property for tax year 2001 was $2,041,320. The assessor changed the assessed value to $2,359,450.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Two-Year Assessment Cycle

The Assessor shall annually assess all real property in the following manner: new assessed values shall be determined as of January first of each odd-numbered year and shall be entered in the assessor’s books; those same assessed values shall apply in the following even-numbered year, except for new construction and property improvements which shall be valued as though they had been completed as of January first of the preceding odd-numbered year. Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

Statutes Given Effect As Written

Statutes are to be given effect as written and there is no need for construction of a statute which is clear on its face. The plain language of the statue is to be given effect. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Boston, 72 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); Bright v. Bright, 989 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999); McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1996).

DECISION

The answer to the issue presented in this case is answered by the clear and unequivocal language of the controlling statute, Section 137.115.1, RSMo. See, Two-Year Assessment Cycle, supra.

Because the word “shall” is used throughout the statute, the assessor is mandated to use the same assessment in the even-numbered year as was used in the preceding odd-numbered year with the sole exception being where there has been new construction and property improvements. In the present case, the qualify condition of new construction or property improvements does not exist. There was no new construction or property improvements to the subject during the year 2001. The plain language of the statute must be given effect. See, Statutes Given Effect As Written, supra. The compulsory language of the statute mandates the rejection of the assessment made by the Respondent on the subject property for the year 2002.

The Commission has twice held that Section 137.115.1 deprives an Assessor of the ability to increase the assessed value of real property in even-numbered years. In Ostrander v. Zimmerman, STC No. 96-32502, March 13, 1997, the taxpayer moved into his newly constructed house on the day before Thanksgiving, 1995. From December 1, 1995, through December 31, 1995, the property was assessed as an improved parcel at an appraised value of $159,075. For 1996, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the property utilizing a Certificate of Value showing that the taxpayer had actually paid $181,725 for the property. The taxpayer argued that the assessor was bound by the assessed value established for 1995, the odd-numbered year. The Commission agreed, holding that the post-occupancy valuation for 1995 “must be carried forward for the 1996 assessment of the property.”

In Marks v. Raines, STC No. 98-73000, November 25, 1998, the Assessor sought to increase the assessed value of the taxpayers’ residence for 1998 based upon improvements to the property including a concrete driveway, retaining sea wall and boat dock. Taxpayers introduced evidence showing that such improvements had been placed on the property prior to January 1, 1997, and had apparently not been reflected on the assessor’s records for 1997. The Commission found for the taxpayer, holding that there was no new construction or improvements during 1997 which would trigger a new assessed value for 1998 under Section 137.115. The Hearing Officer found against the Assessor “as a matter of law, that since no new construction and improvements had taken place during 1997, he has no legal authority to change the assessment for 1998.”

The underlying principle involved in both Ostrander and Marks are applicable and controlling in the present case. There was no new construction or property improvements on the subject property during 2001. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, Respondent has no legal authority to change the assessment for 2002.

Respondent’s reliance on Nike IHM, Inc., et al. v. Zimmerman, STC Nos. 00-33023 through 00-33028, February 5, 2002, is unfounded. Nike involved the issue of exemption pursuant to Section 172.273, RSMo 1986 as amended, which was held by the Missouri Supreme Court to be unconstitutional on August 1, 2000. Nike and other tenants had, for a period of years, been deemed exempt pursuant to such statute. The Assessor filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute and, on January 1, 2000, the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Missouri. In 2000, the Assessor initially assessed the properties involved, but withdrew the assessments upon direction of legal counsel, thereby continuing to treat the properties in the Research Park as exempt. On August 1, 2000, the Missouri Supreme Court issued its opinion declaring Section 172.273 unconstitutional. The Assessor immediately reacted to such decision and, through the St. Charles County Board of Equalization, assessed the properties at issue for 2000. The tenants appealed to the Commission.

The case was presented to the Commission on stipulated facts. The issue before the Commission was whether the Assessor, and the county Board of Equalization, were authorized to assess the properties under the circumstances involved. In its decision, the Commission never reached the issue of whether the assessments violated the two-year assessment cycle. Rather, the Commission held that it was its duty, pursuant to Section 138.380, to place upon the assessment rolls any property which, during the year involved, may be discovered to have, for any reason, escaped taxation. The Commission held that it was bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri and that, accordingly, the properties involved were not exempt on January 1, 2000. Therefore, the Commission treated the properties involved as omitted property. (Nike decision is on appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District).

The present case is not a case of “omitted” property, or, for that matter, property which has escaped taxation for some reason. Rather, it is a case in which Respondent has simply increased the assessed value of the subject property based upon an appellate decision involving different properties in another county. The increase in assessed value by the Respondent did not come about as a result of new construction or improvements. Section 137.115.1, as construed by the prior decisions of this Commission, clearly states that an assessor is bound by the assessed value established in the prior odd-numbered year in the succeeding even-numbered year “except for new construction and property improvements.” Because there is no new construction to the subject, Respondent was not authorized to raise the assessed value of the subject property for 2002 and such assessed value must be returned to the 2001 value.

Respondent’s argument that he did not increase the value of the subject property in the second year of the assessment cycle misses the mark. The mandate of the controlling statute is that the assessed value cannot be increase in the absence of new construction and improvements. There are two ways in which the assessed value can be increase, one of which is to increase the value in true money. The other means of changing the assessed value is by changing the classification. The change in classification in the present case wrongfully breached the statutory line. It increased the assessed value. This is exactly what the plain language of the statute does not authorize.

The language of the St. Louis Court of Appeals (now the Eastern District) in the case of Hannibal ex rel. Bassen v. Bowman, et al., 71 S.W. 1122, 1123, is especially applicable to the present case. The Bowman court, in an assessment case, stated:

“He (the assessor) can only proceed at the time and in the manner pointed out by statute, and, to justify the assessment, he must be able to put his finger on the statute which gives him the authority to make it.”

In the present case, Respondent has not and cannot “put his finger” on a statute giving him authority to change the assessment on the subject property in an even-numbered year. The hand of Complainant rests squarely on the plain language of the controlling statute which bars the change in classification which the Respondent made. The action of the Respondent must be reversed. The subject must be assessed at its 2001 assessed value.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2002 is set at $2,041,320.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED April 22, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Chief Hearing Officer